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Thesis	  Abstract	  	  	  The	  defeats	  suffered	  by	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  in	  the	  two	  Opium	  Wars	  revealed	  to	  the	  Chinese	   how	   their	   traditional	   armed	   forces	   were	   incapable	   of	   defending	   the	  country	  against	  Western	  aggressors.	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  elites	  advocated	  that	  China	  needed	  to	  strengthen	  herself	  by	  pursuing	   a	   degree	   of	   military	   modernisation	   which,	   in	   effect,	   meant	  Westernisation.	  Under	  the	  banner	  of	  ‘Chinese	  learning	  for	  fundamental	  structure,	  
Western	   learning	   for	  practical	  use’,	   a	   substantial	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy	  was	  established	   and	   was	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   in	   East	   Asia.	   Yet	  despite	   this	   huge	   effort,	   this	   force	   invariably	   failed	   to	   fulfil	   its	   task	   of	  safeguarding	  the	  empire.	   	  	   The	   central	   argument	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  inevitable,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	   being	   incompatible	  with	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	  modern	   steam	   navy.	  China	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   was	   characterised	   by	  autocratic	  Manchu	  rule,	  decentralisation	  of	  provincial	  authorities,	  self-­‐sufficient	  agrarian	   economy,	   and	   a	   social	   elite	   consisting	   of	   Confucian	   scholars.	   This	  research	   analyses	   in	   detail	   how	   such	   a	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   affected	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Chinese	  naval	  power	   in	   the	   facets	  of	   the	   statesmen	  behind	  the	   navy,	   the	   naval	   officer	   corps,	   the	   building	   and	   acquisition	   of	   ships	   and	   the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  naval	  power	  was	  used.	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  dissertation	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  such	  as	  that	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  not	  conducive	   to	   producing	   a	   powerful	   navy,	   and	   that	   the	   defeat	   of	   that	   navy	  was	  inevitable	  and	  not	  accidental.	  This	  research	  examines	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  against	  the	  history	  of	  the	  nation	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  employs	  existing	  literature	  on	  seapower	  for	  analytical	  guidance.	  The	  main	  body	  of	  the	  dissertation	  is	  based	  on	  published	  and	  unpublished	  primary	  sources.	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  Chapter	  One	  	  	  Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.1	  The	  Research	  Question	  and	  its	  Significance	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  two	  the	  Opium	  Wars,	  some	  Qing	  Dynasty	  Chinese	  elites	  realised	   that	   challenges	   from	   the	  outside	  world	  were	  no	   longer	   avoidable,	   and	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  (AD	  1644-­‐1911)	  must	  change	  if	   it	  was	  to	  survive	  from	  foreign	  aggressions.	  In	  1861,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  embarked	  on	  a	  campaign	  known	  today	  as	  the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement.	   Under	   the	   two	   banners	   of	   the	   movement:	  ‘learn	   barbarians’	   superior	   techniques	   with	  which	   to	   repel	   the	   barbarians’1	   and	  ‘Chinese	   learning	   for	   fundamental	   structure,	  Western	   learning	   for	   practical	   use’2	  these	  elites	  embarked	  on	  adopting	  Western	  weapons	  to	  safeguard	  the	  Empire.	  As	  a	   key	   feature	  of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	   a	  Western-­‐style	   steam	  navy	  (in	  fact	  four	  mutually	  independent	  navies)	  was	  established	  and	  given	  the	  task	  of	  warding	  off	  foreign	  seaborne	  aggressors.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  Chinese	  and	  foreign	  observers	  it	  was	  a	  naval	  force	  of	  remarkable	  strength.	  In	  its	  heyday,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  boasted	   sixty-­‐five	   large	  warships	  and	   forty-­‐five	   torpedo	  boats,	   and	  held	   the	   eighth	   place	   in	   the	   world	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   strength. 3 	   To	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   ‘师夷长技以制夷’.	   Barbarians:	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	  worldview	   developed	   its	   particular	   image	   of	   the	  2	   ‘中学为体，西学为用’.	  There	  is	  no	  clearly	  stated	  definition	  of	  Western	  learning.	  Western	  learning	  included	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  knowledge	  imported	  from	  the	  West.	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  as	  opposed	  to	  China’s	  traditional	  scholarship	   –	   the	   Chinese	   learning.	   Western	   learning	   in	   a	   narrow	   sense	   denotes	   modern	   science	   and	  technology,	   and	  Western	   learning	   in	   a	  broad	   sense	   includes	   the	  political,	   economic,	   ideological	   aspects	   of	  Western	  thinking.	  3	   Immanuel	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  Third	  Edition,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  p.	  340.	  Also	  see	  Benjamin	  A.	  Elman,	   ‘Naval	  Warfare	  and	  the	  Refraction	  of	  China’s	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Reforms	  into	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Failure,	  1865-­‐1895’.	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  2	  (2004),	  pp.	  318-­‐319.	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disappointment	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  its	   duty.	   It	   suffered	   catastrophic	   defeats	   in	   its	   two	  major	   tests:	   the	   1884-­‐1885	  Sino-­‐French	   War	   and	   the	   1894-­‐1895	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War.4	   These	   two	  maritime	   defeats,	   the	   latter	   in	   particular,	   sounded	   the	   death	   knell	   for	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  The	  Qing	  Empire	   fell	   into	  an	   irreversible	  decline	  after	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  and	  eventually	  collapsed	  and	  was	  overthrown	  by	  the	  Republican	  Revolution	  of	  1911.	   	  The	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  is	  worth	  studying	  not	  merely	  because	  its	  failure	   exacerbated	   China’s	   security	   situation	   and	   contributed	   to	   a	   particularly	  chaotic	  era	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  history	  known	  as	  the	  ‘century	  of	  humiliation’;	  no	  less	  significantly,	  many	  legacies	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period	  are	  still	  with	  us	  today.	   One	   particular	   legacy	   that	   demands	   a	   re-­‐examination	   of	   this	   period	   of	  history	   is	   the	   different	   understanding	   of	   the	   word	   seapower	   in	   Chinese	   and	  English	   languages.	   In	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary,	   the	   word	   seapower	   is	  defined	  as:	  (1)	  ‘a	  nation	  or	  state	  having	  international	  power	  or	  influence	  on	  sea’;	  and	  (2)	  ‘the	  strength	  and	  efficiency	  of	  a	  nation	  (or	  nations	  generally)	  for	  maritime	  
warfare’.5	   In	   the	  Chinese	   language,	   seapower	   as	   a	  word	  was	   introduced	   in	   the	  aftermath	   of	   the	   naval	   debacles	   of	   1894-­‐95	   combining	   the	   characters	   hai	   and	  
quan.	   Literally,	   hai	   means	  maritime	   or	   sea,	   and	   quan	   refers	   to,	   amongst	   other	  things,	   either	   power/strength,	   or	   legal	   rights,	   or	   advantageous	   position.	   The	  combined	  word	  hai-­‐quan,	   therefore	   connotes,	   simultaneously,	   ‘strength	   at	   sea’,	  ‘legal	  rights	  at	  sea’	  and	  ‘advantageous	  position	  at	  sea’.	  The	  traumatic	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	   became	   intertwined	   with	   the	   Chinese	   interpretation	   of	   hai-­‐quan.	   Its	  definition	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  three	  elements	  that	  the	  Qing	  China	  had	  lost	   in	  the	  wars	  against	  the	  French	  and	  the	  Japanese	  –	  its	  strength	  at	  sea,	  its	  legal	  rights	  and	   its	  advantageous	  position	  at	  sea.	  Since	   the	  key	  reason	   for	   these	   losses	  was	  perceived	   as	   owning	   to	   the	  weakness	   of	   the	   navy,	   the	   Chinese	  word	   hai-­‐quan	  began	  to	  associate	  itself	  exclusively	  with	  naval	  power,	  and	  not	  the	  holistic	  notion	  defined	  by	  the	  English	  word	  seapower	  i.e.	   ‘a	  nation	  or	  state	  having	  international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Before	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  most	  Westerners	  thought	  China	  had	  the	  advantage.	  See	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	  Richard	  J.	  Smith,	  ‘The	  Military	  Challenge:	  The	  North-­‐west	  and	  the	  Coast’	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  
China,	   Vol.	   11:	   Late	   Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   2,	   Kwang-­‐Ching	   Liu	   and	   John	   K.	   Fairbank	   eds.,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  pp.	  268-­‐269.	  5	   Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  online	  version.	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power	  or	  influence	  on	  sea’	  and	  ‘the	  strength	  and	  efficiency	  of	  a	  nation	  (or	  nations	  
generally)	  for	  maritime	  warfare’.	  By	  defining	  the	  word	  hai-­‐quan	  purely	  on	  the	  strength	  element	  of	  seapower,	  in	  other	  words	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  navy,	  China	  became	  overly	  concerned	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	  possessing	  naval	  strength	  (that	  is,	  an	  advantageous	  position	  at	  sea,	  which	  others	  might	  contest)	  or	  losing	  it	  (thus	  losing	  one’s	  legal	  rights	  at	  sea).	  Therefore	  the	  Chinese	  neglected	  the	  full	  meaning	  of	  the	  English	  word	  seapower	  and	   all	   the	   elements	   concerning	   the	   type	   of	   governance	   and	   national	  organisation	  required	  for	  strength	  at	  sea.	  This	  partial	  interpretation	  of	  seapower	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences.	  Many	  later	   generations	   of	   Chinese	   statesmen,	   military	   thinkers	   and	   academics	  continued	   to	   show	   the	   inclination	   to	   understand	   seapower	   in	   the	   light	   of	  ‘strength	   at	   sea’,	   and	   to	   justify	   the	   ‘advantageous	   position	   at	   sea’	   to	   protect	  China’s	   ‘legal	   rights	   at	   sea’	   from	   imperialism	   (which	   was	   later	   rephrased	   into	  hegemonism).	   In	   the	   first	   major	   inspection	   of	   the	   newly	   established	   People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Navy	  in	  1953,	  Mao	  Zedong	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  service	  when	  he	  said:	   ‘in	  order	  to	  resist	  invasions	  of	  imperialism,	  we	  must	  build	  a	  powerful	  navy.’6	  Adm.	  Liu	  Huaqing	  of	  the	  navy	  further	  elaborated	  that	  world’s	  navies	  are	  of	  two	  types:	   those	   that	   serve	   the	   ambitious	   purpose	   of	   contesting	   the	   status	   of	  hegemony,	  and	  those	  that	  aim	  at	  safeguarding	  national	  independence,	  territorial	  integrity	  and	  sovereignty.	  He	  categorised	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Navy	  into	  the	  latter	  and	  defined	  it	  as	  ‘a	  defensive	  force	  to	  protect	  national	  maritime	  defence	  
security,	   to	  safeguard	  maritime	  rights,	  and	  to	  secure	  the	  nation	  against	  seaborne	  
imperialism	   and	   hegemonic	   aggression.’ 7 	   Such	   views	   echoed	   the	  Self-­‐Straighteners	  of	  the	   late	  19th	  century	  to	  a	  considerable	  degree	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   the	   Chinese	   navy	  was	   conceptualised	   as	   a	   ‘Great	  Wall	   at	   Sea’	   to	  ward	   off	  foreign	  invasions.	   	   	  This	  view	  is	  prevalent	  in	  today’s	  Chinese	  academia.	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Zhang	  Shiping	  of	   the	   Academy	   of	   Military	   Science	   argued	   that	   seapower	   to	   China	  meant	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   'Central	   Leadership	   and	   Navy	   Building',	   News	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   China,	   People's	   Daily	   Online,	  accessed	  1st	  August	  2015,	  http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/151935/151937/151943/index.html.	  7	   Huaqing	   Liu,	   '海军的地位与作用问题	   Haijun	   de	   Diwei	   yu	   Zuoyong	   Wenti	   [The	   Role	   and	   Strategic	  Significance	  of	   the	  Navy]'	   in	  Huaqing	  Liu.	  刘华清军事文选	   Liu	  Huaqing	   Junshi	  Wenxuan	  [Selected	  Military	  
Works	  of	  Liu	  Huaqing],	  Vol.	  1.	  (Beijing:	  PLA	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  304.	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naval	  capabilities	  to	  safeguard	  the	  administrative	  control	  in	  the	  contiguous	  zone	  and	   the	   exclusive	   economic	   zone,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   naval	   capabilities	   to	   counter	  armed	   foreign	   attack,	   deliberate	   invasion	   and	   occupation,	   and	   breach	   of	  international	   and	   Chinese	   domestic	   law.8	   Maj.	   Gen.	   Jin	   Yinan	   of	   the	   National	  Defence	  University,	   echoed	   Zhang	   by	   arguing	   that	   China’s	   seapower	   should	   be	  interpreted	  against	  ‘sea	  rights’	  (sic.)	  in	  the	  Chinese	  context.9	   The	  views	  of	  these	  military	  scholars	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  civilian	  academics.	  For	  example,	  Zhang	  Wenmu	  argues	  that	  the	  military	  strength	  at	  sea	  per	  se	  is	  neutral,	  and	  it	  is	  legitimate	  when	  the	  strength	  is	  employed	  to	  safeguard	  a	  nation’s	  ‘legal	  rights	  at	  sea’,	  and	  it	  is	  hegemonic	  and	  thus	  illegitimate	  when	  the	  naval	  strength	  is	  wielded	  in	   order	   to	   manipulate	   or	   exert	   control	   over	   other	   nations.10	   Professor	   Liu	  Zhongmin	  and	  Cao	  Wenzhen	  both	  supported	  this	  view	  and	  called	  for	  a	  stronger	  naval	  power	  for	  this	  purpose.11	  It	  can	  be	  distilled	  from	  this	  brief	  review	  that	  the	  discussion	  of	  seapower	   in	  present-­‐day	   China	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   traumatic	   naval	   defeats	   of	   the	   late	   19th	  century.	  The	  logic	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  thinking	  runs	  as	  follows:	  since	  the	  suffering	  of	  the	   Chinese	   nation	   in	   the	   ‘century	   of	   humiliation’	   was	   caused	   by	   inadequate	  naval	  power,	  China	  today	  needs	  a	  strong	  navy	  to	  prevent	  similar	  tragedies	  from	  occurring	   again.	   Therefore,	   many	   Chinese	   statesmen,	   military	   thinkers	   and	  academics	   have	   been	   calling	   for	   a	   stronger	   navy	   with	   better	   ships,	   better	  armaments,	  more	  professionally	  trained	  men,	  an	  efficient	  command	  mechanism	  and	   greater	   governmental	   support.	   However,	   in	   doing	   so,	   they	   neglect	   a	   vital	  historical	  question:	  why	  did	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  fail	  to	  attain	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  naval	  power?	  This	  question	  is	  too	  important	  to	  be	  left	  unanswered.	   	  Perplexingly,	  however,	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China	  did	  actively	   seek	   a	   strong	   navy.	   A	   glance	   at	   the	   historical	   archives	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   Shiping	  Zhang,	  中国海权	   Zhongguo	  Haiquan	  [China's	  Sea	  Power].	  (Beijing:	  People’s	  Daily	  Press,	  2009),	  pp.	  211-­‐213.	  9	   Yinan	   Jin,	   '钓鱼岛争端唤醒中华民族海权意识	   Diaoyuao	  Zhengduan	  Huanxing	  Zhonghua	  Minzu	  Haiquan	  Yishi	  [The	  Diaoyu	  Islands	  Dispute	  Awakens	  Chinese	  Nation's	  Consciousness	  of	  Sea	  Power]',	  China	  National	  
Radio	  Website,	  last	  modified	  November	  14,	  2013,	   	  http://mil.cnr.cn/mjzl/jynzl/zjgd/201311/t20131114_514134765.html.	  10	   Wenmu	  Zhang,	  论中国海权	   Lun	  Zhongguo	  Haiquan	  [On	  China's	  Sea	  Power],	  (Beijing:	  Ocean	  Press,	  2009),	  pp.	  1-­‐8.	  11	   Zhongmin	  Liu,	   ‘海权问题与中美关系论述	   Haiquan	  Wenti	  Yu	  Zhongmei	  Guanxi	  Lunshu	   [Sea	  Power	  and	  the	  Debate	  on	  Sino-­‐US	  Relations]’,	  Northeast	  Asia	  Forum,	  No.	  5.	  (Sep-­‐Oct.,	  2006),	  pp.	  69-­‐75.	  Wenzhen	  Cao,	  ‘美国的海洋霸权战略与中国的对策	   Meiguo	  de	  Haiyang	  Baiquan	  yu	  Zhongguo	  de	  Duice	  [American	  Maritime	  Hegemony	  and	  China's	  Countermeasures]’.	  Strategy	  and	  Management,	  No.	  5.	  (Sep-­‐Oct.,	  2011),	  pp.	  69-­‐82.	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Self-­‐Strengthening	   period	   shows	   that	   the	   Chinese	   elites’	  will	   to	   have	   powerful	  warships,	   capable	   men	   and	   effective	   commanding	   system	   was	   not	   lacking.	   In	  which	   case	   this	   begs	   the	   question:	   what	   went	   wrong	   with	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	  naval	   development?	  Many	   have	   claimed	   that	   corrupt	   government	   officials	   and	  the	   incompetence	  of	  naval	  commanders	  were	  the	  main	  causes	  of	   the	  defeats	  of	  the	   Chinese	   navy.12	   This	   thesis	   disputes	   this	   argument.	   Admittedly,	   problems	  such	  as	  corruption	  and	  incompetence	  did	  exist	  and	  did	  have	  deleterious	  effects	  on	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   navy.	   But	   these	   problems	  were	   certainly	   not	   unique	   to	  China;	   moreover,	   some	   historians	   greatly	   exaggerate	   the	   seriousness	   of	   these	  problems	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  better	  and	  deeper	  explanations.13	   	  In	   contrast,	   this	   dissertation	   argues	   that	   the	   fundamental	   cause	   of	   the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  lies	  with	  the	  institutions	  of	   the	   Qing	   Empire.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   causes	   of	   the	   failure	   lay	   deep	   in	   the	  institutions	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   mere	   corruption	   or	  incompetence	   of	   a	   few	   officials	   and	   officers.	   As	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	  suggests,	  seapower	  is	  expressed	  outwardly	  in	  naval	  strength;	  and	  foundationally,	  it	  tends	  to	  align	  closely	  with	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  nation.	  This	  notion	  suggests	  that	  we	  should	  depart	  from	  the	  superficial	  calculations	  of	  warships’	  performance	  and	  its	   immediate	   contributors	   as	   well	   as	   the	   over-­‐simplifying	   opinion	   that	   sees	  naval	   power	   as	   an	   outgrowth	   of	   the	   national	   wealth.	   Instead,	   it	   should	   be	  realised	   that	  powerful	  navies	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   stem	   from	  a	  particular	   type	  of	  nation	   or	   national	   organisation	   –	   in	   other	   words,	   seapowers.	   Put	   simply,	   19th	  century	  China	  was	  utterly	  different	  from	  those	  nations	  commonly	  recognised	  as	  seapowers	   such	   as	   Athens,	   Venice,	   Holland	   and	   Britain.	   From	   this	   observation	  arises	  the	  core	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  thesis:	  specifically,	   that	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  Western-­‐style	   steam	   navy	   was	   incompatible	   with	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty’s	   state	  institutions.	  That	  deep	  incompatibility	  between	  a	  steam	  navy	  and	  the	  state	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	   Among	  those	  who	  hold	  this	  view	  are	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Jin	  Yinan,	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Xiao	  Yusheng,	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Luo	  Yuan,	  etc.	  See	  Yazhou	  Liu	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  甲午殇思	   Jiawu	  Shangsi	  [Grief	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War],	  (Beijing:	  Shanghai	  Far	  East	  Publishers,	  2014).	  13	   For	  example,	  in	  an	  article	  challenging	  the	  traditional	  claim	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Western-­‐style	  army	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  Allen	  Fung	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Western-­‐style	  army,	  which	  was	  also	  a	  fruit	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  were	  in	  fact	  well-­‐equipped	  during	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  war	  with	   Japan	   and	   that	   the	  Chinese	   field	   commanders	  were	  not	   as	   incompetent	   as	  many	   claimed.	  Allen	  Fung,	   ‘Testing	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening:	  The	  Chinese	  Army	   in	   the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894-­‐1895’,	  Modern	  
Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	  30,	  No.	  4,	  Special	  Issue:	  War	  in	  Modern	  China	  (Oct.,	  1996),	  pp.	  1007-­‐1031.	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was	  meant	   to	   support	   it	  was	   the	   fundamental	   cause	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Qing	  Empire’s	  steam	  navy.	   	  	  	  
1.2	  Literature	  Review	  	  The	  current	  literature	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  satisfactory	  answer	  to	  the	  core	  question	  of	  this	   research.	   In	   English,	   John	   L.	   Rawlinson’s	   China’s	   Struggle	   for	   Naval	  
Development:	   1839	  –	   1895	   is	   the	  primary	  monograph	  dealing	  with	   the	   topic	   of	  the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   steam	   navy.14	   Different	   from	   other	   historians	   who	   either	  limited	   themselves	   to	   narrating	   what	   had	   happened,	   or	   pointing	   an	   accusing	  finger	  at	  superficial	   ‘symptoms’	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  navy	  such	  as	  insufficient	  firepower	  or	  lack	  of	  training	  to	  explain	  its	  defeats,	  Rawlinson’s	  work	  attempts	  to	  penetrate	   to	  a	  deeper	   level	  of	  analysis.	  He	  argued	  that	  a	  contradiction	  between	  modernisation	  and	  Confucianism	  was	  the	  fundamental	  cause	  of	  the	  defeats	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  While	   this	   argument	   sounds	   compelling,	   Rawlinson	   failed	   to	   provide	   an	  in-­‐depth	  explanation	  of	  what	  he	  identified	  as	  the	  contradiction	  between	  the	  navy	  and	  the	  Confucian	  tradition.	  His	  critic	   J.	  Wang	  pointed	  out	  that	  China’s	  Struggle	  
for	  Naval	  Development	  was	  more	  of	  a	  narrative	  than	  an	  analysis:	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	   the	   book	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	   organisation	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   and	   the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  whereas	  many	  more	   profound	   topics	   such	   as	   the	   Chinese	   Board	   of	   Admiralty,	   financing	   and	  training	   received	   insufficient	   attention.	   In	   a	   similar	   way,	   David	   Fong	   and	   Jack	  Gerson	  also	  criticised	  Rawlinson	  work:	  they	  argue	  that	   ‘…	  the	  struggle	  for	  naval	  
development	   is	  often	   lost	  sight	  of	  because	  so	  much	  of	  his	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  
details	   of	  administrative	  and	   technological	   configurations	  of	   the	  major	  Foochow,	  
Kiangnan	   and	   Tientsin	   complexes	   and	   the	   “battles”	   of	   Sino-­‐French	   and	  
Sino-­‐Japanese	  Wars.’15	  Ultimately,	   Rawlinson’s	   argument	   is	  more	   intriguing	   than	   enlightening.	   He	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	   John	   L.	   Rawlinson,	   China's	   Struggle	   for	   Naval	   Development:	   1839-­‐1895,	   (Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	  University	  Press,	  I967).	  15	   David	  Fong	   and	   Jack	  Gerson,	  Review	  of	  China's	   Struggle	   for	  Naval	  Development:	   1839-­‐1895.	   By	   John	  L.	  Rawlinson.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies.	  Vol.	  27,	  No.	  1.	  (Nov.,	  1967),	  p.	  139.	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only	  offers	  broad	  brush	  stroke	  and	  even	  simplistic	  judgements,	  which	  leave	  the	  misleading	   impression	   that	   ‘Confucianism	   should	   take	   the	   blame	   for	   the	   Qing	  Empire	   ‘s	   naval	   defeat’	   and	   ‘if	   China	   had	   discarded	   the	   whole	   package	   of	   its	  traditional	   institutions	   and	   adopted	   a	   Western	   system,	   then	   the	   defeat	   could	  have	  been	  avoided’.	  In	  other	  worlds,	  Confucianism	  according	  to	  Rawlinson	  is	  at	  once	  an	  all-­‐pervasive	  yet,	  in	  his	  analysis	  anyway,	  difficult	  to	  pinpoint	  cause	  of	  the	  naval	   failure.	   Rawlinson’s	   argument	   about	   the	   tension	   between	   Confucianism	  and	  modern	  navy	  is	  an	  excellent	  starting	  point	  for	  further	  research,	  including	  the	  research	  in	  this	  thesis,	  but	  his	  book	  is	  in	  no	  way	  definitive.	  Richard	   Wright’s	   work	   the	   Chinese	   Steam	   Navy:	   1862-­‐1945	   is	   also	   an	  outstanding	  book	   that	   covered	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  period.16	   In	   the	  book	  he	  not	   only	   outlined	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy,	   but	   also	   provided	  large	  amount	  of	  photographs	  and	  detailed	  technical	  information	  of	  the	  important	  foreign	  and	  home-­‐built	  warships	  of	  that	  navy.	  These	  materials	  were	  not	  available	  in	   Rawlinson’s	   work.	   Wright’s	   work	   helped	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   the	  Chinese	   steam	   navy	   and	   that	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world,	   and	   contextualised	   the	  Chinese	  efforts	  of	  building	  a	   steam	  navy	   into	   the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  global	  naval	  development	  in	  the	  modern	  era.	  Nonetheless,	  Wright’s	  book	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  ships	   and	   the	   sea	   battles	   than	   with	   the	   navy	   as	   a	   whole.	   Wright’s	   critic	   M.R.	  Peattie	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   historical	   understanding	   displayed	   in	   the	   Chinese	  
Steam	  Navy:	  1862-­‐1945	  was	  weak.17	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  rich	  information	  about	  ships,	  Wright	  remained	  –	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  Chinese	  materials	  –	  an	  outside	   observer	   not	   being	   able	   to	   form	   deeper	   historical	   insights.	   Therefore,	  although	  Wright’s	  work	  remained	  as	  one	  of	   the	   few	  books	   in	  English	   literature	  about	   the	   late	  19th	   century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	   it	  plays	  only	  a	   complementary	  role	   to	   Rawlinson’s	   book	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   navy’s	  defeats.	  In	   Chinese	   literature,	   the	   number	   of	   studies	   concerning	   late	   19th	   century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  is	  richer	  than	  those	  in	  the	  English	  language.	  Primary	  works	  in	  this	  field	  include:	  Jiang	  Ming’s	  Longqi	  Piaoyang	  de	  Jiandui	  (Dragon	  Flags	  over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	   Richard	  N.	  J.	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  1862-­‐1945.	  (London:	  Chatham,	  2000).	  17	   Mark	  R.	  Peattie,	  Review	  of	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  1862–1945.	  By	  Richard	  N.	  J.	  Wright.	  War	  in	  History.	  Vol.	  10,	  No.	  1.	  (Jan.,	  2003),	  p.	  117.	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the	  Navy:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	   the	  Sea	  Fleet	   in	  Modern	  China	   ‘龙旗飘扬的舰队’),	  Wang	   Jiajian’s	  Li	  Hongzhang	   yu	  Beiyang	  Haijun	   (Li	  Hongzhang	  and	   the	  Beiyang	  
Fleet:	  The	  Failure	  and	  the	  Lessons	  of	  Naval	  Construction	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China	  ‘李
鸿章与北洋海军’),	  and	  Qi	  Qizhang’s	  Wanqing	  Haijun	  Xingshuai	  Shi	  (The	  Rise	  and	  
Fall	   of	   the	   Navy	   of	   the	   Late	   Qing	   Dynasty	   ‘晚清海军兴衰史’).18	   Jiang’s	   book	  divided	  the	  naval	  development	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  from	  1861	  to	  1911	  into	  four	  periods	   and	   organised	   the	   materials	   in	   a	   chronological	   order.	   Most	   of	   the	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  building	  of	  the	  navy	  within	  the	  four	  respective	  periods	  and	   the	   maritime	   wars	   that	   marked	   the	   turning	   from	   one	   period	   to	   another.	  Wang’s	  work	   focuses	  on	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   –	   the	   elite	   fleet	  of	   the	  navy	  and	   the	  role	   that	   Li	   Hongzhang	   played	   in	   its	   development.	   Differing	   from	   Jiang,	  Wang	  organised	  his	  book	   thematically.	  The	  narrative	  of	  his	  book	   covers	  a	  number	  of	  key	   aspects	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century,	   such	   as	   the	  background	  surrounding	   its	   founding,	   its	  personnel,	   training	  and	  equipment.	   It	  also	   covers	   the	   naval	   bases,	   fortifications,	   funding	   as	   well	   as	   other	   peacetime	  activities.	  As	  to	  Qi’s	  book,	  the	  first	  half	  of	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	   naval	   endeavours	   and	   examines	   a	   variety	   of	   issues	   ranging	   from	   the	  Opium	  Wars	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  book	  turns	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  major	  maritime	  wars	  the	  navy	  participated	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	   	  	   In	   spite	   of	   their	   varied	   approach	   in	   their	   book	   structures,	   a	   closer	  examination	   shows	   that	   they	   are	   not	   significantly	   different	   from	   each	   other.	  Firstly,	  all	  three	  books	  are	  based	  on	  virtually	  the	  same	  collection	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	   historiographical	   sources.	  While	   helpful	   in	   broadening	   views	   of	   the	  navy,	   they	   did	   not	   offer	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   it.	   Secondly,	   the	   books	   all	  focus	  on	  telling	  what	  happened,	  but	  shed	  little	  light	  on	  why	  things	  happened	  the	  way	   they	   did.	   They	   lack	   critical	   analyses	   of	   the	   key	   issues	   and	   causes	   in	   a	  systematic	  and	  explicit	  way.	  This	  narrative	  approach	   is,	   to	  an	  extent,	   confusing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   Ming	   Jiang,	  龙旗飘扬的航队-­‐中国近代海军兴衰史	   Longqi	   Piaoyang	   dejiandui:	   Zhongguojindai	   Haijun	  
Xingshuaishi	   [Dragon	   Flags	   over	   the	   Navy:	   The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   the	   Sea	   Fleet	   in	   Modern	   China],	   (Beijing:	  Sanlian	   Shudian,	   2002).	   Jiajian	   Wang,	  李鸿章与北洋舰队:近代中国创建海军的失败与教训	   Li	   Hongzhang	  
yu	  Beiyang	  jiandui:	  jindai	  Zhongguo	  Chuangjian	  Haijun	  de	  Shibai	  yu	  jiaoxun	  (Jiaoding	  Ban)	  [Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  
the	  Beiyang	  Fleet:	  The	  Failure	  and	  the	  Lessons	  of	  Naval	  Construction	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China],	  Revised	  Edition,	  (Beijing:	  Sanlian	  Shudian,	  2008).	  Qizhang	  Qi,	  晚清海军兴衰史	   Wanqing	  Haijun	  Xingshuaishi	   [The	  Rise	  and	  
Fall	  of	  the	  Navy	  of	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty],	  (Beijing:	  People’s	  Press,	  1998).	  
	   14	  
because	   it	   tends	   to	  make	   the	  defeat	  of	   the	  Chinese	   steam	  navy	  appear	   to	  have	  been	   caused	   by	   a	   series	   of	   accidents	   rather	   than	   through	   institutional	  deficiencies.	   	  	  	  
1.3	  Research	  Outline	   	  	  The	  core	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  incompatibility	  between	  the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   China’s	   state	   institutions	   and	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy	  that	  was	  the	  fundamental	  cause	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  Why	  is	  the	  compatibility	  important?	  Samuel	  Huntington	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  military	  of	  any	  society	  are	  shaped	  by	  two	  forces:	  a	  functional	  imperative	   stemming	   from	   the	   threats	   to	   the	   society’s	   security	   and	   a	   societal	  imperative	   arising	   from	   the	   social	   forces,	   ideologies,	   and	   the	   institutions	  dominant	  within	   the	   society.	   A	  military	   that	   reflects	   only	   social	   values	  may	  be	  incapable	   of	   effectively	   performing	   its	   function.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   military	  institutions	   purely	   shaped	   by	   functional	   imperatives	   may	   be	   impossible	   to	  contain	   within	   society.	   The	   degree	   to	   which	   they	   conflict	   depends	   upon	   the	  intensity	  of	  the	  security	  needs	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  strength	  of	  the	  value	  pattern	  of	   the	   society.19	   Jiang	   Baili,	   a	   Chinese	   military	   thinker	   of	   the	   Republican	   era,	  anticipated	  Huntington	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  conformity	  between	  a	  nation’s	  ‘living	  conditions’	   and	   ‘fighting	   conditions’	   makes	   a	   nation	   militarily	   powerful	   and	  conversely	  the	  discord	  between	  these	  two	  conditions	  renders	  a	  nation	  militarily	  weak.20	  If	  we	  examine	  the	  two	  slogans	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  ‘Chinese	  
learning	  for	  fundamental	  structure,	  Western	  learning	  for	  practical	  use’	  and	  ‘learn	  
the	   barbarians’	   superior	   techniques	  with	  which	   to	   repel	   the	   barbarians’	   through	  the	  lens	  of	  Huntington	  and	  Jiang,	  we	  can	  conclude	  the	  following	  two	  points:	  the	  first	   point	   is	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   ‘Western	   learning’,	   or	   ‘barbarians’	   superior	  techniques’	  i.e.	  a	  steam	  navy	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  functional	  imperative	  –	  the	  need	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	   Samuel	   Huntington,	   The	   Soldier	   and	   the	   State:	   The	   Theory	   and	   Politics	   of	   Civil-­‐Military	   Relations,	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  p.2.	  20	   Baili	  Jiang,	  国防论 Guofang	  Lun	  [On	  National	  Defence],	  (Hong	  Kong:	  Open	  Page	  Publishing	  Co.,	  2013),	  p.3.	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tackle	   the	   newly	   appeared	   maritime	   threats.	   Second,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	   did	   not	   intend	   to	   change	   the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	  Empire.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   wanted	   to	   force	   a	   marriage	  between	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   system	   and	   a	   Western-­‐style	   steam	   navy.	  Therefore,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   Chinese	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   was	  compatible	   with	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   steam	   navy	   would	   determine	   the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  latter.	  	   ***	  	  At	  this	  point,	  a	  deeper	  reflection	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  seapower	  is	  needed.	  Yet	  it	  was	  not	  an	  easy	  task	  even	  for	  Alfred	  T.	  Mahan,	  who	  popularised	  the	  word	  ‘seapower’,	  but	   who	   did	   not	   define	   it	   explicitly.	   This	   research	   will	   certainly	   not	   try	   to	  formulate	  a	  definition	  of	  seapower,	  but	  the	  dual	  nature	  of	  seapower	  needs	  to	  be	  underscored	   in	   the	   light	   of	   Huntington’s	   and	   Jiang’s	   theory:	   seapower	   is	  simultaneously	  a	  quantitative	  concept	  (having	  a	  navy)	  and	  a	  qualitative	  concept	  (being	  a	  maritime	  nation);	  and	  if	  a	  country	  is	  a	  seapower,	  it	  tends	  to	  have	  more	  seapower	  –	  a	  stronger	  navy	  –	  than	  those	  that	  are	  not	  maritime	  nations.	  Outwardly,	   seapower	   is	   a	   quantitative	   concept,	   which	   means	   virtually	   all	  countries	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  seapower.	  Geoffrey	  Till	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘seapower	  is	  a	  
relative	   concept,	   something	   that	   some	   country	   have	   more	   than	   others.	   The	   real	  
issue	   is	   the	  matter	   of	   degree.	   Nearly	   all	   countries	   have	   a	   degree	   of	   seapower.’21	  Seapower	   in	   a	   quantitative	   sense	   is	  mainly	   expressed	   in,	   especially	   in	   the	   late	  19th	   century	   and	   prior,	   naval	   power.	   Naval	   power	   usually	   embodied	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  naval	  assets	  that	  a	  nation	  have,	  such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  warships	  and	  their	   amour,	   firepower,	   speed,	   and	   the	   competence	   of	   its	   commanders	   and	  crews.	   	   	  	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   seapower	   is	   a	   qualitative	   concept,	   which	   means	   some	  countries	  are	  seapowers	  whilst	  others	  are	   less	  so.	  Richard	  Harding	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘seapower	  lay	  not	  just	  in	  the	  navy	  or	  battlefleet,	  but	  in	  the	  effective	  integration	  
of	   her	   administration,	   political	   system,	   army,	   colonies,	   and	   maritime	   economy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	   Geoffrey	  Till,	  Seapower:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century.	  Second	  Edition,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2009),	  p.	  22.	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towards	   the	   ends	   of	   the	   state.’22	   Seapower	   in	   a	   qualitative	   sense	   means	   a	  particular	  way	  of	  organizing	  national	  life.	  A	  glance	  at	  the	  nations	  and	  states	  that	  had	   been	   broadly	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   seapowers	   throughout	   history,	   such	   as	  Athens,	  Venice,	  Holland	  and	  Britain,	  reveals	  that	  they	  have	  many	  key	  features	  of	  their	  national	   lives	   in	   common:	  all	   are	   littoral	   states,	   all	  had	  seaborne	   trade	  as	  the	  pillar	  of	   its	  economy	  and	  all	  are,	  albeit	  to	  a	  varied	  extent,	  democracies.	  It	   is	  obvious	   that	   these	   features	   do	   not	   come	   as	   a	   natural	   consequence	   of	   the	  development	  of	   feudal-­‐agrarian	  society	   like	   the	   imperial	  China.	   In	  other	  words,	  
being	   a	   seapower	   is	   not	   a	   higher	   stage	   of	   feudal-­‐agrarian	   society;	   rather,	   it	   is	  more	   of	   a	   choice	   and	   a	   particular	   pattern	   of	   national	   life,	   which	   includes	   a	  package	  of	  political,	  economic	  and	  ideological	  settings.	  Moreover,	  nations	  that	  are	  seapowers	  (maritime	  nations)	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  seapower	   (stronger	   navies).	   In	   reviewing	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   British	   Royal	  Navy	  as	  the	  world’s	  most	  powerful	  navy,	  Harding	  concluded	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  that	  navy	  was	  enabled	  by	  the	  adjustment	  of	  a	  series	  of	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  technological	  elements	  of	  the	  society:	  	  
‘[the	   process	   through	   which	   the	   British	   Royal	   Navy	   achieved	   global	  dominance]	  was	   the	   result	  of	  making	   short-­‐	  and	   long-­‐term	  adjustments	  
to	  meet	   the	   changing	   requirements	   of	   social	   expectations,	   the	   economy,	  
the	   objective	   of	   the	   state,	   competition	   from	   enemies,	   its	   own	   social	   and	  
organisational	   systems	   and	   technology.	   The	   navy	   has	   been	   of	   crucial	  
importance	   to	   the	   political,	   cultural	   and	   economic	   evolution	   to	   Britain.	  
Britons’	  perceptions	  of	  themselves	  have	  been	  shaped	  to	  a	  marked	  degree	  
by	  an	  understanding	  of	  their	  geographical	  position	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  sea	  
in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  islands.’23	  	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   British	   Royal	   Navy	   is,	   to	   a	   marked	   extent,	   the	  consequence	  of	  the	  nation’s	  becoming	  a	  seapower.	   	  Here	   a	   brief	   sketch	   of	  what	  makes	   a	   country	   a	   seapower	   is	   needed.	   In	   his	  seminal	   book	   the	   Influence	   of	   Seapower	   upon	   History	   1660-­‐1783,	   Mahan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   Richard	  Harding,	  Seapower	  and	  Naval	  Warfare,	  1650-­‐1830,	  (London:	  UCL	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  286.	  23	   Richard	  Harding,	  The	   Evolution	   of	   the	   Sailing	  Navy,	   1509-­‐1815.	   First	   American	   Edition,	   (New	   York:	   St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  142.	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identified	  six	  factors	  as	  determinants	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  nation	  is	  eligible	  for	  the	  title	   of	   a	   seapower. 24 	   They	   are:	   (1)	   geographical	   position,	   (2)	   physical	  conformation,	   (3)	   extent	   of	   territory,	   (4)	   number	   of	   population,	   (5)	   national	  character	   and	   (6)	   character	   and	   policy	   of	   governments.25 	   In	   summarizing	  Mahan’s	   six	  points,	  Paul	  Kennedy	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   first	   three	  elements	   are	  essentially	  geographical,	  which	   include:	  a	   favourable	  geographical	  position	  that	  enabled	   the	   nation	   to	   concentrate	   upon	   the	   growth	   of	   seapower;	   and	   a	   well	  situated	   position	   that	   provided	   the	   nation	   with	   an	   easy	   access	   to	   oceanic	  waterways,	  good	  harbours	  as	  well	  as	  a	  seaboard	  which	  was	  not	   too	  difficult	   to	  defend	  and	  was	  not	  divided;	  and	  a	  sparse	  soil	  and	  climate	  that	  often	  served	  as	  an	  inducement	   to	   overseas	   endeavour.	   Mahan’s	   three	   latter	   points,	   according	   to	  Paul	  Kennedy,	  are	  also	  interconnected:	  the	  number	  of	  population	  that	  ‘following	  the	  sea’	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  those	  engaged	  in	  maritime	  commerce	  and	  those	  readily	  available	  to	  the	  navy;	  the	  nation’s	  inclination	  to	  exploit	  the	  fruits	  which	  the	  sea	  offers	  (e.g.	  seaborne	  commerce	  and	  overseas	  interests)	  and	  readiness	  to	  make	  a	  sufficient	  standing	  investment	  in	  maritime	  strength	  to	  protect	  its	  interests	  upon	  and	   across	   the	   sea;	   and	   the	   government’s	   capability	   in	   fostering	   the	   nation’s	  naval	   and	   commercial	   potential	   in	   time	   of	   peace,	   and	   skilfulness	   in	   the	  exploitation	  of	  seapower	  in	  times	  of	  war.26	   	  A	  preferable	   approach	  of	  pursuing	  naval	   strength	   is	   to	  become	  a	  maritime	  nation	  by	  realigning	  the	  nation’s	  political,	  economic	  and	  ideological	  settings	  with	  the	   abovementioned	   requirements.	   However,	   there	   are	   some	   countries	   that	  cannot	   or/and	   do	   not	  want	   to	   pursue	   naval	   strength	   by	   becoming	   a	  maritime	  nation.	   The	   incompatibility	   between	   their	   pattern	   of	   national	   life	   and	   the	  requirements	   of	   navy	   will	   have	   adverse	   impacts	   on	   the	   results	   of	   nation’s	  achievement	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  strong	  navy.	  G.	  Till	  pointed	  out:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	   It	   should	  be	  pointed	  out	   that	   (a)	  Mahan’s	   six	  points	   are	  not	  universally	   accepted,	   some	  naval	   thinkers	  formulated	  their	  own	  version	  of	  determinants	  of	  seapower;	  (b)	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  points	  changes	  over	  time.	   Examples	   of	   critiques	   of	  Mahan’s	   points	   are	   seen	   in,	   amongst	   others,	   Eric	   Grove,	  The	   Future	   of	   Sea	  
Power,	   (Annapolis:	   Naval	   Institute	   Press,	   1990),	   pp.	   221-­‐232,	   Paul	   Kennedy,	  The	   Rise	   And	   Fall	   of	   British	  
Naval	   Mastery,	   (London	   and	   Basingstoke:	   The	   Macmillan	   Press,	   1983),	   pp.	   348-­‐349,	   and	   Till,	   Seapower,	  pp.83-­‐113.	  But	  few	  of	  Mahan	  critics	  deny	  that	  being	  a	  seapower	  means	  accepting	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  arrangement,	  and	  the	  critiques	  rarely	  tried	  to	  subvert	  Mahan’s	  points	  altogether.	  25	   Alfred	  Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History:	  1660–1783,	   (New	  York:	  Dover	  Publication,	   Inc.,	  1989),	  pp.	  29-­‐69.	  26	   Kennedy,	  The	  Rise	  And	  Fall	  of	  British	  Naval	  Mastery,	  pp.	  5-­‐6.	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‘Historians	   have	   drawn	   clear	   distinctions	   between	   organic	   seapower	  
which	   develops	   naturally	   (Britain,	   the	  Netherlands)	   from	   the	   artificial	  
variety	   that	   is	   the	   product	   of	   governmental	   fiat	   (the	   Russian	   Navy	   of	  
Peter	   the	   Great).	   The	   latter	   is	   often	   said	   to	   be	   shallow-­‐rooted	   and	  
unlikely	  to	   last;	  the	  former	  is	  seen	  as	  preferable.	  Even	  so,	  most	  seem	  to	  
think	   that	   governments	   can,	   and	   indeed	   should	  want	   to,	   develop	   their	  
seapower	  and	  so	  need	  to	  work	  out	  a	  strategy	  for	  doing	  so…	  This	  may	  not	  
be	  easy,	   since	   the	  significance	  of	   these	  constituents	   [of	  seapower]	  may	  
depend	   very	   much	   on	   a	   strategic	   context	   over	   which	   national	  
governments	  have	  little	  control…’27	  	   ***	  	  In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   above	   discussions,	   the	   following	   passages	  will	   take	   a	   closer	  look	  at	   the	  approach	   through	  which	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  pursued	  the	   Western-­‐style	   steam	   navy.	   Many	   previous	   researches	   isolated	   the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  from	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  as	   if	   they	  were	   two	  mutually	   independent	   topics,	   which	  was	   certainly	   not	   the	  case.	   The	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   was	   shaped	   by	   the	   political,	   economic	   and	  ideological	  forces	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  China.	  This	  research	  will	  contextualise	  the	   development	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   into	   the	   background	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  and	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  former’s	  defeat	  against	  the	  latter.	   	  What	  was	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement?	  A	  glance	  at	   its	  first	   slogan	   ‘learn	   barbarians’	   superior	   techniques	   with	   which	   to	   repel	   the	  
barbarians’	   reveals	   the	   answer:	   the	   ultimate	   purpose	   of	   China’s	   adoption	   of	  Western	  weapons	  was	   to	   resist	   foreign	   invasions	   and	   to	   prevent	   the	   tragedies	  such	  as	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  from	  occurring	  again.	  Those	  wars	  showed	  the	  Chinese	  that	   the	   Westerners’	   weaponry	   –	   warships	   in	   particular	   –	   were	   far	   more	  powerful	   and	  effective	   than	   their	  Chinese	  equivalents.	   In	  order	   to	  make	  up	   for	  the	  weaknesses	  in	  military	  capability	  and	  to	  better	  safeguard	  China’s	  sovereignty,	  the	  weapons	  of	  the	  Western	  ‘barbarians’	  had	  to	  be	  adopted.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  83.	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Qing	   Empire’s	   building	   of	   a	   Western-­‐style	   steam	   navy	   was	   motivated	   by,	   in	  Huntington’s	  words,	  a	  ‘functional	  imperative’.	  Another	  question	  follows:	  at	  what	  level	  was	  the	  Westernisation	  was	  carried	  out?	  A	  glance	  at	  the	  second	  slogan	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  ‘Chinese	  
learning	  for	  fundamental	  structure,	  Western	  learning	  for	  practical	  use’	  reveals	  the	  answer:	   the	   Westernisation	   was	   limited	   to	   a	   military	   (practical)	   level,	   while	  traditional	   Chinese	   institutions	   remained	   unchanged	   throughout	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthen	  Movement.	   In	   fact,	   the	   exact	  motivation	   of	   China’s	   adoption	   of	  Western	  weapons	  was	  to	  defend	  the	  old	  institutions.	  Immanuel	  C.Y.	  Hsü	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   advocates	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	   promoted	  modern	  projects	  primarily	   to	  enable	   the	  Qing	  Empire	   to	   resist	   foreign	  aggression:	   ‘they	  
never	   dreamed	   of	   remaking	   China	   into	   a	   modern	   state.	   In	   fact,	   they	   strove	   to	  
strengthen	   the	   existing	   order	   rather	   than	   to	   replace	   it.	   They	   had	   absolutely	   no	  
conception	   of	   economic	   development,	   industrial	   revolution	   and	   modern	  
transformation.	  Consequently	  their	  endeavours	  resulted	  in	  no	  more	  than	  a	  handful	  
of	   isolated	   modern	   enclaves	   scattered	   over	   an	   otherwise	   traditional	   country,	   in	  
which	   the	   old	   institutions	   remained	   dominant.’ 28 	   In	   short,	   the	   ‘societal	  imperative’,	  to	  employ	  Huntington’s	  words,	  remained	  unchanged	  throughout	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	   	  Historians	  generally	  agree	  that	  the history of the Self-Strengthening Movement 
can be divided into three periods.29	   In	   the	   first,	   from	   1866	   to	   the	   early	   1870s,	  China	   embarked	   on	   the	   pursuit	   of	   Western	   firearms,	   machines	   and	   scientific	  knowledge,	  a	  number	  of	  industrial	  plants	  devoted	  to	  shipbuilding,	  production	  of	  ammunitions	  and	  equipment	  such	  as	  the	  Fuzhou	  Shipyard,	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  and	   the	   Tianjin	   Arsenal	   were	   established.	   During	   the	   second	   period,	   from	   the	  early	   1870s	   to	   1885,	   tensions	   between	   China	   and	   foreign	   countries	   such	   as	  Japan’s	  1874	   Invasion	  of	  Taiwan,	   the	  Margary	  Affair,	   and	   the	   Sino-­‐French	  War	  exerted	   further	   pressure	   on	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   to	   build	   a	   stronger	   navy.	   This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  288.	  29	   See	   Albert	   Feuerwerker,	   China's	   Early	   Industrialization:	   Sheng	   Hsuan-­‐huai	   (1844-­‐1916)	   and	   Mandarin	  
Enterprise,	   (Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1958),	   p.9.	   Xulu	   Chen,	  近代中国社会的新陈代谢	  
Jindai	   Zhongguo	   Shehui	   de	   xinchendaixie	   [Metabolism	   in	   Modern	   Chinese	   Society],	   (Shanghai:	   Shanghai	  People's	  Press,	  1992),	  pp.	  109-­‐115.	  Yi	  Dai,	   ‘洋务历史试论	   Yangwu	  Lishi	  Shilun	   [A	  Tentative	  Essay	  on	   the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Movement]’	   in	  洋务运动史论文选	   Yangwu	  Yundong	   Shi	   Lunwen	  Xuan	   [Selected	   Papers	   on	  
the	  History	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Movement].	  Fangji	  Ruan	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  (Beijing:	  People’s	  Press,	  1985),	  pp.	  1-­‐10.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  282.	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period	   saw	  substantial	   increases	   in	  Chinese	  naval	  power.	  Modern	  defence	   cost	  far	  more	  than	  traditional	  defence,	  a	  degree	  of	  modern	  industries	  such	  as	  mining,	  metallurgy	   and	   transportation	   were	   established	   to	   support	   the	   military	  endeavours.	   In	   the	   last	   stage	   lasting	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Sino-­‐French	   War	   in	  1884-­‐85	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  1894-­‐95,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  military	  and	  naval	  build-­‐up	  continued.	  This	  period	  witnessed	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Board	  of	  Admiralty	  –	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  and	  the	  formal	  establishment	  of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	  Mercantile	   enterprises	  were	   established	   in	   the	   hope	   that	  they	   could	   facilitate	   the	   military	   modernisation	   by	   providing	   it	   with	   funds;	  however	  the	  officials	  welcomed	  private	  capital	  but	  resented	  private	  control.	  The	  development	  of	   Chinese	  business	   sector	  was	  hindered	  by	   the	  bureaucracy	   and	  remained	  very	  weak.	  It	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  this	  brief	  review	  that	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  efforts	  focused	  on	  military	  modernisation/Westernisation,	  but	  little	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  change	  traditional	  Chinese	  institutions.	  Hsü	  pointed	  out:	  ‘the	  scope	  of	  activity	  [of	  the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement]	  was	   limited	   to	   firearms,	   ships,	   and	  machines,	  
etc.	  No	  attempts	  were	  made	  to	  assimilate	  Western	  institutions,	  philosophy,	  arts	  and	  
culture.	   The	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   barely	   scratched	   the	   surface	   of	  
modernisation,	  without	   achieving	   a	   breakthrough	   in	   industrialisation.’30	   Indeed,	  the	  movement	  was	  in	  fact	  activities	  of	  modernisation/Westernisation	  carried	  out	  only	  at	  a	  military	  level	  rather	  than	  through	  a	  sweeping	  reform	  of	  the	  state.	   	  The	  word	   ‘Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement’	   is	  commonly	  employed	   in	  English	  literature	   to	   refer	   to	   that	   movement.	   But	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   when	   the	  movement	  was	  active,	  it	  was	  more	  commonly	  known	  inside	  China	  as	  yang	  wu	  (洋
务),	   which	   literally	   means	   ‘Western	   affairs’	   or	   ‘foreign	  matters’.	   Yen-­‐ping	   Hao	  and	  Erh-­‐min	  Wang	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  China’s	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	   in	   relations	   with	   the	   outside	   world,	   and	   in	   its	   narrow	   sense	   the	   term	  ‘Western	  affairs’	  means	  the	  adoption	  of	  Western	  technological	  knowledge.31	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  287.	  31	   Yen-­‐ping	   Hao	   and	   Erh-­‐min	   Wan,	   ‘Changing	   Chinese	   Views	   of	   Western	   Relations,	   1840-­‐95’	   in	   The	  
Cambridge	  History	  of	  China,	  Vol.	  11:	  Late	  Ch'ing,	  1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2,	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	  John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  167.	   In	  a	  broad	  sense,	   the	  yang	  wu	  also	   included,	  according	  to	  Ting-­‐yee	  Kuo	  and	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu,	  the	  handling	  of	  diplomacy,	  foreign	  trade	  revenues	  and	  all	  matters	   concerning	   traders	   and	  missionaries,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   management	   of	   new	   programmes	   in	   which	  things	   Western	   were	   involved,	   such	   as	   language	   schools,	   army	   training,	   arsenals,	   shipyards,	   mines,	  merchant	  steamships	  and	  the	  navy.	  Ting-­‐yee	  Kuo	  and	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening:	  The	  Pursuit	  of	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Chinese	   naming	   of	   the	  movement	   –	   yang	  wu	   revealed	   that	   the	  Westernisation	  was	  largely	  regarded	  as	  a	  means	  to	  tackle	  foreign	  threats,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  reform	  that	   could	   transform	   the	   nation.	   Ultimately,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   in	   this	   thesis,	   the	  steam	  navy	  remained	  largely	  quarantined	  from	  Chinese	  society.	   	  The	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	   therefore,	  was	  a	  movement	  that	   tried	  to	  achieve	   modernisation/Westernisation	   at	   a	   military	   level	   to	   safeguard	   the	  traditional	   Chinese	   institutions.	  What	  was	   this	   ‘China’	   that	   the	  movement	  was	  supposed	   to	  defend?	   It	  would	  be	  misleading	   if	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘China’	  were	   to	  be	  interpreted	   from	   today’s	   perspective.	   Today’s	   understanding	   of	   ‘China’	   is	   in	  agreement	  with	   the	  Western	  sense,	  which	  considers	  China	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  like	   any	   other	   state	   in	   the	   world	   in	   line	   with	   the	   Westphalian	   model	   of	  international	   relations.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   concept	   of	  sovereignty	  and	  nation-­‐state	  was	  not	  introduced	  to	  China	  until	  as	  late	  as	  the	  turn	  of	   the	  20th	  century.32	   During	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period,	   the	  notion	  of	  China	  was	   subjected	   to	   a	   different	   interpretation,	   namely	   the	   Sino-­‐centric	   system,	   in	  which	  China	  saw	  international	  relations	  as	  ‘both	  hierarchical	  and	  centripetal	  with	  
China	   and	   its	   emperor	   located	   at	   a	   centre	   that	   the	   constituents	   units	   of	   various	  
kinds	  and	  sizes	  encircled	  in	  increasingly	  distant	  orbit’.33	   One	  aspect	  of	  this	  system	  needs	   to	   be	   stressed	   here:	   the	   Chinese	   system	   featured	   a	   very	   weak	   sense	   of	  nationalism	  and	  territoriality.	  Instead,	  the	  ‘China’	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  trying	  to	  defend	  was	  the	  traditional	  Chinese	  pattern	  of	  national	  life.34	  In	   other	   words,	   what	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   was	   trying	   to	  safeguard	  was	  not	  the	  sovereign	  nation-­‐state	  China	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  today,	  but	  instead	   the	   old	   Chinese	   socio-­‐political	   order.	   However,	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	  Chinese	  order	  prior	  to	  the	  20th	  century	  shows	  that	  it	  was	  hugely	  different	  from	  that	   of	   the	   seapowers	   of	   the	   age:	   the	   polity	  was	   a	   dynasty	   ruled	   by	   a	  Manchu	  autocratic	   emperor;	   the	   politics	   was	   characterised	   by	   a	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Western	  Technology’	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China	  Volume	  10:	  Late	  Ch'ing	  1800–1911,	  Part	  1,	   John	  K.	  Fairbank	  ed.,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  504.	  32	   Hao	  and	  Wang,	  ‘Changing	  Chinese	  Views	  of	  Western	  Relations,	  1840-­‐95’,	  p.188-­‐199.	  33	   Erik	  Ringmar,	  ‘Performing	  International	  Systems:	  Two	  East-­‐Asian	  Alternatives	  to	  the	  Westphalian	  Order’,	  
International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  66,	  No.	  1,	  (Winter	  2012),	  pp.	  1-­‐25.	  34	   Youlan	  Feng,	  中国哲学简史	   Zhongguo	  Zhexue	   Jian	  Shi	   [A	  Short	  History	  of	  Chinese	  Philosophy],	   (Beijing:	  Peiking	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  p.	  163.	  Some	  scholars	  even	  go	  further	  to	  claim	  that	  “China	  is	  a	  civilization	  pretending	   to	   be	   a	   [nation-­‐]	   state”,	   see:	   Lucian	  W.	   Pye,	   ‘China:	   Erratic	   State,	   Frustrated	   Society’,	   Foreign	  
Affairs,	  Vol.	  69,	  No.	  4.	  (Fall,	  1990),	  p.	  58.	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central	  and	  local	  governments	  and	  strong	  provincialism;	  the	  dominant	  ideology	  was	   Confucianism;	   the	   society	   centred	   around	   the	   gentry	   i.e.	   Imperial	  Examination	   degree	   holders;	   the	   economy	   was	   overwhelmingly	   agrarian	   and	  self-­‐sufficient,	   merchant	   class	   was	   disparaged.	   In	   short,	   the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	   that	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   tried	   to	   defend	   with	   the	   steam	   navy	   in	  particular	  was	  categorically	  different	  from	  the	  aforementioned	  maritime	  states’	  pattern	  of	  national	  life.	   	  Here	   lies	   the	   fundamental	   paradox	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement:	   a	  Western-­‐style	   steam	   navy	   was	   adopted	   and	   was	   assigned	   the	   task	   of	  safeguarding	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   order	   which	   was	   categorically	   different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  seapowers.	  The	  navy	  was	  expected	  to	  play	  the	  same	  role	  as	  the	  Great	  Wall	  –	  to	  ward	  off	  barbarians	  to	  protect	  the	  order	  inside	  it.	  However,	  the	  steam	  navy	  was	   far	  more	   complicated	   than	  bricks	  and	  mortar	   for	  only	  when	  a	  country	   became	   a	   seapower	   in	   the	   deep	   sense	   of	   the	  word	   can	   the	  might	   and	  sustainability	  of	  its	  navy	  be	  secured.	  What	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  did	  not	  realise	  was	   that	   Western	   weaponry	   was	   the	   fruit	   of	   Western	   societies	   and	   needed	   a	  Western-­‐style	  system	  to	  uphold.	  Navies	  are	  even	  more	  so.	  N.A.M.	  Rodger	  pointed	  out:	   	  	   ‘Warships	   were	   …	   the	   most	   complex	   and	   advanced	   of	   all	   artefacts.	   To	  
build	   and	   operate	   them	   requires	   a	   mass	   of	   technical,	   industrial	   and	  
professional	  skills,	  ashore	  and	  afloat,	  and	  a	  sophisticated	  system	  to	  mould	  
them	  into	  an	  effective	  whole.	  Above	  all	  it	  requires	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  
of	   sea	   power	   which	   cannot	   be	   improvised.	   Ships	   can	   be	   constructed	  
relatively	   quickly,	   but	   the	   skills	   and	   the	   capabilities	   which	  make	   up	   an	  
effective	  navy	  can	  only	  be	  built	  up	  with	  long	  years	  of	  investment.’35	   	  	  Due	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  and	  the	  seapowers,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	   navy	   would	   be	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   strong	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   China.	   The	  relation	  between	  the	  two,	  by	  analogy,	  was	  like	  Western	  scions	  transplanted	  onto	  Chinese	   trunks.	   The	   scions	   themselves	   were	   fully	   functional	   and	   had	   proven	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	   N.	  A.	  M.	  Roger,	  The	  Safeguard	  of	  the	  Sea:	  A	  Naval	  History	  of	  Britain	  660-­‐1649,	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books	  Ltd.,	  2004),	  p.105.	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effective	   in	   seapowers.	   But	   their	   incompatibility	   with	   the	   new	   trunk	   –	   the	  ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire,	   affected	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   fruits.	  However,	  in	  war	  there	  was	  no	  prize	  for	  the	  runner-­‐up;	  being	  not	  strong	  enough	  meant	  defeat.	  	  	  
1.4	  Methodology	   	  
	  The	  main	  work	   of	   this	   thesis	  was	   carried	   out	   at	   four	   locations	   in	   London:	   the	  Maughan	  Library	  at	  King’s	  College	  London	  for	  its	  collection	  of	  books	  on	  the	  study	  of	  seapower;	  and	  the	  library	  of	  the	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies	  with	  its	  comprehensive	  collection	  of	  first	  and	  second	  hand	  materials	  on	  Chinese	  history	  and	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement;	   and	   the	   National	   Archives	   at	   Kew	   and	  Caird	   Library	   at	   the	   National	   Maritime	   Museum	   at	   Greenwich	   for	   access	   to	  historical	   archives,	   in	   particular	   Admiralty	   and	   Foreign	   Office	   records,	   which	  contain	  information	  on	  the	  Chinese	  naval	  education	  missions	  in	  England.36	  Differed	  from	  older	  histories	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  that	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  operations	  and	  personalities,	  this	  research	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  the	   navy	   and	   the	   19th	   century	   Chinese	   system.	   To	   be	   more	   specific,	   how	   the	  elements	  of	  the	  Qing	  system’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  affected	  the	  development	  of	   the	  steam	  navy.	  Admittedly	  uncertainties	  always	  play	  a	  part	   in	  any	  war,	  but	  outcomes	  are	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  factors	  that	  are	  in	  turn	  determined	  by	  the	  state	   institutions.	   The	   voluminous	   treatises	   on	   seapower	   available	   in	   English	  literature	  disclosed	  the	  ‘secrets’	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  maritime	  societies	  and	  naval	  strength.	  These	  studies	  provide	  this	  research	  with	  a	  map	   indicating	   from	  what	  angle	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  Chinese	  societies	  should	  be	  conducted.	   They	   also	   provide	   this	   research	   with	   a	   lens	   through	   which	   some	  particular	  elements	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  such	  as	  politics,	  economy	  and	  social	  ethos	  will	  be	  singled	  out	  and	  scrutinised.	   	  Once	   the	   framework	   is	   set	   up,	   the	   second	   step	   is	   to	   understand	   how	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	   There	  are	  also	  some	  records	  on	  the	  British-­‐built	  warships	  sold	  to	  China	  in	  the	  Tyne	  and	  Wear	  Archives,	  New	   Castle,	   as	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   acquired	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   warships	   from	   Armstrong	  Whitworth	  &	  Co.	  Ltd.	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various	  aspects	  of	  the	  navy	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  politics,	  economy	  and	  ideology	  of	  the	   late	  19th	  century	  China.	  First	  hand	  materials	  played	  a	  vital	  role	   in	  this	  step.	  Qing	  China	  documents	  are	  highly	  varied	  in	  nature	  and	  enormous	  in	  quantity.	  To	  avoid	   drowning	   in	   the	   flood	   of	   historical	   archives,	   this	   research	   took	   the	  following	   approach.	   For	   the	   studies	   of	   policies	   and	   projects	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  memorials	  to	  the	  Throne	  and	  Imperial	  Edicts	  are	  the	   fundamental	   sources. 37 	   These	   materials	   are	   found	   in	   the	   following	  compilations:	  (a)	  Chouban	  Yiwu	  Shimo	  (A	  Complete	  Account	  of	  the	  Management	  of	   Barbarian	   Affairs	   ‘筹办夷务始末’)	   and	   compiled	   by	   the	   Palace	   Museum.	   It	  contains	  documents	  on	  China’s	  dealing	  with	  the	  West	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthen	  Movement	  until	  1874.	  (b)	  Haifang	  Dang	  (Archives on Maritime 
Defence ‘海防档’)	   compiled	   by	   the	   Institute	   of	   Modern	   History.	   It	   provides	  records	  of	  policy-­‐making	  on	  naval	  affairs.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Volume	  I	  contains	  the	  correspondences	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  ships	  and	  guns	  between	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  and	   the	   two	   key	   practitioners	   of	   maritime	   defence	   –	   Beiyang	   and	   Nanyang	  Superintendents	   of	   Trade	   as	   well	   as	   other	   relevant	   provincial	   officials.	   The	  Volume	  II	  contains	  records	  of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.	   (c)	  Qingmo	  Haijun	  Shiliao	  (Historical	  Materials	  on	  the	  Navy	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  “清末海军史料”)	  compiled	   by	   the	   China	   Ocean	   Press.	   It	   collected	   a	   number	   of	   important	  memorials	   to	   the	   Throne	   and	   Imperial	   Edicts	   that	   shaped	   the	   Chinese	   steam	  navy.	  These	  memorials	  were	  reorganised	  thematically.	  (d)	  Jindai	  Shiliao	  Congkan	  (Collectanea	  of	  Materials	  on	  Modern	  Chinese	  History	   ‘近代史料丛刊’)	   compiled	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Chinese	  Historians.	  This	  is	  a	  broad	  collection	  of	  documents	  on	  modern	  Chinese	  history.	   In	  which	   the	   eight-­‐volume	  documentary	   collection	  
Yangwu	   Yudong	   (The	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   ‘洋务运动 ’)	   is	   a	   rich	  collection	  of	  materials	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	   	  A	  second	  source	  of	  first	  hand	  materials	  include:	  (a)	  the	  various	  posthumous collections	   of	   the	  writings	   of	   key	   officials	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  such	   as	   that	   of	   Li	   Hongzhang	   (李文忠公全集),	   Zuo	   Zongtang	   (左文襄公全集),	  Shen	   Baozhen	   (沈文肃公政书),	   Zeng	   Guofan	   (曾文正公全集).	   These	   materials,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	   The	  memorials	  to	  the	  Throne	  are	  reports	  to	  the	  emperor	  sent	  by	  imperial	  ministers,	  provincial	   leaders	  and	  other	  senior	  officials.	  This	  was	  the	  principle	  means	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  emperor	   in	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty.	   See	   Silas	   Hsiu-­‐liang	   Wu,	   ‘The	   Memorial	   Systems	   of	   The	   Ch'ing	   Dynasty	  (1644-­‐1911)’,	  Harvard	  Journal	  of	  Asiatic	  Studies.	  Vol.	  27	  (1967),	  pp.	  7-­‐75.	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apart	   from	   contending	   official	   correspondence,	   sometimes	   include	   candid	  personal	  letters,	  which	  tell	  more	  of	  the	  inside	  stories	  and	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  official	  documents	  to	  gauge	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  memorials	  presented	  to	  the	  Throne;	  (b)	  personal	  diaries	  and	  biographies	  and	  of	  important	  historical	  figures,	  such	   as	   that	   of	   Yan	   Fu	   –	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   students	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	  Academy	  and	  later	  the	  Superintendent	  of	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy	  (严几道年
谱)	  and	  Guo	  Songtao	  –	  China’s	  first	  ambassador	  to	  Britain	  (伦敦与巴黎日记).	   	  A	   third	   source	   of	   first	   hand	   materials	   is	   third	   party	   observations.	   Many	  Westerners	  had	  worked	  in	  or	  alongside	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	  their	  memoirs	  sometimes	   contains	   information	   and	   comments	   about	   the	  Chinese	   steam	  navy.	  Such	   as	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   British	   China	   Station	   Adm.	   Sir	   E.	   R.	  Fremantle’s	  memoir	  The	  Navy	  as	  I	  have	  known	  It;	  and	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  Officer	  Henry	   N.	   Shore’s	   The	   flight	   of	   the	   Lapwing:	   A	   naval	   officer's	   jottings	   in	   China,	  
Formosa	   and	   Japan;	   and	   Pulling	   Strings	   in	   China	   by	   William	   F.	   Tyler’s	   who	  worked	  in	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet;	  and	  Through	  the	  Dragon’s	  Eyes	  by	  American	  naval	  officer	  L.C.	  Arlington’s	  who	  served	  in	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	  Most	  of	  these	  third	  party	  observations	  were	  objective	  and	  professional,	  they	  can	  be	  read	  together	  with	  the	  abovementioned	  two	  types	  of	  materials	  as	  important	  complementary	  materials.	   	  	  	  
1.5	  Chapter	  Outline	  	  Older	  research	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  tend	  to	  adopt	  a	  linear	  narrative	   approach	   that	   overly	   emphasised	   the	   battles	   and	   the	   personalities.	  Despite	  the	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  in	  elucidating	  the	  evolvement	  of	  the	  navy	  and	  telling	  the	  story	  of	  the	  build-­‐up	  to	  the	  wars,	  it	  is	  less	  suitable	  for	  systematic	  analysis	  on	  how	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  navy	  was	  moulded	  and	  influenced	  by	  state	  institutions,	  which	  this	  research	  wishes	  to	  disclose.	   In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  this	  dissertation	  will	  consist	  of	   the	  following	  seven	  chapters:	  Chapter	  one	  being	  the	  introduction;	   Chapter	   two	   a	   review	   of	   the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	  Empire	   against	   the	   theories	   of	   seapower;	   Chapters	   three	   to	   six	   constitutes	   the	  main	  body	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  will	  examine	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   set	   out	   in	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Chapter	  two;	  and	  Chapter	  seven	  will	  form	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  dissertation.	   	  In	   Chapter	   two,	   the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   will	   be	  broken	  down	  and	  examined	  from	  three	  dimensions:	  the	  political	  dimension,	  the	  economic	  dimension	  and	  the	  ideological	  dimension.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  dimensions,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘secrets’	  of	  naval	  success	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  narrative	  of	  the	  situation	   of	   China,	   which	   will	   reveal	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  was	  different	   from	  that	  of	  seapowers.	  Chapter	  two	  lays	  the	  foundation	  of	  detailed	  analysis,	  which	  will	  be	  carried	  into	  Chapters	  three	  to	  six.	   Chapter	  three	  will	   focus	  on	  the	   impacts	  of	   the	  system	  on	  the	  politics	  of	   the	  Chinese	   steam	   navy,	   specifically:	   (a)	   the	   emperor	   and	   the	   ministers	   in	   the	  Imperial	   Court;	   (b)	   the	   provincial	   Self-­‐Strengtheners;	   and	   (c)	   the	   contending	  views	   of	   the	   strategic	   significance	   of	   the	   steam	   navy.	   Chapter	   four	   will	  investigate	   the	   impacts	  of	   the	  system	  on	  the	  officer	  corps	  of	   the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	   specifically:	   (a)	   recruitment	   of	   naval	   cadets;	   (b)	   naval	   academies;	   (c)	  advanced	  naval	  education;	  and	  (d)	  senior	  officers	  of	   the	  navy.	  Chapter	   five	  will	  investigate	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  system	  on	  the	  hardware	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	  specifically:	   (a)	   various	   types	   of	   home-­‐built	   ships;	   (b)	   decline	   of	   Chinese	  indigenous	  shipbuilding	  capability;	  and	  (c)	  China’s	  naval	  acquisition	  from	  abroad.	  Chapter	  six	  will	  investigate	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  system	  on	  the	  use	  of	  naval	  power,	  specifically:	   (a)	   Chinese	   military	   traditions	   and	   their	   influences	   on	   the	   use	   of	  naval	   power;	   (b)	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   four	   regional	   fleets	   and	   the	   subsequent	  defeat	   of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  during	   the	   Sino-­‐French	  War;	   and	   (c)	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Board	   of	   Admiralty	   (the	   Haijun	   Yamen)	   and	   the	  defeat	  of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   in	   the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  Chapter	   three	  to	  six	  will	  offer	  a	  panoramic	  explanation	  on	  how	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  adversely	  affected	   by	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’,	   and	   was	   eventually	  defeated.	   	  Chapter	  seven	  will	  be	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  It	  will	  reiterate	  the	  central	   argument	   of	   this	   thesis	   –	   that	   the	   incompatibility	   between	   the	   state	  institutions	  based	  on	  the	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China	  and	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy,	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  It	  will	  also	  review	  the	  abortive	  efforts	  made	  in	  the	  aftermath	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of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  to	  reform	  the	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  and	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  naval	   failures	  within	  the	  context	  of	   the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  reform.	  This	  hopes	  to	  disclose	  the	  deeply	  rooted	  reasons	  for	  the	  Qing	   Empire’s	   inertia	   to	   change,	   and	   to	   show	   that	   the	   problems	   that	   caused	  China’s	  weakness	  at	  sea	  could	  not	  have	  been	  solved	  overnight.	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Chapter	  Two	  	  	  The	  ‘Fundamental	  Structure’	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	   lays	   the	   foundation	  of	   this	  dissertation.	   It	  will	   try	   to	  explain	  what	  the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   consisted	   of,	   and	   reveal	   the	  incompatibility	   between	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   and	   the	  requirements	  of	   a	   steam	  navy.	  This	  dissertation	  believes	   that	   the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	   i.e.	   the	   ‘social	   imperative’	   in	   Huntington’s	   terms	   and	   the	   ‘living	  conditions’	   in	   Jiang’s	   terms	   consisted	   of	   three	  main	   aspects:	   politics,	   economy	  and	  ideology	  (see	  Figure	  2.1).	   	  Then,	   how	   does	   one	   assess	   the	   compatibility	   between	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	   structure’	   and	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	   steam	   navy?	   In	   this	  dissertation,	   this	   compatibility	   is	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   naval	   administrative	  efficiency	   in	   the	   political	   dimension,	   by	   the	   quantity	   of	   resources	   available	   to	  navy	   in	   the	  economic	  dimension	  and	  by	  social	  willingness	  to	  support	  a	  navy	   in	  the	   ideological	   dimension.	   As	   a	   first	   step,	   this	   chapter	   will	   explain	   how,	   with	  regard	   to	   navy,	   high	   administrative	   efficiency,	   abundance	   of	   resources	   and	  strong	   social	   support	   can	   be	   attained	  more	   generally.	   Afterwards,	   this	   chapter	  will	   juxtapose	   the	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   with	   that	   of	  seapowers	   in	   each	   dimension,	   and	   argue	  why	   these	   requirements	   for	   a	   steam	  navy	  could	  not	  be	  attained	  by	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	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  Figure	  2.1	  A	  schematic	  of	   the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	   the	  Qing	  Empire	  and	   its	  relations	  with	  the	  steam	  navy.	  The	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  consisted	   in	   three	  main	  aspects:	  politics,	  economy	  and	  ideology.	  Politics	  determined	  the	  administrative	  efficiency	  of	  the	  navy;	  economy	  determined	  the	   amount	   of	   resources	   available	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   navy;	   ideology	   determined	   the	  society’s	  willingness	  to	  support	  the	  navy.	   	  	  	  
2.1	  The	  Political	  Dimension	  	  In	  this	  dimension	  we	  are	  going	  to	  look	  at	  the	  relations	  between	  a	  nation’s	  form	  of	  governance	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  naval	  administrative	  efficiency.	  Mahan	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘particular	  forms	  of	  government	  with	  their	  accompanying	  institutions,	  and	  the	  
character	  of	  rulers,	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another,	  have	  exercised	  a	  very	  marked	  influence	  
upon	  the	  development	  of	  sea	  power.’38	   Generally	  speaking,	  powerful	  navies	  were	  associated	  with	  representative	  governments.	  Lambert	  offered	  an	  explanation:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	   Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History,	  p.	  58.	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‘In	  absolutist	  regimes	  the	  personal	  wishes	  of	  the	  monarch	  prevailed.	  Often	  
prestige	   was	   more	   important	   than	   fighting	   strength,	   although	   the	   two	  
requirements	   were	   not	   necessarily	   mutually	   exclusive.	   Republics	   and	  
constitutional	  monarchies	  proved	  better	  able	  to	  sustain	  naval	  power,	  for	  
the	   politics	   of	   such	   states	   reflected	   the	   interests	   of	   several	   groups	   that	  
benefited	   from	   naval	   strength:	   merchants,	   coastal	   towns,	   colonial	  
speculators	   and	   investors.	   That	   these	   states	   also	   tended	   to	   be	  maritime	  
indicates	   a	   strong	   link	   between	   the	   economic	   life	   of	   the	   nation	   and	   the	  
political	   system	   it	   develops.	   Through	   the	   power	   of	   purse,	   these	   groups	  
determined	   what	   type	   of	   navy	   was	   maintained	   and	   often	   how	   it	   was	  
used.’39	  
	  However,	  it	  cannot	  be	  claimed	  that	  nations	  whose	  political	  systems	  were	  not	  in	   conformity	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   republics	   and	   constitutional	   monarchies	  could	   not	   have	   powerful	   navies	   at	   all.	   Some	   strong	   navies	   in	   history	   have	  emerged	   from	   countries	   and	   regimes	   hardly	   noted	   for	   their	   adherence	   to	  democratic	   principles.	   As	   Mahan	   observed:	   ‘…	   despotic	   power,	   wielded	   with	  
judgment	   and	   consistency,	   has	   created	   at	   times	   a	   great	   sea	   commerce	   and	   a	  
brilliant	  navy	  with	  greater	  directness	  than	  can	  be	  reached	  by	  the	  slower	  process	  of	  
a	   free	   people.’40	   There	   is,	   indeed,	   ample	   evidence	   to	   support	   Mahan’s	   point.	  Countries	  with	  an	  agrarian	  economy	  and/or	  absolutist	  political	   system	  such	  as	  England	   under	   Henry	   VIII	   and	   Tsarist	   Russia	   under	   Peter	   the	   Great	   had	   all	  achieved	   considerable	   naval	   strength.	   This	   is	   because	   absolutist	   regimes	  were	  sometimes	  more	  adept	  at	  mobilising	  resources	  than	  representative	  governments,	  and	  could	  therefore	  amass	  relatively	  greater	  resources	  to	  boost	  naval	  strength	  in	  a	   relatively	   shorter	   time.	   However,	   navies	   supported	   by	   and	   dependent	   on	  absolutist	  power	  are	  usually	  less	  sustainable	  because	  ‘…	  despots	  come	  and	  go	  and	  
these	  achievements	  have	  often	  died	  with	  them.’41	   	  Key	   to	  a	  really	  powerful	  navy	  consists	  not	  only	   in	   the	  amount	  of	  resources	  one	   can	  mobilise	  and	   invest	   in	   it,	   but	   equally	   importantly	  on	   the	   sustainability	  and	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  the	  investment.	  As	  Till	  argues:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	   Andrew	  Lambert,	  War	  at	  Sea	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Sail,	  (London:	  Cassell	  &	  Company	  Ltd,	  2000),	  p.	  25.	  40	   Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History,	  p.	  58.	  41	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  86.	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   ‘…	  it	  is	  not	  liberalism	  and	  democratic	  principles	  in	  themselves	  that	  were,	  
and	   are,	   decisive	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   development	   of	   seapower,	   but	  
administrative	   efficiency	   in	   raising	   money	   and	   other	   resources,	   and	   in	  
spending	  it	  wisely.	  But,	  as	  a	  very	  general	  rule,	  these	  qualities	  do	  seem	  to	  
have	   been	   particularly	   associated	   with	   freer,	   stable,	   more	   mercantile	  
styles	  of	  society	  and	  government.’42	   	  	  	   One	  of	   the	   important	  reasons	  why	  high	  naval	  administrative	  efficiency	  was	  more	   attainable	   in	   representative	   governments	   than	   in	   absolutist	   regimes	  was	  that	   the	   former	   usually	   allowed	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   delegation	   of	   power	   to	  professional	   bodies,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   were	   usually	   reluctant	   to	   do	   so.	   Such	  delegation	  of	  power	  ensures	  that	  a	  navy	  can	  be	  more	  efficiently	  aligned	  with	  the	  resources	  it	  needs	  in	  peacetime	  and	  more	  competently	  commanded	  in	  wartime.	  Taking	  the	  English	  (later	  British)	  navy	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  decades	  following	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,	  the	  navy	  was	  transferred	  from	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  monarch	  to	  the	  control	  of	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Admiralty.	  This	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  watershed	  in	   the	   nation’s	   naval	   history.	   Prior	   to	   this	   point,	   the	   success	   of	   the	   navy	   was	  mostly	   due	   to	   the	   enthusiasm	   of	   England’s	   navalist	   kings.43	   After	   this	   point,	  naval	   success	   was	   derived	   from	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   system.	   The	   Admiralty,	   as	  Baugh	   observed,	   was	   an	   authoritative	   body	   of	   high	   administrative	   and	  commanding	   efficiency	   to	   which	   all	   other	   braches	   of	   naval	   administration	  reported.	   It	   was	   a	   ‘…	   permanent,	   authoritative	   centre	   of	   accumulated	   naval	  
expertise	  …’	  yet	  it	  wielded	  strong	  influence	  in	  state	  affairs	  since	  the	  First	  Lord	  of	  the	  Admiralty	  was	   a	  member	   of	   the	   cabinet.44	   With	   respect	   to	   the	  Parliament,	  Rodger	  noted:	  	  
‘The	  importance	  of	  1689	  to	  naval	  history	  was	  not	  that	  Parliament	  created	  
English	   seapower,	   but	   that	   it	   began	   to	   take	   it	   over	   …	   it	   mattered	   very	  
much	  that	   the	  Navy	  and	  the	  money	   finished	  up	   together	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	   Till,	  Seapower,	  pp.	  86-­‐87.	  43	   Jon	   Sumida,	   In	   Defence	   of	   Naval	   Supremacy:	   Financial	   Limitation,	   Technological	   Innovation	   and	   British	  
Naval	  Policy,	  1889-­‐1914,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  p.	  3.	  44	   Daniel	  Baugh,	  ‘The	  Eighteenth	  Century	  Navy	  as	  a	  National	  Institution’	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Illustrated	  History	  of	  
the	  Royal	  Navy,	  J.	  R.	  Hill	  and	  Bryan	  Ranft	  eds.,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  p.	  122.	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the	  House	  of	  the	  Commons.	  …	  	   [In	  contrast	  to	  the	  crown’s	  government]	  Parliament’s	  government	  was	  …	  
highly	   centralised	   and	   precociously	   professional.	   Here	   were	   found	   the	  
Treasury	  and	  the	  revenue-­‐collecting	  departments,	  especially	  the	  Customs	  
and	   Excise,	   and	   here	   too	   was	   the	   Navy	   …	   The	   location	   of	   the	   main	  
revenue-­‐raising	   and	   revenue	   spending	   departments	   on	   the	   efficient,	  
Parliamentary	  side	  of	  the	  British	  government	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  distinctive	  
and	   important	   feature	   of	   British	   constitutional	   development.	   Because	  
Parliament	   captured	   the	   Navy,	   it	   was	   able	   to	   realise	   the	   character	   of	  
British	  sea	  power	  as	  the	  ideal	  expression	  of	  the	  nation	  in	  arms	  …	  It	  made	  
the	  Navy	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  liberty	  of	  the	  people,	  where	  the	  army	  was	  an	  
expression	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  crown.	  The	  Stuarts	  could	  never	  have	  done	  
this,	  however	  wisely	  they	  had	  managed	  the	  Navy.’	   45	  	  	   This	  being	  said,	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  political	  systems	  and	  administrative	   efficiency	   should	   not	   be	   simplistic	   and	   naval-­‐centric.	   The	   navy	  was	   not	   always	   the	   top	   priority	   on	   all	   nations’	   strategic	   agendas.	   Different	  nations	   had	  different	   ambitions	   or	  were	   confronted	  with	   different	   threats	   that	  might	   require	   different	   types	   of	   forces	   to	   address.	   Here	   geography	   should	   be	  taken	   into	   the	   equation	   for	   naval	   strength,	   because	   it	   determines	   a	   country’s	  strategic	   agenda.	   Kennedy	   echoed	   Mahan	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   geography	   on	   a	  country’s	   naval	   strength:	   ‘…	   a	   state	   which	   had	   neither	   to	   defend	   nor	   to	   extend	  
itself	  by	  land	  was	  much	  more	  favourably	  placed	  to	  concentrate	  upon	  the	  growth	  of	  
its	   sea	   power	   than	   one	   which	   was	   compelled	   to	   stay	   prepared	   against	   land	  
neighbours	   …’.46	   Insular	   countries	   had	   particularly	   favourable	   conditions	   to	  develop	   navy	   because	   they	   can	   safeguard	   territory	   and	   expand	   interests	  overseas	  with	  the	  same	  force.	  However,	  there	  were	  not	  many	  insular	  countries;	  most	  countries	  had	  a	  shared	  border	  with	  their	  neighbouring	  countries,	  and	  some	  countries	   had	   a	   frontier	   with	   a	   hostile	   neighbour,	   which	   necessitated	   a	   large	  standing	  army.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	   N.	  A.	  M.	  Roger,	  The	  Command	  of	  the	  Ocean:	  A	  Naval	  History	  of	  Britain,	  1649-­‐1815,	  (London:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2004),	  pp.	  578-­‐579.	  46	   Kennedy,	  The	  Rise	  And	  Fall	  of	  British	  Naval	  Mastery,	  p.	  5.	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   The	  need	  for	  a	  large	  standing	  army	  had	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  naval	  power.	  This	  was	  not	  only	  because	  the	  two	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  for	  a	  share	  of	  the	  budget	   and	  manpower	   from	   time	   to	   time.	  More	   importantly,	   the	   two	  were	  suited	  to	  different	  forms	  of	  governance,	  for	  efficient	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  army	  and	  efficient	   mobilisation	   of	   the	   navy	   required	   different	   political	   systems.	   Rodger	  drew	   the	   following	   conclusion	   from	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   political	   systems	  preferred	  by	  armies	  and	  navies:	   	   	  	  ‘absolutist	   monarchy	   was	   essentially	   a	   system	   of	   government	   for	  
mobilizing	  manpower	  rather	   than	  money.	  More	  efficient	   in	   its	  way	   than	  
the	  medieval	  constitutions	  it	  replaced,	  it	  was	  poorly	  adapted	  to	  meet	  the	  
much	  greater	  strains	  imposed	  on	  the	  state	  and	  society	  by	  a	  modern	  navy.	  
For	   that,	   it	   may	   be	   suggested,	   what	   was	   needed	   was	   a	   system	   of	  
government	   which	   involved	   the	   participation	   by	   those	   interest	   groups	  
whose	  money	   and	   skills	   were	   indispensible	   to	   sea	   power	   –	   not	   just	   the	  
nobility	   and	   peasantry	  whom	  absolutism	   set	   to	  work,	   but	   investors	   and	  
managers,	  the	  skilled	  craftsmen;	  all	  the	  classes	  in	  short,	  which	  absolutist	  
government	   least	   represented	   and	   least	   favoured.	   The	   demands	   of	   sea	  
power	  were	  not	   only	   greater	   in	   themselves,	   but	   fell	   upon	  a	  much	  wider	  
cross-­‐section	   of	   society,	   and	   required	   a	   much	   greater	   degree	   of	   social,	  
political	   and	   administrative	   integration	   than	   armies	   did.	   A	   military	  
regime	  could	  sustain	  itself	  by	  force,	  but	  a	  navy	  had	  to	  earn	  public	  support.	  
Autocracy	  was	  adequate	  for	  an	  army,	  but	  navies	  needed	  consensus.’47	  	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   needs	   for	   a	   large	   army	   would,	   to	   an	   extent,	   justify	   the	  absolutist	  political	  system,	  and	  therefore	  inhibit	  the	  development	  of	  navy.	  For	  an	  insular	  country	  that	  enjoyed	  favourable	  geographical	  conditions	  that	  exempted	  it	  from	  the	  need	   to	  maintain	  a	   large	  army,	   the	  navy	  could	  be	  given	  a	  central	   role	  and	   a	   democratic	   system	   favoured	   it.	   For	   countries	   that	   needed	   to	   protect	  themselves	  with	  a	   large	  army,	   the	  navy	  usually	  received	  secondary	   importance	  and	  an	  absolutist	  government	  was	  the	  preferable	  form	  of	  governance.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   N.	  A.	  M.	  Roger,	  The	  Safeguard	  of	  the	  Sea:	  A	  Naval	  History	  of	  Britain	  660-­‐1649,	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books	  Ltd.,	  2004),	  p.	  432.	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   ***	  	  The	   Qing	   Empire’s	   security	   agenda	   revolved	   around	   the	   goal	   of	   perpetuating	  autocratic	  Manchu	  rule.48	   The	  Qing	  emperors,	  in	  particular	  those	  of	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	   century,	   were	   absolute	   rulers,	   and	   it	   is	   generally	   agreed	   that	   the	   Qing	  Dynasty	  had	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  autocracy	  in	  Chinese	  history.	  The	  Grand	  Council	  was	   the	   institution	   that	   guaranteed	   the	   Qing	   emperors’	   absolute	   power.	   The	  Grand	   Council	   was	   originally	   an	   imperial	   institution	   designed	   to	   increase	  efficiency	   and	   confidentiality	   in	   communication	   between	   the	   emperor	   and	   his	  senior	  military	  commanders,	  but	  later	  evolved	  into	  a	  mechanism	  to	  ensure	  direct	  communications	  between	  the	  emperor	  and	  senior	  officials.49	   In	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  all	   senior	   officials,	   including	   provincial	   leaders,	   were	   empowered	   to	   write	  memorials	   to	   the	  Throne.	  This	  was	   a	   system	  of	   communication	   through	  which	  these	   officials	   reported	   to	   the	   emperor	   personally	   and	   directly.	   The	   Grand	  Council	  ensured	   that	   the	  communications	  between	  the	  emperor	  and	   the	  senior	  officials	   to	  be	   carried	  out	   confidentially:	   the	   reports	  were	   to	  be	  opened	  by	   the	  emperor	  in	  person	  and	  instructions	  were	  to	  be	  returned	  directly	  to	  the	  senders.	  Imperial	   governmental	   bodies	   were	   largely	   bypassed	   and	   were	   therefore	  excluded	   from	   the	   decision-­‐making	   of	   important	   state	   affairs.	   Even	   the	   grand	  councillors	  themselves	  theoretically	  had	  no	  right	  to	  advise	  the	  emperor.	  This	   administrative	   system	   helped	   the	   emperor	   to	   keep	   state	   affairs	   in	  absolute	  control,	  but	  had	  also	   inevitably	  made	   the	  Qing	  emperors	  entangled	   in	  micro-­‐management	   activities,	   which	   made	   it	   almost	   impossible	   for	   them	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	   One	   particularity	   of	   the	  Qing	  Dynasty	   that	   is	  worthy	   of	  mentioning	   is	   that	   different	   from	  most	   of	   the	  previous	  Chinese	  empires	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  was	  an	  alien	  dynasty	  –	  it	  was	  ruled	  by	  the	  Manchus	  rather	  than	  the	  Han	  Chinese.	  The	  latter	  took	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Chinese	  population	  and	  had	  developed	  a	  relatively	  more	  advanced	   political,	   economic	   and	   ideological	   system.	   The	   former,	   an	   ethnic	   minority,	   was	   originally	   a	  nomadic	  people	  from	  north-­‐eastern	  China.	  The	  Manchus	  conquered	  China	  in	  1644	  and	  established	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  but	  they	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  empire.	  In	  order	  to	  win	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Han	  Chinese,	  the	  Manchus	  identified	  themselves	  with	  most	  of	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  traditions,	  kept	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   governmental	   institutions,	   embraced	   Confucianism	   as	   a	   state	   ideology,	   and	  absorbed	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  into	  its	  bureaucracy	  to	  work	  alongside	  with	  the	  Manchus.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Manchus	  strived	  to	  maintain	  their	  superiority	  over	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  kept	  a	  separated	  Manchu	  identity.	  This	  particular	  factor	  of	  Manchu	  rule	  had	  had	  profound	  impacts	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  which	  will	  be	  mentioned	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Mark	  Elliott,	  The	  Manchu	  Way:	  The	  Eight	  Banners	  and	  Ethnic	  Identity	  in	  
Late	  Imperial	  China,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  p.	  3.	  49	   For	  more	  details	  about	  the	  Grand	  Council	  and	  its	  evolution,	  see	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  47-­‐51.	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continuously	   focus	  on	  any	   specific	   issue.	  The	  Qing	  emperors	  were	  diligent	   and	  devoted	   men	   who	   in	   fact	   performed	   functions	   of	   an	   entire	   group	   of	   cabinet	  ministers,	  Hsü	  observed:	  	  ‘In	   [the	   emperor’s]	   executive	   capacity	   he	   decided	   all	   important	   state	  
policies,	   made	   appointments,	   conferred	   titles,	   approved	   promotions,	  
demotions	  and	  dismissals,	  awarded	  pensions,	  commanded	  the	  army,	  and	  
ratify	   treaties	   with	   foreign	   powers.	   As	   supreme	   legislator	   he	   enacted,	  
annulled,	  and	  amended	  laws	  by	  decrees	  and	  edicts.	  Judicially,	  he	  was	  the	  
highest	   court	   of	   appeal,	   granting	   pardons	   and	   reprieves	   as	   a	   mark	   of	  
favour.	   Indeed,	   the	   highest	   form	   of	   absolute	   monarchism	   was	   reached	  
under	  the	  Ch’ing	  [the	  Qing	  Empire].’50	  	   If	   the	   volume	   of	   memorials	   to	   the	   Throne	   was	   still	   manageable	   to	   the	  emperors	  themselves	  in	  the	  18th	  century,	  it	  was	  hardly	  the	  case	  anymore	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  when	  the	  scale	  of	  state	  affairs	  became	  increasingly	  complex	  as	  the	  empire	   was	   confronted	   with	   internal	   and	   external	   crises.51	   There	   was	   good	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  efficiency	  –	  if	  not	  effectiveness	  too	  –	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  carried	  out	  in	  such	  form.	  H.	  Mao	  commented:	   	  	  ‘relying	  on	  one	  person’s	   intellectual	   capacity	   to	  make	  decisions	  on	  huge	  
amount	  of	  state	  affairs	  in	  a	  short	  time,	  requires	  not	  only	  great	  talent	  and	  
bold	   vision,	   but	   also	   precise	   and	   sophisticated	   planning.	   Moreover,	  
physical	  and	  intellectual	  strength	  was	  vitally	  important	  too.	  According	  to	  
archives,	   we	   can	   learn	   that	   Qing	   emperors	   had	   to	   read	   and	   reply	  
memorials	   totalling	  more	   than	   ten	   thousand	  words	   on	   a	   daily	   basis,	   as	  
well	  as	  making	  a	  series	  of	  corresponding	  decisions.	  Even	  minor	  mistakes	  
could	  be	  very	  consequential	  ...	  it	  was	  impossible	  …	  to	  make	  decisions	  on	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  45-­‐46.	  51	   For	   instance,	  during	   the	   thirteen	  years	  of	  his	   reign	   (1723-­‐1735),	   the	  Yongzheng	  Emperor	  dealt	  with	  a	  staggering	  number	  of	  memorials	  to	  the	  Throne.	  There	  are	  around	  33,000	  memorials	  extant	  today,	  and	  the	  actual	  number	  should	  be	  much	   lager	  than	  this.	  See	  Mark	  C.	  Elliott,	   ‘The	  Manchu-­‐Language	  Archives	  of	   the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Palace	  Memorial	  System’,	  Late	  Imperial	  China,	  Vol.	  22,	  No.	  1,	  (Jun.	  2001),	  p.	  36.	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analytical,	  deliberative	  and	  rational	  basis….’52	   	  	  This	   arrangement	   ensured	   the	   emperor’s	   exclusive	   control	   of	   state	   affairs.	  However,	   from	   a	   naval	   point	   of	   view,	   this	   decision-­‐making	   mechanism	  established	   the	   emperor	   as	   the	   barrier	   between	   the	   navy	   and	   the	   resources	   it	  needed	   to	   flourish.	   This	  mechanism	  excluded	   the	   social	   group	  whose	   interests	  were	   hinged	   on	   maritime	   successes	   from	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process,	   and	  determined	  that	  if	  there	  was	  to	  be	  any	  impetus	  to	  build	  a	  strong	  navy	  it	  had	  to	  come	   from	   the	   emperor	   himself.	   However,	   Chinese	   economic,	   ideological	   and	  security	   realities	   determined	   that	   it	  was	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   China	   could	   have	  devoted	  navalist	  emperors.	  The	  administrative	  and	  military	  commanding	  system	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  structured	   to	   prevent	   the	   emperor’s	   absolute	   power	   from	  being	   challenged	   by	  individuals	  or	  bureaucratic	  bodies.	   In	   spite	   that	   there	  were,	   from	   time	   to	   time,	  powerful	   statesmen	   that	   wielded	   considerable	   influence	   on	   state	   affairs;	   no	  individual	   or	   bureaucratic	   body	   ever	   achieved	   institutionalised	   power	   or	  interfered	   with	   the	   wishes	   and	   decisions	   of	   the	   emperor.	   Prince	   Gong,	   who	  helped	   the	   Empress	   Dowager	   Cixi	   to	   become	   the	   de	   facto	   ruler	   of	   China	   from	  1861	  to	  1908,	  had	  the	  power	  and	  the	  will	  to	  promote	  a	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy;	  but	   he	   was	   chastised	   for	   having	   too	   much	   power	   and	   did	   not	   succeed	   in	  becoming	  an	  effective	  promoter	  of	   the	  steam	  navy.	   In	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	   there	  was	  no	  prime	  minister,	  and	  the	  nominal	  cabinet	  –	  the	  Grand	  Secretariat	  was	  only	  titular.53	   The	  Grand	  Council	  was	   the	  bureaucratic	  body	  closest	   to	   the	  emperor,	  but	   it	  was	  not	   comparable	   to	  a	  Western-­‐style	   cabinet	  office	   in	   terms	  of	  power.	  The	   grand	   councillors	  were	   concurrent	   appointees,	   and	   they	   did	   not	   serve	   for	  definite	   tenures.54	   This	  meant	   that	  when	   threatened	  or	  questioned	  by	   a	   grand	  councillor,	  the	  emperor	  could	  have	  him	  removed	  without	  having	  to	  refer	  to	  any	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   Haijian	   Mao,	  天朝的崩溃：鸦片战争再研究	   Tianchao	   de	   bengkui:	   Yapian	   zhanzheng	   zaiyanjiu	   	   [The	  
Collapse	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Kingdom:	  Rethinking	  the	  Opium	  War].	  (Beijing:	  Sanlian	  Shudian,	  1995),	  p.	  170.	  53	   In	  the	  early	  18th	  century,	  the	  Grand	  Council	  pre-­‐empted	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Grand	  Secretariat.	  Before	  the	  Grand	  Secretariat	  lost	  its	  power	  to	  the	  Grand	  Council,	  there	  were	  four	  grand	  secretaries	  and	  two	  associate	  grand	   secretaries	   to	   advise	   the	   emperor.	  However,	   there	  was	   no	   leader	   among	   them,	   and	   they	  were	   not	  allowed	  to	  issue	  orders	  directly	  to	  the	  Six	  Boards	  or	  to	  the	  provincial	  governments.	  Only	  the	  emperor	  could	  do	  that.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  36,	  47-­‐48,	  51.	  54	   Ibid.,	  50.	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legal	  framework.55	   	  It	   was	   particularly	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   two	   most	   important	   central	  bureaucratic	  bodies	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  –	  the	  Chinese	  Foreign	  Office	   founded	   in	  1861	  –	   and	   the	  Haijun	  Yamen	   –	   the	  Chinese	  Board	   of	   Admiralty	   founded	   in	   1885	   –	   were	   modelled	   on	   the	   Grand	   Council.	  These	   two	   bureaucratic	   bodies	   only	   had	   very	   limited	   bureaucratic	   power	   and	  therefore	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  equivalent	  to	  Western	  foreign	  offices	  and	  naval	  ministries.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Zongli	   Yamen	   had	   no	   constitutional	   basis.	   It	  was	  placed	  under	  the	  charge	  of	  a	  prince	  of	  the	  blood,	  who	  was	  usually	  supported	  by	   a	   handful	   of	   ministers	   who	   were	   concurrently	   metropolitan	   officials.	  Theoretically,	   the	   Zongli	   Yamen	   only	   concerned	   itself	   with	   the	   execution	   of	  foreign	   policy,	   not	   the	   making	   of	   it,	   as	   the	   ultimate	   decision-­‐making	   power	  remained	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  emperor.56	   Largely	  for	  the	  same	  reason,	  the	  Haijun	  
Yamen,	  which	  had	  only	  existed	  for	  ten	  years	  between	  1885	  and	  1895,	  was	  even	  more	  powerless.	  The	  Six	  Boards	  –	  the	  Board	  of	  Civil	  Office,	  the	  Board	  of	  Revenue,	  the	  Board	  of	  Rites,	  the	  Board	  of	  War,	  the	  Board	  of	  Punishment,	  and	  the	  Board	  of	  Public	  Works	  constituted	  the	  main	  governmental	  body	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court.	  However,	  the	  six	  boards	   had	   very	   little	   real	   power	   and	   only	   operated	   within	   the	   constraint	   of	  traditions.	  Therefore,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  full	  equivalents	  to	  the	  state	  ministries	  of	  Western	  governments.	  As	  Horowitz	  observed:	  	  
‘within	   their	   areas	   of	   activity,	   the	   Qing	   Six	   Boards	   had	   limited	   powers.	  
They	   could	   not,	   for	   example,	   issue	   orders	   directly	   to	   provincial-­‐level	  
officials,	   or	   equivalent-­‐level	   central	   government	   organs.	   To	   implement	  
their	   decisions	   they	   needed	   either	   voluntary	   cooperation	   on	   the	   part	   of	  
other	  officials	  or	  an	  imperial	  edict	  to	  force	  the	  issue…	  Even	  small	  reforms	  
were	  difficult	   to	   implement	  ….	   Introducing	  systemic	  reforms	  required	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  50.	  56	   The	  Zongli	   Yamen	  engaged	  not	   only	   in	   foreign	   affairs	   but	   also	   in	   a	   number	   of	  modernisation	   projects,	  such	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  modern	  schools,	  Western	  science,	  industry	  and	  communication,	  etc.	  These	  projects	  were	   considered	   as	  Western	   learning	   and	  were	   therefore	   confined	   to	   the	   Zongli	   Yamen	   and	   quarantined	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  bodies	  that	  focused	  on	  Chinese	  learning.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  268-­‐296.	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extraordinarily	   broad	   consensus	   of	   officials,	   or	   the	   strong	   hand	   of	   a	  
reforming	  emperor.’57	  	  It	   can	   be	   concluded	   from	   this	   brief	   review	  of	   the	  Qing	   Imperial	   Court	   that	   the	  power	   of	   imperial	   ministries	   was	   pre-­‐eminently	   nominal	   and	   conditional	   to	  imperial	   oversight.	   The	   emperor	   concentrated	   almost	   all	   decision-­‐making	  powers	  in	  his	  hands.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  Western-­‐style	  separation	  of	  powers,	  the	  navy	  was	  not	  represented	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   Imperial	  Court.	  Unless	  the	  emperor	  himself	  wanted	   to	  build	  a	   strong	  navy,	   it	  would	  be	   impossible	   for	  the	  naval	  sector	  to	  get	  support	  from	  the	  central	  government.	  A	  steam	  navy	  did	  emerge;	  but	  it	  came	  from	  the	  provincial	  authorities	  rather	  than	   the	   Imperial	   Court.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   emperor’s	   successful	   attainment	   of	  monopoly	  of	  power	  within	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  the	  authority	  between	  the	  central	  and	  provincial	  governments	  ebbed	  and	  flowed	  with	  the	  central	  government	  not	  always	   in	   absolute	   control.	   The	   relations	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	  governments	   were	   characterised	   by	   a	   fundamental	   contradiction:	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  provincial	  authorities	  for	  administration	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  emperor	  was	  not	  able	  to	  reach	  far	  at	  a	  high	  efficiency	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  advanced	  means	  of	  communication.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  central	  government	  tried	  to	  prevent	  the	  local	  authorities	  from	  attaining	  too	  much	  power	  for	  fear	  of	  regional	  power	  centres	  forming	  that	  might	  challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  the	   Imperial	   court.	   Preventing	   the	   local	   authorities	   from	   becoming	   too	   strong	  was	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  the	  central	  government’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  provincial	  authorities.58	   	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	   Richard	  Horowitz,	   ‘Breaking	  the	  Bonds	  of	  Precedent:	  The	  1905-­‐6	  Government	  Reform	  Commission	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  the	  Qing	  Central	  State’,	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	  37,	  No.	  4	  (Oct.,	  2003),	  pp.	  779.	   	  58	   Shaofang	   Chen,	   ‘清代地方官治行政的传统特征 	   Qingdai	   Difang	   Guanzhi	   Xingzheng	   de	   Chuantong	  Tezheng	  [The	  Traditional	  Characteristics	  of	  Local	  Administration	  and	  Bureaucracy	  in	  Qing	  Dynasty]’,	  求索
Qiu	  Suo	  [Seeker],	  No.	  7,	  (Jul.	  2006),	  pp.	  219-­‐222.	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  Map	   2.1	   A	  Map	   of	   administrative	   division	   of	   the	  Qing	   Empire.	   Apart	   from	   a	   handful	   of	   special	  administrative	  areas	  such	  as	  Mongolia,	  Manchuria	  and	  Tibet,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  had	  a	  total	  number	  of	   eighteen	   regular	   provinces.	   These	   eighteen	   provinces	  were:	   Zhili,	   Shandong,	   Shanxi,	   Henan,	  Jiangsu,	   Anhui,	   Jiangxi,	   Zhejiang,	   Fujian,	   Hubei,	   Hunan,	   Shaanxi,	   Gansu,	   Jiangsu,	   Sichuan,	  Guangdong,	  Guangxi,	  Yunnan	  and	  Guizhou.	  Later	   in	  1884	  and	  1887,	  Xinjiang	  and	  Taiwan	  were	  made	  provinces	   respectively.	  The	   eighteen	   regular	  provinces	  were	  put	  under	   a	  dual	   control	   of	  governors-­‐general	   and	   governors,	   totalling	   eight	   and	   fifteen	   respectively.59	   Two	   of	   the	   former	  controlled	  only	  one	  province	  each	  –	  Zhili	  and	  Sichuan,	  while	   the	  remaining	  six	  had	   jurisdiction	  over	   two	   to	   three	   provinces.	   These	   were:	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Liangjiang	   (Jiangsu,	   Anhui	   and	  Jiangxi),	  Minzhe	   (Fujian	  and	  Zhejiang),	   Liangguang	   (Guangdong	  and	  Guangxi),	  Huguang	   (Hubei	  and	  Hunan),	  Shangan	  (Shanxi	  and	  Gansu),	  and	  Yungui	  (Yunnan	  and	  Guizhou).60	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  dual	   control	   system	  was	   to	  make	   the	  governors-­‐general	   and	  governors	   to	   counter-­‐balance	  each	  other.61	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	   The	  number	  varied	  from	  reign	  to	  reign	  in	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  but	  did	  not	  change	  significantly.	  60	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  55.	  61	   The	   imperial	   Court	   also	   derived	   a	   sense	   of	   security	   from	   maintaining	   a	   subtle	   balance	   between	   the	  Manchus	   and	   the	   Han	   Chinese	   in	   the	   provincial	   offices.	   According	   to	   a	   statistic,	   57	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  governors-­‐general	  and	  48.4	  per	  cent	  of	  governors	  were	  Manchus,	  compared	  with	  43	  per	  cent	  and	  51.6	  per	  cent,	  respectively,	  Han	  Chinese.	  Ibid.	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Yet,	   another	   important	   characteristic	   of	   the	   political	   landscape	   of	   the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  that	  there	  was	  strong	  sense	  of	  provincialism.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  time	  in	  the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   China	   had	   eighteen	   provinces	   and	   a	   handful	   of	   special	  administrative	  areas	  (see	  Map	  2.1).	  The	  unification	  of	   the	  empire	  had	  been	  the	  paramount	  concern	  for	  the	  emperor,	  for	  unity	  meant	  peace.	  Yet	  the	  vastness	  and	  diversity	  of	  the	  empire	  often	  tended	  to	  result	  in	  disunity.	  The	  eighteen	  provinces	  that	   constituted	   China	   proper	   were	   divided	   by	   geography	   into	   clearly	  demarcated	  regions.	  Also,	  almost	  all	  provinces	  had	  agriculture	  as	  the	  pillar	  of	  the	  economy.	   In	   spite	   of	   variance	   in	   agricultural	   productivity,	   most	   of	   them	  were	  comparatively	   self-­‐sufficient.	   These	   politico-­‐economic	   conditions	   resulted	   in	   a	  tradition	   of	   minimal	   interdependence	   between	   the	   various	   provinces.	   Local	  interests	  were	  usually	  the	  paramount	  concern	  for	  provincial	  officials,	  resulting	  in	  the	   provincialism	   in	   Chinese	   political	   practice.	   These	   two	   features:	   the	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	   for	  power	  between	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   and	  provincial	   governments,	  and	   the	   provincialism	   among	   local	   leaders	   had	   characterised	   the	   political	  landscape	  of	  the	  empire.	  Before	  continuing	  our	  discussion	  of	  politics,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  make	  a	  brief	  detour	  to	  discuss	  the	  military.	  The	  military	  was	  shaped	  by	  the	  political	  dynamics,	  and	  it	  also	  played	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  affecting	  them.	  The	   vast	   territory	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   required	   a	   large	   standing	   army	   for	  defence.	  In	  comparison	  with	  previous	  Chinese	  dynasties,	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  need	  of	  a	  large	  army	  was	  even	  greater	  because	  it	  not	  only	  had	  to	  defend	  its	  borders,	  it	  but	  also	  had	  to	  defend	  the	  hinterland	  as	  well:	  the	  Manchu	  regime	  was	  threatened	  from	  within	  by	  Han	  Chinese	   anti-­‐Manchu	   sentiments,	  which	   from	   time	   to	   time	  developed	  into	  armed	  uprisings.62	   A	  standing	  army	  –	  the	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  –	  as	   large	   as	   600,000	   men	   was	   maintained.63	   In	   fact,	   to	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	   Marianne	   Bastid-­‐Bruguiere,	   'Current	   of	   Social	   Change'in	  The	   Cambridge	   History	   of	   China,	   Vol.	   11:	   Late	  
Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2,	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	   John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  594.	  63	   There	  was	  another	  branch	  of	  army	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  –	  the	  Eight	  Banner	  Army.	  This	  was	  an	  army	  mostly	  consisted	  of	  Manchus	  and	  it	  totalled	  approximately	  200,000	  men.	  This	  army	  was	  structured	  differently	  from	  the	   Green	   Standard	   Army.	   It	   was	   allowed	   to	   have	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   concentration	   (though	   it	   still	   was	  subject	  to	  checks	  and	  balances	  from	  within)	  because	  most	  of	  the	  soldiers	  and	  commanders	  were	  Manchus	  and	  many	  of	  its	  leaders	  were	  remote	  relatives	  of	  the	  emperor.	  The	  Eight	  Banner	  Army	  was	  more	  trusted	  by	  the	  Qing	  emperors	  and	  they	  symbolised	  the	  Manchu	  rule	  of	  China.	  Elliot	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Banner	  troops	  ‘were	   to	   inspire	   fear	   and	   submission	   in	   Chinese	   population’.	   While	   ‘as	   a	   supplement	   force	   to	   the	   Eight	  Banners,	  the	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  fulfilled	  a	  Qing	  wish	  to	  “use	  Han	  [Chinese]	  to	  rule	  Han	  [Chinese]”.’	  Elliott,	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threat	  from	  within	  was	  much	  greater	  than	  that	  from	  without,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  put	  down	  internal	  revolts	  had	  shaped	  the	  empire	  military	  agenda.	  H.	  Mao	  observed	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  played	  three	  roles	  at	  the	  same	  time:	  a	  national	   defence	   force,	   an	   internal	   garrison	   force,	   and	   a	   police	   force.	   Of	   these	  three	  roles,	  the	  Qing	  armed	  forces	  were	  more	  of	  the	  third	  than	  the	  first.64	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  army	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  per	  se,	  since	  most	   of	   the	   previous	   Chinese	   dynasties	   were	   not	   overthrown	   by	   foreign	  invasions	   but	   by	   revolts	   from	   within.	   Therefore,	   the	   Qing	   armed	   forces	   were	  structured	   to	  prevent	  military	  commanders	   from	  being	  able	   to	  concentrate	   too	  many	  troops	  under	  their	  command.	  There	  was	  no	  general-­‐in-­‐chief	  at	  a	  national	  level,	   the	   ranks	   of	   military	   officers	   went	   up	   no	   higher	   than	   provincial	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief,	  so	  that	  no	  military	  commander	  would	  be	  able	  to	  expand	  his	  sphere	  of	  influence	  beyond	  his	  province.	  Senior	  provincial	  military	  commanders	  had	  had	  relatively	  small	   formations	  of	  troops	  placed	  under	  their	  direct	  control;	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  troops	  were	  dispersed	  among	  numerous	  garrison	  posts	  and	  played	  a	  largely	  constabulary	  role.	  As	  Lococo	  Jr.	  wrote,	  ‘the	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  
was	   extremely	   fragmented,	   with	   literally	   thousands	   of	   large	   and	   small	   outposts	  
throughout	  the	  empire,	  many	  with	  as	  few	  as	  twelve	  men.’65	   	  Also,	  the	  provincially	  structured	  armed	  forces	  were	  placed	  under	  the	  control	  of	   civil	   officials	   and	   adopted	   a	   defensive	   posture.	   A	   key	   reason	   behind	   this	  arrangement	  was	  also	  to	  ‘tame’	  the	  military:	   	  	   ‘From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   Chinese	   officialdom,	   a	   passive	   defence	   policy	  
had	   the	   advantage	   of	   making	   it	   easier	   to	   assure	   civilian	   dominance	   in	  
China.	  An	  army	  that	  was	  assigned	  to	  garrison	  duty	  and	  seldom	  to	  the	  field	  
for	   active	   campaigning	   could	   be	   kept	   in	   leading-­‐strings	   by	   carefully	  
regulating	  its	  flow	  of	  supplies.	  Civilian	  officials,	  charged	  with	  the	  duty	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Manchu	  Way,	  pp.	  128-­‐129.	  The	  Banner	  Troops	  gradually	  became	  too	  slack	  and	  corrupt	  to	  fight	  since	  the	  early	  18th	  Century,	  and	  played	  only	  a	  symbolic	  role	  thereafter.	  Also	  see	  Mao,	  The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  
Kingdom,	  p.	  52.	  64	   Mao,	  The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Kingdom,	  p.	  53.	  65	   Paul	  Lococo	  Jr.,	  ‘The	  Qing	  Empire’	  in	  A	  Military	  History	  of	  China.	  Updated	  Edition,	  David	  Graff	  and	  Robin	  Higham	   eds.,	   (Lexington:	   University	   Press	   of	   Kentucky,	   2012),	   p.	   122.	   It	   was	   observed	   that	   ‘the	   military	  
system	  of	  the	  various	  provinces	  is	  not	  the	  same.	  The	  discipline	  is	  not	  uniform,	  and	  rations	  and	  weapons	  differ.	  
The	  drills	  are	  so	  disparate	  that	   in	  time	  of	  peace	  there	  is	  no	  communication	  between	  various	  provincial	  army	  
units	  and	  in	  time	  of	  war	  there	  is	  neither	  cooperation	  nor	  coordination.	  It	  is	  therefore	  very	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  
military	  success.’	  Li,	  The	  Political	  History	  of	  China,	  1840-­‐1928,	  p.	  214.	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providing	   food	  and	  weapons	   to	   local	  military	  commanders,	   could	   in	  any	  
dispute	   expect	   to	   balance	   one	   military	   leader	   off	   against	   another.	   This	  
made	   it	   relatively	   easy	   to	   nib	   the	   rebelliousness	   in	   bud,	   should	   any	  
military	   captain	   find	   himself	   tempted	   to	   bring	   armed	   forces	   to	   bear	   on	  
decision-­‐making	  on	  imperial	  headquarters.’66	  	   These	   characteristics	  made	   the	  Qing	   Empire’s	  military	   very	   inefficient	   and	  cumbersome.67	   China	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  was	  troubled	  not	  only	  by	  the	  First	  and	  the	  Second	  Opium	  Wars,	  but	  also	  by	  a	  series	  of	   internal	  upheavals	  and	  revolts.	  The	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  was	  the	  largest	  among	  them.	  It	  lasted	  from	  1850	  to	  1864	  and	  spread	  over	  sixteen	  provinces	  and	  destroyed	  nearly	  six	  hundred	  cities	  and	  towns.	  The	  Nien	  Rebellion	  was	   the	  second	   largest.	   It	   lasted	   from	  1851	  to	  1868	  and	   spread	   over	   eight	   provinces.	   The	   standing	   army	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   had	  great	   difficulties	   in	   tackling	   these	   rebellions,	   which	   nearly	   succeeded	   in	  overthrowing	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	   	  The	  Qing	  Empire	  survived,	  but	  its	  survival	  came	  at	  a	  price.	  A	  twofold	  major	  change	   took	   place	   and	   transformed	   the	   political	   landscape	   of	   the	   empire.	   The	  first	  major	  change	  was	  that	  the	  provincial	  governments	  gained	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  the	   central-­‐local	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   for	   political	   power;	   decentralisation	   became	   a	   key	  feature	  of	  the	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments.68	   In	  the	  early	  and	  middle	  periods	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  usually	  had	  the	  last	  word	  in	  national	  affairs.	  However,	  during	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  Imperial	  Court’s	  financial	  power	  was	  exhausted,	  and	  the	  status	  of	  emergency	  forced	   it	   to	   hand	   over	   military	   and	   financial	   authorities	   to	   provincial	  governments.	   The	   autonomy	   of	   provincial	   governments	   increased	   as	   a	  consequence,	  and	  they	  retained	  it	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  In	  the	  post-­‐Taiping	  period,	   the	   central	   government	   declined	   and	   the	   provincial	   power	   rose.69	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	   William	  McNeill,	  The	  Pursuit	   of	  Power:	  Technology,	  Armed	  Force,	  And	  Society	   Since	  A.D.	   1000.	   (Chicago:	  University	  Of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1982),	  p.	  34.	  67	   For	  more	  details	  about	  the	  ineffectiveness	  of	  the	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  in	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  see	  Mao,	  The	  
Collapse	   of	   the	   Heavenly	   Kingdom.	   For	   more	   details	   of	   the	   degradation	   of	   the	   Green	   Standard	   Army	   see	  Ergang	   Luo,	  绿营兵制	   Luying	   Bingzhi	   [A	   History	   of	   the	   Green	   Standard	   Army],	   (Beijing:	   Zhonghua	   Shuju,	  1984),	  p.	  73.	  68	   Hao	  Chang,	   ‘Intellectual	  Change	  and	  the	  Reform	  Movement,	  1890-­‐8’,	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China,	  
Vol.	  11:	  Late	  Ch'ing,	  1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2.	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	  John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  316.	  69	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  251-­‐252.	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degree	  of	  decentralisation	  of	  power	   increased,	  with	  the	   Imperial	  Court	  wishing	  to	  restore	  the	  old	  order.	   	  A	   second	  major	  change	  was	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  group	  of	  bureaucrats,	  and	  many	  of	   them	  became	   leading	   figures	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  The	   military	   forces	   that	   saved	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   from	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	  turmoil	  were	  not	  the	  standing	  army,	  but	  a	  new	  type	  of	  army	  –	  the	  local	  militias.	  The	  Xiang	  Army,	  the	  Huai	  Army	  and	  the	  Chu	  Army	  were	  the	  most	  representative	  ones	  among	  of	   this	   type	  of	  army.	  Unlike	   the	  standing	  army,	   these	   local	  militias	  had	  a	  more	  efficient	  organisational	   structure	  and	  held	  a	  more	  positive	  attitude	  towards	   Western	   weapons.	   These	   differences	   made	   them	   more	   powerful	   and	  eventually	  allowed	  them	  to	  crush	  the	  rebellions.	  However,	  because	  of	  these	  very	  differences,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   considered	   these	   local	   militias	   as	   a	   potential	  threat.	  A	  majority	  of	  the	  local	  militia	  armies	  were	  dissolved	  after	  the	  war,	  while	  some	  leaders	  of	  these	  forces	  were	  awarded	  provincial	  offices.	  For	  example,	  Zeng	  Guofan,	   leader	   of	   the	   Xiang	   Army	   was	   appointed	   as	   governor-­‐general	   of	  Liangjiang,	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   leader	   of	   the	   Huai	   Army,	   became	   the	   governor	   of	  Jiangsu	   and	   Zuo	   Zongtang,	   leader	   of	   the	   Chu	   Army	   was	   made	   governor	   of	  Zhejiang.	   These	   former	   local	  militia	   leaders,	   now	  provincial	   leaders,	   embarked	  on	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   and	   they	   were	   joined	   by	   many	   of	   their	  former	   subordinates	   who	   saw	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   as	   their	   new	  
raison	  d'être.	  The	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   was	   therefore	   initiated	   at	   a	   provincial	  level.	  At	   this	  moment,	   it	   is	  necessary	   for	  us	   to	   review	   the	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  First,	  the	  emperor	  was	  an	  autocratic	  but	  not	  a	  navalist	  ruler.	  He	  held	  a	  monopoly	  on	  power	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  tended	  to	  not	  tolerate	  any	  individual	   or	   bureaucratic	   body	   that	   had	   alternate	   authority.	   Second,	   the	  relations	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	   governments	   were	   characterised	   by	   a	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  for	  power,	  in	  which	  the	  provincial	  authorities	  gained	  the	  upper	  hand	  because	   of	   the	   turmoil	   of	   the	   mis-­‐19th	   century.	   This	   only	   intensified	   as	   the	  Imperial	   Court	   attempted	   to	   regain	   control.	   Third,	   the	   relations	   between	   the	  provinces	   were	   characterised	   by	   provincialism	   with	   the	   provincial	   leaders	  regarding	  local	  interests	  as	  their	  primary	  concern	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  	   This	  political	  landscape	  affected	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  in	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several	  ways.	   First,	   there	   lacked	   central	  direction	  and	  planning.	  The	  provincial	  promoters	  of	  naval	  modernisation	  had	  limited	  resources	  and	  capabilities,	  yet	  the	  work	   done	   in	   the	   various	   provinces	   were	   characterised	   by	   low-­‐level	   and	  obsolete	  development	   attempts,	  which	  only	   further	   lowered	   the	   cost-­‐efficiency	  of	   naval	   development.	   Second,	   The	   building	   of	   the	   navy	   enjoyed	   little	   support	  from	   the	   Imperial	   Government;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   central	   government	   was	  reluctant	  to	  see	  the	  growth	  of	  provincial	  power.	  Third,	  the	  provincial	  promoters	  of	  naval	  modernisation	  tended	  to	  compete	  rather	  than	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other,	  because	   the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	   themselves	   saw	  any	  achievement	  as	   foundation	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  power.	  	  	  
2.2	  The	  Economic	  Dimension	  	  In	   this	  dimension	  we	  will	  discuss	   the	  how	  a	  nation’s	  economy	  impacted	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  resources	  it	  can	  supply	  to	  its	  navy.	  To	  begin	  with,	  two	  types	  of	  power	  and	   their	   different	   requirement	   of	   resources	   should	   be	   distinguished.	   The	  strength	  of	  a	  continental	  power	  was	  usually	  determined	  by	  the	  size	  of	  its	  army,	  whereas	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  seapower	  was	  usually	  determined	  by	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  its	  warships.	  Armies	  and	  navies	  differed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  resources	  they	  required:	  the	  former	  is	  manpower	  intensive,	  whereas	  the	   latter	   is	  a	  capital	  and	  technology	   intensive.	   Different	   types	   of	   power	   required	   different	   forms	   of	  economies	  to	  sustain	  them.	  Agrarian	  economies	  suited	  continental	  powers	  better	  because	  they	  could	  easily	  provide	  food	  to	  upkeep	  a	  large	  population,	  from	  which	  a	  large	  armed	  force	  could	  be	  expected.	  Trade	  suited	  seapowers	  better	  because	  it	  was	  effective	  in	  nurturing	  capitalism	  and	  industrialisation,	  from	  which	  a	  strong	  navy	  could	  be	  expected.	  Agrarian	   economies	   could	   have	   deleterious	   effects	   on	   the	   growth	   of	   naval	  power,	  because	  agriculture	  pinned	  manpower	  down	  to	  land,	  and	  discouraged	  the	  development	   of	   seafaring	   communities.	   In	   comparison	   with	   seaborne	   trade,	  agriculture	  was	  a	  more	  stable	  and	  secure	  way	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  life.	  Therefore,	  agrarian	  nations	  usually	  had	  less	  impetus	  for	  seafaring.	  The	  examples	  of	  England	  and	  France	  illustrated	  this	  point.	  A	  principal	  reason	  for	  the	  French	  people’s	  lack	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of	   eagerness	   of	   seagoing,	   as	   Mahan	   observed,	   was	   that	   ‘…	   the	   physical	  
conditions	  …	  have	  made	  France	  a	  pleasant	  land,	  with	  delightful	  climate,	  producing	  
within	   itself	   more	   than	   its	   people	   needed.’70	   England	   on	   the	   other	   hand:	   ‘…	  
received	   from	   nature	   but	   little	   …	   Their	   many	   want	   …	   led	   her	   people	   abroad	   …	  
between	   products	   and	   colonies	   shipping	   is	   the	   inevitable	   link.	   So	   their	   seapower	  
grew.	  ’71	  Seaborne	   trading	   nations	   supported	   navies	   better	   not	   only	   because	   they	  attached	  greater	  importance	  to	  it,	  but	  also,	   in	  such	  societies	  navies	  could	  find	  a	  suitable	  socio-­‐economic	  basis	  in	  which	  to	  flourish.	  G.	  Till	  observed:	  	  ‘	  [merchant	  ships]	  are	  merely	  the	  outward	  sign	  of	  a	  vast	  maritime	  system	  
that	   also	   includes	   shipbuilding	   and	   repair,	   the	   fisheries,	   ports	   and	   land	  
communications,	   maritime	   insurance	   and	   a	   capitalist	   infrastructure	   to	  
underpin	   the	  whole.	   The	   eighteenth-­‐century	   Royal	  Navy	  may	   have	   been	  
the	  biggest	   industrial	  enterprise	   in	   the	  world	  but	   it	  depended	  absolutely	  
on	   the	   health	   of	   the	   maritime	   economy	   in	   general	   and	   on	   the	   skilled	  
seamen,	   navigators,	   shipwrights	   and	   artisans,	   shipyards	   and	   material	  
supplies	  associated	  with	  the	  merchant	  shipping	  industry	  in	  particular.’72	  	  Till	   further	  explained	  how	  the	  maritime	  economy	  could	  benefit	  a	  navy.	  First,	   it	  could	  devote	  huge	  resources	  to	  building	  and	  maintaining	  a	  fleet	  but	  at	   less	  real	  cost.	  Second,	  it	  supported,	  from	  the	  profits	  of	  trade,	  access	  to	  a	  mass	  of	  industrial	  and	   technological	   developments.	   Third,	   it	   could	   be	   translated	   into	   specific	  military	   advantages	   (e.g.	   Britain’s	   technological	   edge	   of	   ship	   bottom	  copper-­‐sheathing	   technique	   over	   that	   of	   France).73	   In	   this	   sense,	   even	   if	   an	  agrarian	   economy	   had	   the	   will	   to	   build	   a	   navy,	   its	   socio-­‐economic	   foundation	  would	  make	  it	  unlikely	  that	  it	  would	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  such	  achievements.	  At	   this	   point,	   a	   particular	   aspect	   of	   national	   economy	   –	   the	   capability	   of	  mobilising	   social	   capital	   should	   be	   discussed.	  Marx	   noticed	   the	   close	   relations	  between	  seapower	  and	  capitalist	  financial	  infrastructure:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	   Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History,	  p.36.	  71	   Ibid.,	  36-­‐37.	  72	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.102.	  73	   Ibid.,	  35.	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  ‘The	   system	   of	   public	   debt,	   i.e.	   of	   national	   debts,	   whose	   origin	   we	  
discovered	   in	  Genoa	  and	  Venice	   ...	  The	  colonial	  system	  with	   its	  maritime	  
trade	  and	  commercial	  wars	  served	  as	  a	  forcing-­‐house	  for	  it.	  Thus	  it	  took	  
first	  in	  Holland.’74	   	  	  Such	  financial	  infrastructures	  as	  national	  debts	  were	  very	  effective	  in	  absorbing	  surplus	  mercantile	   capitals	   from	   society	   and	   pumping	   them	   into	   naval	   coffers	  when	   required.	   Many	   powerful	   navies	   in	   the	   world	   had	   benefited	   from	   it.	  Kennedy	  claimed	  that	  the	  creation	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  financial	   institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Stock	  Exchange	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  National	  Debt	   ‘not	   only	   knit	   the	   Treasury	   and	   financiers	   together,	   but	   also	   provided	   the	  
capital	   for	   overseas	   ventures	   and	   for	   expensive	   wars’.75	   Lambert	   argued	   that	  these	  financial	  infrastructures	  ensured	  the	  English	  (later	  British)	  Royal	  Navy	  the	  financial	   strength	   to	   rule	   the	   waves.76	   The	   development	   of	   the	   French	   and	  German	  navies	  also	  benefited	  from	  such	  financial	  infrastructures,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.77	   In	  1882,	   the	   Japanese	  central	  bank,	   the	  Bank	  of	   Japan,	  was	  opened.	   In	  1886,	   the	  Meiji	  government	   issued	   its	   first	  public	  bonds	  specifically	  earmarked	  for	  naval	  expansion.	  These	  financial	  infrastructures	  greatly	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  Japanese	  naval	  power.78	  	   Mobilisation	   of	   social	   capital	   was	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   efficient	   in	   societies	  characterised	  by	  democratic	  principles.	  It	  was	  obvious	  that	  capitalists	  would	  be	  less	  willing	  to	  lend	  their	  money	  to	  a	  government	  in	  which	  they	  had	  no	  say	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making.	  Both	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	   the	  British	  National	  Debt	  were	  established	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution,	   which	   marked	   the	  commencement	   of	   a	   constitutional	   monarchy	   in	   England.	   These	   financial	  infrastructures	   transformed	   the	   navy	   from	   the	  King’s	   navy	   to	   the	   state’s	   navy.	  The	  monied	  classes	  no	  longer	  considered	  the	  navy	  as	  an	  undertaking	  irrelevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	   Karl	  Marx,	  Capital,	  Vol.	  1,	  (London:	  Penguin,	  1981),	  p.	  919.	  75	   Kennedy,	  The	  Rise	  And	  Fall	  of	  British	  Naval	  Mastery,	  p.	  71.	  76	   Lambert,	  War	  at	  Sea	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Sail,	  p.14.	   	  77	   Sumida,	  In	  Defence	  of	  Naval	  Supremacy,	  p.	  7.	  78	   Mark	  Metzler,	   Lever	   of	   Empire:	   The	   International	   Gold	   Standard	   and	   the	   Crisis	   of	   Liberalism	   in	   Prewar	  
Japan,	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2006),	  pp.	  24-­‐25.	  J.	  Charles	  Schencking,	  Making	  Waves:	  
Politics,	   Propaganda,	   and	   the	   Emergence	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	   Navy,	   1868–1922,	   (Stanford:	   Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  p.	  37.	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to	  themselves	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  investment.	  The	  improvement	  of	  financial	  
capabilities	   in	   the	   Germany	   and	   France	   had	   also	   been	   enabled	   by	   pro-­‐democracy	  
political	  reforms:	  	  
‘During	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  Germany	  Empire	  and	  France	  reformed	  their	  
state	   bureaucracies	   …	   founded	   national	   banks,	   which	   provided	   an	  
apparatus	  through	  which	  the	  state	  could	  borrow,	  and	  constituted	  elected	  
legislative	  bodies	   that	   controlled	   the	   state	  budget	  and	   in	   the	  manner	  of	  
the	  British	  parliament,	  which	  improved	  government	  credit	  because	  loans	  
to	   the	   state	   were	   secured	   by	   the	  measure	   of	   control	   over	   taxation	   and	  
spending	   that	   was	   held	   by	   the	   elected	   representatives	   of	   monied	  
interests.’79	  	   Navies	  became	  even	  more	  expensive	   in	   the	   age	  of	   steam.	  The	   leapfrogging	  development	   of	   naval	   technology	   and	   the	   resulting	   fast	   upgrading	   of	   naval	  hardware	  further	  increased	  the	  costliness	  of	  navy.	  Engels	  observed:	   	  	  
‘…	  the	  rivalry	  between	  armour-­‐plating	  and	  the	  fire	  power	  of	  guns	  is	  so	  far	  
from	   being	   at	   an	   end	   that	   nowadays	   a	   ship	   is	   almost	   always	   not	   up	   to	  
requirements,	   already	   out	   of	   date,	   before	   it	   is	   launched.	   The	   modern	  
warship	  is	  not	  only	  a	  product,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  specimen	  of	  modern	  
large-­‐scale	   industry,	   a	   floating	   factory-­‐producing	   mainly,	   to	   be	   sure,	   a	  
lavish	  waste	  of	  money	  …	  
	  
…	  the	  state	  …	  has	  now	  to	  pay	  for	  one	  ship	  as	  much	  as	  a	  whole	  small	  fleet	  
used	  to	  cost;	  …	  [and]	  has	  to	  resign	  itself	  to	  seeing	  these	  expensive	  vessels	  
become	  obsolete,	  and	  therefore	  worthless,	  even	  before	  they	  slide	  into	  the	  
water.’	   80	  	  In	   this	   context,	   it	  was	   increasingly	  difficult	   for	   traditional	   state-­‐owned	  military	  industrial	   plants	   to	   build	   warships	   of	   the	   latest	   design	   at	   low	   cost.	   McNeill	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	   Sumida,	  In	  Defence	  of	  Naval	  Supremacy,	  p.	  7.	  80	   Friedrich	  Engels,	  Anti-­‐Duhring,	  1878.	  Reprint.	  (New	  York:	  International	  Publishers,	  1970),	  p.	  191.	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observed	  that	  many	  state-­‐owned	  arsenals	  with	  high	  operational	  costs	  stood	  idle	  much	  of	  the	  time	  because	  the	  nation’s	  demands	  were	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  keep	  them	   busy.81	   This	   often	   resulted	   in	   state-­‐owned	   arsenals	   producing	   obsolete	  models	   at	   higher	   production	   costs.82	   This	   problem	   could	   only	   be	   solved	   by	  allowing	   greater	   participation	   of	   private	   arms	   manufacturers	   who	   engaged	   in	  international	   sales.83	   However,	   this	  was	   only	   likely	   to	   happen	   in	   democracies.	  Absolutist	   governments	   whose	   policies	   lacked	   flexibility	   were	   less	   capable	   of	  tackling	  the	  limits	  in	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  state-­‐owned	  arms	  manufacturing.	  	   ***	  	  The	  economy	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  very	  different	  from	  that	  of	  those	  of	  a	  true	  seapower.	  The	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  a	  continental	  power	  with	  a	  huge	  population	  of	  some	  430	  million	  in	  the	  1850s,	  with	  a	  standing	  army	  as	  large	  as	  800,000	  men.84	  Soil	  and	  human	   labour	  constituted	  the	  economic	   foundations	  of	   the	  country.	   In	  contrast	   to	   the	   seapowers	   whose	   national	   strength	   was	   hinged	   on	   the	   wealth	  created	  through	  trading,	  agriculture	  was	  the	  economic	  pillar	  for	  Chinese	  empires.	  In	   the	   eyes	  of	  Chinese	   emperors,	   prosperous	   agriculture	  meant	  not	  only	   social	  stability,	  but	  also	  greatness	  of	  the	  nation,	  as	  prosperous	  agriculture	  could	  uphold	  a	  large	  population,	  and	  a	  large	  population	  could	  nurture	  a	  strong	  army.	  Most	  of	  the	   succeeding	   Chinese	   empires	   had	   attached	   great	   importance	   to	   agriculture;	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  no	  exception.	  This	   economic	   pattern	   shaped	   China’s	   military	   and	   its	   strategy.	   Chinese	  warfare	  was	  mainly	  revolved	  around	  agriculture.	  As	  the	  historian	  L.	  Ni	  observed	  that	  when	  China	  was	   in	  disunity,	  Chinese	  military	  behaviour	   tended	   to	   show	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  aggressiveness,	  because	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  military	  was	  to	  capture	  arable	   lands	  (e.g.	   the	  wars	   in	   the	  Spring	  and	  Autumn	  Period).	  When	  China	  was	  unified,	   the	   aggressiveness	   usually	   declined	   as	   the	   nation’s	  military	   adopted	   a	  defensive	  posture	  partly	  because	  the	  capture	  of	  arable	  land	  had	  been	  completed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	   McNeill,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Power,	  pp.	  271-­‐272.	  82	   McNeill	   observed	   that	   the	   state-­‐owned	   Woolwich	   Royal	   Arsenal	   had	   invested	   in	   new	   machinery	   for	  producing	  larger	  and	  larger	  wrought	  iron	  guns	  for	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ever	  since	  the	  1860s.	  But	  the	  shift	  to	  steel	  escalated	  costs	  so	  suddenly	  and	  drastically	  that	  the	  responsible	  authorities	  balked	  at	  installing	  the	  necessary	  new	  facilities	  at	  Woolwich.	  Ibid.,	  271.	  83	   Ibid.,	  271-­‐272.	  84	   This	  number	  includes	  600,000	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  plus	  200,000	  Eight	  Banner	  Army.	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making	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  said	  land	  becoming	  its	  top	  priority.	  The	  government	  too	   became	   preoccupied	   with	   the	   administration	   of	   the	   vast	   empire	   and	   the	  management	  of	  agricultural	  activities	  within	  it.85	   	  In	   the	   same	   sense,	   there	   existed	   no	   Western-­‐style	   navy	   in	   the	   Chinese	  military	   system,	   fundamentally	   because	   China’s	   strength	   came	   from	   within,	  rather	  than	  from	  overseas.	  Instead	  of	  a	  navy,	  China	  had	  water	  forces	  (the	  name	  is	  translated	   literally	   in	   order	   to	   underscore	   the	   difference).	   They	  were	   different	  from	  Western	  navies	  in	  three	  interconnected	  senses:	  first,	  the	  water	  forces	  were	  structured	  differently.	   In	  conformity	  with	  Chinese	  military	  traditions,	  the	  water	  
forces	  were	  subject	  to	  no	  centralised	  command.	  The	  water	  forces	  were	  organised	  provincially,	   and	   their	   disposition	   was	   highly	   dispersed.86	   Secondly,	   unlike	  Western	  navies,	  the	  water	  forces	  were	  not	  a	  sea-­‐going	  force.	  As	  Lorge	  pointed	  out:	  ‘naval	   needs	   of	   Chinese	   empires	  were	   usually	   limited	   to	   the	   rivers	   and	   canals	   of	  
their	   own	   territory,	   not	   the	   sea	   coast.’87	   Thirdly,	   the	   water	   forces	   main	   tasks	  consisted	  in	  patrolling	  rivers	  and	  territorial	  waters	  against	  smuggling	  and	  piracy,	  since	  ‘Chinese	  empire	  was	  never	  really	  mercantilistic’	  and	  ‘there	  was	  no	  single	  case	  
in	   which	   the	   Chinese	   Imperial	   Navy	   captured	   and	   off-­‐shore	   market.’ 88	  Consequently,	  ‘there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  man-­‐of-­‐war	  in	  China	  
since	  capturing	  an	  existing	  off-­‐shore	  market	  was	  never	  on	  the	  Chinese	  agenda.’89	  	   More	   specifically,	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   economy	  was	   a	   self-­‐sufficient	   natural	  economy.	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  provinces	  were	  the	  largest	  economic	  units;	  at	  the	  most	  basic	   level,	   the	  economy	  was	  composed	  of	  numerous	  self-­‐supporting	  cells	  of	   peasant	   households.	   The	   situation	  was	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   French	   economy	  depicted	  by	  Marx	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Brumaire	  of	  Louis	  Bonaparte:	  	  ‘…	   an	   enormous	   mass	   whose	   members	   live	   in	   similar	   conditions	   but	  
without	  entering	  into	  manifold	  relations	  with	  each	  other	  …	  their	  field	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	   Lexiong	   Ni,	  文明的转型与中国海权:	  从陆权走向海权的历史必然	   Wenming	   de	   zhuanxing	   yu	   Zhongguo	  
haiquan:	  Cong	  lunquan	  zouxiang	  haiquan	  de	  lishi	  biran	  [Civilisationa	  Transformation	  and	  China's	  Sea	  Power:	  
The	  Historical	  Inevitability	  of	  Moving	  from	  Land	  Power	  to	  Sea	  Power],	  (Beijing:	  Xinhua	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  173.	  86	   Mao,	  The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Kingdom,	  p.	  50.	  87	   Peter	  Lorge,	  ‘Water	  Forces	  and	  Naval	  Operations’	  in	  A	  Military	  History	  of	  China.	  Updated	  Edition,	  David	  Graff	  and	  Robin	  Higham	  eds.,	  (Lexington:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  2012),	  p.	  82.	   	  88	   Gang	  Deng,	  Maritime	  Sector,	  Institutions,	  and	  Sea	  Power	  of	  Premodern	  China.	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwook	  Press,	  1999),	  p.	  207.	  89	   Ibid.,	  212.	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production,	   the	   small	   holding,	   permits	   no	   division	   of	   labor	   in	   its	  
cultivation,	  no	  application	  of	  science,	  and	  therefore	  no	  multifariousness	  
of	  development,	  no	  diversity	  of	  talent,	  no	  wealth	  of	  social	  relationships	  …	  
a	   small	   holding,	   the	   peasant	   and	   his	   family;	   beside	   it	   another	   small	  
holding,	   another	   peasant	   and	   another	   family.	   A	   few	   score	   of	   these	  
constitute	   a	   village,	   and	   a	   few	   score	   villages	   constitute	   a	   department.	  
Thus	   the	   great	   mass	   of	   …	   nation	   is	   formed	   by	   the	   simple	   addition	   of	  
homologous	   magnitudes,	   much	   as	   potatoes	   in	   a	   sack	   form	   a	   sack	   of	  
potatoes.’	   90	  	  This	  form	  of	  economy	  determined	  that	  the	  Qing	  Chinese	  society	  had	  only	  limited	  need	   for	   trade.	   Fundamentally	   because	   there	  was	   low	   social	   division	  of	   labour	  and	   the	   productivity	   of	   each	   basic	   unit	   of	   economy	   was	   equally	   low.	  Consequently,	   such	  an	  economy	  had	  an	  adverse	   impact	  on	   the	  development	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  as	  well	  as	  industrialisation	  in	  China.	  	   Mercantilism	   was	   considered	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   agrarian	   economy;	   steps	  were	  taken	  to	  inhibit	  commerce	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  agriculture.91	   A	  tradition	  called	  ‘exalting	   agriculture	   and	   disparaging	   commerce’	   was	   cultivated	   in	   Chinese	  society.92	   Merchants	  and	  mercantile	  capitals	  were	  put	  under	  strict	  control.	  The	  authorities	  were	  vigilant	  of	  undue	  concentration	  of	  too	  much	  wealth	  as	  much	  as	  they	  were	  vigilant	  of	  undue	  concentration	  of	  too	  many	  troops	  under	  one	  military	  commander.	   Merchants	   were	   encouraged	   to	   convert	   themselves	   into	   land	  owners	  rather	  than	  re-­‐invest	  and	  expand.	  As	  McNeill	  observed:	  	  ‘Chinese	   merchants	   and	   manufacturers	   themselves	   subscribed	   to	   the	  
value	   system	   that	   limited	   their	   roles	   in	   society	   to	   comparatively	  modest	  
proportions.	   They	   proved	   this	   by	   investing	   in	   land	   and	   in	   education	   for	  
their	   sons,	   who	   thus	   join	   the	   dominant	   landowning	   class	   and	   could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	   Karl	  Marx,	   'The	  Eighteenth	  Brumaire	  of	  Louis	  Napoleon'	  in	  Selected	  Works,	  Vol.	  1.	  Karl	  Marx.,	  (Moscow:	  Foreign	  Languages	  Publishing	  House,	  1962),	  p.	  334.	   	  91 	   Daqing	   Wang,	   ‘1980	   年以来中国古代重农抑商问题研究综述 	   1980	   Nian	   Yilai	   Zhongguo	   Gudai	  Zhongnongyishang	  Wenti	   Yanjiu	   Zongshu	   [A	   Review	   of	   Researches	   concerning	   Ancient	   Chinese	   Policy	   of	  Encouraging	  Agriculture	  and	  Restraining	  Commerce	  Since	  1980]’,	  Trends	  of	  Recent	  Researches	  on	  the	  History	  
of	  China,	  No.	  3.	  (Mar.,	  2000),	  pp.	  12.	  92	   ‘重农抑商’	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compete	  for	  a	  place	  in	  the	  ranks	  of	  officialdom.’	   93	   	  	  In	  most	   of	   the	   Chinese	   empires	   since	   antiquity,	   manufacturing	   and	   commerce	  were	  considered	  less	  important	  and	  as	  society’s	  ‘minor	  undertakings’	  (mo	  ye)	  as	  opposed	   to	   the	   ‘fundamental	   undertaking’	   (ben	   ye)	   of	   agriculture.94	   Chinese	  economic	   policies	   tended	   to	   favour	   the	   latter	   rather	   than	   the	   former.	   The	  emperor,	  who	  was	  supposed	  to	  epitomise	  Chinese	  values,	  opined	  in	  response	  to	  the	  McCartney	  Mission’s	  display	  of	  the	  cream	  of	  British	  modern	  industry:	  ‘I	  set	  no	  
value	   on	   objects	   strange	   or	   ingenious,	   and	   have	   no	   use	   for	   your	   country's	  
manufactures.’95	   	  In	   the	   same	   sense,	   science	   and	   technology	   received	   very	   little	   attention	   in	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  The	   four	   constituent	   functional	  groups	  of	   the	  Chinese	   society	  were,	  in	  precedency	  order,	  scholars,	  peasants,	  artisans,	  and	  tradesmen.	  Artisans,	  the	   social	   group	   that	   had	   the	   strongest	   potential	   in	   promoting	   science	   and	  technology,	   were	   considered	   to	   be	   lower	   than	   peasants	   and	   only	   higher	   than	  tradesmen.	   The	   governmental	   repression	   of	   the	   artisans,	   merchants	   and	  mercantile	   capitals	   hindered	   the	   development	   of	   science	   and	   technology,	   and	  impeded	   the	   development	   of	   industrialisation.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   answers	   to	   the	  Needham	   Question	   disclosed,	   totalitarianism,	   which	   was	   usually	   symbiotic	   to	  agrarian	   economy,	   should	   take	  most	   of	   the	   blame	   of	   China’s	   backwardness	   in	  science.96	   Consequently,	   the	   Chinese	   society	   lacked	   a	   solid	   commercial	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	   McNeill,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Power,	  p.	  48.	  94	   Minor	   undertaking	   is	   known	   as	   末业	   (mo	   ye)	   in	   Chinese,	  whereas	   agriculture	   is	   known	   as	   本业	   (ben	  
ye).	  95	   Qianlong,	  Letter	  to	  George	  III	  (1792),	  University	  of	  California,	  Santa	  Barbara.	  Retrieved	  January	  25,	  2015;	   	  Between	  mid-­‐18th	  century	  and	  the	  First	  Opium	  War	  (1839-­‐1842)	  most	  of	  Chinese	  international	  trade	  was	  carried	  out	  via	  the	  Hong	  merchants	  in	  Guangzhou.	  A	  key	  reason	  for	  China’s	  confining	  international	  trade	  to	  Guangzhou	  was	  that	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  feared	  that	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  foreign	  ships	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  collusion	  between	  foreigners	  and	  traitorous	  natives.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  141.	  Yet,	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Hong	  merchants	  was	  normally	  regarded	  as	  a	  burden	  rather	  than	  a	  privilege.	  Peer	  Vries,	  State,	  
Economy	  and	  the	  Great	  Divergence:	  Great	  Britain	  and	  China,	  1680s-­‐1850s,	  (London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academics,	  2015),	   p.	   357.	  The	  Hong	  merchants,	   in	   the	  words	  of	  Wakeman	   Jr.,	   played	   an	   ‘unwilling	   role	  …	  as	   security	  
merchants.’	  Frederic	  Wakeman,	  Strangers	  at	  the	  Gate:	  Social	  Disorder	  in	  South	  China,	  1839-­‐1861,	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1966),	  p.	  44.	   	  96	   The	  Needham	  Question	  is	  known	  as:	  why	  did	  modern	  science,	  the	  mathematisation	  of	  hypotheses	  about	  Nature,	  with	  all	  its	  implications	  for	  advanced	  technology,	  take	  its	  meteoric	  rise	  only	  in	  the	  West	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Galileo	  [but]	  had	  not	  developed	  in	  Chinese	  civilisation	  (or	  Indian	  or	  Islamic)?	  Joseph	  Needham,	  The	  Grand	  
Titration:	  Science	  and	  Society	  in	  East	  and	  West,	  (London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1969),	  p.	  16.	  Karl	  Wittfogel	  used	  'Oriental	  Despotism',	  while	  Joseph	  Needham	  used	  'Bureaucratic	  Feudalism'	  to	  describe	  the	  structural	  obstacle	  of	  Chinese	  development	  of	  science	  during	  imperial	  times.	  See	  Karl	  A.	  Wittfogel,	  Oriental	  Despotism:	  
A	  Comparative	  Study	  of	  Total	  Power,	  (New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1957)	  and	  Needham,	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industrial	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  naval	  power.	   	  	  	  
	  	  Map	  2.2	  A	  map	  of	  the	  Grand	  Canal.97	   	   Totalling	  nearly	  1,800	  km,	  the	  Grand	  Canal	  was	  the	  world’s	  longest	  artificial	  canal.	  It	  started	  from	  Hangzhou	  in	  the	  south	  and	  ended	  in	  Beijing	  in	  the	  north.	  It	  also	  linked	  three	  major	  navigable	  rivers:	  the	  Yangtze	  River,	  the	  Huai	  River	  and	  the	  Yellow	  River.	  The	  canal	  was	  mainly	  used	   for	  shipping	  grains	   from	  the	  south	   to	   the	  north.	   In	   its	  height,	  more	  than	  8,000	  boats	  transport	  around	  300,000	  tons	  of	  grain	  through	  the	  Grand	  Canal	  yearly.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Grand	  Titration,	  pp.	  190-­‐217.	  For	  more	  recent	  critiques	  against	  these	  lines	  of	  interpretation,	  see	  Roger	  Hart,	   ‘Beyond	   Science	   and	   Civilization:	   A	   Post-­‐Needham	   Critique’,	   East	   Asian	   Science,	   Technology,	   and	  
Medicine,	   No.	   16,	   (1999),	   pp.	   88-­‐114;	   and	   Benjamin	   A.	   Elman,	   ‘The	   Failures	   of	   Contemporary	   Chinese	  Intellectual	  History’,	  Eighteenth-­‐Century	  Studies,	  Vol.	  43,	  No.	  3,	  (Spring	  2010),	  pp.	  371-­‐391.	  97	   Susan	  M.	  Jones	  and	  Philip	  A.	  Kuhn,	  ‘Dynastic	  Decline	  and	  the	  Roots	  of	  Rebellion’	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  
of	  China	  Volume	  10:	  Late	  Ch'ing	  1800–1911,	  Part	  1.	  Ed.	  John	  K.	  Fairbank,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  120.	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The	   Qing	   government	   also	   discouraged	   seagoing	   activities,	   as	   they	   were	  difficult	  to	  oversee.	  The	  North	  China	  Plain	  and	  the	  Yangtze	  Plain,	  due	  to	  its	  fertile	  land	  and	  good	  irrigation,	  were	  the	  centres	  of	  agriculture	  production.98	   It	  seemed	  to	   be	   a	   necessity	   to	   develop	   a	   degree	   of	   maritime	   transportation,	   as	   the	  agricultural	  centre	  was	  concentrated	  in	  places	  not	  far	  from	  the	  sea	  and	  navigable	  rivers,	   and	   was	   distant	   from	   the	   places	   where	   the	   grain	   was	   needed.	   But	   the	  successive	   Chinese	   empires,	   never	   lacked	   the	   capability	   to	   mobilise	   large	  amounts	   of	   manpower,	   solved	   the	   problem	   of	   transportation	   by	   building	   an	  artificial	   canal	   –	   the	   Grand	   Canal	   (see	   Map	   2.2),	   which	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	  continued	   to	   use.	   It	   further	   developed	   well-­‐designed	   supervision	   system	   to	  oversee	   transportation	   along	   the	   Grand	   Canal	   and	   appointed	   senior	   imperial	  officials	   to	   be	   in	   charge	   of	   its	   management.	   Maritime	   transportation	   was	   not	  encouraged.	   	  Another	   reason	   why	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   discouraged	   seagoing	   activities	   was	  that	   in	   the	  early	  and	  mid-­‐Qing	  Dynasty,	   the	  sea	  was	  a	  major	  source	  of	  security	  threats.	   Taiwan	   Island	   and	   a	   number	   of	   other	   islands	   in	   its	   vicinity	   remained	  under	   the	   control	  of	   the	   residual	   forces	  of	   the	  Ming	  Dynasty	  until	   the	   late	  17th	  century.	  These	   island	   forces	  harassed	   the	   southeast	   coastal	   areas	   from	   time	   to	  time.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	  pirates	  operated	  along	   the	  southern	  Chinese	  seaboard	  throughout	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty.99	   Instead	   of	   strengthening	   the	   water	   forces	   to	  eradicate	   the	   threats,	   the	   continental-­‐minded	   Qing	   authorities	   tightened	   the	  control	  of	   the	   inhabitants	  of	  seaboard	  areas	   in	  order	  to	  cut	   the	  enemy	  off	   from	  supply	  of	   food	   and	  other	  materials.100	   In	   commenting	  upon	  a	   report	   sent	  by	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	   Quansheng	   Ge	   et	   al.	   ‘过去 300	   年中国部分省区耕地资源数量变化及驱动因素分析	   Guoqu	   300	   Nian	  Zhongguo	   Bufen	   Shengqu	   Gengdi	   Shuliang	   Bianhua	   Ji	   Qudong	   Yinsu	   Fenxi	   [Changes	   of	   Cultivated	   Land	  Quantity	  and	  Driving	  Forces	  Analysis	  of	   Some	  Provinces	  of	  China	   in	  Past	  300	  Years]’,	  Progress	   in	  Natural	  
Science,	  Vol.	  13,	  No.	  8.	  (2003),	  pp.	  825-­‐832.	  99	   Yuxiang	   Chen,	   ‘清代中叶广东海盗之研究	   (1810-­‐1885)	   Qingdai	   Zhongye	   Guangdong	   Haidao	   zhi	   Yanjiu	  [The	  Study	  of	  Chinese	  Pirates	  along	  the	  Coast	  of	  Guangdong	  Province	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  1810-­‐1885]’,	  
Cheng	  Kung	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Studies,	  No.	  34.	  (Jun.,	  2008),	  pp.	  94-­‐95.	  Yajuan	  Zhang,	  ‘近十五年来清代乾嘉
年间海盗问题的研究	   Jin	  Shiwunian	  Lai	  Qingdai	  Qianjia	  Nianjian	  Haidao	  Wenti	  de	  Yanjiu	  [Researches	  in	  the	  Last	   Fifteen	  Years	   concerning	  Maritime	  Piracy	   in	  Qian	  Long-­‐Jia	   Jing	  Regimes	  of	  Qing	  Dynasty]’,	  Trends	   of	  
Recent	  Researches	  on	  the	  History	  of	  China,	  No.	  3.	  (Mar-­‐Apr.,	  2012),	  pp.42-­‐49.	  100	   Prior	   to	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   only	   in	   rare	   cases	   the	   Qing	   government	   tried	   to	   tackle	  seaborne	   threats	   by	   means	   of	   naval	   counterattack.	   The	   Qing	   Government	   in	   1662	   ordered	   coastal	  inhabitants	   from	   Shandong	   province	   in	   the	   north	   to	  Guangdong	   province	   in	   the	   south	   to	  move	   inland	   to	  negate	   the	   coast	   as	   a	   battleground	   and	   to	   cut	   off	   the	   supply	   lines	   of	   Zheng	  Chenggong	  –	   a	  Ming	  Dynasty	  loyalist	  who	  used	  his	   navy	   to	  harass	   the	  mainland’s	   coast.	   The	  Qing	  Empire	  developed	   a	  degree	  of	   naval	  force	  to	  launch	  a	  counterattack	  in	  the	  mid-­‐17th	  century,	  but	  the	  navy	  no	  longer	  remained	  on	  a	  war	  footing	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local	  official	  about	  pirates,	  the	  Kangxi	  Emperor	  said:	  ‘there	  is	  no	  den	  for	  pirates	  in	  
the	   ocean.	   They	   are	   in	   fact	   land-­‐based	   gangsters	   …	   local	   officials	   should	   watch	  
closely	   the	   land	   [rather	   than	   the	   sea].’101	   Notably	   among	   the	   steps	   taken	   to	  address	   maritime	   threats	   by	   land	   were	   the	   sea	   ban	   –	   decree	   that	   prohibited	  seagoing,	   and	   the	   relocation	   of	   coastal	   inhabitants. 102 	   To	   which	   Fairbank	  observed:	   	  	  
‘…	  instead	  of	  controlling	  the	  sea,	  the	  Ming	  and	  Ch’ing	  [Qing]	  both	  applied	  
to	  maritime	   enemies	   the	   concept	   developed	   against	   invaders	   by	   land	  …	  [the	   concept	   was]	   applied	   to	   the	   japan-­‐based	   pirates	   of	   the	   Sixteenth	  
Century	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Manchu	   sea	   rebels	   under	   Cheng	   Ch’eng-­‐kung	  [Koxinga]	   in	   the	   Seventeenth	   Century,	   this	   called	   for	   withdrawing	   the	  
Chinese	  population	  and	  resources	  from	  the	  whole	  seacoast,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
great	  suffering,	  and	  shutting	  off	  maritime	  trade…’	   103	  	  Consequent	   to	   the	   abovementioned	   reasons,	   the	   Chinese	   state-­‐sponsored	  seafaring	  activities	  was	  very	  weak,	  and	  when	  China	  had	  to	  develop	  a	  navy	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  there	  was	  very	  little	  that	  Chinese	  society	  could	  offer	  in	  support	  a	  steam	  navy.	   	  As	  to	  finance,	  unlike	  European	  seapowers	  whose	  rise	  benefited	  greatly	  from	  the	  combination	  between	  maritime	  exploration,	  trade,	  and	  overseas	  colonies,	  the	  Chinese	   empire	   dismissed	   commerce	   as	   a	   means	   to	   create	   national	   wealth.	  Instead,	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   governmental	   revenue	  of	   the	  Qing	  Dynasty	   came	   from	  land	   taxes.104	   Due	   to	   the	   slow	   increase	   in	   cultivated	   land,	   the	   national	  wealth	  accumulated	   only	   at	   a	   moderate	   pace.	   The	   expenditures,	   consisting	   mainly	   of	  military	  expenses	  and	  officials’	  salaries,	  remained	  steady,	  if	  not	  increased	  due	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  after	  the	  Ming	  Dynasty	  loyalists	  were	  annihilated.	  Benjamin	  A.	  Elman,	  ‘Naval	  Warfare	  and	  the	  Refraction	  of	  China’s	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Reforms	   into	   Scientific	   and	   Technological	   Failure,	   1865-­‐1895’.	  Modern	   Asian	  
Studies,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  2	  (2004),	  pp.	  283-­‐326.	  101	   GZD-­‐KX,	  Vol.	  34,	  p.	  1.	  102	   Hongbin	   Wang,	  清代前期海防：思想与制度[Coastal	   Defence	   in	   the	   Early	   Qing	   Dynasty:	   Theory	   and	  
System],	  (Beijing:	  Social	  Sciences	  Academic	  Press,	  2002),	  pp	  60-­‐61.	  Yishan	  Xiao,	  清代通史	   qingdai	  tongshi	  
[A	   General	   History	   of	   the	   Qing	   Period],	   Revised	   Edition,	   (Taibei:	   The	   Commercial	   Press,	   Ltd.,	   1962),	   pp.	  370-­‐372.	  103	   J.	  Fairbank,	  ‘Introduction:	  Varieties	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Military	  Experience’	  in	  Chinese	  Ways	  in	  Warfare,	  F.	  A.	  Kierman	  and	  J.	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1974),	  pp.	  25-­‐26.	  104	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  59.	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war	   and	   natural	   disasters.	   According	   to	   the	   calculation	   of	   Y.	   Xiao,	   during	   the	  reign	   of	   the	   Qianlong	   Emperor,	   the	   heyday	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire,	   the	   annual	  revenue	  was	  around	   forty-­‐three	   to	   forty-­‐four	  million	   taels	  and	   the	  surplus	  was	  around	  eight	  to	  nine	  million	  taels.105	  	  	  
Years 1836-45 1846-55 1856-65 1866-75 1876-85 1986-95 1896-1911 
Number of 
Incidents 
246 933 2,332 909 385 314 653 
Table	   2.1	   Frequencies	   of	   domestic	   insurrections	   from	   1836	   to	   1911.106	   It	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   this	  table	   that	   the	   frequency	   of	   domestic	   revolts	   was	   high	   in	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century.	   These	   revolts,	  together	  with	  the	  two	  Opium	  Wars,	  had	  exhausted	  the	  imperial	  coffers	  of	  the	  empire	  and	  induced	  the	  emergence	  of	  local	  militia	  forces,	  from	  which	  many	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  emerged.	   	  	  	   In	  such	  economic	  context,	  the	  growth	  of	  national	  wealth	  depended	  on	  good	  harvest	  and	   the	  absence	  of	  war	  and	  natural	  disasters.	  The	   imperial	  coffers	  had	  managed	  to	  accumulate	  a	  saving	  of	  around	  70	  million	  taels	  over	  a	  stable	  period	  spanning	   the	   reign	   of	   the	   Kangxi,	   Yongzheng	   and	   Qianlong	   emperors. 107	  However,	  the	  savings	  accumulated	  in	  that	  period	  were	  soon	  used	  up	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  rampant	  anti-­‐Manchu	  secret	  societies	  and	  rebellions	  such	   as	   the	   White	   Lotus,	   Taiping	   and	   Nien	   Rebellions	   dealt	   a	   heavy	   blow	   on	  Chinese	   economy	   not	   only	   because	   they	   resulted	   in	   huge	  military	   expenditure	  but	   they	   also	   severely	   disrupted	   agricultural	   production	   –	   the	   empire’s	   main	  source	  of	  income	  (see	  Figure	  2.4).108	   The	  two	  major	  foreign	  wars,	  the	  First	  and	  the	   Second	  Opium	  War	   in	   the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  had	   also	   contributed	   greatly	   in	  exhausting	  the	  savings	  made	  in	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.109	   The	  finances	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  61,	  p.	  63.,	  Xiao,	  A	  General	  History	  of	  the	  Qing	  Period,	  pp.	  432-­‐435,	  See	  also	  Yuping	  Ni,	  清朝嘉道财政与社会 Qingchao	   jia-­‐dao	  caizheng	  yu	   shehui	   [Finance	  and	  Society	   in	   the	  Qing	  
Dynasty,	  Jiaqing	  and	  Daoguang	  Periods],	  (Beijing:	  The	  Commercial	  Press,	  2013),	  pp.	  52-­‐53,	  106	   Marianne	  Bastid-­‐Bruguiere,	   'Current	   of	   Social	   Change'in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	   of	   China,	   Vol.	   11:	   Late	  
Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2,	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	   John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  594.	  107	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  126.	  108	   Kang	  Chao,	  Man	  and	  Land	  in	  Chinese	  History:	  An	  Economic	  Analysis,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  p.	  31.	  109	   Mao	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  Opium	  War	  cost	   the	  Qing	  government	  about	  250	  million	   taels,	   see	  Mao,	  The	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of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   were	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   bankruptcy	   by	   the	   1860s	   when	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  started.	  By	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   the	   empire	   was	  suffering	  from	  a	  severe	  shortage	  of	  capital.	  Gerschenkron’s	  research	  shows	  that	  in	   the	   first	   spurt	  of	   industrialisation	  of	   the	   ‘backward’	  European	   countries	   like	  Russia	  and	  Germany,	  state	  budgets	  and	  industrial	  banks	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  offsetting	   the	   limited	  market	   demand	   and	   capital	   supply.110	   The	   Qing	   Empire,	  however,	   refused	   to	   establish	   such	   financial	   infrastructure	   to	   mobilise	   social	  capital.	  Feuerwerker	  explained:	   	  	   ‘The	   failure	   of	   the	   Ch'ing	   [Qing]	   government	   to	   promote	   a	   modern	  
banking	   system	   which	   could	   foster	   industrial	   investment	   ultimately	  
stemmed	   from	   the	   same	   causes	   which	   made	   it	   unable	   to	   invest	   in	  
economic	  development	   from	  its	  own	  budget.	   In	  brief,	   the	   fiscal	  system	  of	  
the	  central	  government	  like	  other	  aspects	  of	  its	  administration	  was	  quite	  
superficial.	   Even	   in	   normal	   times	   the	   imperial	   bureaucracy	   …	   did	   not	  
penetrate	   very	   deeply	   into	   Chinese	   society,	   including	   those	   aspects	   of	  
society	  which	  constituted	  the	  economy.	  The	  central	  government	  normally	  
confined	   its	   economic	   role	   to	   claiming	   its	   share	   of	   a	   relatively	   fixed	  
economic	   product	   and	   to	   providing	   the	   internal	   order	   and	   external	  
defences	   which	   would	   permit	   that	   product	   to	   be	   reproduced	   from	   one	  
year	  to	  the	  next.	  This	  was	  of	  course	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  main	  stream	  of	  
the	  Confucian	  political	  ideology.	  …	  [it	  was	  not	  that	  there	  were	  no	  means	  to	   depart	   from	   economic	   passivity]	   …	   Such	   departures,	   however,	   were	  
perhaps	  particularly	  difficult	   for	  the	  ultra-­‐conservative	  Manchu	  dynasty,	  
always	  conscious	  of	   its	   foreign	  origin	  and	  determined	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  
mandate	  by	  upholding	  Confucian	  orthodoxy.’111	   	  	  The	   ruling	   Manchus	   were	   reluctant	   to	   establish	   a	   modern	   financial	  infrastructure	   in	   order	   to	   nurture	   its	  modern	   defence	   industry	   because	   it	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Collapse	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Kingdom,	  p.	  421	  and	  p.	  465.	  110	   Albert	  Feuerwerker,	  ‘Economic	  Trends	  in	  the	  Late	  Ch'ing	  Empire,	  1870-­‐1911’	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  
of	  China,	  Vol.	   11:	  Late	  Ch'ing,	  1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2,	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	   John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  59.	  111	   Ibid.,	  59-­‐60.	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against	  Confucian	  ideology,	  which	  they	  had	  to	  observe	  to	  justify	  their	  legitimacy	  to	  rule.	  Instead,	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  money	  that	  China	  used	  to	  support	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  efforts	  came	  from	  the	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service,	  an	  institution	  established	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  Second	  Opium	  War.	  The	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Services	  opened	  up	  new	  source	  of	  income	  for	  the	  empire.	  The	  customs	   revenue	   became	   the	   major	   source	   of	   ‘disposable	   income’	   for	   many	  projects	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement:	   	  	   ‘In	  the	  late	  1870s,	  the	  total	  revenue	  of	  the	  empire,	  central	  and	  provincial,	  
that	  came	  to	  the	  cognizance	  of	  Peking	  was	  about	  60	  million	  taels.	  While	  
the	   largest	   portion	   still	   came	   from	   the	   land	   tax,	   likin	   accounted	   for	   18	  
million	   (or	  30	  per	  cent)	  and	  maritime	  customs	  revenue,	  12	  million	   taels	  
(or	  20	  per	  cent).	  Since	  the	  older	  sources	  of	  revenue	  and	  even	  the	  likin	  had	  
by	   the	   early	   1860s	   been	   earmarked	   almost	   entirely	   for	   established	   and	  
inflexible	  expenditures,	   the	  customs	  revenue	  was	   invaluable	   for	  any	  new	  
undertakings	  of	  the	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  emergency	  needs.	  Maritime	  
customs	   funds	   furnished	   part	   or	   all	   of	   the	   revenues	   of	   such	   new	  
under-­‐takings	  as	  the	  Peking	  T'ung-­‐wen	  Kuan,	  the	  Peking	  Field	  Force,	  the	  
Kiangnan	   and	   the	   Tientsin	   Arsenals,	   the	   Foochow	   [Fuzhou]	   Navy	   Yard,	  
the	  educational	  mission	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  legations	  abroad	  and	  the	  
new	  naval	  programmes	  after	  1875.’	   112	  	  However,	   the	   customs	   revenue	   was	   not	   a	   reliable	   source	   of	   funds	   for	   the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  customs	  revenue	  was	  not	  statutory.	  It	  was	  controlled	  by	  Beijing,	  and	  requests	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  funds	  had	  to	  be	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  emperor.	   In	  the	  eyes	  of	   the	  emperor,	  however,	   the	  role	  that	  the	  navy	  could	  play	  was	  little	  more	  than	  defending	  the	  coast,	  which	  was	  not	   of	   higher	   importance	   than	   other	   undertakings.	   For	   example,	   the	   military	  campaigns	  in	  northwestern	  China	  in	  the	  1870s	  and	  1880s	  were	  enabled	  by	  loans	  secured	   from	  British	   banks,	  which	  was	   guaranteed	   by	   and	   eventually	   paid	   for	  from	  the	  customs	  revenue.113	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  513.	  The	  likin	  was	  an	  inter-­‐provincial	  transit	  tariff.	  113	   Ibid.,	  515.	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As	  to	  the	  industrial	  plants,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  did	  establish	  a	  number	  in	  order	  to	   manufacture	   western	   weapons	   ranging	   from	   small	   firearms	   to	   steam	  warships. 114 	   But	   totalitarian	   government	   control,	   lack	   of	   funds	   and	  underdeveloped	   industrial	   capabilities	   impeded	   the	   development	   of	   an	  indigenous	   Chinese	  military	   industry.	   In	   the	   realm	   of	   firearms	  manufacturing,	  the	   total	   government	   control	   over	   military	   industrial	   plants	   made	   them	  bureaucratic	  bodies	  with	  the	  functions	  of	  firearms	  production,	  rather	  than	  plants	  operating	   on	   a	   commercial	   basis.	   Consequently,	   the	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   in	   such	  plants	  was	  low.	  For	  example,	  products	  of	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  always	  tended	  to	  be	   more	   expensive	   and	   less	   advanced	   than	   their	   Western	   counterparts.	   The	  production	   of	   muzzle	   loading	   carbines	   in	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   went	   on	   until	  1875.115	   The	   reason	   for	   the	   extended	   production	  was	   that	   the	  manufacture	   of	  new	  breech-­‐loader	  rifles	  would	  require	  upgrading	  of	  the	  machines,	  which	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  without	  large	  amount	  of	  investment.	  Similarly,	  the	  manufacture	  of	  Remington	  rolling	  block	  rifles	  in	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  continued	  until	  1890,	  by	  which	  time	  it	  had	  already	  been	  considered	  as	  obsolete	  in	  the	  West.116	   Moreover,	  the	  Kiangnan	  Arsenal-­‐made	  Remington	  rifles	  were	  not	  only	  more	  costly,	  but	  also	  inferior	  in	  terms	  of	  quality	  and	  many	  Chinese	  army	  units	  refused	  to	  use	  them.117	  This	   form	   of	   totalitarian	   economy	   had	   stronger	   and	   even	  more	   consequential	  impacts	   on	   the	   shipbuilding	   industries	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire,	   which	   will	   be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  later	  chapters.	  In	  a	  bold	  move	   to	  solve	   the	  problem	  of	  a	   lack	  of	   funds,	  private	  capital	  was	  allowed	   to	   be	   invested	   in	   some	   non-­‐military	   industrial	   endeavours	   within	   a	  framework	   known	   as	   ‘government	   supervision,	   merchant	   management’	   (or	  ‘government-­‐sponsored	  merchant	  undertakings’	  according	  to	  Hsü).118	   The	  most	  notable	  examples	  were	   the	  China’s	  Merchants’	   Steam	  Navigation	  Company,	   the	  Kaiping	   Coal	  Mine,	   and	   the	   Imperial	   Telegraphy	   Administration.119	   Capital	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	   For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Chinese	  military	  industries	  established	  in	  late	  Qing	  Dynasty	  see	  Erh-­‐min	  Wang,	  
清季兵工业的兴起	   Qingji	   bing	   gongye	   de	   xingqi	   [Rise	   of	   the	   armaments	   industry	   in	   the	   late	   Qing	   period],	  (Taibei:	  Institute	  of	  Modern	  History,	  Academia	  Sinica,	  1972).	  115	   JNZZJJ.	  Vol.7,	  p.	  17.	  116	   JNZZJJ.	  Vol.7,	  p.18.	  117	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  521.	  118	   Known	  as	  ‘官督商办’	  in	  Chinese.	   	  119	   Albert	   Feuerwerker,	   China's	   Early	   Industrialization:	   Sheng	   Hsuan-­‐huai	   (1844–1916)	   and	   Mandarin	  
Enterprise,	   (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	   Press,	   1958),	   pp.	   9-­‐10.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	   of	  Modern	   China,	   p.	  284.	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such	  enterprises	  came	  mainly	   from	  private	  sources,	  but	  private	   investors	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  take	  part	   in	   the	  administration,	  which	  remained	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  government	   appointed	   officials.	   The	   authorities	  welcomed	   private	   capitals	   but	  resented	   private	   control.	   It	   was	   stipulated	   as	   a	   rule	   for	   such	   enterprises	   that:	  ‘profits	  and	  loss	  are	  entirely	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  merchants	  and	  do	  not	  involve	  
the	  government	  [while	  the	  management	  of	  the	  such	  enterprises	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  bureaucrats]’. 120 	   Hsü	   observed	   that	   ‘these	   government-­‐supervised	   merchant	  
enterprises	  were	  a	  hybrid	  operation	  which	  smacked	  of	  strong	  official	  overtones	  and	  
the	  usual	  bureaucratic	  inefficiency,	  corruption,	  and	  nepotism.’121	   Such	  enterprises	  were	  not	  successful.	  Zheng	  Guanying,	  former	  manager	  of	  the	  China’s	  Merchants’	  Steam	  Navigation	   Company	   complained:	   ‘it	   was	   not	   that	   the	  merchants	   do	   not	  
want	   [to	  invest	  in	  the	  Merchants’	  Steam	  Navigation	  Company],	  [it	  was	  because]	  
they	   are	   concerned	   about	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   bureaucrats,	   and	   their	   lack	   of	  
trustworthiness’.122	  	  	  
2.3	  The	  Ideological	  Dimension	   	  
	  In	   this	   dimension	   we	   are	   going	   to	   look	   at	   the	   relations	   between	   a	   nation’s	  ideology	   and	   the	   society’s	   willingness	   to	   support	   its	   navy.	   A	   sea-­‐loving	   social	  ethos	   serves	   as	   a	   powerful	   catalyst	   in	   facilitating	   the	   development	   of	   naval	  power.	   In	  a	  society	  that	  favoured	  seafaring,	   it	  was	  easier	  for	  the	  navy	  to	  obtain	  resources	   that	   it	   needed.	   Conversely,	   in	   a	   society	   that	   ignored	   the	   sea,	   it	   was	  usually	  harder	  for	  the	  navy	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  them.	  However,	  one	  should	  not	  take	  a	   sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos	   for	   granted.	   Historically,	  many	   societies	   had	   a	   rather	  adverse	   image	   of	   the	   sea.123	   On	   the	   contrary,	   a	   sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos	   was	   a	  product	  of	  nurture	  rather	  than	  nature.	  Sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos	   was	   usually	   associated	   with	   a	   particular	   form	   of	  socio-­‐economic	   ideology	   –	   mercantilism.124	   The	   idea	   of	   mercantilism	   stressed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	   Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu,	   ‘British-­‐Chinese	  Steamship	  Rivalry	   in	  China,	  1873-­‐85’.	   in	  The	  Economic	  Development	  
of	  China	  and	  Japan,	  C.D.	  Cowan	  ed.,	  (London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin	  Ltd.,	  1964),	  p.	  53.	  121	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  284-­‐285.	  122	   ZGYJ,	  p.	  1154.	  123	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  87.	  124	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  36.	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the	   link	   between	   national	   strength	   and	   the	   wealth	   created	   through	   trade.	  Seaborne	   trade	   was	   a	   preferable	   means	   to	   this	   end.	   Mahan,	   a	   promoter	   of	  seaborne	   trade,	   echoed	   this	   view	  by	   claiming	   that	   ‘if	   sea	  power	  be	   really	   based	  
upon	  a	  peaceful	  and	  extensive	  commerce,	  aptitude	  for	  commercial	  pursuit	  must	  be	  
a	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  the	  nations	  that	  have	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another	  been	  great	  
upon	   the	   sea.	   History	   almost	   without	   exception	   affirms	   that	   this	   is	   true.’125	   A	  sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos	   was,	   to	   a	   great	   extent,	   symbiotic	   to	   the	   pursuit	   of	  commercial	  interests.	   	  People	  were	  the	  vehicle	  of	  such	  a	  social	  ethos;	  the	  more	  people	  benefit	  from	  seaborne	  trade,	   the	  stronger	  society’s	  sea-­‐loving	  social	  ethos	   tended	  to	  be.	  The	  key	   to	   the	   successful	   nurturing	   of	   a	   sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos,	   therefore,	   was	   to	  create	  a	  social	  system	  in	  which	  people’s	  interests	  were	  hinged	  on	  the	  success	  of	  seaborne	   trade.	   Many	   writers	   on	   seapower	   found	   that	   there	   was	   a	   ‘maritime	  community’	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  nations	  that	  wielded	  strong	   influence	  at	  sea.126	  Such	   community	   contained	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   professions	   relevant	   to	   maritime	  activities.	  These	  included	  merchants	  and	  manufacturers	  who	  engaged	  directly	  in	  commercial	   activities,	   shipbuilders	   and	  merchant	  marines	   who	   built	   the	   ships	  and	   ran	   the	   shipping,	   financiers	   and	   investors	  who	  provide	  maritime	  activities	  with	   funds,	   and	   politicians	   lobbying	   for	   policies	   that	   fostered	   seaborne	   trade,	  among	  others.	   	  Once	   strong	   enough,	   the	   ‘maritime	   community’	   would	   be	   able	   to	   sway	  policy-­‐making.	  It	  would,	  as	  Till	  summarised,	  (a)	  encourage	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  importance	   of	   maritime	   trade	   in	   society	   and	   government,	   helping	   thereby	   to	  produce	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  that	  trade	  will	  flourish;	  (b)	  elevate	  the	  merchant	  class	   socially	   and	   politically,	   encouraging	   thereby	   the	   development	   of	   a	   value	  system	   and	   a	   style	   of	   government	   that	   fosters	   trade;	   (c)	   facilitate	   the	  development	  of	  naval	  power	  partly	  because	  it	  is	  simply	  more	  efficient	  at	  raising	  the	  resources	  navies	  needed	  and	  partly	  because	  the	  merchant	  classes	  naturally	  saw	  navies	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protecting	  maritime	  trade,	  both	  directly	  and	  indirectly;	  (d)	   provide	   direct	   support	   for	   the	   navy	   in	   that	   most	   essential	   of	   its	   needs	   –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	   Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History,	  p.	  50.	  126	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  84.	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people. 127 	   It	   can	   be	   distilled	   from	   this	   summary	   that	   such	   a	   ‘maritime	  community’	  was	  able	  to	  not	  only	  assert	  itself	  in	  the	  society,	  but	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  naval	  strength.	   	  A	   strong	   ‘maritime	   community’	   stemmed	   from	   prosperous	   seaborne	   trade	  was	  a	  powerful	  generator	  of	  supports	  for	  navy.	  Studying	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy,	  Lincoln	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   prevalent	   mercantilist	   ideology	   assumed	   that	   a	  relationship	  existed	  between	  international	  trade	  and	  the	  naval	  power.128	   Mahan	  echoed	   this	   view	   by	   claiming	   that	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   navy	   sprang	   from	   the	  existence	  of	  peaceful	  shipping	  and	  disappeared	  with	  it.129	   Indeed,	  the	  growth	  of	  Britain’s	   economic	   power	   paralleled	   the	   growth	   of	   its	   naval	   strength;	   other	  nations	  which	  economy	  had	  a	  strong	  element	  of	  seaborne	  trade	  such	  as	  Holland,	  France	  and	  Spain	  were	  largely	  the	  same.	  Because	  for	  seaborne	  trading	  nations,	  a	  navy	  that	  could	  protect	  one’s	  own	  shipping	  and	  attack	  that	  of	  others	  was	  a	  key	  variable	  in	  the	  equation	  of	  business	  success	  and	  thereby	  national	  strength.	   	  Consequently,	   such	   societies	   attached	   great	   importance	   to	   their	   navies.130	  Politicians	   emphasised	   the	   navy’s	   significance	   in	   the	   national	   interest;	  businessmen	   extolled	   the	   navy	   as	   their	   protectors;	   artists	   and	  writers	   painted	  naval	   officers	   as	   national	   heroes.	   The	   navy	   was	   not	   only	   needed,	   but	   also	  celebrated	  in	  seaborne	  trading	  nations,	  carving	  a	  place	  for	  it	  in	  the	  national	  ethos.	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  would	  be	  much	  easier	  for	  navies	  to	  secure	  human,	  material,	  and	  financial	  resources	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  strong.	  Taking	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  for	  example,	  a	  statistic	  showed	  that	  by	  1897,	  2.5	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  entire	  male	  work	   force	   of	   Britain	   was	   employed	   by	   navy	   or	   by	   prime	   naval	   contractors.	  According	  to	  estimates	  from	  1913,	  as	  much	  as	  one-­‐sixth	  of	  Britain’s	  work	  force	  were	  dependent	  on	  naval	  contracts.131	   The	  slogan	  of	  ‘we	  want	  eight	  and	  we	  won’t	  
wait!’	  coined	  by	  the	  British	  public,	  demanding	  the	  building	  of	  more	  Dreadnought	  battleships	   in	   the	   early	  20th	   century	  was	   another	   strong	   evidence	  of	   the	   social	  awareness	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   navy	   to	   the	   British	   Empire	   –	   a	   typical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	   Till,	  Seapower,	  pp.	  84-­‐85.	  128	   Margarette	   Lincoln,	   Representing	   the	   Royal	   Navy:	   British	   Sea	   Power,	   1750-­‐1815,	   (Aldershot:	   Ashgate	  Publishing	  Company,	  2002),	  p.	  5.	  129	   Till,	  Seapower,	  p.	  100.	  130	   Government	  propaganda	  also	  played	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  nurturing	  such	  social	  ethos.	  See	  Jan	  Rüger,	  The	  
Great	   Naval	   Game:	   Britain	   and	   Germany	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   Empire,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  2007).	  131	   McNeill,	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Power,	  p.	  285.	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seapower.132	   	  As	   naval	   officers	  were	   revered	   and	   enjoyed	   high	   social	   status	   in	  maritime	  nations,	  the	  navy	  became	  a	  more	  attractive	  career	  to	  potential	  officers.	  Service	  as	  a	   commissioned	   officer	   in	   the	   Royal	   Navy	   was	   one	   of	   the	   few	   professions	   in	  which	   a	   man	   without	   an	   independent	   income	   could	   maintain	   himself	   as	   a	  gentleman,	   apparently	   working	   for	   the	   public	   good	   rather	   than	   for	   private	  gain.133	   Rodger	   observed	   that	   in	   the	   18th	   century,	   receiving	   a	   commission	   for	  lieutenancy	  made	  one	  ‘an	  officer	  and	  gentlemen	  overnight’.134	   At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  ‘service	  elites’	  amongst	  naval	  officers	  (rather	  than	  those	  of	  noble	  origins)	  received	  peerages.135	   By	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  becoming	  a	  naval	  officer	  had	  become	  a	   ‘fashionable	  profession’	   in	  not	  only	  Britain,	  but	  also	  in	  many	  other	  naval	  powers,	  which	  had	  attracted	  many	  sons	  of	  the	  upper	  classes.136	   This,	  in	  turn,	  further	  consolidated	  the	  status	  of	  navy	  in	   the	   sea-­‐loving	   societies	   and	   made	   it	   even	   easier	   for	   the	   navy	   to	   get	   the	  resources	  it	  needed	  to	  flourish.	   	   	  Also,	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   navy	   and	   the	   society	   were	   not	  one-­‐directional.	  Powerful	  warships,	  such	  as	  HMS	  Victory	  of	  the	  British	  navy	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Battleship	  Yamato,	  often	  embodied	  national	  spirit.	  The	  Royal	  Navy	  inspired	  the	  British	  society	  and	  had	  become	  an	  important	  element	  in	  the	  nation’s	  identity,	  because	  it	  was	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  value	  of	  British	  society	  and	  played	  an	  exemplary	  role	  in	  it.	  J.	  Rüger	  observed	  that	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  was	  regarded	  as:	  ‘one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  metaphors	  of	  Britishness	  in	  the	  19th	  century’.137	   It	  was	  the	  cream	  of	  industrialisation,	  the	  defender	  of	  liberty,	  the	  nation’s	  symbol	  and	  a	  role	  model	  of	  the	  society:	  	  
‘The	  Royal	  Navy’s	  character	  has	  always	  been	  reflected	  in	  social	  life	  of	  the	  
nation,	   which	   in	   1870	   could	   look	   back	   with	   pride	   on	   a	   wealth	   of	  
achievement.	   The	   Industrial	   Revolution	   had	   reached	   its	   apogee	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	   Geoffrey	  Wawro,	  Warfare	  and	  Society	  in	  Europe,	  1792-­‐	  1914,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  p.	  183,	  and	  the	  Chapter	  ‘Sea	  Power	  and	  Popular	  Navalism,	  1890-­‐1914’,	  pp.	  160-­‐187.	  133	   Lincoln,	  Representing	  the	  Royal	  Navy,	  pp.	  3-­‐4.	  134	   Roger,	  The	  Command	  of	  the	  Ocean,	  p.	  387.	  135	   Ibid.,	  513.	  136	   Richard	  Hill,	  War	  At	  Sea	  In	  The	  Ironclad	  Age,	  (London:	  Cassell	  &	  Co.,	  2002),	  pp.	  75-­‐78.	  137	   Jan	  Rüger,	  The	  Great	  Naval	  Game:	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Empire.	  p.	  3.	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Britain	  was	  the	  foremost	  trading	  nation	  in	  the	  world.	  Gradually	  the	  basis	  
of	   English	   life	   was	   changing,	   the	   focus	   of	   employment	   shifting	   from	  
agriculture	   to	   industry	   and	   from	   the	   country	   to	   the	   towns.	   A	   different	  
society	  emerged,	  eager	  to	  learn	  about	  machinery,	  how	  to	  produce	  energy	  
and	  how	  to	  expand	  national	  resources.	  Benefits	  of	  industrialism	  were	  felt	  
in	  everyday	  life…’	   138	  	   ***	  	  The	   Chinese	   society	   had	   a	   very	   different	   social	   ethos	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	  seapowers.	   Confucianism	   had	   been	   the	   dominant	   ideology	   of	   the	   consecutive	  Chinese	  Empires	  since	  the	  Han	  Dynasty	  (220-­‐202	  BC),	  yet	  the	  Manchu	  rulers	  of	  the	  Qing	   Empire	   embraced	   Confucianism	   even	  more	   tightly	   than	  most	   of	   their	  Han	   Chinese	   predecessors. 139 	   As	   an	   ethnical-­‐socio-­‐political	   teaching,	   this	  ideology	   provided	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   that	   helped	   to	   reinforce	   the	   absolutist	  monarchy	   and	   the	   feudal-­‐agrarian	   social	   order.	   For	   instance,	   Confucianism	  principles	   advocated	   the	   Three	   Bonds	   and	   the	   Five	   Relations	   (san	   gang	   wu	  
chang),	   which	   normalised	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   ruler	   and	   the	   subjects,	  father	  and	  son,	   and	  husband	  and	  wife.	  With	   respect	   to	  economy,	  Confucianism	  stressed	  the	   fundamental	   importance	  of	  agriculture	  and	  belittled	  the	  pursuit	  of	  commercial	   interests.	   The	   Confucian	   ideology	   harmonised	   the	   people’s	  behaviour	  and	  mind	  with	  the	  politico-­‐economical	  realities	  of	  the	  Chinese	  empire.	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   John	  Wells,	   The	   Royal	   Navy:	   An	   Illustrated	   Social	   History,	   1870-­‐1982,	   (Stroud:	   Sutton	   Publishing	   Ltd,	  1999),	  p.	  2.	  139	   The	  Manchus,	  an	  ethnic	  group	  originating	  from	  outside	  the	  homeland	  of	  Confucianism	  were	  considered	  as	   less	   ‘Chinese’	   in	   cultural	   terms	   prior	   to	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   causing	   the	   Han	   Chinese	   to	   question	   their	  legitimacy	  to	  rule.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  traditional	  Chinese	  worldview	  stressed	  cultural	  rather	  than	  ethnic	  identity,	  which	  meant	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  Chinese	  depended	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  could	  observe	  Chinese	  traditions.	  As	  the	  Yongzheng	  Emperor	  pointed	  out:	   ‘[a]	  Chinese	  [he	  who]	  identifies	  himself	   with	   barbarian	  way	   of	   life	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   barbarian;	   [a]	   barbarian	   [he	   who]	   identifies	  himself	  with	  Chinese	  way	  of	  life	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  Chinese.’	  (‘中国而夷狄也，则夷狄之；夷狄而中国
也，则中国之’)	  This	  meant	  that	  in	  the	  Chinese	  cultural	  context,	  the	  Manchus	  retained	  their	  legitimacy	  as	  long	  as	  they	  successfully	  adhere	  to	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  –	  mostly	  Confucian	  –	  traditions.	  The	  Manchus,	  in	  spite	  their	  little	   connections	   with	   Confucianism	   before	   they	   rose	   to	   power,	   tended	   to	   stick	   even	   more	   closely	   to	  Confucian	   principles	   than	   the	   Han	   Chinese.	   Openly	   breaking	   with	   Confucian	   traditions	   would	   have	  undermined	  their	  mandate	  to	  rule.	  Therefore,	  they	  did	  not	  have	  the	  option	  open	  to	  the	  Meiji	  reformers	  in	  Japan	   to	   legitimise	   any	   sweeping	   reform	   programme	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century.	   S.	   C.	   M.	   Paine,	   The	  
Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894-­‐1895:	  Perceptions,	  Power,	  and	  Primacy,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  p.	  358.	  Elliott,	  The	  Manchu	  Way,	  p.357.	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It	   played	   a	   substantial	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   Chinese	   society,	   which	   was	   very	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  West.	  Fairbank	  observed:	  	   ‘In	   this	   ancien	   régime	   the	   classical	   learning	   tolerated	   only	  
change-­‐within-­‐tradition,	   the	   extended	   family	   system	   dominated	   the	  
individual,	   a	   doctrine	   of	   duty	   eclipsed	   any	   doctrine	   of	   rights,	   civil	  
administrators	   controlled	   the	  military	   and	   used	   the	  merchants,	   and	   the	  
principles	   of	   moral	   conduct	   took	   precedence	   over	   human	   passions,	  
material	  profit,	  and	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law.	  Truly,	  the	  two	  civilizations	  [the	  Chinese	  civilization	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Western	  world]	  stood	  embattled.’	   140	   	  	   Instead	   of	   pursuing	   trade	   as	   a	   means	   to	   create	   national	   wealth,	   the	   Qing	  authorities	  discouraged	  and	  disdained	  it.	  The	  Chinese	  society	  had	  Confucianism	  as	   its	   official	   ideology.141	   Wright	   pointed	   out	   that	   a	   Confucian	   society	   was	   of	  necessity	   an	   agrarian	   society:	   trade,	   industry,	   economic	   developments	   in	   any	  form	   were	   its	   enemies.142	   Historically,	   China’s	   economy	   relied	   on	   agriculture,	  and	   agrarian	   economy	  was	   comparatively	  more	   stable	   than	   trade.	   Lacking	   the	  scale	  of	  fiscal	  difficulties	  encountered	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  early	  modern	  era,	  Chinese	  officials	   had	   less	   reason	   to	   imagine	   new	   forms	   of	   finance.	   Not	   only	   did	   they	  depend	   little	   on	   mercantile	   wealth	   to	   support	   the	   state,	   they	   also	   feared	   the	  potentially	  disruptive	  consequences	  of	  both	  concentrated	  wealth	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  such	  wealth.143	   The	  economic	  prosperity	  of	  the	  Chinese	  empire	  consisted	  in	  a	  successful	   management	   of	   agrarian	   production	   within	   China	   rather	   than	  commerce.	   To	   Lord	   McCartney’s	   proposal	   for	   trade,	   the	   emperor,	   who	   was	  supposed	   to	   set	   moral	   example	   for	   the	   Chinese	   people,	   replied:	   ‘our	   Celestial	  
Empire	  possesses	  all	   things	   in	  prolific	  abundance	  and	   lacks	  no	  product	  within	   its	  
borders.	   There	   is	   therefore	   no	   need	   to	   import	   the	   manufactures	   of	   outside	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	   J.	   Fairbank,	   ‘Introduction:	   the	   Old	   Order’,	   in	   The	   Cambridge	   History	   of	   China	   Volume	   10:	   Late	   Ch'ing	  
1800–1911,	  Part	  1.	  Ed.	  John	  K.	  Fairbank,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  2.	  141	   It	   should	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   there	   are	   different	   schools	   of	   Confucianism	   and	   the	   interpretation	   of	  Confucian	   classics	   also	   changed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   time.	   The	   Confucianism	   that	  we	   are	   referring	   to	   in	   this	  study	  is	  the	  version	  of	  that	  prevailed	  in	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty.	  142	   Mary	   C.	   Wright,	   The	   Last	   Stand	   of	   Chinese	   Conservatism:	   The	   T'ung-­‐chih	   Restoration,	   1862-­‐1874,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  p.	  3.	  143	   Roy	  Bin	  Wong,	  China	  Transformed:	  Historical	  Change	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  European	  Experience,	  (Ithaca,	  NY.:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  146.	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barbarians	  in	  exchange	  for	  our	  own	  produce.’144	   	  As	   to	   the	   social	   status	   of	   the	   sea-­‐going	   people	   in	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   China,	  John	  Barrow,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  McCartney	  Mission	  observed:	  	   ‘Here	   [in	   China]	  merchants,	   tradesmen	   and	  mechanics,	   are	   considered	  
far	   beneath	   the	   husbandman.	   So	   far	   from	   obtaining	   the	   honours	  
attendant	   on	   commerce	   in	   the	   ancient	   city	   of	   Tyre,	   “whose	  merchants	  
were	  princes,	  whose	  traffickers	  were	  the	  honourable	  of	  the	  earth,”	  or	  the	  
ancient	   immunities	   granted	   in	   Alfred’s	   reign	   by	   which	   an	   English	  
merchant,	  who	  had	  made	  three	  foreign	  voyages	  by	  sea,	  was	  raised	  to	  the	  
rank	   of	   nobility,	   the	   man	   who,	   in	   China,	   engages	   in	   foreign	   trade,	   is	  
considered	  as	  little	  better	  than	  a	  vagabond.’145	   	  	   The	  1740	  anti-­‐Chinese	  Batavia	  Massacre	  in	  the	  Dutch	  East	  Indies	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  When	  the	  Dutch	  colonial	  government	  of	   the	  Dutch	  Indies	  apologised	  to	   the	   Qing	   Imperial	   Court	   for	   the	   deaths	   of	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	   the	   Chinese	  diaspora	   and	   the	   raiding	   and	   burning	   of	   six	   to	   seven	   hundred	   Chinese-­‐owned	  houses,	   the	  Qing	   emperor	   replied:	   ‘the	   Celestial	   Empire	   does	   not	   recognise	   [the	  Chinese	   diaspora	   killed	   in	   the	   massacre]	   as	   Chinese	   nationals,	   they	   who	   leave	  
their	  ancestors’	  tombs	  behind	  to	  make	  [commercial]	  profits	  overseas	  are	  outcasts	  
of	   the	   empire,	   and	   no	   longer	   have	   anything	   to	   do	   with	   the	   Imperial	   Court,	   no	  
matter	   what	   happens	   to	   them.’146	   In	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   strict	   restrictions	  were	  put	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  maritime	  commercial	  activities	  and	  the	  size	  of	  ships	  built	  for	  this	   purposes	   in	   order	   to	   discourage	   it.147	   Therefore,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   long	  seaboard	   and	   the	   large	   population,	   the	   sea	   received	   little	   attention	   in	   Chinese	  national	  life;	  the	  number	  of	  people,	  to	  borrow	  Mahan’s	  words,	  ‘following	  the	  sea’	  was	  small.	  	   Instead	   of	   extolling	   a	   maritime	   community,	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   installed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	   Qianlong,	  Letter	  to	  George	  III	  (1792),	  University	  of	  California,	  Santa	  Barbara.	  Retrieved	  January	  25,	  2015	  145	   John	  Barrow,	  Travels	  in	  China,	  (London:	  T.	  Cadell	  and	  W.	  Davies,	  1804),	  p.	  399.	  146	   Peer	   Vries,	   State,	   Economy	   and	   the	   Great	   Divergence:	   Great	   Britain	   and	   China,	   1680s-­‐1850s,	   (London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academics,	  2015),	  p.	  359.	  147	   For	   the	   Qing	   government’s	   restrictions	   against	   Chinese	   seaborne	   commercial	   activities,	   see	   Wang,	  
Coastal	  Defence	   in	  the	  Early	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  21-­‐48;	   for	  the	  restrictions	  on	  building	  civilian	  ships,	  see	  pp.	  108-­‐160.	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Confucian-­‐scholars	   as	   its	   elites.	   The	   tool	   that	   the	   Qing	   government	   used	   to	  promote	   Confucianism	   among	   Chinese	   elites	   was	   the	   system	   Imperial	  Examinations	   (keju),148	   which	   was	   meritocratic	   system	   for	   official	   selection.	  Potential	   officials	   were	   selected	   according	   to	   their	   performance	   in	   the	  examinations,	  in	  which	  most	  of	  the	  questions	  required	  candidates	  to	  paraphrase	  and	   explain	   certain	   phrases	   extracted	   from	   the	   Confucian	   classics.149 	   This	  system	   was	   welcomed	   by	   the	   Chinese	   people	   because,	   as	   Hsü	   commented,	   ‘it	  
made	  the	  society	  more	  egalitarian	  by	  permitting	  nearly	  all	   its	  members	  to	  rise	  to	  
the	  top	  through	  individual	  merit	  rather	  than	  birth	  or	  wealth.	  It	  encouraged	  social	  
flexibility	   and	   tended	   to	   blur	   class	   distinctions.’150	   The	   government	   also	   saw	   in	  the	   examinations	   the	   following	   practical	   values:	   (a)	   it	   produced	   officials	   of	  intelligence	  who	  were	   thoroughly	   indoctrinated	   in	   the	   Confucian	   ethics;	   (b)	   it	  kept	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   gentry	   fixed	   on	   orthodoxy	   and	  provided	   an	   orthodox	  outlet	   for	   talent	   and	   ambition;	   and	   (c)	   it	   won	   the	   support	   of	   the	   people	   by	  providing	   them	   with	   officials	   whose	   power	   and	   behaviour	   were	   based	   on	  universally	  accepted	  canons.151	   	  Confucian	  scholars	  were	  regarded	  as	  elites	  of	  the	  Chinese	  society.	  The	  Qing	  authorities	  bestowed	  upon	  them	  a	  number	  of	  prerogatives	  to	  honour	  them	  and	  to	   make	   them	   respected	   by	   the	   commoners.152	   To	   begin	   with,	   the	   Confucian	  scholars	   who	   had	   secured	   a	   degree	   in	   the	   examinations	   would	   immediately	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  gentry.	  The	  gentry	  were	  the	  elite	  social	  group	  around	  which	   the	   whole	   Chinese	   society	   revolved.153	   Being	   a	   member	   of	   the	   gentry	  meant	  many	  unique	  privileges.	  For	  example,	  the	  gentry	  were	  distinguished	  from	  the	  commoners	  in	  style	  of	  dress	  and	  in	  embellishments.	  This	  class	  was	  protected	  against	   insults	   from	   commoners	   and	   interference	   of	   officials.	   They	   were	   also	  exempted	   from	   corveé	   labour	   service,	   as	   their	   status	   and	   cultural	   refinement	  forbade	   them	   to	  engage	   in	  manual	   labour.154	   They	  played	  a	   central	   role	   in	   the	  Chinese	   society,	   yet	   they	   were	   the	   most	   devoted	   guardians	   of	   the	   Confucian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  75-­‐80.	  149	   Chuzo	   Ichiko,	   ‘Political	   and	   Institutional	  Reform,	   1901-­‐11’	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	   of	   China,	   Vol.	   11:	  
Late	   Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   2,	   Kwang-­‐Ching	   Liu	   and	   John	   K.	   Fairbank	   eds.,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  376.	  150	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  79.	  151	   Wright,	  The	  Last	  Stand	  of	  Chinese	  Conservatism,	  p.	  79.	  152	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  72-­‐73.	  153	   Ibid.,	  6.	  154	   Ibid.,	  72.	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order.155	   It	   was	   not	   without	   good	   reason	   that	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   as	   sometime	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘gentry	  state’.	  More	   importantly,	   the	   Confucian	   scholars	   were	   the	   reserve	   echelon	   of	  officials:	   an	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   the	   officials	   of	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   were	  selected	  from	  the	  scholars	  who	  had	  secured	  a	  degree	   in	  the	  examinations.	  This	  practise	   had	   had	   a	   threefold	   consequence	   on	   the	   Chinese	   intellectuals	   and	  officialdom.	  First,	  since	  taking	  the	  Imperial	  Examinations	  was	  the	  primary	  path	  to	  upward	  mobility	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  an	  attitude	  came	  to	  prevail	  in	  the	  society	  known	  as	  ‘all	  activities	  are	  unworthy,	  only	  learning	  [Confucian	  classics]	  is	  lofty’.156	  Intellectuals’.	   Attention	   was	   tied	   to	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations	   and	   Confucian	  classics.	   Second,	   since	   officials	  were	   selected	   among	   the	   scholars	  who	   had	   the	  best	  understanding	  Confucian	  classics,	  the	  entire	  bureaucracy	  of	  the	  empire	  was	  subscribed	  to	  the	  Confucian	  dogmas.	  Third,	  an	  intellectual	  climate	  that	  featured	  strong	   inertia	  of	  deeply	  rooted	   institutions	  was	   formed	   in	  Chinese	  society.	  Kuo	  and	  Liu	  observed:	  ‘the	  examination	  system	  …	  not	  only	  [was]	  upheld	  by	  vast	  vested	  
interests	  but	  had	  gained	  sanctity	  because	  of	  tradition.’	   157	   	   	  The	   Imperial	   Examinations	   had,	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent,	   possessed	   and	  shaped	  the	  Chinese	  elite	  class.	  The	  examinations	  and	  the	  ideology	  it	  upheld	  had	  some	   characteristics	   that	   produced	   consequential	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	   	  Firstly,	   the	   examinations	   fell	   prey	   to	   formalism	   and	   became	   increasingly	  impractical.	   In	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   the	   Confucian	   classics	   were	   given	   official	  annotations	   and	   were	   provided	   as	   the	   only	   accepted	   version	   for	   the	  examinations.	   The	   candidates	   strived	   to	   learn	   the	   entire	   text	   of	   the	   classics	   as	  well	  as	  the	  official	  annotations	  by	  rote	  memory,	  and	  the	  examinations	  were	  little	  more	  than	  a	  test	  of	  memory	  and	  calligraphy	  skills.	  The	  whole	  education	  system	  focused	  on	   the	  preparation	  of	   the	  examinations	  and	  departed	   from	   intellectual	  vitality	  and	  political	  significance.158	   It	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  in	  the	  Qing	  China	  all	  students	  studied	  for	  the	  examinations,	  therefore	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  products	  of	  this	  education	  system	  resulted	  in	  a	  class	  of	   intellectuals,	  gentry	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  73.	  156	   ‘万般皆下品，惟有读书高’	  157	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  504.	  158	   Chang,	  ‘Intellectual	  Change	  and	  the	  Reform	  Movement,	  1890-­‐8’,	  p.	  330.	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and	   officials	   that	   were	   intellectually	   moribund	   and	   lacking	   in	   creative	  thinking.159	   	  Secondly,	   the	   study	   of	   science	   and	   technology	   consequently	   received	   no	  attention	  from	  Chinese	  intellectuals,	  fundamentally	  because	  people	  who	  studied	  them	  would	  not	  be	  as	  competitive	  as	  those	  who	  focused	  on	  Confucian	  classics	  in	  securing	  a	  place	  in	  the	  elite	  class.	  Science	  and	  technology	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  the	   undertakings	   of	   an	   artisan,	   and	   not	   worthwhile	   for	   the	   upper	   class.	   An	  advocate	  of	  modernisation	  once	  complained	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  that	  in	  China	  ‘the	  most	   skilful	  of	   the	  artisans	  will	  at	  most	  become	  a	  head	  artisan.	   [Whereas	   in	  the	  West,]	  he	  who	  can	  make	  a	  machine	  which	  benefits	  the	  country	  will	  become	  a	  
prominent	  official,	  his	   family	   for	  generations	  can	  live	  on	  the	  trade	  and	  keep	  their	  
positions	  hereditary.’160	   In	  ancient	  China,	  artisans	  were	  the	  social	  group	  that	  had	  the	  strongest	  potential	  of	  science	  and	  technology,	  but	  the	  Imperial	  Examinations	  determined	  that	  they	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  circle	  of	  elites.	   	  Thirdly,	   the	   Chinese	   elites	   were	   imbued	   with	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	  ideology.	   A	   key	   element	   was	   that	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   worldview	   was	  characterised	   by	   Sino-­‐centrism	   in	   which	   the	   world	   was	   considered	   to	   be	  hierarchic	  and	  non-­‐egalitarian,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  civilisation	  was	  the	  highest	  form.	  It	   was	   ‘internal,	   large	   and	   high’	   while	   the	   non-­‐Chinese	   civilisations	   were	  ‘barbarian’	  and	  ‘external,	  small	  and	  low.’161	   Consequently,	  the	  Chinese	  elites	  had	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  superiority	  over	   foreigners.	  The	  relations	  of	   the	  Chinese	  with	  non-­‐Chinese	   peoples	   were	   ‘coloured	   by	   this	   concept	   of	   Sino-­‐centrism	   and	   an	  
assumption	  of	  Chinese	  superiority.’162	   Even	  though	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  proved	  that	  Chinese	   military	   was	   much	   less	   effective	   than	   that	   of	   the	   West,	   most	   of	   the	  Chinese	   elites	   still	   maintained	   this	   view.	   The	   Western	   countries,	   although	  militarily	   powerful,	   were	   regarded	   by	   Chinese	   officials	   as	   politically	   and	  ideologically	   inferior.	   This	   perspective	   had	   shaped	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   attitude	  towards	   the	  West:	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   some	  open-­‐minded	  Chinese	   officials	   –	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	   Ichiko,	  ‘Political	  and	  Institutional	  Reform,	  1901-­‐11’,	  p.	  376-­‐377.	  160	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  498.	  161	   Yen-­‐ping	   Hao	   and	   Erh-­‐min	   Wan,	   ‘Changing	   Chinese	   Views	   of	   Western	   Relations,	   1840-­‐95’	   in	   The	  
Cambridge	  History	  of	  China,	  Vol.	  11:	  Late	  Ch'ing,	  1800-­‐1911,	  Part	  2,	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	  John	  K.	  Fairbank	  eds.,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  pp.	  143-­‐144.	  162	   Immanuel	  C.	  Y.	  Hsü,	   ‘Late	  Ch'ing	  Foreign	  Relations,	  1866-­‐1905’	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China,	  Vol.	  
11:	   Late	   Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   2,	   Kwang-­‐Ching	   Liu	   and	   John	   K.	   Fairbank	   eds.,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	   Press,	   1980),	   p.	   70,	   and	   see	   Hao	   and	   Wan,	   ‘Changing	   Chinese	   Views	   of	   Western	   Relations,	  1840-­‐95’,	  p.	  70,	  143.	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Self-­‐Strengtheners	   in	   particular	   –	   suggested	   that	   China	   should	   adopt	  Western	  weaponry	   (whilst	  many	   others	   refused	   to	   pick	   up	  Western	  weaponry);	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  wholesale	  Chinese	  elites	  looked	  down	  upon	  anything	  foreign	  and	  were	  reluctant	  to	  make	  any	  changes	  to	  the	  Chinese	  institutions.163	   	  	   Fourthly,	   associated	   to	   the	   Sino-­‐centrism	   worldview	   was	   the	   notion	   of	  dynastic	   cycle.	   F.	  Wakeman	   Jr.	   noted	   that	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   Confucianists,	   ‘history	  
was	  not	   linear	  …	   it	  was	  a	   series	   of	  whirls	  moving	   forward	   through	   time	  without	  
necessarily	  reaching	  a	  higher	  end.’164	   Graff	  explained	  the	  notion	  of	  dynastic	  circle	  as	  follows:	  	   ‘According	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  dynastic	  cycle,	  imperial	  regimes	  emerged	  out	  
of	  the	  chaos	  of	  civil	  war	  to	   impose	  order	  and	  reunify	  the	  country.	  They	  
enjoyed	   a	   period	   of	   vigour	   but	   then,	   after	   the	   passage	   of	   several	  
generations,	   fell	  gradually	   into	  decline.	  Eventually	  rebellions	  broke	  out	  
that	  brought	  down	  the	  dynasty	  and	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  period	  of	  civil	  war,	  
out	   of	   which	   new	   unifier	   would	   emerge	   to	   repeat	   the	   process.	   The	  
traditional	  Chinese	   explanation	   for	   this	   dynastic	   cycle	  was	  wrapped	   in	  
Confucian	  moralism	  and	  rooted	   in	  the	  ancient	  concept	  of	  the	   ‘Mandate	  
of	  Heaven’.	  Heaven	  gave	  its	  blessing	  to	  a	  dynasty	  founder	  on	  account	  of	  
his	   superior	   virtue.	   When	   one	   of	   his	   heirs	   strayed	   from	   the	   proper	  [traditional]	   path	   …	   [and]	   did	   not	   mend	   his	   ways,	   rebellions	   would	  
breakout	   and	   Heaven	   would	   transfer	   its	   support	   to	   a	   more	   virtuous	  
leader	  and	  his	  new	  dynasty.’165	  	   According	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  dynastic	   cycle,	   a	  key	   factor	   that	  determined	   the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Chinese	  empires	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  rulers	  had	  observed	  the	  Confucian	  principles.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  conservative	  Qing	  officials,	  the	  fundamental	  cause	   of	   China’s	   weakness	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   was	   not	   that	   China	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	   Japanese	   scholar	   of	   late	   Qing	   reform	  Hatano	   Yoshihiro	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   Qing	   officials	   and	   literati	  never	  fully	  understood	  the	  external	  crises	  they	  faced	  mainly	  because	  they	  were	  schooled	  in	  the	  traditional	  examination	  system	  and	  thus	  were	  ignorant	  of	  the	  outside	  world.	  Elman,	  ‘Naval	  Warfare	  and	  the	  Refraction	  of	  China’s	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Reforms	  into	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Failure,	  1865-­‐1895’,	  p.	  289.	  164	   Frederic	  Wakeman,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Imperial	  China,	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1977),	  p.	  55.	   	  165	   David	  A	  Graff,	   ‘State	  Making	  and	  State	  Breaking’	   in	  A	  Military	  History	  of	  China.	  Updated	  Edition,	  David	  Graff	  and	  Robin	  Higham	  eds.,	  (Lexington:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  2012),	  pp.	  40-­‐41.	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insufficiently	   modernised,	   but	   was	   because	   that	   China	   failed	   to	   stick	   to	   the	  Confucianism	   orthodox	   firmly	   enough.	   Therefore,	   even	   the	   most	   moderate	  proposals	   of	   modernisation	   would	   subject	   to	   the	   opposition	   of	   Confucian	  hardliners,	  who	   believed	   that	   restoring	   the	   old	   order	   as	   the	   key	   to	   strengthen	  China.	  	  	  
2.4	  Conclusion	   	  	  This	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  a	  society	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  its	  naval	  power.	  Politics	  determined	  the	  efficiency	  of	  naval	  administration;	  economics	  determined	  the	  quantity	  of	  resources	  available	  to	  navy;	  and	  ideology	  determined	  a	  society’s	  willingness	  to	  support	  navy.	   	  Seapowers	   were	   usually	   characterised	   by	   representative	   governments,	  prosperous	  seaborne	  trade,	  and	  sea-­‐loving	  social	  ethos;	  and,	  as	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	   these	   characteristics	   tended	   to	   be	   symbiotic	   with	   each	   other.	   In	  representative	   governments,	   the	   social	   groups	   that	   benefited	   from	   a	   powerful	  navy	  were	  usually	  better	  represented	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  yet	  such	  a	  form	   of	   governance	   allowed	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   delegation	   of	   power	   to	  authoritative	  professional	  bodies,	  which	  could	  increase	  the	  naval	  administrative	  and	  commanding	  efficiency.	  Seaborne	  trade	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  naval	  power	  not	  only	  because	  a	  navy	  was	  needed	  to	  protect	  trade,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  maritime	   economy	   and	   the	   navy	  were,	   to	   a	   great	   extent,	   synergetic	  with	   each	  other.	   Sea-­‐loving	   societies	   usually	   had	   at	   its	   heart	   a	   prosperous	   maritime	  community.	   Such	   a	   community	   had	   its	   interests	   hinged	   on	   naval	   strength,	   and	  therefore	  provided	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  development	  of	  naval	  power.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  strong	  navies	  were	  usually	  stemmed	  from	  seapowers.	  The	   Qing	   Empire	   was	   very	   different	   from	   seapowers	   in	   terms	   of	   politics,	  economy	  and	   ideology.	  The	  polity	  was	  a	  dynasty	  ruled	  by	  absolutist	  emperors;	  the	   economy	   was	   overwhelmingly	   agrarian	   and	   self-­‐sufficient;	   the	   society	  centred	   on	   the	   gentry	   (i.e.	   Imperial	   examination	   degree	   holders);	   and	   the	  ideology	  was	   Confucianism.	   This	  was	   a	   system	   very	   stable	   in	   itself;	   but	   it	  was	  very	  ineffective	  in	  meeting	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  steam	  navy.	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In	   the	  political	   dimension,	   the	  perpetuation	  of	   autocratic	  Manchu	   rule	  was	  the	   fundamental	   concern.	   In	   the	  central	  government	   the	  emperor	  monopolised	  virtually	  all	  rights	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  whilst	  the	  imperial	  ministries	  were	  largely	  titular.	  The	  relations	  between	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  were	  essentially	  a	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  for	  power,	  which	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  the	  latter	  gained	  the	  upper	  hand	   and	   the	   former	   was	   striving	   to	   turn	   the	   situation	   around.	   The	  inter-­‐provincial	  relations	  were	  marked	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  rivalry	   because	   local	   interests	   were	   usually	   the	   main	   concern	   of	   provincial	  leaders.	  The	  military	  of	   the	  Qing	  Empire	  had	   a	   large	   army	  at	   its	   core	   that	  was	  provincially	   organised	   and	   subjected	   to	   the	   check	   of	   civil	   officials.	   In	   the	  economic	  dimension,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  had	  a	  self-­‐sufficient	  agrarian	  economy	  as	  its	  main	  source	  of	  national	  wealth.	  As	  commercial	  activities	  and	  manufacturing	  were	   intentionally	   suppressed	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   agricultural	   production,	  science	   and	   technology	   were	   consequently	   underdeveloped.	   Seagoing	   was	  discouraged	   for	   political	   and	   security	   reasons,	   and	   therefore	   seagoing	   sectors	  withered.	   Land	   tax	  was	   the	  main	   source	   of	   governmental	   revenue	   in	   the	   Qing	  Empire,	   and	   the	   authorities	   refused	   to	   adopt	   more	   flexible	   economic	   and	  financial	   policies	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   development	   of	   indigenous	   industrial	  capabilities.	   Instead	   of	   extolling	   merchants	   and	   seaborne	   trade,	   the	   Qing	  government	   imbued	   its	   elites	   i.e.	   intellectuals,	   gentry	   and	   officials	   with	  Confucianism	   –	   an	   ideology	   that	   reinforced	   absolutism	   and	   agrarian	   economy.	  The	   Imperial	   Examinations	   as	   official	   selection	   mechanism	   had	   shaped	   the	  Chinese	   elites,	   making	   them	   intellectually	   unprepared	   for	   modernisation,	  reluctant	  to	  reform	  and	  disdained	  things	  foreign.	  In	  short,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  steam	  navy,	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	   structure’	   had	   a	   low	   administrative	   efficiency,	   a	   scarcity	   of	  available	  resources,	  a	  social	  ‘sea-­‐blindness’	  and	  a	  strong	  inertia	  to	  refuse	  reform.	  This	  is	   in	  essence,	  the	  general	  background	  when	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  embarked	  on	  the	  building	  of	  a	  steam	  navy.	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  Chapter	  Three	  	  	  The	  Statesmen	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  three	  aspects:	  (1)	  the	  emperor	  and	  the	  ministers	  in	  the	  Imperial	   Court;	   (2)	   the	   provincial	   Self-­‐Strengtheners;	   and	   (3)	   the	   contending	  views	  of	  the	  strategic	  significance	  of	  the	  steam	  navy.	  It	  will	  try	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   informed	   the	   views	   and	   actions	   of	   the	  statesmen	  committed	  to	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  the	  steam	  navy,	  and	  affected	  the	  politics	  behind	  its	  development.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  apolitical	  navy.	  Navies	  are	  built	  by	  rulers,	   crewed	  by	  military	  men	  and	  employed	   for	  political	  ends.	   If	   this	  point	   is	   ignored,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   explain	   why	   different	   nations	   developed	   varied	  levels	  of	  commitment	  to	  naval	  power,	  and	  why	  some	  became	  more	  successful	  in	  building	  a	  navy	  while	  others	  failed	  to	  do	  so.	   	  	  	  
3.1 	   The	  Members	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court	   	  	  If,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   could	  have	   counted	   on	   a	   navalist	   ruler,	   someone	   like	   Henry	   VIII,	   Peter	   the	   Great	   or	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm,	  or	  enlisted	  among	   its	   influential	   figures	  of	  power	   like	  Cardinal	  Richelieu	  or	  Yamamoto	  Gombei,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  could	  have	  been	   very	   different.	   However,	   as	   these	   figures	   had	   to	   emerge	   from	  within	   the	  Qing	   Empire’s	   political,	   economic	   and	   ideological	   realities,	   this	   was	   almost	  impossible.	  Particularly	  at	  the	  highest	  level,	  it	  seems	  highly	  unlikely	  in	  retrospect	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for	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  to	  have	  had	  a	  navalist	  emperor.	  To	  many	  Western	  navalist	  rulers,	   a	   navy	  was	   not	   an end	   per	   se	   but	   a	  means	   to	   an	   end.	   A	   navy	   not	   only	  protected	   their	   countries,	   but	   also	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   supporting	   overseas	  expansion,	   trade	   and	   colonial	   interests,	   the	   synergy	   of	   which	   would	   make	   a	  country	  wealthy	  and	  powerful.	  In	   China,	   however,	   the	   situation	   was	   very	   different.	   Chinese	   emperors	  tended	   to	   attach	   only	   marginal	   importance	   to	   the	   navy	   because	   it	   played	   no	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  equation	  of	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Chinese	  empires.	  The	  issues	  that	   determined	   the	   nation’s	   greatness	   could	   hardly	   be	   addressed	   by	   naval	  power.	  Economically,	   the	  wealth	  of	  the	  nation	  came	  primarily	   from	  agriculture.	  Whether	   or	   not	   the	   vast	   agricultural	   area	   in	   China	   proper	   could	   be	   effectively	  administrated,	   determined	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent	   the	   nation’s	   economic	  well-­‐being.	   Militarily,	   the	  most	  menacing	   and	   persistent	   threat	   to	   the	   nation’s	  security	   had	   always	   been	   cavalries	   of	   the	   nomadic	   tribes	   from	   the	   northern	  steppes.	   In	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   alongside	   the	   northern	   nomads,	   a	   new	   type	   of	  threat	  –	  anti-­‐Manchu	  revolts	  –	  emerged	  in	  the	  Chinese	  hinterland.	  Both	  threats	  required	  a	  large	  army	  –	  rather	  than	  a	  navy	  –	  to	  tackle.	  Priorities	  were	  therefore	  given	  to	  the	  army	  rather	  over	  the	  navy,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  was	  an	  agrarian	  power	  with	  a	  huge	  population	  enabled	  it	  to	  mobilise	  a	  very	  large	  army	  indeed.	  It	  was	   therefore	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	   navy	   was	   less	   important	   to	   Chinese	  emperors	  than	  to	  navalist	  rulers	  in	  Western	  Europe.	   	  In	  Chinese	  politico-­‐economic	   traditions,	   the	  navy	  was	  not	  connected	   to	   the	  nation’s	  vital	  interests;	  it	  therefore	  received	  only	  intermittent	  attention	  from	  the	  absolutist	  emperors.	  Their	  indifference	  to	  seaborne	  trade	  and	  overseas	  interests	  is	   reflected	   in	   the	   Qianlong	   Emperor’s	   reaction	   to	   the	  McCartney	  Mission	   and	  Batavia	  Massacre	  (see	  Section	  2.2).	  The	  role	  of	  the	  traditional	  Chinese	  navy	  –	  the	  
water	  forces	  –	  was	  little	  more	  than	  protecting	  the	  coast	  and	  arresting	  smugglers	  and	  pirates.	  Only	  in	  some	  exceptional	  cases	  did	  powerful	  navies	  emerge	  in	  China,	  such	  as	  the	  expeditionary	  fleet	  built	  by	  the	  Kublai	  Khan	  of	  the	  Yuan	  Dynasty	  (AD	  1271-­‐1368),	   and	   the	   Treasure	   Fleet	   built	   by	   the	   Yongle	   Emperor	   of	   the	   Ming	  Dynasty	  (AD	  1368-­‐1644).166	   However,	  these	  fleets	  were	  mostly	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	   For	  reviews	  regarding	  the	  Chinese	  naval	  activities	  prior	  to	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  see	  Zunpeng	  Bao,	  中国海军
史	   Zhongguo	   Haijun	   Shi	   [The	   History	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Navy],	   (Taibei:	   Haijun	   Chubanshe,	   1951).	   and	   Tieniu	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continental	  power;	  none	  of	  the	  emperors	  that	  built	  them	  tried	  to	  establish	  a	  link	  between	  military	   and	   economy	   that	   characterised	   the	   seapowers	   in	   the	  West.	  The	  building	  of	  such	  fleets	  consumed	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  resources,	  but	  the	  nation	  benefitted	  little	  from	  them,	  and	  the	  fleets	  soon	  faded	  away	  as	  the	  emperors	  died	  or	  the	  empire’s	  agenda	  changed.	  Moreover,	   the	   Manchu	   rulers	   were	   very	   conservative;	   and	   they	   were	  conservative	   by	   necessity	   rather	   than	   choice. 167 	   As	   non-­‐Han	   Chinese,	   the	  Manchus	   retained	   their	   legitimacy	   as	   long	   as	   they	   adhered	   to	   the	  Han	  Chinese	  traditions,	  which	  were	  predominantly	  Confucian.	  As	  Mary	  C.	  Wright	  observed,	  a	  Confucian	  society	  was	  of	  necessity	  an	  agrarian	  society:	  trade,	  industry,	  economic	  development	   of	   any	   form,	   were	   its	   enemy.168	   Therefore,	   the	   Qing	   emperors,	  albeit	   autocratic,	   were	   hemmed	   in	   by	   a	   sea-­‐blind	   Chinese	   tradition.	   They	   had	  little	  leeway	  to	  pursue	  naval	  power	  even	  if	  they	  had	  the	  intention	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  the	  unorthodox	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  pursuit	  would	  put	  their	  legitimacy	  at	  risk.	  In	  short,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  autocratic	  polity	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China,	  the	  emperors	  did	  not	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  convenient	  position	  to	  promote	  naval	  power.	  Even	   if,	   notwithstanding	   all	   the	   restrictions,	   the	  Qing	   Chinese	   emperors	   of	  the	  19th	  century	  wanted	  to	  pursue	  a	  steam	  navy	  (with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  we	  know	  there	  was	  no	  such	  desire),	  they	  would	  still	  not	  be	  able	  to	  attain	  any	  great	  achievements	  due	  to	  the	  adverse	  financial	  and	  security	  realities	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century.	   The	   deep	   survival	   crises	   caused	   by	   internal	   revolts	   not	   only	   severely	  hindered	   the	  military	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   efforts	   financially,	   but	   also	   forced	   the	  government	  to	  give	  strategic	  priority	  to	  put	  down	  the	  crises.169	   A memorial	  that	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  presented	  to	  the	  Throne	  in	  1861	  revealed	  the	  security	  agenda	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  It	  argued:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Zhang	  and	  Xiaoxing	  Gao,	  中国古代海军史	   Zhongguo	  Gudai	  Haijun	  Shi	  [A	  Naval	  History	  of	  Premodern	  China],	  (Beijing:	  PLA	  Press,	  2006).	  The	  Yongle	  Emperor	  of	  the	  Ming	  Dynasty	  organised	  seven	  consecutive	  Treasure	  Fleet	   voyages	   between	   1405	   and	   1433.	   The	   largest	   voyage	   among	   the	   seven	   consisted	   of	   240	   ships	   and	  27,000	  men.	  The	  voyages	   reached	  as	   far	   as	   the	   eastern	   coasts	   of	   the	  African	   continent.	   It	  was	   commonly	  believed	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   these	   voyages	  was	   to	   show	  off	   the	  Ming	   Empire’s	   power	   and	  wealth.	   Other	  explanations	   of	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   voyages	   include:	   to	   find	   pathways	   to	   flank	   the	   Mongols	   who	   were	  harassing	  the	  Ming	  Empire’s	  northern	  border,	  or	  to	  track	  down	  the	  whereabouts	  of	  the	  emperor’s	  enemy	  in	  the	   dynastic	   struggle,	   who	   was	   believed	   to	   be	   at	   large.	   The	   Treasure	   Fleet	   voyages	   had	   no	   economic	  implications	  in	  the	  Western	  sense.	  167	   S.	   C.	   M.	   Paine,	   The	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   of	   1894-­‐1895:	   Perceptions,	   Power,	   and	   Primacy,	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  pp.	  358-­‐359.	  168	   Wright,	  The	  Last	  Stand	  of	  Chinese	  Conservatism,	  p.	  3.	  169	   Ibid.,	  96.	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   ‘as	  to	  the	  [security]	  situation	  of	  today,	  the	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  and	  the	  Nian	  
Rebellion	  …	  are	  threats	  as	  mortal	  as	  illness	  within	  [a	  man’s]	  body.	  Russia	  
shares	   a	   border	   [with	   us	   and	   it]	   is	   ambitious	   of	   encroaching	   on	   [the	  territory	   of]	   the	   Celestial	   Empire.	   [This	   should	   be	   regarded	   as]	   an	  
affliction	   [as	   close	   as]	   of	   [a	   man’s]	   upper	   body.	   Britons	   [only]	   have	  
trading	   in	   their	   mind	   …	   [they	   should	   be	   regarded	   as	   insignificant	   a	  threat	  as]	  illness	  in	  [a	  man’s]	  limbs.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  the	  top	  priority	  to	  put	  
down	  the	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  and	  Nian	  Rebellion;	  the	  second	  priority	   is	  to	  
tackle	  the	  threat	  of	  Russia,	  whereas	  Britain	  should	  come	  the	  third.’170	  	   The	   security	   situation	   has	   improved	   since	   the	   late	   1860s.	   The	   Taiping	  Rebellion	  and	  the	  Nian	  Rebellion	  were	  pacified,	  the	  Chinese	  army	  re-­‐established	  control	   in	  north-­‐western	  China	  and	  the	  tensions	  with	  Russia	  eased	   in	   the	  early	  1880s.	   Financial	   difficulties	  were	   also	   partly	   relieved	   as	   the	   newly-­‐established	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	   Services	   opened	  up	  new	   sources	   of	   revenue.	   Some	  historians	   refer	   this	   period	   as	   the	   ‘Tongzhi	   Restoration’	   or	   the	   ‘Tong-­‐Guang	  Restoration’.171	   The	   improvement	   of	   the	   domestic	   security	   situation	   coincided	  with	  intensified	  threats	  emanating	  from	  the	  sea:	  Japan’s	  1874	  invasion	  of	  Taiwan	  and	   Russia’s	   demonstration	   of	   naval	   power	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  
Treaty	   of	   St.	   Petersburg	   reminded	   the	   Chinese	   emperors	   of	   the	   empire’s	  inadequacy	   in	  naval	  power.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  navy	  continued	  to	  remain	   low	  on	  the	   empire’s	   agenda.	  The	   reason	   is	   obvious:	   a	  degree	  of	  naval	  power	  might	  be	  necessary	   to	   resist	   seaborne	   threats,	   but	   naval	   power	   had	   never	   been	   vital	   to	  China.	   A	   strong	   navy	   would	   not	   aggrandise	   the	   Qing	   Empire,	   which	   was	  fundamentally	  a	  continental	  agrarian	  power.	   	  The	   lack	   of	   attention	   from	   the	   highest	   rulers	   had	   two	   direct	   adverse	  consequences	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy.	   First,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	   CBYWSM-­‐XF,	  Vol.	  71,	  p.	  18.	   	  171	   The	  ‘Tongzhi	  Restoration’	  or	   ‘Tong-­‐Guang	  Restoration’:	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  pacification	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  domestic	  rebellions,	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  successfully	  reasserted	  the	  old	  order.	  Mary	  C.	  Wright	  put	  it:	  ‘not	   only	   a	   dynasty	  but	   also	   a	   civilisation	  which	   appeared	   to	  have	   collapsed	  was	   revived	  …	  This	  was	   the	  T’ung-­‐chih	  Restoration	  [Tongzhi	  Restoration].’	  Kwang-­‐ching	  Liu,	  ‘The	  Ch’ing	  Restoration’	  in	  The	  Cambridge	  
History	   of	   China	   Volume	   10:	   Late	   Ch’ing	   1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   1,	  Ed.	   John	   K.	   Fairbank,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.447	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emperor’s	  attention	   towards	  naval	  modernisation	   lacked	  consistency.	  Research	  shows	   that	   throughout	   the	   three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   decades	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  only	  three	  times	  did	  maritime	  defence	  draw	  strong	  attention	  from	  the	  highest	  ruler	  and	  end	  up	  in	  a	  nationwide	  top-­‐down	  consultation.172	   The	  first	  was	  in	   the	   late	   1860s	   and	   it	   was	   ignited	   by	   Robert	   Hart’s	   (Inspector-­‐General	   of	  Chinese	   Imperial	   Maritime	   Customs	   Services,	   in	   office	   1861-­‐1911)	   memorial	  
Observation	   by	   an	   Outsider	   and	   Thomas	   Wades’	   (British	   Minister	   to	   China,	   in	  office	  1869-­‐1882)	  memorial	  A	  Brief	  Exposition	  of	  New	  Ideas.173	   The	  second	  was	  stirred	  up	  by	   Japan’s	   1874	   invasion	  of	  Taiwan,	   and	   the	   third	  was	   triggered	  by	  China’s	  defeat	   in	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War.	  The	   first	  discussion	  yielded	  no	  concrete	  results;	   the	   second	   prompted	   the	   integration	   of	   provincial	   fleets	   into	   regional	  navies	   (see	   Section	   6.2);	   and	   the	   third	   contributed	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  Chinese	   Board	   of	   Admiralty	   –	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   (see	   Section	   6.3).	   But	   the	  emperor’s	  attention	  soon	  turned	  to	  other	  things	  as	  the	  threat	  disappeared.	  The	  development	   of	   the	   navy	   enjoyed	   little	   support	   and	   coordination	   from	   the	  emperor.	   	  Second,	   the	   navy	   was	   only	   of	   secondary	   importance	   to	   the	   emperor,	   and	  from	  time	  to	  time	  he	  diverted	  the	  already	  tight	  naval	  funds	  to	  other	  endeavours	  he	  considered	  more	  important.	  J.	  Wang’s	  research	  shows	  that	  a	  number	  of	  major	  projects	  during	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period	  were	  funded	  by	  money	  re-­‐directed	  from	  naval	  funds.	  Among	  many	  others	  were	  the	  military	  campaigns	  in	  Xinjiang,	  the	   reparation	   of	   the	   Margary	   Affair,	   the	   building	   of	   the	   Tongzhi	   Emperor’s	  mausoleum,	   the	  Chinese	  Educational	  Mission	   to	   the	  United	  States,	   and	  disaster	  relief	   efforts	   in	   Hebei,	   Henan	   and	   Shandong	   province,	   etc. 174 	   From	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	   See	   Hongbin	  Wang,	  晚清海防：思想与制度研究	   Wanqing	   Haifang：	   sixiang	   yu	   zhidu	   yanjiu	   [Coastal	  
Defense	   in	   the	   Late	   Qing	   Dynasty:	   A	   Study	   on	   Theory	   and	   System],	   (Beijing:	   Commercial	   Press,	   2005),	  pp.48-­‐74,	  80-­‐143,	  196-­‐220.	  173	   In	  1865,	  Hart	  submitted	  to	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  a	  memorial	  named	  Observation	  by	  an	  Outsider	   (局外旁观
论);	  One	  year	   later	   in	  1866,	  British	  diplomat	   in	  China	  Thomas	  Wade	  presented	  A	  Brief	  Exposition	  of	  New	  
Ideas	   (新议论略).	   The	   two	   memorials	   underscored	   the	   importance	   of	   comprehensive	   modernisation	   to	  China’s	  security,	  and	  stressed	  the	  advantages	  of	  railways,	  telegraphs,	  mining,	  schooling,	  Westernised	  army	  and	   navy,	   and	   diplomatic	   representatives.	   In	   particular,	   Wade	   warned	   that	   foreign	   powers	   today	   were	  different	  from	  the	  ‘barbarians’	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  unless	  China	  recognised	  this	  fact	  and	  sought	  progress	  along	  Western	   lines	   the	   nation’s	   fate	  would	   be	   sealed.	   See	  Hsü,	   ‘Late	   Ch'ing	   Foreign	  Relations,	   1866-­‐1905’,	   pp.	  71-­‐72.	  Wade’s	  words	  terrified	  the	  Chinese	  elites,	  who	  were	  still	  yet	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  shock	  of	  the	  Opium	  Wars.	  Consequently,	   the	  Imperial	  Court	   launched	  a	  nationwide	  consultation	  on	  how	  to	  strengthen	  China’s	  maritime	  defence	  against	  Western	  aggression.	   	  174	   Jiajian	   Wang,	  李鸿章与北洋舰队:近代中国创建海军的失败与教训	   Li	   Hongzhang	   yu	   Beiyang	   jiandui:	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perspective	  of	  the	  navy,	  the	  diversion	  of	  funds	  severely	  impeded	  its	  development,	  but	   from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	   the	  emperor,	  however,	  all	   these	  expenses	  seemed	  to	  be	  of	  greater	  significance	  than	  strengthening	  coastal	  defence.	  	   ***	  	  The	  above	  passages	  argued	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  steam	  navy	  could	  hardly	  gain	  support	  from	  the	  autocratic	  emperors	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China.	  Therefore,	  if	   there	  was	  any	  support	   for	  naval	  modernisation	   in	   the	  central	  government,	   it	  could	   only	   come	   from	   other	   members	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Court,	   i.e.	   the	   imperial	  family	   members	   or	   the	   senior	   courtiers.	   But	   also	   this	   was	   unlikely.	   The	   Qing	  Empire	  was	   an	   autocracy;	   the	   emperor	   tended	   not	   to	   tolerate	   any	   individuals	  other	   than	  himself	   to	  have	  real	  power,	  as	   it	  would	  enable	   those	  who	  have	   it	   to	  challenge	   his	   authority	   or	   even	   to	   become	   potential	   usurpers.	   Such	   concerns	  were	   not	   groundless.	   There	   were	   two	   domineering	   imperial	   officials	   that	  emerged	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court:	  one	  in	  the	  late	  17th	  century,	  the	  other	  in	  the	  early	  18th	   century.	   Both	   were	   decorated	   military	   commanders	   who	   later	   wielded	  strong	  influence	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  posed	  great	  threats	  to	  the	  emperor’s	  authority.175	   The	  Qing	  emperors	  had	  a	  lingering	  fear	  of	  such	  men.	  Preventing	  the	  emergence	  of	  assertive	  bureaucrats	  had	  become	  a	  key	  concern	  of	  the	  emperor.	   	  The	   emperor	   himself	   was	   not	   attuned	   to	   naval	   views	   and	  wanted	   to	   hold	  power	  exclusively	  in	  his	  hands.	  This	  means	  that	  members	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  would	  have	  had	   to	  challenge	   the	  emperor	  considerably	   to	  support	   the	  navy.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  emperor	  tended	  to	  regard	  any	  promoter	  of	  naval	  modernisation	  as	  a	  challenger	  to	  his	  rule.	  The	  story	  of	  Prince	  Gong	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  Among	  the	   handful	   of	   senior	   imperial	   officials	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   Qing	   Imperial	  Court,	  nobody	  else	  was	  more	  suitable	  than	  Prince	  Gong	  to	  become	  a	  promoter	  of	  the	   steam	   navy.	   Prince	   Gong	   was	   the	   sixth	   prince	   of	   the	   Daoguang	   Emperor,	  half-­‐brother	   of	   the	   Xianfeng	   Emperor	   and	   uncle	   of	   the	   Tongzhi	   Emperor.	   In	  addition,	  he	  was	  a	  key	  accomplice	  of	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi	  in	  the	  Coup	  of	  1861,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
jindai	  Zhongguo	  Chuangjian	  Haijun	  de	  Shibai	  yu	  jiaoxun	  (Jiaoding	  Ban)	  [Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet:	  
The	  Failure	  and	  the	  Lessons	  of	  Naval	  Construction	  in	  Late	  Imperial	  China],	  Revised	  Edition,	  (Beijing:	  Sanlian	  Shudian,	  2008),	  p.	  384.	  175	   They	  were	  Oboi	   鳌拜	   (c.	  1610-­‐1669)	  and	  Nian	  Gengyao	   年羹尧	   (1679-­‐1726)	   	  
	   78	  
which	  made	  the	  latter	  the	  de	  facto	  supreme	  ruler	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  for	  the	  next	  fifty	  years.176	   In	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi,	  who	  still	  lacked	  experience	  as	  a	  ruler,	  had	   to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  Prince	  Gong	   to	  bring	   the	  situation	  under	  control.	  Consequently,	  Prince	  Gong	  wielded	  considerable	  influences	  in	  the	  Imperial	   Court.	   Among	   the	  many	   titles	   he	   held	   in	   the	   those	   years	  were	   prince	  regent,	  grand	  councillor	  of	  the	  Grand	  Council,	  head	  of	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen,	  and	  chief	  minister	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Household.177	   These	  titles	  made	  him	  virtually	  the	  most	  powerful	  man	  in	  the	  Forbidden	  City.	   	  In	   contrast	   to	   other	   officials	   in	   the	   Forbidden	   City	   who	   usually	   had	  conservative	   inclinations,	   Prince	   Gong	   was	   open-­‐minded	   and	   knew	   the	   West	  better.	   In	   the	  Second	  Opium	  War,	  he	   remained	   in	  Beijing	   to	   take	   charge	  of	   the	  peace	  settlement	  with	  Britain	  and	  France	  whilst	  most	  of	   the	  other	  members	  of	  the	   imperial	   family	   and	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   fled.	   In	   the	   years	   after	   the	   Second	  Opium	  War,	  a	  new	  institution	  –	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  –	  was	  established,	  and	  Prince	  Gong	  became	  its	  head.	  The	  Zongli	  Yamen	  was	  regarded	  as	  the	  Chinese	  equivalent	  of	  a	   foreign	  office	  (but	  of	   less	  real	  power,	  as	  the	  emperor	  retained	  much	  of	   the	  power	   of	   decision-­‐making).178	   The	   Zongli	   Yamen	   was	   not	   only	   in	   charge	   of	  foreign	   affairs	   but	   also	   of	   a	   number	   of	   modernisation	   projects,	   such	   as	   the	  promotion	  of	  modern	  schools,	  Western	  science,	   industry	  and	  modern	  means	  of	  communication.179	   Also	  directly	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  was	  the	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service,	  arguably	   the	  most	   important	   financial	   source	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement.	   Undoubtedly,	   among	   the	   inner	   circle	   of	   the	  ministers	   in	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  Prince	  Gong	  was	  most	  suited	  to	  promote	  naval	  modernisation	  and	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  nation’s	  naval	  power.	  Prince	  Gong	  was	  determined	  to	  promote	  a	  steam	  navy.	  In	  various	  cases,	  he	  stressed	   that	  a	  Western-­‐style	  navy	  would	  be	  a	  necessity	   for	  China’s	   security	   in	  the	   future.180	   He	   used	   to	   remind	   the	   emperor:	   ‘if	   we	   continue	   to	   drift	   along	  
passively	  and	  do	  not	  eagerly	  seek	  to	  improve	  ourselves	  and	  forge	  ahead,	  trouble	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	   For	  details	  of	  the	  Coup	  of	  1861,	  see	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  262-­‐266.	  177	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  306-­‐307.	  178	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  504.	  179	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  215.	  180	   Yangfan	   Li,	   走出晚清 :	   涉外人物及中国的世界观念之研究 	   Zouchu	   Wan	   Qing:	   Shewai	   Renwu	   Ji	  
Zhongguo	  De	  Shijie	  Guannian	  Zhi	  Yanjiu	  [Beyong	  the	  Late	  Qing:	  A	  Research	  concerning	  Personalities	  of	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  and	  China's	  Word	  View],	  Second	  Edition,	  (Beijing:	  Peking	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  pp.	  237-­‐241.	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the	  future	  will	  be	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  deal	  with’.181	   In	  1866	  and	  1874,	  he	  took	  initiative	   in	  promoting	  two	  nationwide	  discussions	  on	  maritime	  defence,	  which	  contributed	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy.	   Also,	   in	   the	   early	  1860s	  and	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1870s,	  he	  twice	  tried	  to	  establish	  a	  centralised	  steam	   navy	   (but	   these	   efforts	   failed,	   see	   Section	   5.3).	   He	   wrote	   multiple	  memorials	  to	  remind	  the	  Throne	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  modern	  navy	  to	  China’s	  security,	  and	  he	  managed	  to	  achieve	  a	  degree	  of	  Westernisation	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Guard	   and	   imperial	   educational	   institutions	   to	   promote	   modernisation	   within	  the	  Imperial	  Court.	   	  But	  Prince	  Gong	  could	  only	  achieve	  so	  much.	  The	  de	  facto	  ruler	  at	  the	  time	  –	  the	   Empress	   Dowager	   Cixi	   –	   mistrusted	   his	   power	   and	   influence.	   In	   the	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  decades	  after	   the	  Coup	  of	  1861,	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi,	  who	  felt	  capable	  enough	   in	  administrating	  state	  affairs,	  gradually	  revoked	  the	  titles	   that	  Prince	  Gong	  had	  gained	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  coup.	  Among	  the	  accusations	  that	  the	   Empress	   Dowager	   charged	   him	   with	   were	   usurpation	   of	   power,	  clique-­‐formation	   and	   overbearance.	   Consequently,	   Prince	   Gong	   was	   gradually	  side-­‐lined,	  losing	  his	  zeal	  in	  state	  affairs	  and	  becoming	  restrained	  in	  conduct.	  In	  1884,	   Prince	   Gong	   lost	   his	   power	   completely.	   In	   the	   remaining	   years	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  he	  stayed	  away	  from	  the	  Forbidden	  City	  and	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  time	  in	  a	  Buddhist	  temple	  in	  suburban	  Beijing.182	  Ideological	   conservatism	   was	   also	   used	   to	   contain	   Prince	   Gong’s	   political	  influence.	   In	   1862,	   the	   College	   of	   Foreign	   Languages	   (the	  Tongwen	   Guan)	  was	  opened	  in	  Beijing	  at	  the	  suggestion	  of	  Prince	  Gong	  (see	  Photo	  3.1).	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	  college	  was	   to	   train	   foreign	   language	  experts	   that	  could	  support	  China’s	  increasing	  contact	  with	  the	  West	  since	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century.	  Four	  years	  later	  in	  1866,	   Prince	  Gong	  proposed	   to	   expand	   the	   repertoire	   of	   the	   college	  by	   adding	  the	  subjects	  of	  astronomy	  and	  mathematics	  to	  its	  curricula.	  This	  proposal,	  as	  Kuo	  pointed	  out,	  was	  aimed	  at	  earning	  the	  Throne’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
Western	   learning.183	   It	   was	   subjected	   to	   ferocious	   attacks	   from	   Confucianism	  hardliners,	  who	  believed	   that	  Western	   learning	   and	  good	  moral	  character	  were	  antithetical.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   Confucian	   hardliners,	   modernisation	   entailed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	   Hsü,	  ‘Late	  Ch'ing	  Foreign	  Relations,	  1866-­‐1905’,	  p.	  91.	  182	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  306-­‐308.	  183	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  528.	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Westernisation,	   and	   learning	   from	   the	  West	   would	   undermine	   the	   ideological	  foundation	  of	   the	  Empire.	  Consequently,	   few	  students	  signed	  up	   for	  astronomy	  and	  mathematics	   lessons	  when	  they	  were	  opened.184	   Rumours	  were	  stirred	  up	  among	  scholarly-­‐officials	  in	  Beijing	  that	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  under	  Prince	  Gong	  had	  treasonous	   intentions,	   and	   conservatives	   called	   Prince	   Gong	   ‘the	   devil	   sixth’	  (Prince	  Gong	  was	  the	  sixth	  son	  of	  the	  Daoguang	  Emperor)	  due	  to	  his	  cooperation	  with	  ‘devil	  foreigners’.185	   The	  College	  of	  Foreign	  Languages,	  due	  to	  its	  promotion	  of	  Western	  learning	  and	  connection	  to	  Prince	  Gong,	  was	  not	  a	  success.	   	  In	   the	   political	   arena	   of	   the	   late	   19th	   century,	   probably	   only	   Prince	   Chun’s	  power	  was	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  Prince	  Gong’s,	  but	  he	  did	  more	  harm	  than	  good	  for	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  The	  reasons	   for	   this	  were	  also	  attributable	   to	   the	   autocratic	   polity	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire.	   Prince	   Chun	   was	   the	  seventh	  son	  of	  the	  Daoguang	  Emperor,	  brother-­‐in-­‐law	  of	  the	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi,	  and	  father	  of	  the	  Guangxu	  Emperor.	  In	  1885,	  he	  was	  appointed	  as	  minister	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  Haijun	  Yamen	  (the	  Chinese	  Board	  of	  Admiralty).	  Prince	  Chun	  was	  said	  to	  be	  a	  mediocre	  politician.	  He	  was	  afraid	  of	  the	  Empress	  Dowager	  Cixi	  and	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  Prince	  Gong’s	  fate.	  He	  reconstructed	  the	  Summer	  Palace	  –	   which	   was	   burnt	   down	   in	   the	   Second	   Opium	  War	   –	   and	   a	   number	   of	   other	  imperial	  gardens	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  Empress	  Dowager	  might	  retreat	  from	  the	  Forbidden	  City	  and	  relinquish	  her	  grip	  on	  state	  affairs.	  The	  funds	  to	  rebuild	  the	  Summer	   Palace	   came	   primarily	   from	   the	   budget	   of	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen	   that	   he	  headed,	   which	   was	   originally	   intended	   to	   be	   spent	   on	   purchasing	   ships	   from	  abroad.	   A	   commonly	   accepted	   calculation	  was	   that	   the	  works	   on	   the	   imperial	  gardens	  cost	  between	  twenty	  and	  thirty	  million	  taels	  (in	  contrast,	  Ding	  Yuan	  and	  
Zhen	   Yuan,	   the	   two	   largest	   ironclad	   battleships	   that	   China	   bought	   in	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  cost	  1.63	  million	  taels	  each).186	   	  Other	   people	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   were	   much	   less	   likely	   to	   become	  promoters	  of	  a	  steam	  navy.	  They	  were	  either	  less	  motivated	  or	  lacked	  the	  power	  that	  would	  have	  enabled	  them	  do	  so.	  In	  short,	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  for	  ministers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  530.	  185	   Known	  as	  ‘鬼子六’	  in	  Chinese.	  186	   For	  an	  estimation	  regarding	  expenditures	  on	  the	  re-­‐construction	  of	  imperial	  gardens,	  see	  Fan,	  The	  New	  
Policy	   toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	   during	   the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	   2,	   p.	   1129;	   and	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  The	  History	  of	   the	  Chinese	  
Navy,	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in	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   and	  members	   of	   the	   imperial	   family	   to	   launch	   pro-­‐navy	  reforms.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  pursue	  any	  reform	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  highest	   ruler,	   which	   was	   the	   Empress	   Dowager	   Cixi	   during	   most	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period.	  Maintaining	  power	  was	  her	  ultimate	  concern	  and	  she	  regarded	  reforms	  as	  potential	  threats	  to	  her	  rule.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  her	  power	  from	   being	   rivalled,	   she	   kept	   the	   people	   around	   her	   under	   a	   careful	  check-­‐and-­‐balance	  regime.	  Ideological	  conservatism	  was	  used	  to	  counterbalance	  those	  who	  supported	  modernisation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Prince	  Gong,	  she	  launched	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	   strike	   to	   eliminate	   the	   perceived	   threat	   to	   her	   rule.	   The	  consolidation	  of	  autocratic	  power	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  pro-­‐navy	  reforms.	   	  	  	  
3.2 	   The	  Provincial	  Practitioners	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  	  Many	   present-­‐day	   historians	   categorise	   the	   political	   elites	   of	   late	   19th	   century	  China	   into	   two	   opposing	   groups:	   a	   ‘Self-­‐Strengthening	   faction’	   and	   a	  ‘conservative	   faction’. 187 	   This	   perspective	   of	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   versus	  conservatives	  highlights	  the	  disagreement	  between	  the	  two	  different	  approaches	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  empire:	  the	  former	  called	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  Western	  ships	  and	   guns,	   while	   the	   latter	   stressed	   that	   the	   fundamental	   cure	   for	   China’s	  problems	  was	   to	   restore	   the	   traditional	   Confucian	   order.	   But	   the	   division	   into	  two	   clearly	   demarcated	   groups	   gives	   a	   misleading	   impression	   that	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   was	   a	   struggle	   between	   a	   ‘Self-­‐Strengthening	  faction’	   and	   a	   ‘conservative	   faction’,	   where	   each	   faction	   was	   a	   quasi-­‐political	  party	  or	   a	  united	  body	  of	   statesmen.	  This	  perception	   is	   not	   completely	   true.	  A	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  process	  through	  which	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  emerged	  reveals	  that	  they	  were	  not	  a	  cohesive	  political	  faction.	  A	   glance	   at	   the	   background	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   shows	   that	   a	  considerable	  number	  of	  them	  were	  former	  members	  of	  local	  militia	  forces,	  which	  played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   pacifying	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	   domestic	   turmoil.	  Noteworthy	   among	   them	  were	   Zeng	   Guofan,	   who	  was	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Xiang	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	   The	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  faction	  is	  known	  as	  ‘洋务派’	  and	  the	  conservative	  faction	  is	  known	  as	  ‘守旧派’	  in	  Chinese.	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Army;	   Zuo	   Zongtang,	   who	   was	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Chu	   Army	   (an	   independent	  branch	  of	   the	  Xiang	  Army);	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang,	  who	  was	   the	   leader	  of	   the	  Huai	  Army.	  Many	  other	   key	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   also	  originated	   from	   the	   local	  militia	  forces.	  Shen	  Baozhen,	  Commissioner	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  from	  1868	  to	  1875	  served	  in	  the	  Xiang	  Army.	  Guo	  Songtao,	  China’s	  very	  first	  ambassador	  to	  Britain	  was	  also	  from	  the	  Xiang	  Army.	  Ding	  Richang,	  head	  of	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal,	  was	  Li’s	  subordinate	  in	  the	  Huai	  Army.	  Ding	  Ruchang	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  Ding	  Richang),	   commander-­‐in-­‐chief	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   was	   also	   formerly	   a	   Huai	  Army	  man.	  It	  was	  not	  a	   coincidence	   that	   the	   figures	   that	   constituted	   the	  main	  body	  of	  the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	  were	  mostly	   former	  members	   of	   local	  militia	   forces.	   As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  Green	  Standard	  Army,	  the	  main	  standing	  army	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	  became	  degraded	  as	  a	   fighting	   force	   from	  the	  18th	   century	  onwards.	  A	  new	   type	   of	   army	   –	   local	   militias	   –	   emerged	   in	   the	   wars	   against	   the	   Taiping	  Rebellion	  and	  other	  domestic	  revolts	  in	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century.	  These	  local	  militia	  forces	   were	   more	   effective	   than	   the	   traditional	   armed	   forces,	   yet	   they	   were	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  them.	  In	  particular,	  the	  organisational	  structure	  of	  these	   local	  militia	   forces	  was	  at	  odds	  with	   that	  of	   the	   traditional	  armed	   forces.	  The	   traditional	   organisational	   structure	   compromised	   the	   command	   efficiency,	  but	   ensured	   that	   the	   old	   armed	   forces	  were	   ‘safe’	   from	  usurpation	   against	   the	  Imperial	   Court.	   The	   local	   militia	   forces,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   increased	   their	  commanding	  efficiency	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  such	  ‘safeness’.	  Taking	  the	  Xiang	  Army	  for	  example,	  all	  of	  its	  soldiers	  were	  recruited	  from	  Hunan	  province	  by	  officers	  to	  whom	   they	   owed	   their	   allegiance.	   The	   officers	   in	   turn	   pledged	   their	   loyalty	   to	  Zeng	   Guofan,	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   Xiang	   Army	   who	   had	   personally	   selected	   and	  commissioned	   them.	   The	   Xiang	   Army	   also	   remained	   largely	   independent	   from	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  in	  terms	  of	  finance	  and	  command.	  Therefore,	  the	  Xiang	  Army	  was	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  a	  ‘private	  army’	  rather	  than	  the	  emperor’s	  army.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  about	  most	  of	  the	  other	  local	  militia	  forces,	  including	  Li’s	  Huai	  Army	  and	  Zuo’s	  Chu	  Army.188	   	  These	   abovementioned	   characteristics	   of	   the	   local	   militia	   forces	   increased	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	   Ergang	  Luo,	   '清季兵为将有的起源	   Qingji	  Bing	  Wei	  Jiang	  You	  de	  Ojyuan	  [The	  Origins	  of	  Private	  Armies	  in	  the	  Qing]',	  Journal	  of	  Chinese	  Social	  Economic	  History,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  2.	  (Jun.	  1937),	  pp.	  235-­‐250.	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their	  military	  effectiveness,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  rendered	  them	  less	  ‘reliable’	  in	  the	  emperor’s	  eyes.	  Their	  nature	  as	  ‘private	  armies’	  made	  them	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  Imperial	   Court.	   Concerns	   were	   raised	   in	   Beijing	   that	   the	   local	   militia	   forces	  would	  challenge	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  after	  the	  domestic	  rebellions	  were	  put	  down.189	   When	  the	  domestic	  wars	  neared	  their	  end,	  men	   in	   the	   local	  militia	   forces	  worried	   that	   they	  would	  be	  demobilised	   as	   soon	   as	   the	  war	  was	  over.	   Their	   concerns	   were	   not	   groundless.	   In	   less	   than	   a	   month	   after	   the	  supreme	  headquarters	  of	  the	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  was	  captured,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  embarked	   on	   dissolving	   the	   Xiang	   Army,	   the	   most	   powerful	   one	   among	   the	  various	  local	  militia	  forces.190	  To	   avoid	   the	   destiny	   of	   being	   dissolved,	   the	   members	   of	   the	   local	   militia	  forces	   needed	   to	   find	   a	   new	   raison	   d'être.	   From	   their	   association	  with	   foreign	  militaries	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Taiping	   War,	   they	   learnt	   first-­‐hand	   the	   superiority	   of	  Western	   ships	   and	   guns.	   For	   example,	   in	   a	   letter	   Li	  wrote	   to	   Zeng	   in	   1863,	   he	  expressed	  his	  admiration	  of	  the	  Western	  weaponry.	  He	  said:	   	  	  ‘I	   have	   been	   aboard	   the	  warships	   of	   British	   and	   French	   admirals	   and	   I	  
saw	   that	   their	   cannons	   are	   ingenious	   and	   uniform,	   their	   ammunition	   is	  
fine	  and	  cleverly	  made,	  their	  weapons	  are	  bright,	  and	  their	  troops	  have	  a	  
martial	  appearance	  and	  are	  orderly.	  These	  things	  are	  actually	  superior	  to	  
those	  of	  China.’191	  	   The	  local	  militia	  forces	  leaders	  were	  also	  aware	  that	  the	  traditional	  Chinese	  armed	  forces	  were	  reluctant	  to	  pick	  up	  modern	  weaponry.192	   These	  leaders	  saw	  a	  new	  raison	  d'être	  in	  military	  modernisation.	  A	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  reports	  that	  these	   local	  militia	   forces	   leaders	  sent	   to	   the	   Imperial	  Court	  shows	   that	  appeals	  for	   military	   modernisation	   appeared	   at	   an	   increasing	   frequency	   as	   the	  anti-­‐revolt	  wars	  approached	  their	  end	  and	  eventually	  peaked	  at	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1860s	  when	  the	  wars	  were	  over.	  No	  wonder	  this	  was	  not	  a	  coincidence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	   Ergang	  Luo,	  湘军兵志	   Xiangjun	  Bingzhi	  [A	  History	  of	  the	  Hunan	  Army],	  (Beijing:	  Zhonghua	  Shuju,	  1984),	  pp.	  181-­‐182.	  190	   Luo,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Hunan	  Army,	  pp.	  181-­‐191.	  191	   Ssu-­‐Yü	   Teng	   and	   John	   K.	   Fairbank,	   China's	   Response	   to	   the	   West:	   A	   Documentary	   Survey,	   1839-­‐1923,	  (Cambridge,	  MA.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1979),	  p.	  69.	   	  192	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  pp.	  496-­‐500.	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Many	   local	   militia	   force	   leaders	   realigned	   with	   military	   modernisation	   as	  their	  new	   raison	  d'être	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	  mid-­‐19th	   century	   turmoil,	   and	  a	  steam	  navy	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  it.	  The	  three	  local	  militia	  forces	  leaders,	  Zeng,	   Li	   and	   Zuo,	   came	   up	  with	   the	   same	   view	   that	   a	   steam	   navy	  would	   be	   a	  necessity	   to	   China.	   Zeng	   once	   stated	   to	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   that	   ‘foreign-­‐style	  
steamships	   are	   a	   necessity	  …	   [they]	   could	   [not	   only]	   suppress	   rebels	   [but	  would	  also]	  be	  useful	   strategically	   in	   the	   long	   run.’193	   Zuo	   also	   reminded	   the	   Imperial	  Court	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  steam	  navy	  in	  various	  occasions	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	   1860s.	   When	   the	   anti-­‐Taiping	   War	   was	   over,	   Zuo	   argued	   that	   building	   a	  steam	  navy	  should	  be	  China’s	  next	  priority	  and	  he	  built	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.194	  Li	   also	   showed	  a	   strong	   interest	   in	  pursuing	  military	  modernisation	   –	   a	   steam	  navy	  in	  particular	  –	  as	  an	  alternative	  function	  for	  his	  Huai	  Army,	  although	  he	  felt	  less	  compelled	  to	  join	  Zeng	  and	  Zuo,	  because	  his	  army	  was	  still	  busy	  engaging	  a	  series	  of	  anti-­‐revolt	  campaigns	  in	  the	  late	  1860s.195	   	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  domestic	  wars	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century,	  many	  local	  militia	  forces	   leaders	   were	   awarded	   important	   provincial	   offices.	   For	   example,	   Zeng	  Guofan	  was	   appointed	   the	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Liangjiang	   (later	   transferred	   to	  the	   position	   of	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   province),	   Li	   Hongzhang	   became	  governor	   of	   Jiangsu	   province	   (later	   succeeded	   Zeng	   to	   became	   the	  governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   province),	   and	   Zuo	   Zongtang	   was	  made	   governor	   of	  Zhejiang	   province	   (and	   was	   soon	   further	   promoted	   to	   governor-­‐general	   of	  Minzhe).	   These	   powerful	   positions	   enabled	   them	   to	   bring	   their	   proposal	   of	  building	  a	  steam	  navy	   into	  reality,	  because	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  provincial	  governments	  began	  to	  enjoy	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  autonomy	  consequent	  on	  the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	   turmoil.	   These	   former	   local	   militia	   forces	   leaders,	   now	  provincial	   leaders,	   became,	   together	   with	   their	   old	   subordinates,	   the	   main	  promoters	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  However,	   this	   did	   not	  mean	   that	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   formed	   a	   cohesive	  and	   coordinated	   alliance	   or	   quasi-­‐political	   party	   among	   themselves.	   On	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	   ZGFQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  3,	  p.	  1603.	  CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  21,	  p.	  21.	  194	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  3,	  pp.	  58-­‐61.	  195	   Ruicheng	  Wang,	  ‘“权力外移”与晚清权力结构的演变,	  1855-­‐1875	  Yuanli	  Waiyi	  Yu	  Wanqing	  Quanli	  Jiegou	  De	   Yanbian	   [The	   “Outward	   Flow	   of	   Power”	   and	   the	   Evolution	   of	   the	   Late	   Qing	   Power	   Structure,	  1855-­‐1875]’,	  Modern	  Chinese	  History	  Studies,	  Vol.	  188,	  No.	  2.	  (Mar.-­‐Apr.,	  2012),	  pp.	  28-­‐46.	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contrary,	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   of	   different	   provinces	  from	   time	   to	   time	   showed	   rivalries	   rather	   than	   cooperation.	   This	   was	   partly	  because	  some	  of	  them	  were	  competitors	  in	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  anti-­‐revolt	  wars	  when	   they	   were	   leaders	   of	   the	   local	   militia	   forces;	   and	   partly	   because	   the	  politico-­‐economic	  framework	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  encouraged	  provincialism	  and	  discouraged	   inter-­‐provincial	   cooperation.	   When	   the	   former	   leaders	   of	   local	  militia	   forces	   became	   provincial	   practitioners	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  the	  seeds	  of	  rivalries	  sowed	  in	  the	  old	  days	  became	  germinated	  and	  institutionalised.196	   	  Two	  concluding	  points	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  above	  discussion	  to	  close	  this	  section.	   First,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   was	   primarily	   a	  Self-­‐Strengtheners’	   –	   mostly	   former	   local	   militia	   forces	   leaders	   –	   undertaking,	  not	  a	  national	  effort.	  It	  should	  be	  understood	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  modernised	  military	   forces	   did	   not	   yet	   mean	   that	   the	   regular	   Qing	   armed	   forces	   were	  supplanted.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  two	  existed	  in	  parallel.	  This	  restricted	  the	  amount	  of	   funds	   that	   the	   steam	   navy	   was	   able	   to	   secure	   from	   imperial	   coffers.	   The	  traditional	   military	   forces	   required	   around	   twenty	   million	   taels	   annually	   to	  maintain,	  whereas	  the	  steam	  navy	  was	  only	  promised	  four	  million	  taels	  per	  year	  at	   the	   height	   of	   its	   development. 197 	   Also,	   since	   the	   traditional	   military	  institutions	   remained	   dominant,	   it	   was	   very	   hard	   for	   the	   steam	   navy	   to	   keep	  itself	  clear	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  traditional	  military	  institutions	  (which	  will	  be	  elaborated	  on	  in	  Section	  4.4).	  Secondly,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   were	   not	   a	   quasi-­‐political	   alliance	   as	   the	  name	   ‘Self-­‐Strengthening	   faction’	   misleadingly	   suggests.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   a	  degree	   of	   internal	   rivalry	   existed	   among	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   themselves,	  which	  was	   sometimes	   even	  more	   intense	   than	   those	   that	   existed	   between	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	   That	  being	   said,	  we	   should	  not	  overly	  generalise	  and	   claim	   that	   rivalries	  dominated	   the	   relationships	  between	   all	   provincial	   practitioners	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement.	   Between	   some	   local	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	   there	  was	   good	   cooperation.	   For	   example,	   Li	  Hongzhang’s	   efforts	   to	  build	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  were	   supported	   by	   Shen	   Baozhen,	  who	  was	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet.	   Shen	   gave	   Li	   the	   four	  Rendel	  gunboats	  originally	  ordered	  for	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	  See	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu	  and	  Richard	  J.	  Smith,	   ‘The	  Military	  Challenge:	  The	  North-­‐west	  and	   the	  Coast’	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China,	  Vol.	  11:	  Late	  Ch'ing,	  
1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   2,	   Kwang-­‐Ching	   Liu	   and	   John	  K.	   Fairbank	   eds.,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	   Press,	  1980),	  p.	  248.	  But	  rivalries	  between	  provincial	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  did	  exist	  and	  produced	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  naval	  modernisation,	  which	  will	  be	  addressed	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	   	  197	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  62.	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Self-­‐Strengtheners	   and	   the	   conservatives.	   Hsü	   observed	   that	   the	   provincial	  promoters	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement	   competed	   rather	   than	  cooperated	  with	  each	  other	  and	  regarded	  their	  achievements	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	   personal	   power.198	   Driven	   by	   mixed	   motivations	   of	   personal	   ambition	   and	  provincialism,	   the	   various	   local	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   rarely	   formed	   alliances	  among	   themselves.	   The	   lack	   of	   coordination	   hampered	   the	   effectiveness	   and	  efficiency	  of	  naval	  modernisation	  projects.	  	  	  
3.3	  The	  Contending	  Views	  of	  the	  Strategic	  Significance	  of	  the	  Steam	  Navy	   	  	  Other	  Chinese	  elites’	  views	  of	  the	  steam	  navy	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  debates	  around	  it.	   In	   late-­‐19th	   century	  China,	   there	  was	  a	   lack	  of	   consensus	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  building	   a	   steam	   navy	   should	   be	   a	   strategic	   priority,	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  steam	  navy	  was	   needed	   at	   all.	   Throughout	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   period,	   such	  disagreements	  were	  never	  solved.	  They	  emerged	  from	  time	  to	  time	  to	  strike	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  whole	  project	  of	  naval	  modernisation.	  Some	  present-­‐day	  historians	   tend	   to	  depict	   the	  people	  who	  disagreed	  with	  naval	  modernisation	  as	   ‘villains’.	  This	   is	  because,	  with	   the	  benefit	   of	  hindsight,	  present-­‐day	   historians	   know	   that	   it	   was	   the	   inadequate	   naval	   power	   that	  contributed	   to	   China’s	   defeat	   in	   the	   Sino-­‐French	  War	   and	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  Therefore	  the	  people	  who	  tried	  to	   impede	  the	  development	  of	   the	  stream	  navy	   should	   take	   some	   of	   the	   blame	   for	   the	   defeats.	   However,	   it	   should	   be	  pointed	  out	  that	  most	  of	  the	  people	  who	  disagreed	  with	  naval	  modernisation	  in	  the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   did	   not	   oppose	   it	   out	   of	   malice.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   most	   of	   them	   were	   determined	   patriots.	   The	   key	   difference	   that	  distinguished	   them	   from	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   was	   that	   they	   had	   a	   different	  view	  towards	  how	  and	  what	  should	  be	  done	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  empire.	   In	  this	  sense,	   they	   should	   not	   be	   regarded	   as	   objectors	   determined	   to	   thwart	   naval	  modernisation.	  Rather,	  they	  had	  in	  their	  mind	  a	  different	  strategic	  agenda.	   	  The	  officials	  who	  disagreed	  with	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	   in	  building	  a	  steam	  navy	  were	  motivated	  by	  at	   least	  one	  of	  the	  following	  reasons	  (some	  had	  mixed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  288.	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motivations).	   The	   first	   group	   consisted	   mostly	   of	   Confucian	   hardliners,	   who	  believed	  maritime	   defence	   should	   be	   conducted	   in	   conformity	   with	   Confucian	  ideology	   rather	   than	   by	   applying	   Western	   techniques.	   The	   second	   group	  consisted	  mostly	  of	  realists,	  arguing	  that	  a	  steam	  navy	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  as	   a	   priority	   because	   the	   empire	   had	   other	  more	   urgent	   issues	   to	   tackle.	   The	  third	  group	  was	  mostly	  driven	  by	  political	  rivalries	  and	  its	  members	  objected	  to	  naval	  modernisation	  because	  they	  believed	  that	  a	  flourishing	  steam	  navy	  would	  make	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  too	  powerful	  to	  be	  brought	  under	  control.	  	   ***	  	  As	  to	  the	  objections	  from	  Confucian	  hardliners,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  renowned	  cases	  happened	   during	   the	   1874	   maritime	   defence	   discussion.	   In	   the	   aftermath	   of	  Japan’s	   1874	   invasion	   of	   Taiwan,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   consulted	   a	   number	   of	  provincial	   officials	   with	   regards	   to	   how	   China	   should	   strengthen	   its	   maritime	  defence	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	   increasingly	   menacing	   Japanese	   naval	   power.	   A	  number	  of	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	  discussion	  suggested	  that	  China	  should	  adopt	  Western	  armaments	  as	   a	  means	   to	  protect	   itself	   from	  maritime	  aggressions.199	  Yu	   Lingchen,	   a	   conservative	   official,	   led	   the	   charge	   for	   an	   attack	   against	  Westernisation.	  His	  opinions	  were	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  dynastic	  cycle	  and	  Sino-­‐centrism.	  He	  believed	  that	  learning	  from	  the	  West,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  military	  benefits,	  would	  undermine	   the	   ideological	   foundation	  of	   the	  empire	   in	  the	  long	  run.	  In	  his	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne,	  Yu	  argued:	   	  	  
‘our	   ancient	   sages	   [taught	   us	   to]	   civilise	   barbarian	   [foreigners]	  with	  
Chinese	   civilisation,	   whereas	   [Self-­‐Strengtheners	   like]	   Li	   Hongzhang	  
and	   Ding	   Richang	   are	   proposing	   to	   replace	   the	   Chinese	   [superior	  civilisation]	   with	   [that	   of	   the	   Western]	   barbarians’.	   I	   believe	   that	  
maritime	   defence	   is	   a	   matter	   so	   important	   that	   a	   mistake	   at	   the	  
foundation	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   destruction	   of	   the	   whole	   edifice	   [in	   the	  long	  run].	   [The	  nurturing	  of	  Confucian]	  talent	  are	  China’s	   top	  priority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  97-­‐101.	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at	  this	  moment,	  [but]	  what	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  Ding	  Richang	  suggested	  
will	   exacerbate	   [the	   lack	   of	   Confucian	   talent].	   …	   Building	   Western	  
machines	   and	   ships	  will	   necessitate	   the	   adoption	   of	  Western	   learning,	  
which	  will	   in	   turn	  necessitate	   that	   talent	   is	   to	  be	  selected	  according	  to	  
whether	  or	  not	  one	   is	  good	  at	  Western	   learning	   [instead	  of	  Confucian	  classics].	   [Therefore]	   although	   those	  who	   put	   forward	   such	   proposals	  [of	   learning	   from	   the	   West]	   were	   initially	   [only]	   trying	   to	   use	  [barbarians’	   superior	   weapons]	   against	   barbarians,	   and	   were	   not	  
intending	   to	   persuade	   [Chinese]	   people	   to	   give	   up	   the	   fundamental	  
Confucian	   principles	   of	   propriety,	   righteousness,	   honesty,	   and	   sense	   of	  
shame.	   However,	   is	   there	   anything	   more	   dishonourable	   than	   learning	  
from	   the	   Westerners?	   It	   is	   impossible	   to	   expect	   one	   to	   live	   up	   to	   …	  [Confucian	   principles]…	   while	   teaching	   them	   dishonourable	   [foreign]	  
things.’	   200	  	  Yu	   suggested	   that	   for	   China,	   the	   fundamental	   solution	   of	  maritime	   defence	  was	   to	   restore	   the	   Confucian	   social	   order,	  which	   had	   been	   in	   decline	   since	   the	  mid-­‐19th	  century.	  If	  the	  Confucian	  order	  was	  restored,	  Yu	  envisioned,	  all	  officials	  would	  be	  more	  devoted	  and	  the	  people	  would	  be	  more	  loyal.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  military,	   Yu	   suggested	   that	   China	   should	   not	   fight	   foreign	   aggressors	   at	   sea.	  Instead,	  the	  army	  should	  be	  brought	  into	  play	  since	  China	  enjoyed,	  as	  he	  saw	  it,	  a	  degree	  of	  military	  superiority	  on	  land.	  In	  the	  attachment	  of	  this	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne,	   he	   highlighted	   the	   threats	   posed	   by	   the	   Russians	   in	   the	   northeast	   and	  reminded	   the	   emperor	   that	   Russia	   was	   in	   fact	   the	   most	   menacing	   threat	   to	  China.201	   	  Yu	  Lingchen	  was	  a	  typical	  guardian	  of	  traditional	  Confucian	  principles.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  officials	  like	  him,	  modernisation	  was	  a	  synonym	  for	  Westernisation,	  and	  Westernisation	   in	   turn	  meant	  a	  departure	   from	  Confucianism,	  as	   the	   two	  were	  considered	   antithetic.	   To	   Confucian	   hardliners,	   the	   adoption	   of	   Western	  techniques	  would	  undermine	   the	   ideological	   foundation	  of	  Chinese	  society	  and	  jeopardise	   the	   traditional	  social	  order	   in	   the	   long	  run.	   It	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	   	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.	  120-­‐122.	  201	   	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  123.	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that	  such	  a	  concern	  was	  not	  completely	  unfounded.	  Confucian	  principles	  did	  play	  a	  role	  in	  affecting	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  Chinese	  empires.	  Wakeman	  Jr.	  pointed	  out	  that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   elaborate	   institutional	   checks	   on	   bureaucratic	  performance,	   the	   efficient	   administration	   of	   the	   Chinese	   dynasties	   had	   to	   rely	  upon	  Confucian	  norms	  of	  behaviour,	  and	  hence	  upon	  the	  officials’	  own	  sense	  of	  self-­‐restraint.202	   The	  notion	  of	  dynastic	  cycle	  was	  not	  totally	  an	  illusion	  (though	  the	   notion	   of	   Sino-­‐centrism	   largely	   was).	   Neither	   was	   discarding	   Confucian	  traditions	   an	  option	  open	   to	   the	  Manchu	   rulers	  of	   the	  Qing	  Empire.	  As	   foreign	  rulers,	   the	   Manchus	   retained	   their	   legitimacy	   to	   rule	   only	   as	   long	   as	   they	  successfully	  adhered	  to	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  traditions.203	   	  	   ***	  	  The	  second	  group	  of	  opponents	  of	  naval	  modernisers	  based	  their	  arguments	  on	  realist	  –	  in	  particular	  economic	  and	  geo-­‐strategic	  –	  imperatives.	  The	  Opium	  Wars	  and	  the	  domestic	  revolts	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  crippled	  the	  empire	  financially	  as	  much	  as	  militarily.	  In	  1872,	  Song	  Jin,	  grand	  secretary	  of	  the	  Grand	  Secretariat	  (the	  nominal	  cabinet	  of	  the	  Qing	  Imperial	  Government)	  handed	  in	  a	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne	  arguing	  that	  China	  should	  stop	  building	  a	  steam	  navy.	  Song	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	   steamships	   not	   only	   had	   little	   practical	   value,	   but	   also	   brought	   a	  heavy	  financial	  burden	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  nation.	  In	  the	  memorial	  he	  said:	  	  
‘a	  total	  amount	  of	  four	  to	  five	  million	  taels	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  building	  
steamships	   in	   Fuzhou,	   [which	   is]	   a	   extremely	   heavy	   and	   wasteful	  
expenditure.	  [It	  is	  unwise]	  if	  the	  steamships	  were	  intended	  for	  defending	  [China]	   against	   barbarians,	   because	   peace	   treaties	   have	   already	   been	  
signed	   [between	   China	   and	   the	   West].	   [Building	   steamships]	   would	  
arouse	  unnecessary	  suspicions.	  Moreover,	  the	  ships	  were	  not	  capable	  of	  
fighting	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  as	  they	  are	  inferior	  to	  the	  foreigners’	  ships.	  …	  [It	  is	  also	  unwise]	  if	  the	  ships	  were	  intended	  for	  patrolling	  the	  seas	  and	  
arresting	   pirates,	   because	   there	   are	   already	  water	   forces	   [assigned	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	   Wakeman,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Imperial	  China,	  pp.	  55-­‐69.	  203	   Paine,	  The	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894-­‐1895,	  p.	  358.	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that	   duty]	   and	   if	   these	   [water	   force]	   ships	   were	   solidly	   built	   and	  
commanded	  by	  men	  who	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  coastal	  waters,	  they	  have	  
no	  reason	  not	  to	  overcome	  [the	  pirates].	  Why	  should	  we	  bother	  to	  build	  
steamships	  alongside	  war	  junks	  and	  meaninglessly	  increase	  expenditure?	  
If	   the	  ships	  are	   intended	   for	   transporting	   [tribute]	  grain	  …	   it	   is	   in	   fact	  
much	  more	  expensive	  than	  traditional	  junk	  boats.’204	  	   In	  the	  same	  memorial,	  Song	  pointed	  out	  in	  a	  criticising	  tone	  that	  the	  pursuit	  of	  such	  novel	  and	  ingenious	  things	  as	  steamships	  could	  only	  be	  tolerated	  when	  the	   nation’s	   economy	  was	   prosperous.	   Given	   that	   the	   empire	   at	   that	   time	  was	  still	   recovering	   from	   the	   calamities	   of	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century,	   the	   shipbuilding	  funds,	  he	  suggested,	  should	  be	  diverted	  to	  help	  the	  recovery.	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  Song	   regarded	   the	   navy	   as	   a	   ‘white	   elephant’	   to	   China.	   His	   view	   was	   not	  unprecedented.	  Nearly	  four	  hundred	  years	  ago,	  when	  the	  Chenghua	  Emperor	  of	  Ming	   Dynasty	   suggested	   resuming	   the	   Treasure	   Fleet	   voyages,	   Liu	   Daxia,	   the	  head	   of	   the	   Board	   of	   War	   of	   the	   Ming	   Dynasty,	   disagreed	   with	   him	   on	   the	  grounds	   that	   the	   expeditions	   wasted	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   financial	   and	   human	  resources	  and	  had	  in	  fact	  little	  practical	  value.205	  Geo-­‐strategy	   was	   another	   main	   concern	   from	   the	   realists’	   point	   of	   view.	  Traditionally,	   China	  was	  more	   concerned	  with	   the	   security	   of	   its	   land	  borders,	  which	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   continuous	  building	   of	   the	  Great	  Wall	   throughout	   the	  nation’s	   history.	   Serious	  maritime	   threats,	   in	   contrast,	   only	   emerged	   since	   the	  Opium	  Wars.	  The	  1874	  Japanese	  invasion	  of	  Taiwan	  intensified	  China’s	  need	  for	  a	  modern	  navy.	   It	   coincided	  with	   the	   spread	  of	   racial	  minority	   revolts	   and	   the	  intensified	  Russian	  expansionism	  in	  the	  north-­‐western	  China,	  which	  could	  only	  be	   tackled	   by	   an	   army	   expedition.	   Chinese	   elites	   at	   the	   time	   held	   divergent	  opinions	   on	  which	   one	   between	   the	   south-­‐eastern	   coast	   or	   the	   north-­‐western	  land	  frontier	  should	  be	  prioritised	  on	  the	  empire’s	  security	  agenda.206	  Li	   Hongzhang,	   leading	   spirit	   of	   the	   navalist	   Self-­‐Strengtheners,	   asked	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  5,	  pp.	  105-­‐106.	  205	   See	   Ming	   dynasty	   sources	   Congjian	   Yan,	  殊域周咨录	   Shuyu	   Zhouzi	   Lu	   [Extensive	   Inquiry	   of	   Faraway	  
Places],	  p.	  307.	  Qiyuan	  Gu,	  客座赘語	   Kezuo	  Zhuiyu	  [Idle	  Talks	  with	  Guests],	  pp.	  29-­‐30.	  206	   For	   more	   details	   of	   the	   debate	   see	   Immanuel	   C.	   Y.	   Hsü,	   ‘The	   Great	   Policy	   Debate	   in	   China,	   1874:	  Maritime	   Defense	   vs.	   Frontier	   Defense’,	   Harvard	   Journal	   of	   Asiatic	   Studies,	   Vol.	   25.	   (1964-­‐1965),	   pp.	  212-­‐228.	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Imperial	  Court	  to	  suspend	  the	  military	  campaigns	  in	  the	  north-­‐west	  and	  shift	  the	  funds	   to	   naval	  modernisation.	   Li’s	  main	   argument	  was	   that	   the	   barren	   land	   of	  Xinjiang	  was	  of	  little	  agricultural	  value	  and	  not	  worth	  the	  cost	  of	  recovering	  it.	  In	  Li’s	  words,	  postponing	  the	  recovery	  of	  Xinjiang	  would	  do	  no	  harm	  to	  the	  ‘vitality’	  of	   China.207	   Zuo	  Zongtang,	  who	   at	   the	   time	  was	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   operations	   in	  Xinjiang,	  disagreed:	   	  	  ‘since	   antiquity,	   China	   has	   always	   been	   suffering	   more	   intense	   security	  
threats	   in	   the	   north-­‐west	   than	   in	   the	   south-­‐east	   [coasts].	   Generally	  
speaking,	   the	   south-­‐east	   is	   flanked	   by	   the	   sea	   [which	   favours	   defence],	  
whereas	   in	   the	   north-­‐east	   steppe	   [which	   lacks	   such	   tenable	   terrain],	  
superiority	  and	  inferiority	  is	  specifically	  determined	  by	  the	  amount	  troops	  [deployed].	  …	  The	  reason	  why	  Xinjiang	  should	  be	  emphasised	  is	  because	  [the	  security	  of	  Xinjiang	  is]	  important	  to	  [the	  security	  of]	  Mongolia,	  and	  
the	  reason	  why	  Mongolia	  should	  be	  defended	   is	  because	  [the	  security	  of	  Mongolia]	  is	  important	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  capital	  city.’208	  	  Zuo	  also	  argued	  that	   the	  Western	  trading	  powers	  posed	   little	   threat	   to	  Chinese	  territory,	   whereas	   the	   Russian	   encroachment	   in	   Xinjiang	   was	   in	   fact	   a	   more	  imminent	  threat.	   	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court’s	  rhetoric	  that	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  coasts	  and	  the	  land	  frontiers	  were	  equally	  important,	   it	  de	  facto	  supported	  the	  latter.	  With	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  Zuo	  raised	  a	  total	  number	  of	  14.7	  million	  taels	  for	  the	   campaigns	   in	   Xinjiang	   by	   borrowing	   from	   foreign	   banks,	   which	   were	  guaranteed	   by	   and	   eventually	   paid	   from	   the	   customs	   revenue.209	   The	   customs	  revenue,	   as	   previously	   indicated,	  was	   a	  major	   financial	   source	   for	   the	   Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  But	  the	  emperor,	  who	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  customs	  revenue,	   regarded	   the	  defence	  of	   land	   frontier	  as	  having	  prior	   claim	  on	   it.	  Hsü	  observed	   that	   ‘there	   was	   a	   definite	   correlation	   between	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	  
nascent	   Chinese	   navy	   and	   the	   Sinkiang	   [Xinjiang]	   campaign’.210	   The	   Imperial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  24,	  p.	  19.	  208	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  8,	  pp.	  176-­‐183.	  209	   Kuo	  and	  Liu,	  ‘Self-­‐Strengthening’,	  p.	  515.	  210	   Hsü,	  ‘The	  Great	  Policy	  Debate	  in	  China,	  1874’,	  p.	  228?	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Court	  supported	  Zuo	  because	  the	  Chinese	  military	  traditions	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  land	  than	  the	  sea,	  and	  the	  highest	  decision-­‐makers	  were	  significantly	  more	  susceptible	  to	  appeals	  for	  frontier	  defence.	  	   ***	  	  A	  third	  type	  of	  objection	  to	  naval	  modernisation	  came	  from	  political	  enemies	  of	  the	  navalist	  Self-­‐Strengtheners.	  Compared	  with	  the	  aforementioned	  two	  types	  of	  oppositions,	   such	   rivalries	   were	   relatively	   inconspicuous.	   They	   were	   usually	  carried	   out	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   more	   justifiable	   arguments.	   For	   example,	   it	   is	  commonly	  believed	  that	  the	  abovementioned	  policy	  debate	  on	  maritime	  defence	  and	   frontier	   defence	   was	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent	   driven	   by	   the	   personal	  hostility	  between	  Zuo	  Zongtang	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang.	  Another	  well-­‐known	  incident	  of	  this	  kind	  happened	  between	  Weng	  Tonghe	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang.	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  war	  with	  Japan,	  Weng	  Tonghe,	  the	  then	  head	  of	   the	  Board	  of	  Revenue,	  managed	   to	  persuade	   the	   Imperial	  Court	   to	   ratify	  his	  proposal	  of	  suspending	  the	  steam	  navy’s	  acquisitions	  from	  abroad	  for	  two	  years,	  and	   redirect	   the	   money	   to	   flood-­‐control	   and	   disaster	   relief.211	   This	   severely	  undermined	   the	   strength	   of	   Li’s	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   as	   the	   fleet	   heavily	   relied	   on	  foreign	  shipbuilders	  and	  arms-­‐makers	  for	  equipment.	  In	  the	  early	  1890s,	  most	  of	  the	  ships	  and	  guns	   that	  Li	  had	  acquired	   in	   the	  previous	  decades	  were	  obsolete	  and	   needed	   upgrade,	   but	   the	   lack	   of	   funds	   rendered	   this	   impossible. 212	  Armament	   inferiority,	   the	   lack	  of	  cutting-­‐edge	  ships	  and	  guns	   in	  particular,	  are	  commonly	   considered	   as	   the	   main	   causes	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet’s	   defeat	   in	   the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu.	  Weng	  not	  only	  played	  a	  crucial	   role	   in	   thwarting	   the	  equipment	  upgrade	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   He	   was	   also	   a	   leading	   hawkish	   figure	   in	   the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  advocated	  a	  hard-­‐line	  policy	  in	  dealing	  with	  Japan	  over	  Korea.	  A	   third	  party	  account	   commented	   that	  Weng	  wanted	   to	  exploit	   the	  war	   to	  win	  over	  Li	  in	  their	  personal	  rivalry.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  war	  with	  Japan,	  Li	  would	  be	  the	  commander	   of	   the	   Chinese	   side	   and	   his	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   would	   be	   fighting	   the	  Imperial	   Japanese	   Navy.	   According	   to	   the	   account,	   Weng	   wished	   to	   see	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  211	   HJDSJ,	  p.	  15.	  WTHJ,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  70.	   	  212	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  78,	  p.	  53.	  
	   93	  
happen	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  equipment	  inferiority	  would	  increase	  the	  chance	  for	  Li	  to	  lose	  the	  war.213	   	  Such	  rivalries	  were	  common	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  and	  the	  Imperial	   Court	  made	   little	   effort	   to	   solve	   them.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   encouraged	  such	   rivalries	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   to	   prevent	   the	   rise	   of	   powerful	   officials	   or	  coteries.	   In	   the	   late	  19th	   century,	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  highest	   ruler	  was	  on	   the	  decline	   consequent	   on	   the	   turmoil	   of	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century.	   In	   order	   to	  counterbalance	   the	   rising	   prestige	   of	   local	   bureaucrats,	   emperors	   frequently	  resorted	  to	  fomenting	  internal	  rivalries.	  Li	  Hongzhang	  was	  a	  typical	  example.	  In	  worrying	  about	  the	  security	  situation	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  the	  empire	  had	  to	  rely	   on	   strongmen	   like	   him	   to	   safeguard	   the	   empire.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  Imperial	   Court	   was	   concerned	   that	   if	   left	   unchecked,	   such	   strongmen	   would	  dwarf	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  degree	  of	  rivalry	  was	  intentionally	   maintained	   and	   exploited	   by	   the	   emperor	   to	   derive	   a	   sense	   of	  security	  from	  acting	  as	  an	  umpire	  between	  the	  rivalling	  officials.214	   	  	  	  
3.3 Conclusion	  
	  The	  Qing	  Empire	  during	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  was	  an	  autocracy;	  the	  emperor’s	  personal	  wish	  played	  a	  significant	  part	  in	  deciding	  the	  nation’s	  policy.	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  navy,	  the	  Qing	  emperors	  were	  not	  navalist,	  fundamentally	  because	  naval	   strength	  had	  rarely	  affected	   the	   rise	  and	   fall	  of	   the	  country.	  The	  alien	  Manchu	  rule	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  further	  impeded	  the	  development	  of	  the	  navy,	  because	  the	  emperors	  tended	  to	  uphold	  their	  legitimacy	  by	  adhering	  to	  the	  Chinese	   feudal-­‐agrarian	   traditions	   that	   neglected	   the	   sea.	   It	   was	   also	   unlikely	  that	   supporters	   of	   naval	   modernisation	   could	   emerge	   from	   officials	   in	   the	  Imperial	   Court.	   Promoting	   naval	   modernisation	   required	   power,	   but	   the	  autocratic	  rulers	  tolerated	  no	  authoritative	  individuals.	  The	  story	  of	  Prince	  Gong	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	   JLSB,	  p.	  6.	  214	   Benjamin	  Elman	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘Qing	  emperors	  viewed	  horizontally-­‐aligned	  groups	  of	  gentry-­‐officials	  as	  
factional	   threats	   to	   the	   sanctity	   of	   vertical	   loyalties	   that	   culminated	   in	   the	   person	   of	   the	   emperor	   himself.’	  Benjamin	   A.	   Elman,	   ‘Imperial	   Politics	   and	   Confucian	   Societies	   in	   Late	   Imperial	   China:	   The	   Hanlin	   and	  Donglin	  Academies’,	  Modern	  China,	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  4.	  (Oct.,	  1989),	  p.	  405.	  
	   94	  
illustrated	  this	  point.	  In	  short,	  the	  Qing	  emperors	  were	  by	  no	  means	  navalist	  and	  they	  allowed	  nobody	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  to	  have	  real	  power,	  a	  necessity	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  steam	  navy.	   	  The	  naval	  modernisation	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  conducted	  at	  the	  provincial	  level,	  and	  its	  promoters,	   i.e.	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners,	  were	  mostly	  former	  leaders	  of	   the	   local	  militia	   forces.	   They	   advocated	   naval	  modernisation	   partly	   because	  they	   knew	   that	   the	   standing	   armed	   forces	   (traditional	  water	   forces	   included)	  held	   an	   overall	   negative	   attitude	   towards	   modernisation,	   and	   partly	   because	  they	  needed	  the	  military	  modernisation	  projects	  as	   their	  new	   raison	  d'être	  –	   in	  other	   words,	   foundations	   of	   personal	   power	   –	   after	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	  anti-­‐revolt	  wars.	  Their	  status	  as	  non-­‐standing	  armed	  forces	  leaders	  determined	  that	  the	  steam	  navy	  was	  not	  born	  to	  replace	  the	  traditional	  water	  forces,	  and	  the	  relations	  among	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  themselves	  were	  characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  cohesiveness	  and	  coordination.	   	  The	   Chinese	   elites	   held	   divergent	   opinions	   towards	   the	   steam	   navy.	   The	  conservatives	  opposed	  it,	  as	  they	  believed	  that	  adopting	  Western	  learning	  would	  undermine	  the	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  the	  empire	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  According	  to	  them,	  Chinese	  learning	  and	  Western	  learning	  were	  antithetic.	  Realists	  argued	  that	  the	   navy	   was	   less	   of	   a	   matter	   of	   urgency	   compared	   to	   other	   issues,	   such	   as	  frontier	  security	  in	  the	  north-­‐west,	  and	  that	  the	  naval	  funds	  should	  be	  redirected	  to	   address	   these	   exigencies.	   The	   development	   of	   the	   steam	   navy	   was	   also	  affected	   by	   the	   struggles	   among	   officials.	   The	   Imperial	   Court	   encouraged	   such	  struggles	   to	   an	   extent,	   as	   it	   could	   derive	   a	   sense	   of	   security	   from	   acting	   as	   an	  umpire	  between	  the	  rivalling	  coteries.	  Such	  was	  the	  political	  background	  of	  the	  Chinese	   steam	   navy.	   Its	   importance	  was	   not	   commonly	   recognised	   among	   the	  elites	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  The	  steam	  navy	  –	  in	  fact	  provincial	  steam	  navies	  –	  was	  little	   more	   than	   a	   handful	   of	   isolated	   enclaves	   scattered	   over	   an	   otherwise	  unsupportive	   country,	   with	   only	   intermittent	   and	   lukewarm	   support	   from	   the	  Imperial	  Court.	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  Photo	  3.1:	  Dr.	  William	  A.P.	  Martin	  and	  his	  students	  in	  China’s	  first	  Western	  learning	  institution	  –	  the	  College	  of	  Foreign	  Languages	  (Tongwen	  Guan).215	   Note	  the	  Chinese-­‐style	  ambience.	  In	  1866,	  it	   was	   suggested	   that	   the	   curriculum	   of	   the	   College	   of	   Foreign	   Languages	   should	   include	  astronomy	  and	  mathematics.	  Many	  conservative	  officials	  strongly	  opposed	  this	  proposal,	  fearing	  that	   the	  Confucian	  scholars	  –	   the	  vanguards	  of	   the	  Confucian	  empire	  –	  would	  be	  barbarianised	  (Westernised).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  215	   W.	   A.	   P.	   Martin,	   The	   Lore	   of	   Cathay:	   Or,	   The	   Intellect	   of	   China,	   (Edinburgh	   and	   London:	   Oliphant,	  Anderson	  &	  Ferrier,	  1901),	  p.	  34.	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  Chapter	  Four	  	  	  Officers	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  chapter	  will	   focus	  on	  four	  aspects:	  (1)	  the	  recruitment	  of	  naval	  cadets;	  (2)	  the	   naval	   academies;	   (3)	   the	   advanced	   naval	   education;	   and	   (4)	   the	   senior	  commanding	  officers	   of	   the	  navy.	   It	  will	   try	   to	   explain	   the	   impacts	   of	   the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  on	  the	  officer	  corps	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  This	   is	   an	   aspect	   of	   crucial	   relevance.	   Notwithstanding	   a	   population	   of	   four	  hundred	  million,	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China	  could	  hardly	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  nation	  rich	  in	  people	   ‘following	  the	  sea’,	   to	  use	  Mahan’s	  words.	  In	  fact,	   the	  shortage	  of	  naval	   professionals	  was	   a	  more	   serious	   issue	   than	   the	   lack	   of	   ships	   and	   guns.	  Chester	   Holcombe,	   American	   ambassador	   to	   China	   in	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  period,	   commented	   that:	   ‘just	   there	   lay	   the	   crucial	   point	   of	   entire	   business	   of	  
recreating	   a	   Chinese	   …	   navy.	   So	   long	   as	   her	   supply	   of	   funds	   lasted,	   China	   could	  
purchase	  anything	  [she]	  needed.	  …	  The	  whole	  …	  world	  was	  eager	  to	  supply	  her.	  But	  
she	  could	  not	  purchase	  trained	  officers	  and	  disciplined	  soldiers	  in	  any	  market.	  They	  
must	  by	  bred	  and	  educated	  in	  China,	  raised	  from	  among	  her	  own	  people.’216	  	  	  
4.1	  The	  Recruitment	  of	  Naval	  Cadets	  	  The	  opening	  of	  the	  first	  Chinese	  Western	  learning	  educational	  institutions	  set	  the	  foundation	   for	   a	   friction	  with	   traditional	   education.	   This	  was	   the	   result	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	   Chester	  Holcombe,	  The	  Real	  Chinese	  Question,	  (New	  York:	  Dodd,	  Mead	  and	  Company,	  1909),	  p.	  136.	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debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  Western	  learning	  should	  be	  borrowed	  to	  safeguard	  the	  empire.	  The	  imperial	  elites	  split	  into	  two	  opposing	  groups	  in	  this	  debate.	  On	  one	  side,	  there	  were	  the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  who	  believed	  that	  China	  should	  adopt	  a	  degree	   of	   Western	   learning.	   Rallying	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   ‘learn	   barbarians’	  
superior	   techniques	   with	   which	   to	   repel	   the	   barbarians’,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	  believed	  that	  commanding	  a	  degree	  of	  Western	  learning	  could	  strengthen	  China	  militarily	   so	   that	   the	   nation	   would	   be	   more	   able	   to	   protect	   itself	   against	  ‘barbarian’	   aggressions.	   On	   the	   opposite	   side	   were	   the	   conservatives	   who	  disproved	   of	   the	   deviation	   from	   the	   traditional	   pattern	   of	   education,	  which	   all	  the	  Western	  learning	  institutions	  –	  naval	  academies	  included	  –	  represented.	  They	  regarded	   them	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   Chinese	   way	   of	   life.217	   Many	   Confucian	  hardliners	   believed	   that	   the	   calamities	   that	   China	   had	   suffered	   in	   previous	  decades	  were,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  caused	  by	  the	  society’s	  deviation	  from	  Confucian	  principles.	  Consequently	   they	  argued	  that	  restoring	  Confucian	  order	   in	  Chinese	  society	   by	   reiterating	   Confucianism	   in	   public	   education	   was	   the	   fundamental	  cure	  for	  all	  of	  China’s	  problems.	  The	   two	   voices	   however	   were	   not	   equally	   strong.	   The	   Self-­‐Strengtheners,	  though	  calling	  for	  Western-­‐style	  education,	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  completely	  replace	  
Chinese	   learning	   with	   that	   of	   the	   West.	   They	   limited	   the	   adoption	   of	  Western	  
learning	   to	  military	   sciences	   and	   carefully	   avoided	   its	   impacts	   on	   the	   Chinese	  institutions.	   Even	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   the	   most	   vigorous	   advocate	   of	   military	  modernisation,	  held	  a	  reserved	  attitude	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  Western	  
learning.	  Teng	  and	  Fairbank	  observed:	  ‘[Li	  Hongzhang]	  thought	  that	  the	  Chinese	  
political	   and	   educational	   systems	   and	   Chinese	   culture	   and	   customs	   were	   all	  
superior	   to	   those	   of	   foreign	   countries	   –	   except	   for	   cannon,	   railway	   and	  
machinery.’218	   	  The	   conservatives,	   in	   contrast,	   were	   more	   determined	   to	   defend	   the	   old	  order,	  and	  they	  were	  much	  larger	  in	  number.	  An	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  elite	  class	  supported	  the	  conservatives	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  many	  of	  them	  had	  spent	   years	   of	   their	   life	   studying	   the	   Confucian	   classics	   before	   they	   emerged	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	   Knight	   Biggerstaff,	   The	   Earliest	   Modern	   Government	   Schools	   in	   China,	   (Ithaca,	   NY.:	   Cornell	   University	  Press,	  1961),	  p.	  71.	   	   	  218	   Teng	  and	  Fairbank,	  China's	  Response	  to	  the	  West,	  p.	  69.	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from	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations;	   they	  were	   devoted	   disciples	   of	   Confucianism.	  Second,	   many	   Chinese	   officials	   distrusted	   foreign	   things	   and	   the	   Opium	  Wars	  further	   strengthened	   this	   view.	   A	   prominent	   Confucian	   hardliner	   once	  commented:	   ‘why	   must	   we	   learn	   from	   foreigners?	   ...	   the	   foreigners	   are	   our	  
enemies	  …	  It	  cannot	  but	  end	  after	  a	  few	  years	  by	  driving	  the	  Chinese	  people	  fully	  to	  
yield	   to	   foreigners.’219	   Therefore,	   in	   the	   debate	   on	  Western	   learning,	   the	   voice	  against	  its	  adoption	  was	  louder	  than	  the	  voice	  in	  its	  favour.	   	  As	  previously	   indicated,	   the	   Imperial	  Examinations	  were	  considered	  as	   the	  only	   recognised	   path	   to	   upward	  mobility	   in	   Chinese	   society.	   In	   the	   late	   1860s	  and	  early	  1870s,	  the	  pacification	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century	  domestic	  rebellions	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  nationwide	  reinvigoration	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Examinations.	  Both	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  the	  literati	  applauded	  it.	  From	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  this	  symbolised	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  good	  order.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  intellectuals,	  it	  provided	  them	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  time	  lost	  during	   the	   years	   of	   turmoil.	   People	   engaged	   in	   the	   examinations	   with	  enthusiasm.220	   At	   this	  moment,	   some	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   proposed	   to	   open	   up	  ‘special	   examinations’	   for	   Western	   learning	   alongside	   the	   traditional	  examinations	   of	   Confucian	   classics,	   in	   order	   to	   select	   talent	   for	   the	   cause	   of	  military	   modernisation.221	   They	   wanted	   to	   ‘jump	   on	   the	   bandwagon’	   of	   the	  revival	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Examination	  to	  promote	  Western	  learning	  among	  Chinese	  intellectuals.	   They	   hoped	   that	   if	   such	   proposals	   were	   implemented,	   Western	  
learning	  would	  gain	  the	  acceptance	  of	  Chinese	  intellectuals;	  but	  these	  proposals	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  Two	   points	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   passages	   above:	   (a)	   the	   Confucian	  scholars	  and	  general	  officialdom	  held	  a	  hostile	  attitude	  towards	  Western	  learning;	  and	  (b)	  Confucian	  classics	  dominated	  the	  main	  pathway	  to	  honour	  and	  success	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  whereas	  Western	   learning	  was	  excluded	  from	  it.	   It	  was	  against	  this	   background	   that	   the	   earliest	   educational	   institutions	   for	  Western	   learning	  were	  opened	  in	  China;	  first	  the	  College	  of	  Foreign	  Languages	  (the	  Tongwen	  Guan)	  in	   Beijing	   in	   1862,	   and	   then	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy	   in	   1867.	   The	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  219	   Biggerstaff,	  The	  Earliest	  Modern	  Government	  Schools	  in	  China,	  p.72.	  220	   Wright,	  The	  Last	  Stand	  of	  Chinese	  Conservatism,	  p.	  80.	  Also	  see	  Kwang-­‐Ching	  Liu,	  ‘The	  Ch'ing	  Restoration’	  in	   The	   Cambridge	   History	   of	   China	   Volume	   10:	   Late	   Ch'ing	   1800–1911,	   Part	   1.	   Ed.	   John	   K.	   Fairbank,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978),	  p.	  478.	  221	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ	  Vol.	  99,	  p.	  30.	  Wang,	  Research	  on	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  Examination	  System,	  pp.	  176-­‐178.	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attitude	   towards	   students	   of	   Western	   learning	   and	   the	   self-­‐perception	   of	  students	  of	  Western	  learning	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  following	  description	  offered	  by	  an	  official	  of	  the	  conservative	  bloc:	   	  	  
‘No	  respectable	  Chinese	  would	  matriculate	  in	  it	  [the	  Tongwen	  Guan].	  No	  
man	  young	  enough	  to	  still	  have	  hopes	  of	  advancement	  in	  any	  other	  career	  
would	  cast	  in	  his	  fortune	  with	  that	  of	  the	  College.	  The	  few	  who	  came	  were	  
men	  who	  had	  failed	   in	  the	  official	  career	  –	  broken	  down	  hacks	  to	  whom	  
the	  stipend	  offered	  by	  the	  yamen	  [the	  Zongli	  Yamen]	  proved	  dearer	  than	  
their	   reputation.	   …	   They	   were	   looked	   down	   upon	   by	   their	   literary	  
brethren	  as	  renegades	  and	  traitors	  to	  the	  cause.	  They	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  
so	   themselves.	   One	   of	   them	  …	   admitted	  …	   that	   outside	   the	   yamen	  …	   he	  
represented	  himself	  as	  a	  copyist	  or	  clerk.	  He	  never	  acknowledged	  himself	  
to	  be	  a	  student	  of	  the	  College	  [of	  Western	  learning].’222	  	  This	  description	  might	  have	  been	  exaggerated	  to	  an	  extent	  as	  the	  writer	  himself	  was	  a	  conservative	  official,	  but	  from	  this	  extract	  we	  can	  distil	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  hostility	   of	   the	   conservatives;	   that	   is,	   the	  mainstream	   ethos	   of	   Chinese	   society	  towards	  Western	  learning.	   	  It	  was	  not	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  in	  this	  context,	  most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  students,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  had	  the	  wherewithal	  and	  the	  intelligence	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  Confucian	  mainstream,	   would	   be	   hesitant	   to	   pursue	  Western	   learning,	   as	   it	   promised	   no	  obvious	  rewards.	  Consequently,	   few	  reputable	  households	  were	  willing	  to	  send	  their	  sons	   to	  such	  schools.	  The	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  students	  enrolled	  at	   the	  institutions	   for	  Western	   learning	  was	   rather	   low:	   a	   considerable	  portion	  of	   the	  students	   in	   the	   College	   of	   Foreign	   Languages	   was	   made	   up	   of	   middle-­‐aged	  mediocrities	   who	   had	   enrolled	   for	   a	   pension.223	   The	   memoirs	   of	   Dr.	   W.A.P.	  Martin,	  an	  American	  scholar	  who	  served	  in	  the	  Tongwen	  Guan	  as	  a	  teacher	  in	  the	  1860s,	  recorded	  that	  many	  of	  the	  students	  who	  volunteered	  for	  Western	  learning	  were	  dropouts	  of	  the	  mainstream	  educational	  system.224	  In	  the	  same	  sense,	  recruiting	  was	  a	  headache	  for	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  222	   Biggerstaff,	  The	  Earliest	  Modern	  Government	  Schools	  in	  China,	  pp.119-­‐120.	  223	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  271.	  224	   Martin,	  The	  Lore	  of	  Cathay,	  p.	  17.	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and	  the	  other	  naval	  academies	  established	  later	  on.225	   In	  order	  to	  attract	  more	  students,	  many	  naval	  academies	  offered	  a	  number	  of	   incentives.	  First,	   students	  who	  volunteered	  for	  naval	  academies	  were	  usually	  paid	  rather	  generously.	  Apart	  from	  free	  meals,	  residence	  and	  medical	  care,	  naval	  cadets	  were	  usually	  offered	  a	  monthly	   allowance	   of	   three	   to	   four	   taels;	   those	   of	   senior	   grade	   or	   rated	   as	  performing	  above-­‐average	  received	  an	  allowance	  as	  high	  as	  ten	  taels	  or	  more.226	  This	  was	  an	  amount	  even	  higher	   than	   the	   salary	  of	   low-­‐ranking	  officials	   in	   the	  civil	  service	  system.227	   This	  allowance,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Li	  Hongzhang	   ‘would	  be	  
sufficient	  for	  a	  family	  of	  eight	  to	  have	  a	  decent	  life’.228	  Second,	  students	  who	  volunteered	  for	  naval	  academies	  were	  also	  promised	  appointments	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   military	   merit	   upon	   their	   graduation.	   The	  regulation	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  stipulated:	  	   ‘all	  who	  complete	  the	  study	  of	  ship	  command	  and	  those	  who	  learn	  to	  build	  
ships	  in	  conformity	  with	  designs	  will	  be	  given	  military	  rank.	  Persons	  have	  
civil	   rank	   who	   enter	   the	   school	   to	   study	   shall	   still	   be	   permitted	  
advancement	   as	   civil	   officials,	   although	   used	   in	   the	   navy,	   in	   order	   to	  
encourage	  effort.’229	   	  	  This	  meant	  that	  for	  civilian	  students,	  they	  would	  immediately	  receive	  a	  military	  rank	   when	   they	   graduated. 230 	   Students	   who	   had	   attended	   the	   Imperial	  Examinations,	   and	   had	   already	   secured	   a	   degree	   before	   joining	   the	   naval	  academies,	  would	  get	  a	  position	  in	  the	  navy	  immediately	  after	  graduation,	  while	  having	   their	   civil	   ranks	   preserved,	   as	   civil	   ranks	   were	   usually	   more	   highly	  regarded	  than	  military	  ranks.231	  Third,	   the	   naval	   academies	   from	   time	   to	   time	   lowered	   the	   ‘entrance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	   Bao,	   The	   History	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Navy,	   p.	   690.	   PLA	   Navy	   Headquarters	   eds.,	   近代中国海军	   Jindai	  
Zhongguo	  Haijun	  [Modern	  Chinese	  Navies],	  (Beijing:	  Haichao	  Publishing,	  1994),	  p.	  157.	  Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  
toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  609.	  226	   Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  14,	  75,	  82,	  95.	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  57.	   	  227	   DQHD-­‐GX	  ,	  Vol.	  21,	  p.	  9.	  228	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  147.	  229	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  377-­‐378.	  230	   Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  690.	  231	   Ibid.	   This	   stands	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   with	   the	   majority	   of	   Imperial	   Examination	   degree-­‐holders	   who	  usually	  had	  to	  wait	  ten	  to	  twenty	  years	  before	  they	  received	  an	  appointment.	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  80.	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threshold’	   and	   held	   special	   admissions	   to	   relieve	   the	   shortage	   of	   recruits.	   In	  particular,	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   recruits,	   the	   cadets	   were	  encouraged	   to	   introduce	   their	   relatives,	   friends	   and	  other	   acquaintance	   to	   join	  the	  naval	  academies.232	   It	  is	  evident	  that	  such	  policies	  would	  make	  the	  selection	  criteria	   even	  more	  porous	  and	  negatively	   affect	   the	  quality	  of	   recruits.	  This,	   in	  combination	  with	  the	  first	  two	  incentive	  policies,	  resulted	  in	  the	  recruitment	  of	  students	  of	  unsuitable	  age,	  mediocre	  talent,	  and	  unenthusiastic	  about	  a	  military	  career,	  as	  well	  as	  opportunists	  who	  considered	  joining	  the	  navy	  as	  a	  shortcut	  to	  wealth	  and	  power	  (for	  the	  negative	  impacts	  on	  the	  officer	  corps	  see	  Section	  4.4).	   	  The	  aim	  of	   these	   incentive	  policies	  was	   to	  make	   the	  naval	  academies	  more	  competitive	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   mainstream	   educational	   institutions	   by	   opening	   up	   an	  alternative	   route	   of	   personal	   advancement.	   However,	   these	   policies	   had	  many	  side	   effects.	   The	   most	   noteworthy	   side	   effect	   was	   that	   the	   naval	   academies	  became	   even	   more	   despised	   by	   the	   conservatives.	   The	   conservatives	   were	  discontent	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   generous	   stipends	   and	   extraordinary	   promotions	  were	  held	  out	  as	  an	  inducement,	  which	  would,	  as	  they	  saw	  it,	  have	  a	  degrading	  effect	  on	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  upright	  scholars	  and	  officials.	  A	  conservative	  official	  criticised	  that	  such	  policies	  were	  trying	  to:	   	  	  
‘[immorally]	   deviate	  people	   from	  the	  honourable	  path	  of	  keju	   [Imperial	  Examinations]	  and	   induce	  them	  with	  promotions	  and	  silver	   for	  the	  sake	  
of	   [learning	   Western]	   tricks.	   [Such	   a	   practice	   should	   be	   condemned	  because]	   it	   stressed	   fame	   and	   fortune	   but	   overlooked	   moral	   integrity.	  
How	   is	   that	   possible	   to	   expect	   real	   achievements	   from	  morally	   corrupt	  
men?’233	   	  	  A	   considerable	   number	   of	   the	   students	   entered	   the	   naval	   academies	  were	  old-­‐fashioned	   Confucian	   scholars	   who	   had	   involuntarily	   departed	   from	   their	  original	   course,	   rather	   than	   would-­‐be	   military	   men	   who	   were	   eager	   to	   learn	  about	   modern	   warfare.	   Yan	   Fu	   was	   a	   typical	   example.234	   Joining	   the	   Fuzhou	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	   PLA	  Navy	  Headquarters	   eds.,	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navies,	   p.	   157.	  Bao,	  The	  History	  of	   the	  Chinese	  Navy,	   pp.	  693-­‐694.	  233	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  47,	  p.	  16.	  234	   Yan	  Fu	  is	  sometimes	  known	  by	  his	  previous	  name	  Yen	  Tsung-­‐kuang	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Naval	   Academy	   in	   1867,	   Yan	  was	   among	   the	   earliest	   group	   of	   students	   at	   the	  institution.	   Before	   that,	   he	   had	   received	   Confucian	   education	   in	   traditional	  schools,	   but	   his	   father’s	   death	   when	   Yan	   was	   fourteen	   years	   old	   made	   it	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	  continue	  his	  education	  in	  a	  traditional	  school.235	   Instead,	  he	  joined	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy,	   largely	  because	  the	  school	  had	  no	  tuition	  fee	   and	   offered	   its	   students	   a	   generous	   stipend.	   He	   received	   systematic	   naval	  education	   in	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  and,	  as	  he	  was	   indeed	  a	  talented	  man,	  achieved	   good	   scores.	   In	   1877,	   he	   was	   sent	   to	   the	   Royal	   Naval	   College	   at	  Greenwich	  in	  England,	  together	  with	  other	  elite	  students,	  for	  advanced	  education	  as	  a	  commanding	  naval	  officer.	   	  Yet	  it	  seemed	  that	  he	  was	  never	  really	  interested	  in	  becoming	  a	  naval	  officer.	  When	  he	  finished	  his	  first	  year	  of	  study	  at	  Greenwich	  (all	  the	  Chinese	  cadets	  at	  that	  time	  attended	  a	  nine-­‐month	  sub-­‐lieutenant	  course	  at	  Greenwich),	  he	  chose	  to	   study	   for	   another	   year,	   while	   all	   the	   other	   Chinese	   cadets	   went	   to	   various	  British	   Royal	   Navy	   ships	   to	   gain	   hands-­‐on	   experience. 236 	   Because	   of	   his	  outstanding	   academic	   achievement,	   he	   was	   given	   a	   teaching	   position	   in	   the	  Tianjin	   Naval	   Academy	   when	   he	   returned	   to	   China	   in	   1879.	   Later,	   he	   was	  promoted	  to	  be	  superintendent	  of	  that	  Academy	  in	  1890.	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  position	  as	  the	  superintendent	  of	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy,	  he	   seemed	   to	  be	  more	   interested	   in	   taking	   Imperial	  Examinations.	  He	   took	   the	  Imperial	  Examination	  four	  times	  in	  the	  late	  1880s	  and	  early	  1890s,	  but	  failed	  all	  of	   them.	   In	   a	  poem	  written	   to	   a	   friend,	  Yan	   complained	   that	  he	  was	  now	   forty	  years	   old	   but	   still	   a	   ‘teacher’,	   and	   that	   nobody	   understood	   his	   ambition	   to	  become	  an	  honourable	  mainstream	  official	  by	  taking	  the	  Imperial	  Examinations.	  In	  the	  same	  poem,	  he	  expressed	  regret	  for	  taking	  up	  Western	  learning	  when	  he	  was	  young	  because	  he	  was	  now	  regarded	  by	  people	  as	  a	  ‘barbarian	  child’.237	   	  In	  the	  years	  after	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  Yan	  became	  a	  translator.	  His	  greatest	   fame	   came	   from	   his	   translation	   of	   major	  Western	   political,	   economic	  and	   philosophical	   writings.	   Among	   his	   most	   important	   works	   were	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235	   Quchang	  Wang,	  严几道年谱	   Yan	   Jidao	  Nianpu	   [A	   Biographic	   Chronology	   of	   Yan	   Jidao],	   1936.	   Reprint.	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  Book	  Store	  Publishing	  House,	  1991),	  p.	  4.	  236	   Yan	  Fu	  volunteered	  for	  a	  second	  term	  at	  Greenwich	  College	  in	  1978-­‐79.	  See	  Foreign	  Office	  Record	  FO.	  17/794.	  237	   YFJ,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  361.	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translation	  of	  T.H.	  Huxley’s	  Evolution	  and	  Ethics,	   J.S.	  Mill’s	  On	  Liberty	  and	  Logic,	  Herbert	  Spencer’s	  A	  Study	  of	  Sociology,	  and	  Edward	  Jenk’s	  A	  History	  of	  Politics.	  As	  Hsü	   saw	   it,	   the	  key	  message	   that	  Yan	   tried	   to	   express	   through	  his	   translations	  was	   the	   differences	   between	   China	   and	   the	   modern	   West	   in	   their	   attitudes	  towards	  human	  energy.238	   The	  West	  exalted	  action,	  assertiveness,	  struggle	  and	  dynamism	  in	  order	  to	  actualise	  the	  unlimited	  human	  potential.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China,	   the	  attitude	  was	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  The	  ways	  of	  the	  Sages	  discouraged	   the	   development	   of	   the	   people’s	   capacities	   and	   inhibited	   the	   free	  flow	  of	   their	   vital	   energies.239	   Yan	   turned	   to	  philosophical	   thinking	   to	   find	   the	  fundamental	   cause	   of	   his	   sense	   of	   loss,	   and	  what	   he	   disclosed	  was	   the	   precise	  reason	  why	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	   ideological	  principles	  prevented	  the	  nation	   from	  becoming	  strong	  at	  sea.	   	  	  	  
4.2	  The	  Naval	  Academies	  and	  their	  Teaching	  and	  Training	   	  	  The	   disagreement	   between	   educational	   institutions	   of	   Chinese	   learning	   and	  
Western	   learning	   did	   not	   mean	   that	   students	   within	   the	   schools	   of	   Western	  learning	  were	  to	  be	  exempted	  from	  the	  commitment	  to	  Chinese	  learning.	  Under	  the	   slogan	   ‘Chinese	   learning	   for	   the	   fundamental	   structure,	  Western	   learning	   for	  
practical	  use’,	  Western	  learning	  had	  to	  take	  a	  backseat	  to	  Chinese	  learning	  after	  all.	  To	  prevent	  students	  from	  becoming	  too	  Westernised,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  had	   Chinese	   classics	   as	   a	   part	   of	   its	   curriculum.	   In	   an	   1867	   memorial	   to	   the	  Throne,	  navy	  yard	  commissioner	  Shen	  Baozhen	  reported	  that	  all	  students	  in	  the	  naval	   academy	  were	   required	   to	   study	  The	  Sacred	  Edict	   of	   the	  Kangxi	  Emperor	  and	  The	  Classics	  of	  Filial	  Piety,	  as	  well	  as	  writing	  essays	  in	  Chinese,	  in	  addition	  to	  their	   more	   specialised	   subjects.	   Although	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy	   was	   an	  institution	  for	  Western	  learning,	  he	  reported,	  there	  was	  no	  excuse	  for	  becoming	  less	   Chinese.240	   After	   1882,	   every	   Wednesday	   was	   dedicated	   to	   the	   study	   of	  Chinese	  classics.241	   It	   is	  hard	   to	  know	  exactly	  how	  much	   time	  was	  allocated	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  422.	  239	   Ibid.	  240	   SWSGZS,	  p.	  813.	  241	   Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  696.	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the	  study	  of	  Chinese	  classics,	  but	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  the	  naval	  academies	  attached	  fundamental	  importance	  to	  their	  study.242	   Henry	  N.	  Shore,	  a	  British	  naval	  officer	  who	  visited	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  the	  1870s,	  observed:	   ‘candidates	  are	  
examined	  as	   to	   their	  knowledge	  of	   the	  Chinese	  classics,	  and	  until	   recently	  no	  one	  
was	  admitted	  unless	  he	  had	  a	  good	  knowledge	  of	  the	  classics	  and	  the	  literature	  of	  
his	  own	  country.’243	  Incorporating	  classics	  as	  part	  of	  a	  military	  officer’s	  education	  was	  not	  unique	  to	   China.	   Many	   foreign	   militaries	   at	   that	   time	   also	   included	   their	   countries’	  classics	   as	   a	   key	   element	   of	   officer	   education.	   The	   study	   of	   classics	   was	  considered	   necessary	   to	   build	   a	   military’s	   identity	   and	   to	   cultivate	   a	   sense	   of	  loyalty.	   For	   example,	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	   Navy	   also	   had	   classics	   as	   an	  important	   part	   of	   their	   officer	   education	   to	   preserve	   the	   nation’s	   culture	   and	  traditions	  in	  the	  navy.244	   However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  being	  taught	  the	  classics	  as	  part	  of	  a	  naval	  education	  had	  several	  drawbacks.	  This	  was	  not	  only	  because	  the	  learning	  of	  classics	  consumed	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  could	  have	  been	   used	   for	   military	   training;	   more	   importantly,	   classics	   were	   a	   vehicle	   of	  ideology,	   and	   the	   Chinese	   ideology	   per	   se	   had	   an	   inhibiting	   effect	   on	   naval	  modernisation.	   	  As	   previously	   indicated,	   the	  Qing	  Dynasty	   version	   of	   Confucianism	  was	   an	  ideology	  designed	  to	  reinforce	  China’s	  absolutist	  monarchy	  and	  feudal-­‐agrarian	  order.	   It	   offered	   a	   set	   of	   moral	   principles	   that	   suited	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	  society	  rather	  than	  its	  sea-­‐going	  activities.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  very	  first	  entrance	  examination	  held	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  1867,	  candidates	  were	  asked	  to	  compose	  an	  essay	  on	  the	  topic	  of	   filial	  piety.245	   This	  was	  a	  core	  value	  of	   the	  Confucian	   social	   order.	   On	   this	   subject	   the	   key	   Confucianism	   classic	   –	   the	  Analects	   –	   preached:	   ‘while	   his	   parents	   are	   alive,	   one	   must	   not	   go	   away	   to	   a	  
distance’.246	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   such	   a	   creed	   was	   more	   compatible	   with	   an	  agrarian	   power	   with	   a	   defensive	   army	   rather	   than	   a	   state	   actor	   with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	   PLA	  Navy	  Headquarters	  eds.,	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navies,	  p.	  204.	  Biggerstaff,	  The	  Earliest	  Modern	  Government	  
Schools	  in	  China,	  p.	  209.	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  57.	  243	   Henry	   N.	   Shore,	   The	   Flight	   of	   the	   Lapwing:	   A	   Naval	   Officer's	   Jottings	   in	   China,	   Formosa	   and	   Japan,	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green,	  and	  Co.,	  1881),	  p.	  228.	  244	   Alessio	  Patalano,	  Post-­‐war	  Japan	  as	  a	  Sea	  Power:	  Imperial	  Legacy,	  Wartime	  Experience	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  
a	  Navy,	  (London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academics,	  2015),	  p.	  31.	  245	   Wang,	  A	  Biographic	  Chronology	  of	  Yan	  Jidao,	  p.	  4.	  246	   The	  Analects.	  Book	  II:	  Li	  Ren	  19	  in	  Confucius.	  D.	  C.	  Lau,	  tran.,	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1979),	  p.	  74.	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ambition	  of	  having	  an	  ocean-­‐going	  navy.	  Another	  example	  of	  the	  adverse	  impacts	  of	   elements	   of	   the	   traditional	   ideology	   on	   naval	   modernisation	   was	   that	   Zuo	  Zongtang,	   the	   founding	   father	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	  Naval	   Academy,	   named	   the	   naval	  academy	  an	  artisan	  bureau	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  proper	  school.247	   This	  name	  implied	  the	   inferiority	   of	   the	   naval	   cadets	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   those	   who	   received	   a	   classical	  education	   in	  mainstream	  schools.	  The	   four	  constituent	   functional	  groups	  of	   the	  traditional	  Chinese	   society	  were	   scholars,	   peasants,	   artisans	   and	   tradesmen,	   in	  descending	  order	  of	  importance.	  Naval	  cadets	  were	  categorised	  under	  the	  social	  group	  of	   artisans	   and	   considered	   less	   respectable	   than	  Confucian	   scholars	   and	  peasants.	   	  Moreover,	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   contents	   of	   Chinese	   learning	   and	  Western	  
learning	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  focused	  on	  different	  subjects.	  Chinese	   learning	  was	  centred	  on	  literary	  and	  humanistic	  studies.	  This	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  science	  and	   technology,	   which	   constituted	   the	   essence	   of	   Western	   learning.	   The	  differences	   between	   the	   two	   made	   it	   very	   hard	   for	   students	   who	   were	  accustomed	  to	  Chinese	  learning	  to	  pick	  up	  Western	  learning.	  Even	  though,	  in	  the	  eyes	   of	   James	   Carroll,	   dean	   of	   the	   department	   of	   theoretical	   navigation	   of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy,	  the	  Chinese	  students	  were	  ‘diligent	  and	  attentive	  to	  their	  
work’	  and	  ‘intelligently	  they	  have	  nothing	  to	  lose	  in	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  boys	  of	  
Western	   lands’,	   they	   still	   suffered	   from	   a	   very	   high	   dropout	   rate.248	   A	   1874	  report	   presented	   to	   the	   Chinese	   authorities	   by	   Prosper	   Giquel,	   head	   foreign	  advisor	  of	  the	  navy	  yard,	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  branch	  of	  naval	  architecture,	  teaching	  staff	   had	   met	   with	   difficulties	   in	   ‘bringing	   [the	   students]	   to	   the	   stage	   of	  
advancement’;	  and	  in	  the	  branch	  of	  theoretical	  navigation,	  ‘out	  of	  the	  one	  hundred	  
and	   five	  pupils	  who	   entered	   the	   school	   only	   thirty-­‐nine	   remain;	   six	   are	  dead;	   the	  
other	   sixty	   have	   had	   to	   be	   sent	   away,	   after	   a	   course	  more	   or	   less	   prolonged,	   as	  
incapable	  of	  following	  out	  the	  course	  of	  study.’249	   The	  different	  and,	  in	  many	  ways,	  irreconcilable	   aims	   of	   Chinese	   and	   Western	   learning	   were	   a	   key	   cause	   of	  students’	  learning	  difficulties.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	   Zuo	  named	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  as	  ‘求是堂艺局’.	  QMHJSL,	  pp.	  377-­‐378.	  248	   Shore,	  The	  Flight	  of	  the	  Lapwing,	  p.	  228.	   	  249	   Prosper	  Giquel,	  The	  Foochow	  Arsenal,	  and	  Its	  Results:	  From	  the	  Commencement	  in	  1867,	  to	  the	  End	  of	  the	  
Foreign	  Directorate,	  on	  the	  16th	  February,	  1874,	  H.	  Lang	  tran.,	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  Evening	  Courier,	  1874),	  p.	  20.	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Also,	   as	   Chinese	   elites	   were	   reluctant	   to	   make	   institutional	   changes	   to	  embrace	  Western	   learning,	   a	   clear-­‐cut	   demarcation	   between	   Chinese	   learning	  and	  Western	   learning	   remained	   throughout	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  The	   various	   Chinese	   naval	   academies	   hired	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   foreign	  teachers	  and	  instructors,	  and	  used	  foreign	   languages	  –	  English	  and	  French	  –	  as	  their	  working	  language.	  At	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  modernisation,	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  languages	  and	  reliance	  on	  foreign	  teachers	  and	  instructors	  was	  understandable	  because	   China	   had	   a	   very	   weak	   foundation	   in	   modern	   nautical	   science	   and	  technology.	   But	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   naval	   academies	   kept	   on	   hiring	   teachers	   and	  instructors	   from	   the	   West	   throughout	   the	   entire	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   period	  revealed	  that	  Chinese	  society	  was	  reluctant	  to	  assimilate	  Western	   learning	  into	  itself.	   In	   recounting	   a	   visit	   to	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy	   in	   the	   early	   1890s,	  nearly	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  decades	  after	  Western	  learning	  was	  introduced	  into	  China,	  Adm.	  Edmund	  R.	  Fremantle	  noted:	  	   ‘the	  teaching	  is	  good,	  and	  the	  students	  are	  only	  too	  anxious	  to	  learn;	  but	  
most	  of	  the	  knowledge	  so	  acquired	  was	  wasted	  through	  the	  jealousy	  of	  the	  
mandarins	  of	  European	  education;	  so	  that	  the	  best	  thing	  for	  these	  young	  
men	  to	  do	  in	  their	  own	  interests	  was	  for	  them	  the	  endeavour	  to	  forget	  all	  
they	   had	   learnt	   at	   college	   [naval	   academy]	   on	   account	   of	   its	   supposed	  
inferiority	  to	  things	  Chinese!’250	   	  	   Consequently,	   few	  students	  perceived	  that	  becoming	  a	  naval	  officer	  was	  an	  honourable	   undertaking.	   It	  was	   observed	   that	  many	   of	   the	   cadets	   in	   the	   naval	  academies	  preserved	  their	  traditional	  scholarly	  appearances	  rather	  than	  put	  on	  a	  martial	  appearance	  as	  a	  military	  officer.	  Key	  military	  qualities	  such	  as	  virility	  and	  physical	   strength	   received	   much	   less	   attention	   than	   they	   deserved.251	   In	   the	  eyes	  of	  Shore,	  the	  cadets	  there	  were:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  250	   Edmund	  R.	   Fremantle,	  The	  Navy	   as	   I	   Have	   Known	   It:	   1849-­‐1899,	   (London:	   Cassell	   and	   Company	   Ltd.,	  1904),	  p.	  400.	  251	   It	  was	  observed	   that	   the	  Chinese	  naval	  cadets	  spend	  more	   time	  on	  studying	   than	  on	   taking	  exercises:	  ‘indeed,	   their	   love	   of	   [academic	   work]	   sometimes	   carried	   them	   far	   into	   the	   night,	   and	   they	   required	   to	   be	  
checked,	  else	  their	  health	  would	  be	  impaired	  …	  [however]	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  taking	  exercise	  on	  principle	  being	  a	  
thing	  unheard	  of.’	  Shore,	  The	  Flight	  of	  the	  Lapwing,	  p.	  164.	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‘weak,	   puny	   creatures,	   without	   a	   bit	   of	   spirit	   or	   a	   spark	   of	   ambition,	  
effeminate	  to	  a	  degree	  …	  out	  of	  school	  they	  just	  mope	  about	  or	  work	  at	  
their	   tasks,	   they	   never	   play	   at	   a	   game	   …	   on	   the	   whole	   a	   Buddhist	  
Monastery	  would	  be	  more	  congenial	  to	  their	  tastes	  than	  watch-­‐keeping	  
at	  sea’.252	  	  Chinese	   observations	   noted	   the	   same	   phenomenon.	   One	   said	   that	   the	   cadets	  looked	  too	  ‘bookish’	  to	  be	  military	  men.253	   Guo	  Songtao,	  Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  Britain,	  noted	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  the	  elite	  Chinese	  cadets	  sent	  to	  Greenwich	  Naval	  College	  were	  notably	  weaker	  than	  their	  English	  counterparts	  in	  terms	  of	  physical	  strength.254	   	  	   ***	  	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  various	  Chinese	  naval	  academies	  should	  be	  examined.	   The	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy	   was	   the	   leading	   institution	   in	   naval	  education	  and	  training.	  Among	  all	  of	  the	  Chinese	  naval	  academies	  opened	  during	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  it	  was	  the	  earliest,	  biggest	  and	  most	  successful.	  By	   the	   start	   of	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War,	   it	   had	   the	   largest	   number	   of	  graduates,	   and	   almost	   all	   the	   commanders	   of	   the	   capital	   ships	   of	   the	   Chinese	  steam	   navy	   were	   Fuzhou	   graduates.255	   In	   Fuzhou,	   officer	   cadets	   started	   their	  professional	   education	  with	   a	   course	   in	   theoretical	   navigation	   that	  was	   taught	  entirely	   in	   English.	   During	   a	   course	   of	   three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   years,	   cadets	   studied	  various	   subjects,	   including	   arithmetic,	   geometry,	   algebra,	   plane	   and	   spherical	  trigonometry,	  nautical	  astronomy,	  theoretical	  navigation	  and	  geography.256	   The	  classroom	  teaching	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  two-­‐year	  course	  in	  practical	  navigation,	  in	  which	  ‘the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  branches	  of	  knowledge	  requisite	  in	  the	  captain	  
of	  a	  ship’	  was	  taught.257	   According	  to	  Giquel,	  upon	  the	  completion	  of	  these	  two	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	   Shore,	  The	  Flight	  of	  the	  Lapwing,	  pp.	  228-­‐229.	  253	   LWZGQJ-­‐PLHG,	  Vol.	  19,	  pp.	  40-­‐41.	  254	   Songtao	   Guo,	  伦敦与巴黎日记	   Lundun	   yu	   Bali	   Riji	   [Diaries	   in	   London	   and	   Paris],	   (Changsha:	   Yuelu	  Shushe,	  1984),	  p.	  450.	  255	   The	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  also	  offered	  education	   for	  naval	  architects	  and	  engine-­‐room	  officers.	  This	  chapter	  will	  primarily	  focus	  on	  deck	  officers.	  256	   Biggerstaff,	  The	  Earliest	  Modern	  Government	  Schools	  in	  China,	  p.214.	  257	   Ibid.,	  216.	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courses	   the	   cadets	   were	   expected	   to	   be	   able	   to	   ‘navigate	   in	   sight	   of	   land’.258	  Some	  above-­‐average	  students	  were	  even	  good	  enough	  to	  be	  qualified	  as	  captains.	  In	  the	  late	  1870s,	  as	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  gained	  pace,	  the	  shortage	  in	  naval	  professionals	  once	  again	  became	  a	  salient	  problem.	  There	  were	  two	  approaches	  to	  meet	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  naval	  officers:	  one	  was	  to	  further	  expand	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy;	  the	  other	  was	  to	  establish	  new	  naval	  academies	   in	   other	   regional	   maritime	   defence	   districts	   (for	   the	   division	   of	  maritime	  defence	  districts	  see	  Section	  6.2).	  In	  principle,	  the	  former	  solution	  had	  greater	   potential	   as	   it	   would	   be	   much	   more	   cost-­‐effective.	   The	   Fuzhou	   Naval	  Academy	  also	  already	  had	  a	  solid	  foundation	  and	  rich	  experience	  in	  teaching	  and	  training,	  whereas	  the	  other	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  had	  to	  start	  from	  scratch.	   But	   the	   various	   regional	   maritime	   defence	   authorities	   did	   not	   pool	  resources	   to	   strengthen	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy;	   instead	   they	   established	  naval	   academies	   of	   their	   own.	   From	   1881	   to	   1890,	   five	   new	   naval	   academies	  sprung	   up	   along	   Chinese	   coasts.	   The	   Beiyang	   Superintendent,	   patron	   of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  established	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  1881,	  and	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Naval	   Academy	   in	   1890.	   The	  Guangdong	   provincial	   government,	  which	  was	   in	  charge	   of	   the	   Guangdong	   Fleet,	   established	   the	   Guangdong	   Naval	   and	   Army	  Academy	   in	   1886.	   The	   Nanyang	   Superintendent,	   patron	   of	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet,	  established	   the	   Jiangnan	   Naval	   Academy	   in	   1890.	   Even	   the	   Manchu	   Imperial	  Guard	  established	  the	  Kunminghu	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  Beijing	  next	  to	  an	  artificial	  lake	  in	  the	  Summer	  Palace	  in	  1887.	  In	   spite	   of	   the	   growth	   in	   the	   number	   of	   naval	   academies,	   the	   number	   of	  graduates	  did	  not	  increase	  proportionally.	  The	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  naval	  officer	  education	  was	  very	  low.	  Up	  to	  1894,	  the	  total	  expenditure	  on	  naval	  education	   had	   reached	   a	   staggering	   3.05	   million	   taels. 259 	   The	   number	   of	  graduates,	  however,	  did	  not	  show	  a	  related	  increase	  (see	  Table	  4.1).	  Apart	  from	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  and	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy,	  which	  had	  139	  and	  eighty-­‐eight	  students	  qualified	  as	  junior	  line	  officers	  respectively,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  naval	   academies	   had	   very	   limited	   achievements.	   The	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	   Giquel,	  The	  Foochow	  Arsenal,	  and	  Its	  Results,	  p.	  32.	  259	   This	  number	  includes	  the	  expenses	  of	  the	  three	  naval	  education	  missions	  to	  Europe,	  but	  the	  expenditure	  on	  the	  education	  mission	  to	  the	  US	   is	  not	   included,	  as	  only	  a	  small	  portion	  of	   the	   latter	  group	  of	  students	  joined	  the	  navy	  when	  they	  returned.	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broke	  out	  before	  the	  first	  group	  of	  students	  in	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Naval	  Academy	  and	  the	   Jiangnan	  Naval	  Academy	  had	   finished	   their	   courses.	  The	  Kunminghu	  Naval	  Academy	   originally	   had	   twenty-­‐four	   students	   in	   its	   first	   group	   of	   cadets,	   but	  fifteen	  were	  diverted	   to	  army	  units	  half	  way	   through	   the	  course	  and	  only	  nine	  made	  it	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  practical	  navigation.	  The	  second	  class	  of	  forty	  students	  of	  the	  Kunminghu	  Naval	  Academy	   finished	   the	  course	   in	   theoretical	  navigation	   in	  1893,	   but	   only	   two	   were	   qualified	   to	   proceed	   to	   practical	   navigation.260	   The	  Guangdong	  Naval	  Academy	  and	  Army	  had	  forty-­‐eight	  graduates,	  but	  many	  were	  transferred	   from	   other	   subjects	   of	   Western	   learning,	   such	   as	   botany	   or	   law	  studies,	  to	  the	  naval	  course.	  Their	  qualifications	  were	  questionable.261	  Most	   of	   the	   later-­‐established	   naval	   academies	   failed	   to	   attain	   a	   teaching	  standard	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy.	  In	  fact,	  they	  were	  all	  modelled	   after	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy.262	   Apart	   from	   reproducing	   the	  curriculum	  and	  the	  administration	  system	  of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy,	  some	  even	  transferred	  teaching	  staff	  and	  students	  from	  Fuzhou.263	   Yet,	   living	  up	  to	  a	  standard	  as	  high	  as	  that	  of	  Fuzhou	  was	  difficult	  for	  them,	  mainly	  due	  to	  financial	  difficulties.	   Both	   the	   Nanyang	   and	   Guangdong	   Naval	   Academy	   had	   to	   cut	   the	  number	   of	   teaching	   staff	   and	   to	   lay	   off	   students	   due	   to	   a	   shortage	   of	   funds.264	  Only	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy	  attained	  a	  standard	  comparable	  to	  Fuzhou	  and	  managed	   to	  make	   some	   improvements	   by	   refining	   the	   curriculum,	   prolonging	  the	  duration	  of	   courses	  and	  enhancing	  hands-­‐on	  experiences.265	   The	  quality	  of	  education	   offered	   by	   the	   various	   naval	   academies	   can	   hardly	   be	   qualified	   as	  good.	  In	  addition,	  the	  various	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  were	  reluctant	  to	  help	  each	  other	  in	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  naval	  education.	  In	  an	  1891	  memorial	  to	   the	  Throne,	   Liu	  Kunyi	   (the	   then	  Nanyang	   Superintendent	   and	  patron	   of	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet)	  complained	  that	  Li	  Hongzhang	  (the	  then	  Beiyang	  Superintendent	  and	   patron	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet)	   refused	   to	   let	   Liu’s	   Jiangnan	   Naval	   Academy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  612.	  261	   Ibid.,	  623.	  262	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  52,	  p.	  7.	  Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  782,	  804,	  812,	  816-­‐817.	  263	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  389.	  Wang,	  A	  Biographic	  Chronology	  of	  Yan	  Jidao,	  p.	  8.	  LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  40,	  p.	  47;	  Vol.	  42,	  pp.	  25-­‐26;	  Vol.	  52,	  p.	  7.	  LWZHQJ-­‐PLHG,	  Vol.	  19,	  p.	  20.	  Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.776	  264	   Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.777,	  807	  265	   ibid.,	  786-­‐787,	  789-­‐790.	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cadets	   join	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   for	   further	   training,	   and	   to	   then	   get	   them	  commissioned	   into	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  upon	  completion,	  as	  previously	  agreed.266	  Li	   told	   Liu	   that	   there	   were	   no	   vacancies	   for	   these	   young	   officers.	   However,	  almost	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  Li	  was	  petitioning	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  for	  establishing	  a	  new	  naval	  academy	  within	  his	   jurisdiction	  –	  which	  later	  became	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Naval	  Academy	  –	  because,	  according	  to	  Li,	  there	  was	  an	  ‘urgent	  need	  for	  [naval]	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  80.	  267	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  405.	  268	   The	  Chinese	  seafaring	  communities	  were	  very	  weak	  and	  marginalised	  in	  the	  society.	  C.	  Ng	  observed	  that	  ‘seafaring	  people	  made	  the	  [Qing]	  authorities	  uncomfortable	  because	  they	  were	  not	  under	  official	  surveillance.’	  Chin-­‐keong	   Ng,	   ‘Information	   and	   Knowledge:	   Qing	   China’s	   Perceptions	   of	   the	   Maritime	   World	   in	   the	  Eighteenth	   Century’	   in	   The	   East	   Asian	   Maritime	  World	   1400-­‐1800:	   Its	   Fabrics	   of	   Power	   and	   Dynamics	   of	  
Exchanges,	  Angela	  Schottenhammer	  ed.,	  (Wiesbaden:	  Harrassowitz	  Verlag,	  2007),	  p.	  92.	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   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.687-­‐691.	   	  270	   Number	  does	  not	  include	  the	  expenses	  on	  the	  Naval	  Education	  Missions	  to	  Britain	  and	  France.	   	  271	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  225.	  Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Navy,	  pp.	  790-­‐791,	  796,	  804,	   811.	   QMHJSL,	   pp.	   395-­‐396,	   434-­‐460.	   Fan,	   The	   New	   Policy	   toward	   Foreign	   Affairs	   during	   the	   Qing	  
Dynasty,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  623.	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4.3 	   The	  Naval	  Educational	  Missions	  Abroad	  	  A	  closer	   look	  at	   the	   teaching	  and	  training	   in	   the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  shows	  that	   the	   training	   that	   the	   cadets	   received	   only	   covered	   the	   basic	   skills	   of	  captaining	  single	  steamships.	  Other	  skills	  required	  of	  a	  naval	  commander	  were	  largely	  absent.	  Giquel’s	  1874	  report	  revealed:	  	  
‘some	  of	  them	  [naval	  cadets]	  might	  be	  placed	  aboard	  foreign	  men-­‐of-­‐war,	  
where	  for	  two	  years	  they	  would	  act	  the	  part	  of	  officers,	  and	  would	  assist	  
in	  that	  capacity	  not	  only	  in	  the	  handling	  of	  individual	  vessels,	  but	  also	  in	  
the	   combined	   movements	   of	   many	   ships	   united	   into	   squadrons.	   They	  
would	   also	   become	   familiarised	   with	   different	   kinds	   of	   cannon	   and	  
firearms,	   which	   we	   have	   not	   been	   able	   to	   present	   for	   their	  
examination.’272	   	  	  War	  at	  sea	  was	  much	  more	  than	  sailing	  single	  ships.	  It	  also	  involved	  another	  area	  of	  study	  –	  naval	  tactics.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  education	  in	  Fuzhou	  and	  all	  the	  other	  naval	  academies	  of	  China	  –	  as	  they	  were	  copies	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  –	  was	   also	   inadequate.	   How	   to	   fill	   the	   gap	   between	   being	   able	   to	   sail	   single	  steamships	  and	  being	  able	  to	  command	  battles	  at	  sea	  was	  a	  problem	  had	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  Chinese	  naval	  educators.	   	  In	   1873,	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Commissioner	   Shen	   Baozhen	   stressed	   to	   the	  Imperial	   Court	   the	   need	   for	   sending	   naval	   academy	   graduates	   abroad	   for	  advanced	   studies	   on	   shipbuilding	   and	   naval	   warfare.	   Elite	   students	   of	   naval	  architecture,	  he	  said,	  should	  be	  sent	  to	  France	  to	  study	  in-­‐depth	  the	  principles	  of	  shipbuilding	   and	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   naval	   technology.	   Elite	   students	   of	  navigation,	  he	  argued,	   should	  be	   sent	   to	  England	   to	  pursue	   in-­‐depth	   studies	   in	  the	  principles	  of	  sailing	  ships,	  naval	  training	  and	  naval	  warfare.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	   these	   students	   should	  devote	   three	   to	   five	   years	   to	   advanced	   studies	   and,	  upon	  their	  return	  to	  China,	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  cadets	  should	  be	  sent	  abroad	  to	  fill	  the	  vacancies	  they	  left	  behind.	  Shen	  expected	  that	  in	  this	  way	  there	  would	  be	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   Giquel,	  The	  Foochow	  Arsenal,	  and	  Its	  Results,	  p.	  32.	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a	   steady	   flow	   of	   trained	   officers	   coming	   back	   to	   China.273	   A	   number	   of	   other	  leading	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  supported	  this	  proposal.	  Among	  them	  were	  the	  then	  Beiyang	   Superintendent	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   the	   then	   Nanyang	   Superintendent	   Li	  Zongxi,	  and	  the	  founding	  father	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  Zuo	  Zongtang,274	   	  From	  Shen’s	  memorial	  and	  his	  supporters’	  attitude,	  it	  can	  be	  discerned	  that	  they	  intended	  to	  address	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  Chinese	  naval	  education	  –	  i.e.	  the	  gap	  between	  being	  able	  to	  sail	  single	  steamships	  and	  being	  able	  to	  command	  battles	  at	  sea	  –	  by	  continuously	  sending	  students	  abroad.	  Admittedly,	  China	  was	  not	  the	  only	   country	   sending	   young	  officers	   abroad	   for	   advanced	   training,	   as	   it	   can	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  Navy	  List	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  that	  there	  were	  also	  a	  number	  of	  foreign	  officers	  serving	  aboard	  British	  men-­‐of-­‐war	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  to	  gain	  practical	  experience.	  But	  China’s	  reliance	  on	  Britain	  for	  advanced	  naval	  education	  (and	  on	  France	   for	  naval	  architecture)	  was	  much	  stronger	  and	  more	   structural.	   Achieving	   autonomy	   in	   advanced	   naval	   education	   required	  institutional	   changes	   which	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   were	   reluctant	   to	   make.	  Instead,	   they	   were	  more	   inclined	   to	   look	   to	  Western	   seapowers	   for	   advanced	  naval	   education,	   as	   this	   strategy	   could	   meet	   their	   educational	   requirements	  while	  minimising	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  Chinese	  institutions	  at	  home.	  The	  degree	  of	  China’s	  reliance	  on	   the	  West	   for	  naval	  modernisation	  can	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  number	  of	  students	  sent	  abroad.	  The	  first	  batch	  of	  thirty	  students	  was	   sent	   to	   Europe	   in	   1877.275	   If	   it	  were	   not	   for	   the	   financial	   constraints,	   the	  first	  naval	  educational	  mission	  would	  have	  been	  much	  larger.	  Initially	  forty-­‐nine	  students	  were	  planned	   to	  be	   sent	  overseas,	  where	   they	  were	   supposed	   to	   stay	  for	  five	  years.	  But	  the	  size	  of	  the	  mission	  was	  cut	  down	  to	  thirty	  students	  and	  the	  duration	   of	   study	   shortened	   to	   three	   years	   due	   to	   financial	   difficulties.276	   In	  1879,	   when	   the	   first	   group	   of	   students	   returned	   to	   China,	   Shen	   presented	  another	   memorial	   to	   the	   Throne,	   appealing	   for	   more	   students	   to	   be	   sent	   to	  Europe.	   In	   rather	   poetic	   language,	   he	   said	   that	   China	   had	   to	   continue	   sending	  students	   abroad	   to	   ‘draw	   water	   directly	   from	   the	   fountainhead’.277	   An	   1884	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  273	   SWSGZS,	  Vol.	  4,	  pp.	  64-­‐65.	  274	   HFD,	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  pp.	  480-­‐481,	  486-­‐489,	  498-­‐499.	  275	   Twelve	  students	  of	  navigation	  were	  sent	   to	  England	  and	  eighteen	  students	  of	  naval	  architecture	  were	  sent	  to	  France.	  276	   LWZGQJ-­‐PLHG,	  Vol.	  18,	  pp.	  32-­‐33.	  277	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  387-­‐388.	  
	   114	  
memorial	   to	   the	   Throne	   presented	   by	   Li	   Hongzhang	   revealed	   that	   he	   saw	  theoretical	   navigation,	   practical	   navigation	   and	   study	   abroad	   as	   the	   three	  mandatory	  steps	  for	  a	  cadet	  to	  go	  through	  before	  becoming	  an	  elite	  officer	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.278	  It	   can	   be	   clearly	   seen	   that	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   would	   rather	  institutionalise	  the	  studying	  aboard	  project	  than	  solve	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  Chinese	  naval	   education	   by	   promoting	   institutional	   changes	   at	   home.	   On	   this	   basis,	  China’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  West	  for	  advanced	  naval	  education	  became	  structural.	  In	  contrast,	  Japan	  also	  sent	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  its	  elite	  students	  abroad	  in	  the	  initial	  stage	  of	   its	  pursuit	  of	  naval	  power;	  but	   in	  the	   late	  1870s,	   Japan	  began	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  Western	  assistance	  and	  it	  achieved	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy.	  A	  key	  reason	   for	   this	   was	   that	   Japan	   not	   only	   sent	   students	   abroad	   to	   acquire	  knowledge	   and	   expertise,	   but	   also	   reformed	   its	   institutions	   at	   home.	   The	  combination	   of	   those	   two	   components	   enabled	   Japan	   to	   establish	   an	  independent	  naval	  system,	  but	  China	  refused	  to	  do	  so.279	   An	  anecdote	  retold	  by	  Adm.	   Fremantle	   illustrates	   this	   point.	   Luo	   Fenglu	  was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   Chinese	  students	  sent	  abroad.	  He	  studied	  in	  King’s	  College	  London	  in	  the	  late	  1870s	  and	  returned	   to	   China	   to	   become	   Li	   Hongzhang’s	   secretary.	   Adm.	   Fremantle	  mentioned	  in	  his	  memoir:	   	  	   ‘[Luo]	  was	   secretary	   to	   Li	   Hung	   Chang	   [Li	   Hongzhang]	  when	   I	   was	   in	  
China,	  a	  very	  able	  man,	   speaking	  and	  writing	  English	  perfectly.	  Li	  Hung	  
Chang	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  said	  to	  him:	  “I	  don't	  know	  how	  it	  is,	  we	  send	  our	  
men	  to	  Europe	  and	  America,	  and	  have	  foreign	  instructors	  in	  our	  colleges,	  
as	  do	  the	  Japanese,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  derive	  the	  advantage	  from	  their	  
instructions	  which	  the	  Japanese	  do”;	  to	  which	  Loh	  Feng-­‐Loh	  [Luo	  Fenglu]	  
replied	   “That	   is	   quite	   true,	   I	   was	   a	   classmate	   of	   the	   Marquis	   Ito	   [Itō	  Hirobumi]	  in	  England;	  he	  is	  now	  prime	  minister	  of	  Japan,	  and	  I	  am	  your	  
Excellency’s	  secretary.”’280	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   QMHJSL,	  p.	  32.	  279	   David	  C.	  Evans	  and	  Mark	  R.	  Peattie,	  Kaigun:	  Strategy,	  Tactics,	  and	  Technology	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	  
Navy,	  1887-­‐1941,	  (Annapolis:	  Naval	  Institute	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  12.	  280	   Fremantle,	  The	  Navy	  as	  I	  Have	  Known	  It,	  pp.	  400-­‐401.	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It	  was	  very	  hard	  for	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  dependence	  on	  the	  West	  for	  advanced	  naval	  education.	  Achieving	  this	  goal	  required	  institutional	  changes,	  but	  these	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  China	  because	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  old	  institutions.	  From	   the	   late	   1870s	   to	   the	   late	   1880s,	   a	   total	   of	   thirty-­‐five	   officer	   cadets	  were	   sent	   to	   England	   in	   three	   groups.281	   The	   first	   group	   consisted	   of	   twelve	  officer	   cadets	   and	   arrived	   in	   England	   in	   mid-­‐1877.	   Half	   of	   them	   entered	   the	  newly-­‐opened	  Royal	  Naval	  College	  at	  Greenwich	  for	  a	  nine-­‐month	  sub-­‐lieutenant	  course.282	   The	  other	  half	  boarded	  various	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ships	  immediately,	  and	   they	   were	   later	   joined	   by	   the	   students	   who	   finished	   their	   studies	   at	  Greenwich.283	   This	   first	   group	   of	   students	   finished	   their	   studies	   and	   returned	  China	   in	   late	   1879.	   The	   second	   naval	   educational	   mission	   consisted	   of	   four	  officer	   cadets.	   The	   first	   two	   arrived	   in	   England	   in	   1882.	   They	   first	   went	   to	  Greenwich	   for	   a	   nine-­‐month	   sub-­‐lieutenant	   course,	   then	   spent	   a	   year	   aboard	  British	   Royal	   Navy	   ships	   and	   later	   returned	   to	   Greenwich	   for	   a	   gunnery	  lieutenant	   course.284	   The	   other	   two	   students	   followed	   that	   same	   course	   but	  started	   one	   year	   later.	   This	   second	   group	  of	   students	   returned	   to	   China	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1880s.	  The	   third	  naval	  educational	  mission	  had	  nineteen	  students.	  Twelve	  entered	  Greenwich	   in	   two	  batches	  and	  afterwards	   served	  aboard	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ships	  for	  one	  to	  two	  years.	  Three	  entered	  the	  gunnery	  school	  HMS	  Excellent.	  Upon	   graduation,	   one	   went	   to	   Royal	   Arsenal	   at	   Woolwich	   to	   further	   his	  knowledge	   in	  gunnery,	  while	  the	  other	  two	  were	  sent	  to	  British	  warships.	  Two	  others	  joined	  British	  ships	  immediately	  when	  they	  arrived	  in	  England,	  then	  one	  of	  them	  entered	  Greenwich,	  and	  the	  other	  one	  returned	  to	  China	  due	  to	  illness.	  Apart	  from	  one	  student	  who	  died	  during	  his	  stay	  in	  England,	  the	  rest	  returned	  to	  China	  in	  the	  late	  1880s.	   	  Meanwhile	   a	   closer	   examination	   of	   the	   results	   of	   the	   naval	   education	  missions	  abroad	  shows	  that	  they	  could	  hardly	  be	  qualified	  as	  successes.	  First,	  the	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	   the	  naval	   educational	  missions	  was	   very	   low.	  The	  various	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   There	  were	  another	  thirty-­‐four	  naval	  architects	  sent	  to	  France	  during	  the	  same	  period	  of	  time.	  Wang,	  Li	  
Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  226.	  282	   ADM	  1/6426	  283	   FO	  17/768,	  and	  Navy	  List,	  1877-­‐1879	  284	   FO	  17/939,	  pp.	  87,	  180.	  FO	  17/1009,	  pp.97-­‐98.	  FO	  17/1034,	  p.48	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missions	  were	  arranged	  and	  funded	  by	  regional	  authorities.285	   This	  meant	  that	  not	   all	   maritime	   defence	   districts	   benefited	   equally	   from	   the	   missions.	   Only	  better	  off	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  –	  the	  Beiyang	  Superintendent	  and	  Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   –	   could	   afford	   to	   send	   students	   abroad,	   and	   most	   of	   the	  returning	   young	   officers	   were	   commissioned	   into	   the	   elite	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   The	  total	   expense	   of	   the	   three	   naval	   educational	   missions	   was	   674,151	   taels,	  averaging	  at	  9,770	  taels	  per	  person	  (a	  total	  number	  of	  sixty-­‐nine	  students	  were	  sent	   abroad:	   thirty-­‐four	   naval	   officer	   cadets	   to	   England	   and	   thirty-­‐five	   naval	  architects	   to	   France).286	   This	   was	   extremely	   expensive,	   especially	   taking	   into	  consideration	   that	   many	   of	   the	   naval	   architects	   trained	   in	   France	   stayed	   idle	  when	   they	   returned	   to	  China	  due	   to	   the	  decline	   of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	   (see	  Section	  5.2).	  The	  naval	  educational	  missions	  lacked	  sustainability.	  Second,	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   language	   barrier	   lowered	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  young	  officers	  studying	  aboard.	  Consequent	  on	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  Russian	  student	  in	   early	   1877,	   concerns	   were	   voiced	   in	   the	   Royal	   Naval	   College	   at	   Greenwich	  about	   foreign	   students’	   proficiency	   in	   English. 287 	   A	   preliminary	   English	  examination	   was	   set	   up	   to	   weed	   out	   foreign	   candidates	   who	   did	   not	   have	   an	  adequate	   command	   of	   English.	   A	   regulation	   issued	   by	   the	  British	  Admiralty	   in	  June	  1877	  required	  that	  ‘candidates	  will	  …	  be	  required	  to	  satisfy	  the	  authorities	  of	  
the	   College	   that	   they	   possess	   an	   adequate	   knowledge	   of	   English	   and	   sufficient	  
proficiency	   in	   the	   subjects	   of	   instruction.’288	   Even	   though	   the	   Chinese	   students	  had	   already	   been	   taught	   in	   English	   in	   China	   for	   at	   least	   five-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   years	  (three-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	   years	   classroom	   learning	   plus	   two	   years	   aboard	   a	   training	  ship),	  there	  was	  still	  a	  considerable	  number	  who	  failed	  to	  pass	  the	  English	  test.	  The	  study	  of	  English	  consumed	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  their	  time	  and	  lowered	  the	   results	   of	   their	   years	   abroad.	   A	   Zongli	   Yamen	   report	   after	   the	   First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   criticised	   that	   the	   study	   of	   English	   had	   consumed	   an	  excessive	   amount	   of	   time	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   real	   effect	   of	   studying	  abroad.289	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   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.28,	  pp.	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   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	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  pp.	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Last,	   but	   most	   importantly,	   it	   is	   doubtful	   whether	   those	   missions	   fulfilled	  their	   very	   purpose	   of	   closing	   the	   gap	   between	   being	   able	   to	   sail	   single	  steamships	   and	   being	   able	   to	   command	   battles	   at	   sea.	   The	   first	   generation	   of	  cadets	  who	  studied	   in	  England	   in	   the	   late	  1870s	  was	  not	  allowed	   to	   join	  other	  British	   students	   and	   they	   had	   to	   ‘reside	   and	  mess	   outside	   the	   precincts	   [of	   the	  Greenwich	  college]’.290	   Only	  from	  the	  second	  mission	  onwards	  were	  the	  cadets	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  classes	  at	  Greenwich	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  private	  students.	  But	  a	  closer	  comparison	  between	  the	  curricula	  of	  Chinese	  naval	  academies	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Greenwich	  Naval	  College	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  were	  largely	  the	  same.	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   study	   in	   Greenwich	   was	   little	   more	   than	   a	   repetition	   of	   what	   the	  Chinese	  cadets	  had	  already	  learnt	  in	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  (see	  Photo	  4.1).	  It	  was	  also	  questionable	  how	  much	  experience	   they	  derived	   from	   the	   time	  spent	  aboard	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ships.	  Giquel	  wanted	  them	  to	  act	  as	  officers,	  so	  that	  they	  could	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  fleet	  manoeuvring	  and	  naval	  tactics.	  But	   Adm.	   Fremantle	   mentioned	   in	   his	   memoirs	   that	   Ye	   Zukui,	   who	   later	  captained	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  protected	  cruiser	  Jing	  Yuan,	  was	  ‘not	  allowed	  to	  do	  
duty’	   when	   he	   was	   aboard	   HMS	   Invincible	   (known	   as	   Yeh	   Tsoo-­‐kwei	   in	   the	  memoir). 291 	   Whether	   or	   not	   the	   other	   Chinese	   students	   were	   given	   the	  opportunity	   to	   act	   as	   officers	   is	   unascertainable,	   but	   even	   if	   they	   did	   act	   as	  officers	  –	  which	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  –	  it	  remains	  questionable	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  experiences	   helped	   them	  when	   they	   returned	   to	   China.	   The	   second	   half	   of	   the	  19th	   century	   was	   an	   era	   of	   explosive	   technological	   development,	   in	   which	   the	  ships	  and	  guns	  changed	  rapidly.	  The	  Royal	  Navy	  ships	  aboard	  which	  they	  served	  in	  the	  1870s	  were	  hugely	  different	  from	  the	  ships	  that	  they	  later	  commanded	  in	  China	  in	  the	  1880s	  and	  1890s	  (see	  Photo	  4.1	  and	  Photo	  4.2).	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   Adm.	  Fanshawe	  to	  the	  Admiralty,	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   Fremantle,	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  as	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  Have	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  It,	  p.	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Name in Standard Chinese Pinyin 





Liu Buchan/Lew Poo Chin Minotaur/Raleigh Ding Yuan(定远) 
Lin Taizeng/Lin Tsai Tsan Penelope/ Achilles 
Black Prince 
Zhen Yuan (镇远) 
Jiang Chaoying/Chung Chow Ing Defence Cheng Qing (澄庆)* 
Huang Jianxun/Wang Kien Shoon Bellerophon Chao Yong (超勇) 
Jiang Maozhi/Kiang Mow Tye Agincourt Jian Sheng (建胜)* 
Lin Yingqi/Lin Ying Khe Agincourt Wei Yuan (威远) 
Fang Boqian/Fang Peh Kien Euryalus/Spartan Ji Yuan (济远) 
He Xinchuan/Ho Sin Chuan  Boadicea Jing Qing (镜清)* 
Lin Yongsheng/Lin Yung Sing Minotaur Jīng Yuan (经远) 
Ye Zukui/Yin Choo Kwei Invincible Jìng Yuan (靖远) 
Sa Zhenbing/Soh Ching Ping Monarch Kang Ji (康济) 
Yan Fu/Yen Tsung Kwang - - Table	   4.2	   List	   of	   Chinese	   naval	   cadets	   of	   the	   first	   naval	   educational	   mission	   to	   England:	   the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ships	  they	  served	  and	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  ships	  they	  later	  commanded.292	  	  *	  The	  Cheng	  Qing	  was	  a	  1,268-­‐ton	  composite	  gunboat	  built	  and	  owned	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet.	  It	  was	  sunk	  in	  the1884	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou.	  The	  Jian	  Sheng	  was	  a	  British-­‐built	  Rendel	  gunboat	  belonging	  to	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet.	   It	  was	  also	  sunk	   in	   the	  1884	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou.	  The	   Jing	  Qing	  was	  a	  Fuzhou-­‐Built	  2,200-­‐ton	  cruiser.	   It	   served	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  and	   its	  service	  was	  extended	   into	   the	  Republican	  Era.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  ships	  belonged	  to	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet;	  most	  were	  sunk	  or	  captured	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	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  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  31.	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4.4	  The	  Senior	  Commanding	  Officers	   	  	  Senior	  officers	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  deserve	  special	  attention	  due	  to	  their	  key	  role	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  command.	  The	  officials	  that	  occupied	  higher	  positions	  in	  the	   chain	   of	   command	   were	   mostly	   statesmen	   in	   charge	   of	   policy-­‐making.	  Officers	   that	   occupied	   lower	   positions	   in	   the	   chain	   of	   command	   were	   mostly	  junior	   officers	   in	   charge	   of	   manning	   weapons	   and	   machines.	   These	   senior	  officers	  were	  significant	  because	  of	  their	  duty	  to	  translate	  war	  objectives	  set	  by	  policy-­‐makers	   into	   specific	  military	   actions	   executed	   by	   junior	   officers.	   Before	  the	  development	  of	  communications	  technology	  that	  enabled	  authorities	  ashore	  to	  take	  the	  direction	  of	  battle	  into	  their	  own	  hands,	  afloat	  senior	  officers	  were	  in	  most	   cases	   the	   highest	   authority	   present	   in	   war.	   These	   senior	   officers	   were	  simultaneously	   expected	   to	   be	   warriors,	   politicians	   and	   administrators.	   Their	  competence	  determined	   to	  a	   considerable	  extent	   the	   success	  or	   failure	  of	   each	  military	  action.	  Within	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	  senior	  officers	  comprised	  three	  backgrounds:	   those	   transferred	   from	   traditional	   water	   forces,	   those	  professionally	  educated	  by	  naval	  academies,	  and	  foreign	  officers.	  	   ***	  	  As	   previously	   indicated,	   military	   modernisation	   was	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners’	  undertaking,	   not	   China’s.	   The	   modernised	   forces	   were	   little	   more	   than	   a	  modernised	  offshoot	   of	   an	  otherwise	   traditional	  military	   institution.	  H.	  Wang’s	  research	   shows	   that	   during	   the	   Guangxu	   Reign	   (1875-­‐1908),	   half	   of	   the	  memorials	   to	   the	  Throne	  categorised	  under	   ‘shipbuilding’	   still	  pertained	   to	   the	  building	   of	   junk	   boats	   for	   traditional	  water	   forces,	   and	   only	   about	   a	   half	  were	  centred	  on	  the	  building	  of	  steamships	  for	  the	  steam	  navy.	   293	   M.	  Jiang’s	  study	  of	  the	  Fujian	  water	  forces	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusion.294	   The	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  did	   not	   supplant	   the	   old-­‐fashioned	   water	   forces;	   rather,	   the	   two	   existed	   in	  parallel	  with	  each	  other.	   	  Therefore,	   it	   was	   very	   hard	   for	   the	   steam	   navy	   to	   remain	   unaffected	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  293	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  485-­‐486.	  294	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  94.	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traditional	  water	   forces.	   As	   the	   number	   of	   steamships	   being	   built	   increased	   in	  early	   1870s,	   a	   problem	  emerged:	   sailing	   these	   ships	   required	   a	   high	  degree	   of	  professionalism,	  but	   there	  was	  a	   lack	  of	   such	  professionals	   among	   the	  Chinese	  people.	   The	   nation	   lacked	   a	   seafaring	   community,	   modern	   science	   and	  technology,	  which	  were	  all	  essential	  for	  a	  functioning	  steam	  navy.	  Some	  regional	  fleets	  hired	  foreign	  professionals	  to	  captain	  the	  steamships,	  but	  an	  1870	  Imperial	  Edict	   decreed	   that	   all	   the	   steamships	   ‘must	   be	   commanded	   by	   Chinese	  
nationals’.295	   As	  a	  trade-­‐off,	  Chinese	  who	  had	  worked	  aboard	  foreign	  steamships	  and	  had	  learnt	  how	  to	  sail	  them	  were	  hired	  to	  command	  the	  ships	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  fleet.	  J.	  Wang’s	  research	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1870s,	  men	  of	  such	  origins	  captained	  eight	  of	  the	  thirteen	  capital	  ships	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  fleet.296	   	   	  However,	   these	   people	  might	   have	   been	   capable	   of	   sailing	   steamships,	   but	  they	   were	   hardly	   good	   at	   being	   military	   commanders.	   Guo	   Songtao	   (Chinese	  ambassador	  to	  London	  from	  1877	  to	  1879)	  noted	  in	  his	  diary	  an	  anecdote	  retold	  by	  John	  Fryer:297	  	   ‘In	  1874,	  Chinese	  coasts	  were	  on	  alert	  as	  Japan	  landed	  troops	  on	  Taiwan	  
Island	  [Taiwan	  was	  part	  of	  Fujian	  province	  by	  1874].	  A	  steam	  ship	  with	  
a	  total	  crew	  of	  around	  three	  hundred	  men	  was	  ordered	  to	  garrison	  the	  
Wusong	   Estuary.	   No	   sooner	   the	   order	   was	   given	   than	   about	   sixty	   to	  
seventy	   men	   asked	   for	   sick	   leave.	   Around	   a	   half	   of	   the	   crew	   quitted	  
before	  a	  delayed	  departure.	  Only	  roughly	  twenty	  remained	  aboard	  when	  
the	  vessel	  arrived	  at	  the	  Wusong	  Estuary.’298	  	  Despite	   being	   ethnically	   Chinese,	   many	   of	   these	   men	   were	   in	   fact	   Chinese	  diaspora	  who	  had	   grown	  up	   in	   Southeast	  Asia,	   and	  were	   therefore	   considered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  295	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  2776-­‐277.	  296	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  77.	  297	   John	  Fryer	  (1839-­‐1928)	  known	  as	   傅兰雅	   in	  Chinese,	  was	  a	  British	  national	  who	  spent	  a	  considerable	  amount	   of	   his	   time	   in	   China	   in	   the	   translation	   bureau	   of	   the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal.	   See	  Doris	   Sze	   Chun,	   ‘John	  Fryer,	  the	  First	  Agassiz	  Professor	  of	  Oriental	  Languages	  and	  Literature,	  Berkeley’.	  Chronicle	  of	  the	  University	  
of	  California,	  No.	  7,	  Changing	  Places:	  Scholars	  Here	  and	  Abroad.	  (Fall	  2005)	   	  http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/changing-­‐places-­‐scholars-­‐here-­‐and-­‐abroad	  298	   Guo,	  Diaries	   in	   London	   and	   Paris,	   p.	   40.	   The	   name	   of	   the	   ship	   was	   not	   mentioned	   in	   Guo’s	   diary.	   A	  cross-­‐check	  of	  historical	  records	  shows	  that	  the	  ship	  mentioned	  was	  probably	  Ce	  Hai	  (测海)	  of	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	  The	  ship	  was	  captained	  by	  Xu	  Chuanlong,	  who	  served	  aboard	  a	   foreign	  steam	  merchantman	  before	  joining	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	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not	  fully	  trustworthy	  by	  Mandarin	  officials.299	   Shen	  Baozhen	  (the	  first	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	  in	  office	  1867-­‐1875)	  reported	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  that	  many	  of	  them	  were	  not	   fully	   imbued	  with	  Chinese	  culture	  and	  customs.	  The	  report	  also	  claimed	   that	   because	   the	   foreign	   ships	   aboard	   which	   they	   obtained	   their	  seamanship	   were	   not	   fighting	   ships,	   many	   of	   them	   were	   not	   accustomed	   to	  military	   life.300	   Shen	  petitioned	   the	   Imperial	  Court	   to	  appoint	  a	   senior	  military	  officers	   to	   command	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet,	   so	   that	   the	  Chinese	   captains	  who	  used	  to	  be	  on	  foreign	  steamers	  would	  develop	  more	  ‘feelings	  of	  loyalty	  and	  patriotism’,	  and	  become	  better	  trained	  militarily.301	  The	   Imperial	   Court	   appointed	   senior	   water	   force	   officers	   as	   senior	  commanders	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet.	  This	  was	  a	   landmark	  appointment	  that	   changed	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   fleet.	   Before	   this	   point,	   the	   steam	   fleet	   was	  exclusively	   a	   Self-­‐Strengtheners’	   undertaking	   and	   was	   kept	   away	   from	   the	  influence	   of	   the	   traditional	   water	   forces.	   Now	   the	   transfer	   of	   senior	   officers	  opened	  up	  a	  channel	  through	  which	  the	  water	  forces	  could	  exert	  influence	  on	  the	  steam	  navy.	  The	  most	   consequential	   among	   the	  many	  problems	   that	   the	  water	  
forces	   transmitted	   to	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   via	   personnel	   transfers	   was	   an	  operational	  doctrine	  that	  did	  not	  suit	  a	  steam	  fleet.	  As	  previously	  indicated,	  the	  water	   forces	   did	   not	  make	   up	   a	   navy	   in	   the	  Western	   sense.	   Their	   operational	  doctrine	   was	   more	   in	   line	   with	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   army	   than	   that	   of	   a	  modern	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy.	  As	   senior	   officers	   of	   the	   traditional	   water	   forces	   were	   transferred	   to	   the	  steam	  fleet,	   they	  brought	  along	  with	  them	  an	  unsuitable	  doctrine.	  For	  example,	  Luo	   Dachun	   was	   one	   such	   senior	   officer.	   He	   was	   appointed	   as	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   in	   early	   1873.	   An	   extract	  from	   his	   diary	   shows	   that	   training	   of	   the	   fleet	   under	   his	   command	   was	  conducted	  in	  a	  water	  force	  fashion:	   	  	  
‘[at	   around	   five	   in	   the	   morning]	   I	   set	   sail	   aboard	   the	   Yang	   Wu	   and	  
commanded	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing,	  Fu	  Bo,	  An	  Lan,	  Mei	  Yun,	  Jing	  Yuan,	  Zhen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  299	   C.	  Ng	  observed	  that	  ‘the	  Qing	  state	  was	  especially	  suspicious	  of	  their	  subject	  who	  were	  employed	  by	  foreign	  
countries	  as	  …	  interpreters	  or	  as	  crew	  members	  of	  foreign	  trading	  junks.’	  Ng,	  ‘Information	  and	  Knowledge’,	  p.	  92.	  300	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  277-­‐278.	  SWSGZS,	  Vol.	  4,	  pp.	  43-­‐44.	  301	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  277-­‐278.	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Wei,	  Chang	  Sheng,	  Hai	  Dong	  Yun,	  Fu	  Xing	  and	  Ji	  An,	  ten	  ships	  in	  total.	  [I]	  
passed	   down	   the	   order	   to	   raise	   a	   triangular	   blue-­‐bordered	   flag	   on	   the	  
mizzenmast	   to	   order	   the	   various	   ships	   to	   get	   ready	   for	   the	   exercise.	  
Afterwards,	  a	  triangular	  yellow	  dragon	  flag	  was	  raised;	  the	  various	  ships	  
answered	   by	   raising	   flags	   one	   by	   one.	   [This	   was	   the	   signal	   to]	  weigh	  
anchor	  and	   set	   sail.	   At	   seven	   in	   the	  morning,	   [the	   squadron]	   arrived	  at	  
the	  …	  training	  ground.	  A	  small	  triangular	  yellow	  dragon	  flag	  was	  raised	  
on	  the	  mizzenmast;	  the	  various	  ships	  answered	  by	  raising	  flags.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  unfurl	  the	  sails.	  A	  small	  triangular	  yellow	  dragon	  flag	  and	  a	  
large	  rectangular	  white	   flag	  were	  raised;	   the	  various	   ships	  answered	  by	  
raising	  flags.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  furl	  the	  sails.	  A	  small	  square	  red	  flag	  
and	  a	  rectangular	  red	  flag	  were	  raised.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  practice	  
rifles	   and	   naval	   guns.	   A	   triangular	   blue-­‐bordered	   red	   flag	   and	   a	  
rectangular	  five-­‐coloured	  flag	  were	  raised.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  take	  a	  
break	   for	  one	  hour.	  After	  a	   short	  while,	  a	   rectangular	   five-­‐coloured	   flag	  
was	  raised	  on	  the	  foremast.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  resume	  exercising.	  A	  
large	  rectangular	  red	   flag	  was	  raised	  on	  the	   foremast;	   the	  various	  ships	  
answered	   by	   raising	   flags.	   [This	   was	   the	   signal	   to]	   hold	   naval	   guns	  
exercise.	  A	  rectangular	  black	  flag	  was	  raised	  on	  the	  foremast;	  the	  various	  
ships	  answered	  by	  raising	  flags.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  hold	  manoeuvre	  
exercises.	  A	  long	  flag	  was	  raised	  on	  the	  foremast.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  
hold	   sampan	   exercises.	  A	   small	   triangular	  dragon	   flag	  and	  a	   triangular	  
blue-­‐bordered	  red	  flag	  were	  raised	  on	  the	  mizzenmast;	  the	  various	  ships	  
answered	  by	  raising	  flags.	  [This	  was	  the	  signal	  to]	  land	  and	  hold	  exercises	  
onshore.	  It	  was	  at	  dusk	  when	  the	  drill	  of	  British	  and	  French	  foreign	  guns	  
finished,	   a	   ‘令’-­‐lettered	   flag	   was	   raised,	   troops	   were	   gathered	   and	   the	  
ships	  returned.’302	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302	   See	  Dachun	  Luo,	  ‘Entry	  of	  the	  13th	  Year	  of	  the	  Tongzhi	  Reign,	  the	  3rd	  Month,	  the	  16th	  day’	  in	  台湾海防
并开山日记 Taiwan	  Haifang	  Bing	  Kaishan	  Riji	  [The	  Defence	  and	  Development	  of	  Taiwan,	  1874-­‐75:	  The	  Journal	  
of	  Brigade-­‐General	  Luo	  Dachun],	  David	  Pong	  comp.,	   (Taibei:	  The	  Economic	  Research	  Department,	  Bank	  of	  Taiwan,	   1972).	   The	   training	   ship	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  Yang	  Wu	  was	   also	   captained	  by	   a	   senior	  officer	   transferred	   from	  the	   traditional	  water	   forces.	   It	  was	  noted	   that	   the	  Yang	  Wu	   ‘carried	   the	   flag	  of	  an	  
admiral,	   but	  what	   this	  officer’s	   [the	  admiral]	   functions	  were	   I	   could	  not	  discover,	   for	  he	   rarely	  appeared	  on	  
board,	  and	  when	  he	  did,	   shut	  himself	  up	   in	  a	   small	  highly	   scented	  den,	   somewhere	   in	   the	  middle	  of	   the	   ship,	  
from	  which	  he	   seldom	  or	   ever	   emerged.	  …	  The	  only	   part	   of	   the	  performance	   in	  which	   the	  admiral	   took	  any	  
active	  share	  was	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  men	  and	  witnessing	  punishments.’	  Shore,	  The	  Flight	  of	  the	  Lapwing,	  pp.	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The	  extract	  from	  Luo	  Dachun’s	  diary	  shows	  that	  the	  training	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  followed	  the	  water	  forces’	  doctrine,	  which	  in	  turn	  followed	  that	  of	  the	  traditional	   army’s,	   as	   the	   former	   usually	   played	   a	   complementary	   role	   to	   the	  latter.	  No	  wonder	  such	  training	  would	  not	  make	  the	  fleet	  a	  capable	  fighting	  force	  at	  sea.	   	  Usually	   the	   water	   forces	   did	   not	   go	   far	   away	   from	   land,	   as	   they	   were	  supposed	  to	  play	  a	  complementary	  role	  to	  the	  troops	  on	   land.	  The	  steam	  fleets	  were	   infected	   with	   this	   problem	   and	   its	   operational	   range	   was	   confined	   to	  coastal	  waters.	  It	  was	  criticised	  that	  the	  trainings	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  under	   the	   command	   of	   the	   officers	   transferred	   from	   traditional	   water	   forces	  were	   ‘little	   more	   than	   firing	   guns	   in	   coastal	   waters	   on	   days	   of	   calm	   wind	   and	  
tranquil	  waves’,303	   and	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘traversing	  the	  ocean’	  went	  ‘no	  further	  than	  
Sheshan	  Island	  [an	  island	  about	  75km	  from	  the	  Wusong	  Estuary,	  near	  Shanghai]’.	  304	   There	   is	   evidence	   that	   senior	   officers	   transferred	   from	   traditional	   water	  
forces	   commanded	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   until	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   Battle	   of	  Fuzhou,	  in	  which	  the	  fleet	  was	  annihilated.305	   	  Arguably,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  had	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet,	   because	   it	   too	   had	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   its	   senior	   officers	  who	  had	  originated	  from	  the	  water	  forces.	  A	  study	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  early	  1870s,	  among	  the	  five	  steam	  warships	  that	  constituted	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  apart	  from	  one	  ship	  whose	   record	   is	   missing,	   three	   of	   the	   five	   ships	   were	   commanded	   by	   senior	  officers	   transferred	   from	   the	   traditional	   water	   forces.306	   The	   autobiography	   of	  Wu	  Dating,	   head	  of	   the	   steamship	   training	  bureau	   (lunchuan	   caolian	   ju)	   of	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   from	   1870	   to	   1877,	   noted	   that	   the	   training	   regulations	   of	   that	  fleet	  was	  a	  mixture	  of	  Western	  and	  Chinese	  methods.307	   There	  is	  evidence	  that	  senior	   officers	   transferred	   from	   the	   traditional	   water	   forces	   retained	   the	  commandership	   of	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet	   throughout	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.308	   Consequently,	   the	  modernisation	  of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234-­‐235.	  303	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  414.	  304	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1020.	  305	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.177.	  306	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  81.	   	  307	   Ibid.,	  pp.	  81-­‐82.	  308	   Arlington’s	  comments	  on	  the	  training	  standard	  of	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  see	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  
Naval	  Development,	  p.	  123.	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and	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet	   was	   only	   in	   appearance.	   They	   were	   equipped	   with	  steamships,	   but	   the	   operational	   doctrine	   remained	   largely	   the	   same	   as	   the	  traditional	  water	  forces’.	   	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   and	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet,	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  suffered	  less	  adverse	  influences	  of	  the	  traditional	  water	  forces,	  and	  its	  modernisation	  was	  more	  comprehensive.	  This	  was	  mainly	  due	  to	  two	  largely	  fortuitous	  reasons.	   	  First,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  enjoyed	  a	  stronger	  leadership.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  witnessed	   ten	   consecutive	   commissioners	   between	   its	   establishment	   in	   1867	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  1894.	  The	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  was	  patronised	  by	  five	  consecutive	  Nanyang	  Superintendents	  between	  1875,	  when	  it	  was	   established,	   and	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	   in	   1894.	   In	  contrast,	   Li	   Hongzhang	   held	   the	   office	   of	   Northern	   Superintendent	   and	  governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   province	   (which	   gave	   him	   the	   authority	   over	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet)	  from	  1875	  to	  1894,	  and	  his	  power	  and	  prestige	  were	  on	  the	  rise	  during	  this	  period.	  Li’s	  power	  ensured	  that	  his	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  was	  kept	  away	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  traditional	  military.	   	  Second,	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  modernisation	  had	  a	   later	   start	   than	   the	   steam	  fleets	  in	  the	  south,	  i.e.	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	  Unlike	  the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   and	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet,	   which	   had	   their	   own	  shipbuilding	   capabilities	   to	   support	   regional	   naval	  modernisation,	   the	   Beiyang	  Fleet	   had	   no	   shipbuilding	   plant	   to	   rely	   on	   (Li’s	   Tianjin	   Arsenal	   had	   very	   low	  shipbuilding	  capabilities).	  The	  boom	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  therefore	  started	  only	  in	  the	  late	  1870s	  when	  purchasing	  from	  abroad	  replaced	  shipbuilding	  at	  home	  to	  become	  the	  main	  source	  of	  ships	   for	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  Before	  the	  boom,	  the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   was	   much	   smaller	   than	   the	   steam	   fleets	   in	   the	   south,	   and	  consequently	   there	  was	  very	   little	  need	   to	   transfer	  senior	  officers	   from	  the	  old	  
water	   forces.	  When	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  need	   for	  naval	  professionals	  rose	   in	   the	  late	   1870s	   and	   early	   1880s,	   the	   professionally-­‐trained	   native	   Chinese	   naval	  officers	   had	   finished	   their	   education	   and	   were	   ready	   to	   take	   on	   their	  responsibilities	   (the	   first	   group	   of	   naval	   officers	   sent	   to	   England	   returned	   in	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1879).309	   Perhaps	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   the	   infiltration	   of	   men	   from	   the	  water	  
forces,	  and	  thereby	  to	  prevent	  their	  adverse	   influence	  on	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	   the	  1888	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   Regulation	   clearly	   stipulated	   that	   only	   naval	   academy	  graduates	  were	  eligible	  to	  join	  the	  fleet	  as	  officers.310	   	  These	   two	   factors	   enabled	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   to	   remain	   unaffected	   by	   the	  traditional	  water	  forces.	  Without	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  latter,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  had	  managed	   to	   become	   a	  modern	   fleet	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   equipment	   and	   doctrine;	  whereas	  the	  modernisation	  of	  the	  other	  two	  fleets	  took	  place	  only	  on	  the	  facade	  of	   equipment,	   and	   the	   doctrine	   remained	   largely	   the	   same	   as	   that	   of	   the	  traditional	  water	  forces.	  However,	  a	  closer	   look	  at	  the	  two	  factors	  by	  which	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  was	  kept	  away	  from	  the	  adverse	  influences	  of	  the	  traditional	  water	  
forces	   reveals	   that	   they	   were	   largely	   ‘accidental’.	   Had	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   been	   not	   strong	   enough	   to	   resist	   the	   infiltration	   of	   traditional	  
water	  forces,	  or	  had	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  started	  before	  the	  first	  group	   of	   professionally	   trained	   officers	   was	   ready	   to	   take	   duties	   aboard,	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   would	   have	   suffered	   the	   same	   degree	   of	   influence	   from	   the	  traditional	  water	  forces	  as	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	   	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   infiltration	   of	   the	   traditional	  water	   forces	   into	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   and	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   was	   a	   less	   ‘accidental’	   result.	  Since	  China	   lacked	  both	  strong	  seafaring	  communities	  and	  modern	  science	  and	  technology,	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   hire	   those	   who	   had	   worked	   aboard	   foreign	  vessels	   to	   man	   the	   Chinese	   steamships.	   But	   because	   most	   of	   these	   men	   were	  members	  of	  the	  south-­‐eastern	  Asian	  Chinese	  diaspora,	  they	  were	  considered	  not	  ‘Chinese’	   enough	   and	   lacked	   military	   quality,	   which	   instigated	   the	   transfer	   of	  senior	   officers	   from	   the	  water	   forces.	   Those	   senior	   officers	   transmitted	   to	   the	  steam	  fleets	  a	  doctrine	  that	  was	  not	  suitable	  for	  sea	  fighting	  in	  the	  modern	  age.	  The	  performances	  of	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	   in	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  proved	  this	  point.311	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  412-­‐414.	  310	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  482-­‐484.	   	  311	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  pp.	  122-­‐124.	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***	  	  Concerning	   professionally-­‐educated	   native	   naval	   officers,	   a	   particularly	  noteworthy	   phenomenon	   is	   that	   a	   considerable	   number	   came	   from	   Fujian	  province.312	   In	   the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu,	  officers	  of	  Fujianese	  origin	  commanded	  eight	  of	   the	   ten	  Chinese	   ships	   that	   engaged	   the	   Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet.	   It	   remains	  difficult	   to	   ascertain	   the	   exact	   number	   of	   Fujianese	   officers	   in	   the	   late	   19th	  century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	  as	  the	  four	  regional	   fleets	  operated	  independently	  from	   each	   other.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   census	   conducted	   in	   the	   Republican	   Era	  (1912-­‐1949)	  offers	  a	  rough	  indicator	  of	  the	  number	  of	  Fujianese	  officers	   in	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  steam	  navy,	  as	  the	  Republican	  navy	  inherited	  the	  officer	  corps	  of	  the	  Qing	  navy.	  A	  1937	  headcount	  of	  the	  Republican	  navy	  reveals	  that	  2,139	  out	  of	   2,563	   naval	   officers,	   and	   187	   out	   of	   234	   officers	   at	   Headquarters,	   were	   of	  Fujianese	   origin.313	   Evidently,	   Fujianese	   officers	   comprised	   the	  majority	   of	   the	  officer	  body	  of	  the	  Qing	  steam	  navy,	  especially	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  –	  the	  navy’s	  most	  powerful	  unit.	   	  The	  reason	  for	   the	   large	  number	  of	  Fujianese	   in	   the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  is	  twofold.	  A	  direct	  reason,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  is	   that	   the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  was	   considered	   the	  best	   among	   the	  various	  naval	   academies	   and	   had	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   graduates.	   An	   indirect	   but	  fundamental	   reason	   is	   that	   Fujian	   province	   had	   some	   geo-­‐economic	  particularities	   that	   made	   its	   people	   more	   willing	   to	   become	   naval	   officers.	   A	  review	  of	  Chinese	  agriculture	  history	  shows	  that	  Fujian	  province	  had	  a	  very	  low	  amount	  of	  arable	  land	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  provinces	  of	  China	  proper.314	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  Fujian	  province	  was	  a	  seaboard	  province	  isolated	  from	  the	  Lower	  Yangtze	  Plain	  by	  the	  Wuyi	  Mountains.	  Though	  weaker	  in	  agriculture,	  Fujian	  province	  had	  stronger	  maritime	  traditions	  that	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Tang	  Dynasty	  (AD	  618-­‐907)	  when	   Quanzhou	   Port	   in	   south-­‐eastern	   Fujian	   province	  was	   one	   of	   the	   busiest	  hubs	   of	   seaborne	   trade	   in	   East	  Asia.	   Consequently,	   the	   Fujianese	   people	   had	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  312	   Fujian	  province	  is	  a	  seaboard	  province	  located	  in	  south-­‐eastern	  China.	  Its	  provincial	  capital	  is	  Fuzhou.	   	  313	   Zunpeng	   Bao,	  清季海军教育史	   Qingji	   Haijun	   Jiaoyushi	   [History	   of	   Naval	   Education	   in	   the	   late	   Qing],	  (Taibei:	  Guofang	  Yanjiuyuan,	  1969),	  p.	  133.	  314	   Ge	  et	  al.,	  ‘Change	  of	  Cultivated	  Land	  and	  Driving	  Forces	  Analysis	  of	  Some	  Provinces	  of	  China	  in	  Past	  300	  Years’,	  pp.	  825-­‐832.	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higher	  potential	   to	  become	  seamen	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   those	   from	   the	  other	  provinces	  of	  China.	  Also,	  the	  geographical	  isolation	  of	  the	  province	  resulted	  in	  a	  strong	  regional	  identity	  that	  to	  an	  extent	  alienated	  the	  Fujianese	  people	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  China.	  An	   anecdote	   that	   illustrates	   this	   point	   is	   that	   of	   the	   first	   group	  of	   young	  naval	  officers	  who	   completed	   their	   studies	   in	   England	   and	   returned	   to	   China.	  When	  they	   were	   summoned	   to	   see	   senior	   imperial	   officials	   in	   Beijing,	   despite	   their	  proficient	  English,	  these	  young	  Fujianese	  naval	  officers	  had	  difficulties	  talking	  in	  Mandarin	  Chinese	  and	  required	  an	  interpreter	  to	  translate	  their	  Fujianese	  dialect	  into	  Mandarin,	  the	  lingua	  franca	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China.315	  	  
	  
Warship Captain Chief Officer Chief Engineer 
Ding Yuan Liu Buchan (Fujian) Li Dingxin (Fujian) Yu Zhenshun (Fujian) 
Zhen Yuan Lin Taizeng (Fujian) Yang Yonglin (Fujian) Lu Linjie (Fujian) 
Zhi Yuan Deng Shichang (Guangdong) Chen Jinkui (Guangdong) Liu Yinglin (Guangdong) 
Ji Yuan Fang Boqian (Fujian) Shen Shouchang (Fujian) Liang Zuquan (Fujian) 
Jìng Yuan  Ye Zukui (Fujian) Liu Guanxiong (Fujian) Lin Dengliang (N/A) 
Jīng Yuan Lin Yongsheng (Fujian) Chen Ce (Guangdong) Sun Jiang (N/A) 
Lai Yuan Qiu Baoren (Fujian) Chen Wenbin (Fujian) Chen Jingqi (N/A) 
Ping Yuan Li He (Guangdong) N/A N/A 
Chao Yong  Huang Jianxun (Fujian) Weng Shouyu (Fujian) Li Xingqiao (N/A) 
Yang Wei Lin Lvzhong (Fujian) Chen Wenchao (Fujian) Chen Xueshu (N/A) Table	   4.3	   Capital	   Ships	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleets	   and	   Commanders	   before	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War316	  	  	   In	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy,	  a	  ‘Fujianese	  clan’	  –	  as	  many	  historians	  coined	  the	  term	  –	  began	  to	  take	  shape	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  naval	  education.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   due	   to	   the	   traditional	   educational	   system’s	   hostility	  towards	  Western	  learning,	  the	  various	  Chinese	  naval	  academies	  were	  confronted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  315	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  606.	  316	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  327.	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with	  a	  severe	  shortage	  of	  recruits.	  Becoming	  a	  naval	  officer	  was	  regarded	  as	  an	  unorthodox	   choice	   for	   Chinese	   students	   from	   other	   provinces,	   but	   considered	  less	  so	  by	  the	  youths	  of	  Fujian	  province.	  They	  actively	  signed	  up	  for	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy,	  and	  many	  even	  travelled	  far	  to	  join	  the	  naval	  academies	  of	  other	  provinces	  when	   that	   of	   Fuzhou	  was	   full.317	   The	  memoir	   of	   a	  Republican	   naval	  officer	  who	  joined	  the	  Tianjin	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  the	   late	  1890s	  revealed	  that	   it	  had	  been	  commonplace	  that	  Fujianese	  cadets	  made	  up	  seventy	  to	  eighty	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  student	  body	  of	  all	  Chinese	  naval	  academies.318	   As	  no	  native	  Chinese	  had	  received	  systematic	  training	  to	  become	  naval	  officers	  before	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  naval	   academies,	   the	   overwhelming	   Fujianese	   graduates	   became	   the	   only	  professionals	  available	  for	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  4.3,	  Fujianese	   officers	   monopolised	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   key	   positions	   on	   the	   capital	  ships	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	   	  Fujianese	  naval	  cadets	  not	  only	  made	  up	  the	  majority	  in	  all	  naval	  academies,	  a	   substantial	   segment	   of	   the	   young	   officers	  who	   had	   received	   advanced	   naval	  education	   abroad	   were	   also	   Fujianese.	   As	   previously	   mentioned,	   Chinese	  indigenous	   naval	   education	   was	   inadequate,	   offering	   courses	   only	   in	   basic	  navigation	  skills	  and	  leaving	  the	  gap	  between	  being	  able	  to	  sail	  single	  steamships	  and	  being	  able	  to	  command	  battles	  at	  sea	  unaddressed.	  In	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  many	  Western	  navies	  established	  institutions	  dedicated	  to	  the	  study	   of	   naval	   tactics.	   Japan,	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   whom	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	  suffered	   a	   catastrophic	   defeat	   in	   1894,	   also	   established	   the	   Higher	   Training	  School	   for	  Naval	  Officers	  (later	  renamed	  as	  Naval	  Staff	  College)	   in	  1888.	  China,	  on	   the	   contrary,	   refused	   to	   do	   so,	   as	   it	   was	   regarded	   as	   too	   unorthodox.319	  Instead	   of	   developing	   a	   degree	   of	   indigenous	   advanced	   naval	   education,	   the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	   sent	   a	   number	   of	   elite	   young	   officers	   abroad	   for	   such	   an	  education.	  An	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  them	  were	  Fujianese.	   	  Due	   to	   financial	   constraints,	   among	   the	   entire	   officer	   corps	   of	   the	   Chinese	  steam	   navy,	   only	   a	   small	   number	   of	   officers	   received	   advanced	   professional	  education	   abroad.	   They	  were	   overwhelmingly	   Fujianese,	   and	   they	  were	   aware	  that	   they	  were	   irreplaceable.	   This	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   problem	  of	   corruption.	   It	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  317	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  606.	  318	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  605.	  319	   Evans	  and	  Peattie,	  Kaigun,	  p.	  13.	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particularly	  noteworthy	   that	   all	   of	   the	   twelve	   elite	   officers	  who	  had	   studied	   in	  England	  in	  the	  first	  naval	  educational	  mission	  were	  Fujianese.	  Upon	  returning	  to	  China,	   they	  were	   given	   key	   command	   positions	   in	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   and	   they	  held	  those	  positions	  until	  the	  fleet	  was	  wiped	  out	  in	  1895.	  Some	  of	  these	  young	  officers,	  however,	  were	  opportunists	  who	  saw	  joining	  the	  navy	  as	  a	  shortcut	  to	  wealth	  and	  power.	  In	  a	  personal	  letter	  that	  Li	  Hongzhang	  sent	  to	  an	  acquaintance,	  he	  mentioned	  that	  some	  of	  those	  officers,	  aware	  of	  their	  own	  importance,	  vowed	  that	  ‘[China’s]	  creation	  of	  an	  ironclad	  navy	  would	  make	  us	  rich	  and	  powerful.	  We	  
should	   form	   an	   alliance	   among	   ourselves	   in	   pursuit	   of	   power	   and	  wealth.	   If	   the	  
rank	  and	  salary	  given	  to	  us	   is	  not	  satisfactory	   [upon	  our	  returning	  to	  China],	  we	  
shall	  boycott.’320	  Zeng	   Jize	   (Chinese	   minister	   to	   Britain,	   in	   office	   1879-­‐1886)	   reminded	   Li	  Hongzhang	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  students	  sent	  to	  England	  should	  be	  diversified.321	  But	   given	   the	   Fujianese	   dominance	   of	   cadets	   in	   naval	   academies	   throughout	  China,	  the	  two	  later	  groups	  of	  cadets	  sent	  to	  England	  remained	  overwhelmingly	  Fujianese.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight	  and	  subsequent	  evidence,	  we	  know	  that	  some	   of	   these	   officers	   indeed	   were	   corrupt.	   Fang	   Boqian,	   who	   later	   became	  commander	  of	  the	  German-­‐built	  protected	  cruiser	  Ji	  Yuan,	  was	  suspiciously	  rich.	  In	  his	  diary	  he	  noted	  that	  he	  had	  a	  number	  of	  properties	  in	  various	  locations	  and	  two	  concubines.322	   In	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  he	  fled	  with	  his	  ship	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  action	  and	  was	   later	  executed	   for	  desertion.323	   John	  O.	  P.	  Bland,	  who	  served	   in	  the	  Chinese	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  from	  1883	  to	  1896,	  declared	  some	  of	  the	  Fujianese	  officers	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  in	  particular	  Liu	  Buchan,	  Lin	  Taizeng	  and	  Fang	   Boqian,	   worked	   the	   fleet	   ‘as	   a	   commercial	   undertaking	   for	   their	   own	  
benefit.’324	  In	  order	  to	  defend	  vested	  interests,	  these	  officers	  became	  very	  inactive	  with	  regards	  to	  rotations.	  Many	  of	   them	  tended	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  their	  positions	  as	  ship	  commanders,	   positions	   that	   brought	   them	   real	   power.	   A	   comparative	   study	  between	   Liu	   Buchan,	   key	   commander	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   and	   his	   Japanese	  counterpart	   Tōgō	   Heihachirō,	   shows	   that	   in	   the	   sixteen	   years	   between	   Liu’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  320	   LWZGQJ-­‐PLHG,	  Vol.	  22,	  entry	  of	  22nd	  day	  7th	  Month	  7th	  Year	  of	  Guangxu	  Reign.	   	   	  321	   LWZGQJ-­‐PLHG,	  Vol.	  18,	  p.	  33.	  322	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  209.	   	  323	   Biggerstaff,	  The	  Earliest	  Modern	  Government	  Schools	  in	  China,	  p.	  249.	  324	   Ibid.,	  250.	  Also	  see	  ZGYJ,	  p.	  880.	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graduation	   from	  England	  and	  China’s	  defeat	   in	  1894,	  Liu	  commanded	  only	   two	  ships	   –	   the	   Rendel	   gunboat	   Zhen	   Bei	   and	   ironclad	   battleship	   Ding	   Yuan.	   In	  contrast,	   Tōgō	   had	   served	   aboard	   seven	   different	   warships	   and	   worked	   in	  various	   naval	   institutions	   ashore.325	   This	   would	   certainly	   make	   Tōgō	   a	   more	  experienced	  naval	  commander	  than	  Liu.	  Other	  Chinese	  senior	  naval	  officers	  also	  showed	   an	   inclination	   to	   cling	   on	   to	   their	   positions	   as	   ship	   commanders.	   The	  commanders	  of	  the	  ten	  capital	  ships	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  never	  changed	  from	  the	  ships	   entering	   commission	   until	   they	   were	   sunk	   or	   captured	   in	   the	   war	   with	  Japan,	  narrowing	  their	  vision	  as	  senior	  naval	  officers.326	   	  These	   senior	   officers	  were	   also	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   training	   of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  As	  has	  been	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  some	  of	  them	  were	  sent	  abroad	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  could	  become	  experts	  in	  naval	  tactics	  and	  fleet	  manoeuvring,	  but	  the	  overseas	  trainings	  did	  not	  equip	  them	  with	  such	  expertise.	  But	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  top	  echelon	  of	  the	  empire	  was	  unaware	  of	  their	  inadequacy	  as	  senior	  naval	  officers.	  Even	  if	  the	  top	  echelon	  was	  aware,	  there	  would	  be	  little	  they	   could	   have	   done	   because,	   after	   all,	   they	   were	   the	   most	   highly	   trained	  officers	   in	   China.	   The	   training	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   under	   the	   charge	   of	   these	  Fujianese	   officers	  was	   adequate	   in	   appearance	   only.	   Some	   confessed	   after	   the	  war	  with	  Japan	  that	  in	  many	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  gunnery	  trainings	  the	  distance	  to	  target	  was	  already	  known	  to	   the	  gunners.327	   Training	  on	  tactical	   formations	  was	  also	  fraught	  with	   cheating	   and	   formalism.328	   Adm.	   Edmund	  R.	   Fremantle,	  who	   had	  been	  the	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  the	  China	  Station	  between	  1892	  and	  1895,	  was	  invited	   to	   visit	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   before	   the	   war	   with	   the	   Japanese	   and	   he	  commented	  to	  his	  English	  colleague	  after	  the	  visit	  that	  ‘[the	  Beiyang	  Fleet]	  seems	  
in	  very	  fair	  order,	  but	  they	  steam	  at	  very	  low	  speed,	  and	  there	  is	  too	  much	  show.329	   	  More	   worryingly,	   the	   Fujianese	   officers	   showed	   a	   dangerous	   tendency	   to	  become	   factionalised	   among	   themselves	   and	   challenged	   the	   authority	   of	   Ding	  Ruchang,	   the	   commander-­‐in-­‐chief	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   Ding	   was	   not	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  325	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   Ibid.	  329	   Fremantle,	  The	  Navy	  as	  I	  Have	  Known	  It,	  p.	  422.	  
	   131	  
professional	  naval	  officer;	  he	  was	  originally	  a	   cavalry	  officer	  of	  Li	  Hongzhang’s	  Huai	   Army.	   It	   was	   said	   that	   one	   of	   the	   key	   reasons	   Li	   made	   him	   the	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   was	   to	   counterbalance	   the	   Fujianese	  clan.	  But	  as	  a	  non-­‐professional,	  Ding’s	  authority	  stood	  on	  shaky	   foundations.330	  As	  Adm.	  Fremantle	  observed	  when	  he	  visited	  the	  fleet:	  ‘[Admiral	  Ding]	  spoke	  no	  
English,	  which	  was	   a	   great	   drawback,	   as	   all	   the	   signals	   and	   semaphores	   [of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet]	  were	   in	  English,	  which	  his	   captain,	  Commodore	  Lew	  Poochin	   [Liu	  Buchan]	  spoke	  fluently;	  so	  that	  he	  was	  much	  in	  the	  latter’s	  hands.’	   331	  William	  F.	  Tyler’s	  memoir	  supports	  this	  view.332	   He	  noted	  that	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  ‘Admiral	  Ding	  held	  a	  council	  of	  war	  and	  it	  was	  decided	  to	  fight	  in	  
line	  ahead	  of	  sections	  –	  a	  section	  being	  mostly	  two	  sister	  ships	   in	  quarter	   line.’333	  But	  when	  the	  Japanese	  were	  in	  sight,	  Liu	  changed	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  fleet,	  ‘the	  
signal	  was	  for	  Line	  Abreast	  with	  leaders	  [the	  flag	  ship	  which	  Liu	  commanded]	  in	  
the	  middle	  instead	  of	  Line	  Ahead	  of	  Sections,	  as	  had	  been	  decided	  by	  the	  Admiral	  in	  
the	  consultation	  with	  his	  captains.’334	   The	  reason	  why	  Liu	  made	  this	  change	  was,	  according	  to	  Tyler,	  that	  ‘with	  the	  battleships	  in	  the	  centre	  and	  the	  weakest	  vessels	  
on	  the	  wings,	  the	  enemy	  would	  give	  the	  latter	  first	  attention’	  so	  that	  ‘it	  would	  avoid	  
the	   immediate	   concentrating	   fire	   on	   his	   [Liu’s]	   ship	   that	  would	   result	   from	   Line	  
Ahead’.335	   It	  remains	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  was	  true,	  but	  The	  
Draft	  History	  of	  Qing,	  the	  official	  history	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  echoed	  this	  view	  to	  an	  extent:	  ‘[Admiral	  Ding	  Ruchang]	  was	  originally	  an	  army	  officer;	  besides,	  he	  was	  
from	  Anhui	  province	  [rather	  than	  Fujian].	  He	  presided	  alone	  over	  and	  was	  checked	  
by	  the	  Fujianese	  clan.	  He	  was	  not	  able	  to	  exercise	  his	  authority.’336	  	   ***	  	  It	   is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  presence	  of	   foreign	  officers	   in	  the	  Beiyang	   Fleet.	   In	   1889,	   thirty-­‐four	   Westerners	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   on	   the	   roster	   of	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Beiyang	   Fleet,	   and	   in	   1890,	   the	   number	   was	   twenty-­‐nine.337	   The	   reliance	   on	  foreign	  talent	  was	  so	  strong	  that	  eight	  of	  them	  participated	  directly	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  and	   the	  Battle	  of	  Weihaiwei.338	   The	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	   reliance	  on	   foreign	  officers	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fleet’s	  operational	  orders	  were	  given	  in	  English	  rather	  than	  Chinese,	  and	  junior	  and	  petty	  officers	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  command	  possessed	  a	  basic	  command	  of	  English.339	   This	  suggests	  that	   foreign	   officers	   may	   have	   played	   a	   considerable	   role	   in	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  training	   of	   the	   fleet.	   Li	   Hongzhang	   argued	   that	   the	   large-­‐scale	   employment	   of	  foreign	   officers	   was	   a	   necessity	   because	   ‘the	   ships	   and	   guns	   were	   advancing	  
almost	   on	   a	   daily	   basis,	   its	   theories	   and	   techniques	   were	   characterised	   by	  
profundities	  that	  were	  unfamiliar	  to	  Chinese.	  …	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  necessity	  to	  borrow	  
talent	   from	   foreign	   countries	   by	   recruiting	   foreigners	   to	   come	   to	   teach	   in	   China.	  [Only]	  in	  this	  way	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  the	  naval	  assets	  can	  be	  expected.’340	   	  As	   this	   extract	   implies,	   the	   Chinese	   officers	  were	   not	   capable	   of	   running	   a	  steam	  navy	  on	  their	  own.	  This	  was,	  in	  turn,	  because	  the	  Chinese	  authorities	  were	  unwilling	   to	   promote	   meaningful	   institutional	   changes	   that	   could	   enable	   the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  to	  attain	  self-­‐standing.	  The	  Imperial	   Japanese	  Navy	  offered	  an	  opposite	  example:	  the	  navy	  not	  only	  learned	  attentively	  from	  foreign	  officers,	  but	   also	   restructured	   its	   naval	   institutions	   after	   Western	   navies.	   In	   the	   early	  stages	  of	  its	  development,	  the	  Japanese	  navy	  also	  hired	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  foreign	  officers.	  Among	  them	  were	  Lt.	  Comdr.	  Archibald	  Douglas,	  Lt.	  Comdr.	  L.P.	  Willan	   and	   Capt.	   John	   Ingles.	   Lt.	   Comdr.	   Douglas	   and	   his	   mission	   established	  British	   traditions	  within	   the	   Japanese	  Navy,	   from	  matters	  of	  seamanship	  to	   the	  style	  of	  uniform	  and	  the	  attitudes	  to	  its	  officers.341	   Lt.	  Comdr.	  Willan	  was	  hired	  to	  teach	  gunnery	  and	  navigation	  at	  the	  Japanese	  Naval	  Academy,	  and	  introduced	  the	  study	  of	  modern	  naval	  tactics	  to	  the	  infant	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy.342	   Capt.	  Ingles’	   arrival	   in	   Japan	   coincided	  with	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	   Japanese	  Naval	  Staff	  College,	  and	  he	  was	  appointed	  both	  as	  an	  instructor	  in	  the	  college	  and	  as	  an	  advisor	   in	   the	   general	   modernisation	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	   navy.	   The	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Japanese	   not	   only	   learnt	   about	   modern	   naval	   tactics,	   but	   also	   adopted	   Ingles’	  suggestions	  on	   streamlining	   the	  naval	   institutions.343	   Based	  upon	   the	  acquired	  knowledge	  and	   the	  reformed	   institutions,	   the	   Imperial	   Japanese	  Navy	  achieved	  self-­‐standing.	   	  In	  contrast	  to	  Japan,	  foreign	  officers	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  military.	  China	  was	  eager	  to	  acquire	  Western	  firepower,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  nation	  paradoxically	  tried	  to	  avoid	  wholesale	  Westernisation.	  Wright	   observed	   that	   in	   Qing	   Dynasty	   China	   ‘foreigners	   were	   accepted	   as	  
technical	   specialists,	  but	   they	  could	  not	  possibly	  perform	  the	  political,	   social,	  and	  
ideological	  roles	  that	  were	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  effective	  military	  leadership’.344	   Even	  the	  most	  enthusiastic	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  believed	  that	  China	  was	  superior	  to	  the	  West	   in	  all	  aspects	  but	  weaponry.	  Foreign	  officers	  were	  employed	  only	   to	  pass	  on	   their	   skills	   to	   the	   Chinese	   officers,	   and	   were	   not	   allowed	   to	   change	   the	  Chinese	   institutions	   or	   to	   become	   an	   organic	   part	   of	   it.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners,	   no	   skill	   the	   foreigners	   could	  offer	  was	  worth	   even	  only	   the	  slightest	  concession	  of	  sovereignty.	   	  This	  mind-­‐set	  in	  dealing	  with	  foreign	  officers	  had	  a	  twofold	  consequence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Chinese	  naval	  power.	  First,	   it	  adversely	  affected	  the	  quality	  of	  military	  aids	  that	  China	  received.	  Driven	  by	  the	  suspicion	  of	  foreign	  advisors,	  Chinese	   officials	   distinguished	   two	   types	   of	   military	   aids:	   those	   controlled	   by	  Chinese	  government	  and	  those	  controlled	  by	  foreign	  governments.345	   The	  latter	  was	  usually	  considered	  as	  a	  form	  of	  intervention	  and	  therefore	  refused.	  Instead	  of	   accessing	   foreign	   military	   talents	   through	   government-­‐to-­‐government	  channels,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   preferred	   to	   access	   foreign	   military	   aid	   via	  personal	  connections.	  This	  approach	  was	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  the	  intervention	  of	  foreign	  governments,	  but	   it	  could	  hardly	  guarantee	  the	  qualifications	  of	   foreign	  advisors	  hired	  via	  personal	  nexus.	  Inspector-­‐general	   (Zong	   Cha)	   was	   the	   highest	   position	   created	   for	   foreign	  advisors	   in	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   346 	   As	   shown	   in	   Table	   4.4,	   all	   five	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343	   Evans	  and	  Peattie,	  Kaigun,	  p.	  13.	  344	   Wright,	  The	  Last	  Stand	  of	  Chinese	  Conservatism,	  p.	  203.	  345	   Ibid.,	  214.	  346	   The	  duty	  of	  inspector-­‐general	  remained	  intentionally	  vague.	  The	  1888	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  Regulation	  did	  not	  institutionalise	  this	  position.	  William	  Tyler	  pointed	  out	  in	  his	  memoir	  that	  the	  position	  of	  inspector-­‐general	  ‘in	  vague	  Chinese	  form	  which	  might	  mean	  anything	  from	  second-­‐in-­‐command	  to	  advisor	  with	  rank	  of	  admiral.’	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inspectors-­‐general	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  came	  via	  personal	  connections.	  A	  closer	  examination	   of	   their	   backgrounds	   shows	   that	   most	   of	   them	   possessed	   no	  adequate	   naval	   qualifications.	   Clayson	   was	   a	   merchantman	   captain,	   while	  Siebelin	   held	   office	   only	   for	   a	   short	   period	   and	   his	   military	   qualifications	   are	  unclear.	   Von	   Hanneken	   was	   a	   former	   German	   army	   officer,	   while	   McClure,	  appointed	  as	   inspector-­‐general	   of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  on	   the	  eve	  of	   the	  Battle	  of	  Weihaiwei,	  was	   a	   ‘skipper	   of	   a	   local	   tug-­‐boat,	   and	   little	  more	   if	   nothing	   less’.347	  Only	   Lang	   (see	  Photo	  4.3)	  was	   a	   real	   naval	   professional,	   but	   he	  was	  unable	   to	  make	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  China’s	  naval	  modernisation	  due	  to	  the	  reason	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  passage.	   	  	  
	  
Name Nationality Time of Service  
William H. Clayson British  Sept 1880 - ? Recommended by Robert Hart (Inspector General of 
China’s Imperial Maritime Custom Service) 
William M. Lang British March 1883 
- Aug. 1884 
Recommended by Robert Hart  
Siebelin German Oct. 1884.10-? Recommended by Li Fengpao (Chinese chargé 
d'affaires to Germany) 
William M. Lang British May 1886 -1890 - 
Constantin 
von Hanneken 
German Aug. 1894 - ?  Recommended by Li Hongzhang (Von Hanneken 
was son-in-law of G. Detring, the then Inspector of 
Tianjin Imperial Maritime Custom Services) 
John McClure British  Nov.1894  
- Feb. 1895 
Persona grata with the Detring family348 
Table	  4.4	  Inspectors-­‐General	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet349	  	  	   Second,	  the	  authority	  of	  foreign	  advisors	  was	  rather	  confined,	  which	  in	  turn	  made	  it	  hard	  for	  them	  to	  improve	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  As	  to	  the	  position	  of	  foreign	   advisors	   in	   the	   Chinese	   military,	   a	   foreign	   observer	   noted:	   ‘they	   were	  
outsiders	   from	   the	  Chinese	  official	  point	  of	   view,	  but	  had	   to	  be	   tolerated	  because	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  164.	  347	   Tyler,	  Pulling	  Strings	  in	  China,	  p.	  60.	  348	   Ibid.	  349	   Qizhang	  Qi,	  北洋舰队	   Beiyang	  Jiandui	  [The	  Beiyang	  Fleet],	  (Jinan:	  Shandong	  People’s	  Press,	  1981),	  p.	  46.	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the	   exigencies	   of	   coast	   defence	   demanded	   the	   navy.’350	   They	   were	   essentially	  hired	  to	  teach,	  but	  without	  authority,	  their	  impact	  could	  not	  be	  guaranteed.	  This	  point	  can	  be	  illustrated	  with	  the	  story	  of	  Capt.	  Lang,	  the	  only	  fully-­‐qualified	  naval	  professional	  among	  all	   the	   five	   inspectors-­‐general	   that	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  hired.	  He	  was	   acclaimed	   as	   an	   outstanding	  naval	   officer	   by	  both	  Chinese	   and	   foreign	  observers	   and	   he	   was	   very	   devoted	   to	   his	   duty.	   Lang	   strived	   to	   regulate	   the	  training	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  in	  British	  fashion	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  protocol	  system	  in	  the	  fleet	  after	  international	  practice.351	  During	   his	   five-­‐year	   stay	   in	   China,	   particularly	   the	   second	   term	   from	  mid-­‐1886	  to	  1890,	  there	  were	  noticeable	  improvements	  in	  the	  training	  standard	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  British	  Admiral	  George	  A.	  Ballard	  commented	  that	  the	  fleet	  under	  Lang’s	  charge	  was	  in	  ‘serviceable	  condition’,	  with	  ‘excellent	  discipline’	  and	  ‘sound	  training’,	  and	  stores	  and	  equipment	  ‘up	  to	  establishment’	  both	  ashore	  and	  afloat.	   Externally,	   the	   ships	   were	   ‘smart	   and	   clean’,	   and	   internally,	   in	   ‘good	  working	   order’.	   Constant	   cruising	   had	   kept	   the	   crews	   alert.	   In	   all	   respects,	   he	  recalled,	  ‘the	  fleet	  represented	  a	  force	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with	  at	  its	  face	  value.’352	  However,	   the	  progress	  was	   interrupted	  by	  Capt.	  Lang’s	   resignation.	  Within	  the	  fleet,	  Lang’s	  relations	  with	  his	  Chinese	  subordinates,	  especially	  the	  Fujianese	  officers,	  were	  strained	  due	  to	  his	  strict	  character	  as	  a	  disciplinarian.	  During	  one	  of	  the	  cruises	  of	  the	  fleet	  in	  1890,	  the	  ships	  called	  at	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Adm.	  Ding	  Ruchang	   left	  his	   flagship	   for	   a	  detour	   to	   the	   island.	   Lang	   flew	  his	  own	  admiral	  pennant	   citing	  he	  had	  appointment	   from	   the	   Imperial	  Court	   as	   admiral.353	   But	  Liu	  Buchan,	  a	  leading	  figure	  of	  the	  ‘Fujianese	  clan’	  disagreed	  and	  had	  Lang’s	  flag	  hauled	  down.354	   Lang	  felt	  offended	  and	  wrote	  a	  complaint	  to	  Li	  Hongzhang,	  but	  Li	   upheld	   Liu	  when	   the	   dispute	  was	   brought	   to	   his	   attention.355	   Angrily,	   Lang	  resigned	   and	   returned	   to	   England.	   Lang	   had	   taken	   his	   commission	   seriously,	  which	  failed	  to	  be	  reciprocated	  by	  Chinese	  officials.	  The	  rank	  of	  admiral	  given	  to	  Lang	  was	  mostly	  used	  as	  a	   lure;	   there	  was	  no	  real	  power	  attached	   to	   it.	   It	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  166.	  351	   Qi,	  The	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  209.	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  164.	  Wang,	  Collected	  
Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  73.	   	  352	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  163.	  353	   Lang	   himself	   and	   the	  British	  Government	   took	   the	   commission	   seriously.	   In	   a	   letter	   sent	   by	   Sir	  N.	   R.	  O’Connor	   to	   London,	   he	   said:	   ‘[Lang]	   considers	   satisfactory	   his	   brevet	   rank	   is	   that	   of	   admiral,	   and	   he	   has	  
actual	  command	  as	  vice	  admiral.’	  see	  ADM1/6827.	  354	   Ibid.,	  164-­‐165.	  355	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  164.	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observed	  that	   the	  training	  of	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  went	   into	  a	  decline	  after	  Lang’s	  departure,	   which	   is	   commonly	   recognised	   as	   a	   major	   reason	   for	   the	   fleet’s	  defeat.356	   	  	  	  
4.5	  Conclusion	  	  Becoming	  a	  naval	  officer	  was	  not	  a	  popular	  choice	  among	  youngsters	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China.	  Learning	  Confucian	  classics	  and	  attending	  Imperial	  Examinations	  was	   the	   only	   recognised	   path	   of	   upward	   mobility;	   Western	   learning,	   on	   the	  contrary,	  was	  looked	  down	  on	  by	  most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  elites.	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  men	  of	  talent	  and	  integrity	  usually	  ‘steered	  clear’	  of	  such	  undertakings,	  whereas	  only	   ‘lesser	   characters	   were	   willing	   to	   associate	   with	   the	   modernisation	  projects’.357	   To	   tackle	   the	   resulting	   shortage	   of	   recruitment,	   the	   Chinese	   naval	  academies	  offered	  incentives	  to	  attract	  students,	  which	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  society’s	  bias	  against	  modernisation.	  Indeed,	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  students	  who	   joined	   the	  Western	   learning	   schools	   –	   naval	   academies	   included	   –	   were	  either	  opportunists	  who	  saw	  the	  steam	  navy	  as	  a	  shortcut	  to	  wealth	  and	  power,	  or	   those	   had	   little	   hope	   of	   passing	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations.	   Yan	   Fu	  was	   an	  example	   of	   the	   latter.	   In	   short,	   the	   strong	   social	   prejudice	   against	   Western	  
learning	   had	   a	   deleterious	   impact	   on	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   recruits	   of	   naval	  academies.	  Within	   the	   naval	   academies,	   the	   study	   of	   Chinese	   classics	   took	   up	   a	  substantial	   amount	   of	   time,	   which	   could	   have	   been	   used	   for	  military	   training.	  More	   worryingly,	   these	   classics	   conveyed	   an	   ideology	   at	   odds	   with	   that	   of	  maritime	  societies,	  and	  stressed	  literary	  and	  humanistic	  accomplishment	  at	  the	  expense	   of	   science	   and	   technology.	   Motivated	   by	   provincialism,	   the	   various	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  established	  their	  own	  naval	  academies.	  All	  of	  these	   academies	   were	   moulded	   after	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy,	   where	   the	  training	  was	  only	  limited	  to	  the	  sailing	  of	  individual	  steamships.	  Due	  to	  financial	  difficulties	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  inter-­‐provincial	  cooperation,	  few	  of	  the	  later-­‐established	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  165.	   	  357	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  289.	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naval	   academies	   attained	   a	   standard	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   Fuzhou.	   The	  achievement	  of	  Chinese	  indigenous	  naval	  education	  remained	  low.	  To	  make	  the	  steamships	  an	  effective	   fighting	   force,	   a	  number	  of	  young	  officers	  were	  sent	   to	  Europe	   in	   pursuit	   of	   advanced	  naval	   education.	   China’s	   reliance	   on	  Europe	   for	  advanced	  naval	  education	  was	  structural,	  as	  the	  naval	  modernisers	  did	  not	  want	  to	  reform	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  to	  improve	  naval	  education.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  naval	  educational	  missions	  abroad,	  however,	  were	  not	  ideal.	   	  The	   senior	   commanding	   officers	   of	   the	   steam	   navy	   were	   of	   three	  backgrounds:	   those	   transferred	   from	   traditional	   water	   forces,	   those	  professionally	  educated	  by	  naval	  academies,	  and	  foreign	  officers.	  The	  first	  group	  dominated	  the	  southern	  fleets,	  i.e.	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	   the	  Guangdong	  Fleet.	   As	  Qing	  China’s	   economy	  had	  no	   strong	   elements	   of	  seaborne	   trade,	   the	   traditional	  water	   forces	  were	   little	  more	   than	  a	   littoral	  and	  riverine	  constabulary	   force	   rather	   than	  a	   seagoing	  navy.	  Therefore	  most	  of	   the	  senior	  officers	  who	  transferred	  from	  the	  water	  forces	  lacked	  the	  professionalism	  required	  to	  command	  a	  steam	  fleet.	  They	  introduced	  to	  the	  new	  fleets	  a	  doctrine	  that	   conformed	   to	   water	   forces	   rather	   than	   modern	   warships.	   Professionally	  educated	   officers	   and	   foreign	   officers	   played	   a	  major	   role	   in	   the	   elite	   Beiyang	  Fleet.	  Most	  of	   the	  professionally-­‐trained	  officers	  were	   from	  Fujian	  province	  –	  a	  province	   characterised	   by	   strong	  maritime	   traditions,	   but	   rather	   isolated	   from	  the	   other	   inland	   provinces.	   Their	   qualifications	   were	   higher	   that	   those	   of	   old	  
water	   forces	   (in	   fact	   their	   capabilities	   as	   commanding	   officers	   were	  questionable),	   but	   the	   gain	  was	   offset	   by	   their	   tendency	   to	   factionalise	   among	  themselves	   and	   to	   put	   their	   personal	   interests	   ahead	   of	   the	   nation’s.	   The	   last	  group	  –	  foreign	  officers	  –	  were	  given	  no	  real	  power	  and	  their	  contribution	  was	  rather	  limited.	  Motivated	  by	  a	  Sino-­‐centric	  mentality	  and	  suspicion	  of	  foreigners,	  the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   refused	   to	   give	   foreign	   officers	   sufficient	   authority	   to	  make	  any	  substantial	   contribution	   to	  China’s	  naval	  modernisation.	  Capt.	  Lang’s	  story	   exemplifies	   this	   point.	   Overall,	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   senior	   commanding	  officers	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  remained	  low.	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Photo	  4.1	  Reference	  letter	  presented	  to	  the	  British	  Admiralty	  by	  the	  directors	  of	  the	  first	  Naval	  Educational	  Mission	  (transcript	  from	  ADM	  1/6423,	  National	  Archives).	  Two	  points	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	   this	   letter:	   (1)	   a	   comparison	   between	   the	   qualifications	   of	   the	   Chinese	   students	   and	   the	  curriculum	  of	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  College	  at	  Greenwich	  shows	  that	  the	  courses	  they	  took	  in	  England	  were	  little	  more	  than	  a	  repetition	  of	  what	  they	  had	  already	  learnt	  in	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy.	  The	  gap	  between	  being	  able	  to	  sail	  single	  steamships	  and	  being	  able	  to	  command	  battles	  at	  sea	  remained	  unbridged.	  (2)	  They	  boarded	  the	  British	  navy	  ships	  as	  officers	  rather	  than	  midshipmen	  (in	   contrast,	  most	   of	   the	   Japanese	   naval	   cadets	   joined	   as	  midshipmen);	   this	  was	   probably	   the	  reason	  why	  the	  cadets	  like	  Ye	  Zukui	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  perform	  duties	  when	  they	  were	  aboard	  British	  warships.	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  (HMS	  Minotaur)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Ding	  Yuan)	  	   	  
	  (HMS	  Bellerophon)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Chao	  Yong)	  	  
	  
 (HMS	  Invincible)                  (Jing	  Yuan)	  	  Photo	  4.2	   	   of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy	  ships	  aboard	  which	  the	  first	  group	  of	  Chinese	  cadets	  served	  when	  they	  were	  in	  England,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  ships	  they	  later	  commanded.	  Note	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  ships.
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  Photo	  4.3	  Capt.	  William	  M.	  Lang	  (second	  row	  in	  Western-­‐style	  uniform)	  and	  Liu	  Buchan	  (second	  row	   left	   to	   Lang).	   Upon	   a	   disagreement	   between	   the	   two	   in	   1890,	   the	   former	   resigned	   and	  returned	   to	   England.	   Lang’s	   relation	   with	   the	   Fujianese	   senior	   commanding	   officers	   in	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  was	  strained.	  He	  once	  commented	  that	  the	  Fujianese	  senior	  officers	  were	  ‘ignorant	  
and	  envious	  men’.358	   The	  training	  standard	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  declined	  after	  Lang’s	  resignation.	  The	  inadequate	  training	  was	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  fleet’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  (Source:	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  30.)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	   Stanley	  F.	  Wright,	  Hart	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Customs,	  (Belfast:	  WM.	  Mullan	  &	  Son,	  1950),	  p.	  481.	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  Chapter	  Five	  	  	  The	  Ships	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   three	   aspects:	   (1)	   the	   various	   types	   of	   home-­‐built	  ships;	   (2)	   the	   decline	   of	   indigenous	   shipbuilding	   capabilities;	   and	   (3)	   naval	  acquisition	   from	   abroad.	   It	   will	   try	   to	   explain	   the	   relationship	   linking	   the	  elements	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ships	  of	  the	  steam	  navy.	  This	  is	  crucial	  because	  ‘warships	  are	  built	  to	  meet	  specific	  
requirements,	  which	  can	  most	  simply	  be	  stated	  as	  a	  national	  strategy.	  …	  it	   is	  well	  
worth	   considering	  why	   the	   powers	   built	   warships,	   and	   how	   they	   chose	   from	   the	  
myriad	  of	  designs	  that	  were	  available	  after	  1860.	  National	  strategy	  …	  dominated	  
those	   decisions.’359	   In	   an	   era	   of	   continuous	   technological	   changes,	   with	   the	  transition	  from	  sail	  to	  steam,	  the	  cost	  to	  build	  warships	  increased	  exponentially.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  ships	  that	  a	  nation	  state	  could	  afford	  was	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  financial	  and	  industrial	  resources	  that	  it	  could	  mobilise.	  In	  turn,	  a	  clear	  set	  of	   strategic	  objectives	   identifying	  naval	  missions	  was	  essential	  for	   striking	   a	   balance	   between	   the	   shape	   and	   size	   of	   a	   fleet	   and	   the	   resources	  required	  to	  develop	  it.	  	  	  
5.1	  The	  Various	  Types	  of	  Home-­‐Built	  Ships	  	  This	   section	  will	   examine	   the	  divergent	  opinions	  among	   the	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  359	   Andrew	   Lambert,	   ‘Introduction’	   in	   Steam,	   Steel	   and	   Shellfire:	   The	   Steam	  Warship,	   1815-­‐1905,	   Robert	  Gardiner	  ed.,	  (London:	  Conway	  Maritime	  Pres	  Ltd,	  1992),	  p.	  9.	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as	  to	  what	  type	  of	  ship	  best	  suited	  China’s	  maritime	  defence.	  There	  were	  three	  divergent	   strands	   of	   thinking:	   the	   school	   of	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’,	   the	   school	   of	  ocean-­‐going	  warships	   and	   the	   school	   of	   littoral/riverine	   gunboats.	   Those	  who	  were	   concerned	  with	   financial	   survivability	   proposed	   the	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’.	  They	   argued	   that	  warships	   should	  be	   able	   to	   sustain	   themselves	  by	   serving	   as	  cargo	   ships	   in	   peacetime.	   Those	   who	   proposed	   ocean-­‐going	   warships	   were	  mostly	  admirers	  of	  Western	  naval	  power.	  From	  a	  purely	  military	  point	  of	  view,	  they	   suggested	   that	   China	   should	   build	   larger	   and	  mightier	   warships	   because	  such	  ship	  could	  better	  defend	  the	  country	  against	  foreign	  aggression.	  Those	  who	  advocated	   littoral/riverine	   gunboats	   were	   mostly	   men	   emerged	   from	   the	  traditional	  water	  forces.	  They	  wanted	  to	  build	  a	  type	  of	  ship	  that	  was	  suitable	  for	  the	  Chinese	  traditional	  pattern	  of	  maritime	  warfare.	   	  While	   all	   strands	   of	   arguments	   were	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   naval	  modernisation,	  each	  one	  of	  the	  three	  had	  its	  particular	  reasons,	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	   Had	   their	   ideas	   been	   debated,	   openly	   discussed	   and	   centrally	  coordinated,	  the	  result	  might	  have	  been	  a	  more	  balanced	  navy.	  But	  a	  debate	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  a	  strategically	  informed	  choice	  never	  really	  took	  place.	  This	  was	   partly	   due	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   an	   authoritative	   decision-­‐making	   body	   and	   a	   clear	  strategy	   in	   the	   central	   government,	   and	   partly	   because	   the	   maritime	   defence	  districts	  were	  reluctant	  to	  coordinate	  with	  each	  other	  horizontally.	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  revolved	  around	  the	  emperor,	  who	  had	  very	  limited	  interests	  and	  time	  to	  dedicate	  to	  the	  navy.	  The	  top	  echelon	  rarely	  gave	  clearly	  stated	  instructions	  on	  how	   the	   steam	  navy	   should	  be	  built.	  When	   they	  did,	   they	   tended	   to	  use	   vague	  terms	   such	   as	   ‘effective’	   and	   ‘suitable’.	   The	   local	   practitioners	   were	   left	   to	   do	  what	  they	  believed	  was	  right.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  maritime	  defence	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	   and	   its	   finances	   were	   largely	   organised	   provincially.	   This	   meant	   that	  shipbuilding	   projects	   were	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   on	   a	   regional	   basis	   without	  centralised	   or	   inter-­‐regional	   coordination.	   Under	   this	   premise,	   different	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	  were	  motivated	  to	  build	  ships	  for	  different	  reasons.	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The	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	   	  	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  was	  the	  largest	  shipbuilding	  centre.	  It	  had	  an	  ambitious	  long-­‐term	   shipbuilding	   plan.	   The	   ambition	   required	   the	   navy	   yard	   to	   take	  financial	  balance	  as	  its	  paramount	  concern.	  Zuo	  Zongtang,	  founding	  father	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard,	   envisaged	   that	   the	   Fuzhou-­‐built	   warships	   could	   earn	   their	  keep	  by	   carrying	  government	   tribute	  grain	  or	  other	   types	  of	   cargo,	   so	   that	   the	  new	  steam	  navy	  would	  not	   incur	  new	  expenses	   to	   the	  government.	   In	  an	  1866	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne,	  Zuo	  blueprinted:	   	  	   ‘the	  steamships	  built	  could	  be	  used	  to	  transport	  grains,	  and	  be	  paid	  at	  the	  
same	  rate	  of	  [flat	  bottom	  junk	  cargo	  boat],	  when	  the	   [transportation	  of	  tribute	  grains]	  is	  accomplished,	  they	  can	  be	  hired	  as	  merchant	  ships,	  and	  
make	   profits	   [by	   serving	   at	  merchantmen].	   [The	   profits	  made	   can	   be]	  
used	  for	  maintaining	  and	  building	  [more	  ships].	  When	  alarm	  is	  raised	  in	  
coastal	   areas,	   [the	   ships	   should]	   be	   re-­‐assembled	   under	   military	  
command	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  place	  where	  the	  enemy	  is	  spotted’	   360	  	  This	  mind-­‐set	   had	   far-­‐reaching	   impacts	   on	   the	   ships	   built	   in	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.	  The	  yard	   intended	  to	  build	   two	  types	  of	  ships	  when	   it	  was	  established:	  a	  type	  of	  large	  vessel	  of	  1260-­‐ton	  displacement	  and	  150-­‐horsepower,	  and	  a	  type	  of	  small	   vessel	   of	   500-­‐ton	   displacement	   and	   80-­‐horsepower.	   In	   the	   contract	   that	  Zuo	   signed	  with	   Frenchmen	  Prosper	  Giquel,	   head	   advisor	   of	   the	  navy	   yard,	   he	  explicitly	   provided	   that	   the	   large	   vessels	   built	   in	   Fuzhou	   should	   have	   a	   cargo	  capacity	  of	  10,000	  shi	  of	  rice.361	   	  	   Nevertheless,	  maintaining	  a	  steam	  navy	  was	  still	  too	  heavy	  a	  burden	  for	  the	  Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   to	   shoulder.	   As	   more	   and	   more	   ships	   were	   launched,	   the	  maintenance	  expenses	  skyrocketed	  and	  the	  Navy	  Yard	  was	  forced	  to	  dip	  into	  the	  funds	  that	  it	  had	  previously	  accumulated.	  In	  1871,	  two	  years	  after	  the	  navy	  yard	  launched	  its	  first	  ship	  –	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	  (the	  name	  means	  ‘Qing	  forever’,	  see	  Photo	   5.1),	   it	   sent	   a	   report	   to	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   complaining	   of	   the	   high	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  360	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  5,	  p.	  7.	  361	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  5,	  p.	  37.	  1	  shi	  =	  60.453	  kilograms	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maintenance	  costs.	  The	  report	  pointed	  out:	   	   	  	   ‘the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   large	   ship	   costs	   around	   2,100	   taels	   per	   month,	  
while	  that	  of	  the	  small	  ones	  costs	  around	  1,500	  taels	  per	  month.	  Now	  that	  [the	  Navy	  Yard]	  had	  built	  three	  large	  ships	  and	  two	  small	  ones,	  they	  cost	  
around	   9,000	   taels	  monthly	   to	   upkeep	  …	   [the	   financial	   balance	   of]	   the	  
Navy	  Yard	   is	   already	   in	  deficit,	   and	   the	   expenses	   [on	  maintenance]	  will	  
continue	  to	  grow	  exponentially	  as	  more	  ships	  are	  to	  be	  built	  in	  the	  future.’	  362	   	  	  The	   economic	   hardship	  was	   only	   getting	  worse.	   Financial	   records	   of	   the	   navy	  yard	  show	  that	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1867	  and	  1874,	  ship	  maintenance	  took	  up	  3.6	  per	   cent	   of	   its	   total	   expenditure,	  whereas	   in	   the	  period	  between	  1878	   and	  1880,	   the	   money	   spent	   on	   maintaining	   the	   ships	   increased	   to	   39.4	   per	   cent.	  Maintenance	   expenses	   became	   the	   largest	   item	   of	   expenditure	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  in	  the	  late	  1870s.363	  	   In	  response	  to	  the	  navy	  yard’s	  memorial,	   the	  Imperial	  Court	  suggested	  that	  the	  ships	  could	  be	   loaned	  out	   to	   the	  various	  coastal	  provinces.	   It	  was	  expected	  that	   by	   adopting	   this	   policy,	   the	   coastal	   provinces	   could	   save	   the	   expenses	   of	  hiring	  or	  buying	  steamships	  from	  abroad.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  policy	  should	  also	  lighten	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard’s	   burden	   of	   maintaining	   the	   ships	   and	   training	  sailors. 364 	   The	   coastal	   provinces	   were	   in	   doubt	   about	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  Fuzhou-­‐built	   ships.	   Yet	   they	   cooperated	   and	   adopted	   some	   of	   the	   ships	   to	   use	  them	   for	   transportation	   in	   coastal	   waters	   and	   low	   intensity	   constabulary	  missions	  such	  as	  anti-­‐piracy	  and	  anti-­‐smuggling.	  But	  this	  policy	  only	  temporarily	  mitigated	  the	  ‘symptom’	  of	  the	  financial	  difficulties	  that	  confronted	  the	  navy	  yard.	  The	  fundamental	  cause	  of	  the	  problem	  remained	  unaddressed:	  China’s	  economy	  lacked	   the	   element	   of	   maritime	   commerce;	   a	   self-­‐sufficient	   agrarian	   economy	  could	  hardly	  support	  a	  steam	  navy.	   	  This	   policy	   also	   had	   a	   severe	   side	   effect:	   the	   military	   value	   of	   the	  Fuzhou-­‐built	   ships	   was	   further	   lowered.	   The	   rapid	   development	   of	   naval	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  362	   HFD	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  p.	  306.	  363	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  p.	  622.	  364	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  307-­‐312.	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technology	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  transformed	  maritime	  designs,	  with	  military	  and	  merchant	  vessels	  became	   increasingly	  different.	  As	   the	  commonalities	  between	  the	   two	   types	  of	   vessels	  decreased,	   it	   became	  more	  and	  more	  difficult	   to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  military	  and	  merchant	  users	  with	   the	  same	  hull.	  Warships	  usually	  preferred	   small	   silhouette,	   thick	   armour,	   robust	   engines	   and	   heavy	   guns,	  features	   that	   had	   no	   practical	   value	   for	   merchantmen.	   Reconciling	   the	  requirements	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  vessels	  became	  increasingly	  challenging	  and	  a	  balanced	   trade-­‐off	  of	   features	  was	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	  achieve.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  originally	  intended	  to	  build	  warships	  that	  could	  temporarily	  be	  used	  as	   cargo	  ships	   (after	  all	   they	  were	  still	  warships);	  but	   the	  provincial	  users	  had	  very	   low	   requirement	   on	   military	   performance,	   they	   wanted	   lightly	   armed	  merchantmen.	   As	   the	   ship	   loaning	   policy	   changed	   the	   rule	   of	   the	   game	   into	   a	  ‘buyers’	   market’,	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   provincial	   users	   prevailed.	  Consequently,	   military	   performance	   took	   a	   backseat	   to	   cargo	   capabilities.	   The	  Fuzhou-­‐built	  ships	  drifted	  off	   from	  their	  original	  course	  of	  military	  vessels	  and	  became	  essentially	  armed	  merchantmen.	   	  Since	  the	  dominant	  requirement	  for	  provincial	  users	  was	  cargo	  capabilities	  rather	  than	  military	  value,	  ships	  of	  high	  fighting	  capabilities	  were	  less	  welcomed,	  as	   they	  were	  usually	   expensive	   to	  maintain	   and	   less	   appropriate	   for	  merchant	  use.	   For	   example,	   the	   cruiser	   Yang	   Wu	   was	   the	   ship	   that	   featured	   the	   most	  advanced	   military	   performance	   of	   all	   the	   Fuzhou-­‐built	   ships	   launched	   in	   the	  1860s	  and	  the	  1870s	  (see	  Photo	  5.2).365	   But	  it	  was	  not	  welcomed	  by	  provincial	  users	   and	   remained	   idle	   in	   the	   Navy	   Yard	   for	   nearly	   three	   years	   until	   it	   was	  commissioned	  as	  a	   training	  vessel	  of	   the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	   in	  1875.	  New	  technology	   did	   not	   introduce	   new	   missions	   to	   the	   ships.	   Lightly	   armed	   and	  big-­‐hulled	   ships	  were	  more	   popular	   among	   provincial	   users	   because	   they	   had	  better	   cargo	   capacities,	   yet	   their	   light	   firepower	   was	   sufficient	   for	   anti-­‐piracy	  and	   anti-­‐smuggling	   duties.	   In	   order	   to	   make	   the	   ships	   more	   popular	   among	  provincial	   users,	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   further	   increased	   the	   ships’	   cargo	  capabilities	  at	  the	  expenses	  of	  their	  military	  performance	  (see	  table	  5.1).	   	  ‘Dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   became	   the	  major	   product	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard.	  Essentially,	   they	  were	  armed	  merchantmen	  rather	  than	  men-­‐of-­‐war.	  For	  nearly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  365	   Yang	  Wu	  was	  a	  copy	  of	  French	  unprotected	  cruiser	  Résolue.	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two	  decades	  between	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  war,	  seventeen	  out	  of	  the	  nineteen	  ships	  that	  had	  a	  larger	  than	  one	   thousand	   tons	   displacement	   built	   by	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   were	   such	  ‘dual-­‐use	   ships’.	   The	   seventeen	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   were	   of	   two	   classes:	   the	  
Wan	  Nian	  Qing	   class	   and	   the	  Wei	   Yuan	   class.	   Twelve	   of	   the	   former	  were	   built	  between	  1868	  and	  1876,	  and	  five	  of	  the	  latter	  were	  launched	  between	  1877	  and	  1884.	   The	   Wan	   Nian	   Qing	   class	   ‘dual-­‐use	   ships’	   featured	   wooden	   keel,	  unarmoured	  hull,	  and	  were	  usually	  armed	  with	  five	  to	  seven	  guns	  (see	  Table	  5.1).	  The	  Wei	  Yuan	  class	  had	  iron	  ribs	  and	  wooden	  hull,	  and	  was	  usually	  armed	  with	  six	  to	  seven	  guns	  and	  a	  number	  of	  smaller	  weapons.	   	   	  As	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  military	  vessels	  and	  merchant	  ships,	  the	  military	  value	  of	   these	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   was	   severely	   compromised.	   Many	   Fuzhou-­‐built	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  had	  their	  cargo	  space	  enlarged	  and	  boilers	  vertically	  placed	  to	   increase	   their	   cargo	   space,	   but	   such	   characteristics	   severely	   lowered	  survivability	  of	  these	  ships	  in	  war.366	   The	  enlarged	  hull	  would	  make	  the	  ship	  an	  easier	   target,	   while	   military	   vessels	   usually	   did	   not	   prefer	   vertical	   boilers	  because	   the	  part	   higher	   than	   the	  draft	   line	  would	   lose	   the	  protection	   of	  water	  body.	  A	  contemporary	  critique	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  were	  in	  fact	  ‘not	  competent	  in	  either	  regards’.367	   Among	  the	  twelve	  ships	  of	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  
Qing	  class,	   five	  ships	  Fei	  Yun,	  Ji	  An,	  Yong	  Bao,	  Fu	  Bo	  and	  Chen	  Hang	  took	  part	  in	  the	  1884	  Battle	   of	   Fuzhou.	  Apart	   from	   the	  1560-­‐ton	  wooden	   cruiser	  Yang	  Wu,	  they	   were	   the	   largest	   ships	   on	   Chinese	   side.	   The	   inadequacy	   of	   these	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  as	  military	  vessels	  was	  clearly	  reflected	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  French	  fleet	  sunk	  most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  ships	  within	  an	  hour	  when	  the	  exchange	  of	  fire	  started.368	   	  Spurred	  by	   the	  catastrophic	  defeat	   in	   the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou,	  Pei	  Yinsen	   (the	  eighth	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	  in	  office	  1884	  -­‐	  1890)	  announced	  that	  the	  navy	  yard	  would	  stop	  building	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  and	  shift	  its	  focus	  to	  the	  building	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  366	   	   Qingyuan	  Lin,	  福建船政局史稿	   Fujian	  Chuanzheng	  Ju	  Shigao	  [A	  Draft	  History	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard],	  (Fuzhou:	  Fujian	  People's	  Press,	  1999),	  pp.	  488-­‐500,	  501-­‐505.	  367	   CZZYHB,	  Vol.	  30,	  p.	  5.	  368	   Other	  materials	  claimed	  that	  most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  ships	  were	  sunk	  by	  the	  French	  within	  fifteen	  minutes.	  Benjamin	  A.	  Elman,	  ‘Naval	  Warfare	  and	  the	  Refraction	  of	  China’s	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Reforms	  into	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Failure,	  1865-­‐1895’.	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	  38,	  No.	  2	  (2004),	  p.	  316.	  The	  French	  had	  seven	  major	  warships	  on	   their	   side:	  Volta,	   Châteaurenualt,	   La	  Galissonniere,	   Triomphante,	  Duguay-­‐Trouin,	  
Villars,	  and	  d'Estaing.	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of	  proper	  men-­‐of-­‐war.	  A	  number	  of	  pure	  warships	  were	  built	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   1880s,	   such	   as	   the	   1300-­‐ton	   torpedo	   cruiser	   Guang	   Jia,	   the	   1000-­‐ton	  torpedo	   cruisers	   Guang	   Yi	   and	   Guang	   Bing,	   and	   the	   2200-­‐ton	   coastal	   defence	  gunboat	   Ping	   Yuan.	   Yet	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   revived	   in	   the	   early	  1890s.	  Both	  the	  ninth	  and	  the	  tenth	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioners	  proposed	  to	  build	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’.369	   For	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons,	   their	   proposals	  were	   not	   put	  into	  practice.	  The	   idea	   of	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   haunted	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard.	   The	   yard	  built	  a	  total	  number	  of	  thirty-­‐three	  ships	  between	  1868	  and	  1894,	  which	  made	  it	  the	   largest	   shipbuilding	   centre	   in	   the	   country	   (the	   second	   largest	   shipbuilding	  centre,	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   launched	   only	   eight).	   Financial	   survival	   was	   the	  paramount	  concern	  for	  a	  shipbuilding	  centre	  as	  large	  as	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.	  The	  yard	  had	  to	  fit	  the	  ships	  into	  the	  economic	  reality	  of	  the	  country	  in	  order	  to	  be	   able	   to	   sustain	   itself.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  maritime	   economy,	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	   were	   the	   best	   and	   probably	   the	   only	   solution,	   even	   though	   it	   seriously	  compromised	   the	   military	   value	   of	   the	   ships.	   The	   building	   of	   such	   ships	  consumed	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  financial	  resources	  that	  were	  originally	  earmarked	  for	   building	   warships	   and	   fostering	   naval	   modernisation.	   It	   also	   wasted	   time,	  which	  was	  exceptionally	  precious	  for	  the	  infant	  Chinese	  shipbuilding	  industry.	  In	  an	   age	   characterised	   by	   rapid	   advancement	   of	   naval	   technology,	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  was	  bogged	  down	   to	   ships	   of	   very	   limited	  military	   value	   for	   nearly	  fifteen	   years.	   Consequently,	   catching	   up	   with	   the	   West	   became	   increasingly	  impossible	  for	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	   Zuoxing	   Zhang	   ed.,	  船政文化研究——船政奏议汇编点校辑	   Chuanzheng	   Wenhua	   Yanjiu:	   Chuanzheng	  
Zouyi	   Huibian	   Dianjiaoji	   [Researches	   on	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard’s	   Achievements:	   Comments	   and	   Corrections	  
regarding	   A	   Collection	   of	  Memorials	   concerning	  Navy	   Yards],	   (Fuzhou:	  Haichao	   Sheying	   Yishu	   Chubanshe,	  2006),	  p.	  426,	  436.	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Name Launched Modifications 
Wan Nian Qing 万年清 1869.6 
· Arguably an enlarged version of the French 
second-class propeller aviso La Motte-Picquet, 
· Armed with six naval guns of various types 
Fu Bo 伏波 1870.12 
· Modified version of the Wan Nian Qing; later 
ships were based on the Fu Bo 
·Reduced draft and reduced length-beam ratio, and 
enhanced load-carrying ability  
· Armed with seven naval guns of various types 
An Lan 安澜 1871.6 
·Dimensions identical to Fu Bo 
·Armed with five naval guns of various types 
Fei Yun 飞云 1872.6 ·Further reduced length-beam ratio 
·Armed with seven naval guns of various types Ji An 济安 1873.1 
Yong Bao 永保 1873.8 
·Dimensions identical to Fei Yun and Ji An 
·Built with further increased cargo space 
·Carried little to no weapon when launched 
Hai Jing 海镜 1873.11 
Chen Hang 琛航 1874 
Da Ya 大雅 1874.5 
Yuan Kai 元凯 1875.6 
·Dimensions identical to the Fei Yun and Ji An 
·Armed with only one main gun and eight auxiliary 
guns when commissioned into service  
Deng Ying Zhou 登瀛洲 1876.6 
·Further reduced length-beam ratio  
·Armed with seven naval guns of various types 
Tai An 泰安 1876.11 
·Dimensions identical to the Deng Ying Zhou 
·Armed with seven naval guns of various types Table	  5.1	  A	  list	  of	  the	  twelve	  ships	  of	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	  class.370	   It	  can	  be	  distilled	  from	  the	  table	  that	   the	  ships’	  military	  value	  was	   increasingly	   lowered.	  Later	   ships	  of	   the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	   class	  were	  armed	  merchantmen	  rather	  than	  warships.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  370	   Lin,	  A	   Draft	   History	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard,	   pp.	   488-­‐495.	   Zhang,	  Researches	   on	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard’s	  
Achievements,	  passim.	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The	  Ocean-­‐Going	  Warships	   	  
	  In	   spite	   of	   the	   compromised	   military	   value,	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard’s	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	  were	  welcomed	  by	  provincial	  users	  as	   they	   suited	  China’s	  economic	   reality.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   ocean-­‐going	   warships	   built	   by	   the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal	   featured	   much	   stronger	   fighting	   capabilities,	   but	   such	   ships	   were	  incompatible	  with	  the	  nation’s	  economic	  reality.	  The	  Hai	  An	  class,	  which	  we	  will	  discuss	   in	   this	   section,	   was	   an	   example	   of	   the	   latter	   (see	   Photo	   5.3).	   Navalist	  Self-­‐Strengtheners	   like	   Ding	   Richang	   believed	   that	   China’s	   maritime	   defence	  force	  should	  have,	  to	  use	  his	  words,	  ‘large	  military	  ships’	  as	  its	  backbone.	  It	  was	  a	  commonplace	   among	   advocates	   of	   sea-­‐going	   warships	   that	   they	   had	   spent	  considerable	   amount	   of	   time	   in	   the	   coastal	   provinces	   where	   they	   had	   the	  opportunity	   to	   learn	   first-­‐hand	   about	   Western	   men-­‐of-­‐war.	   Their	   view	   of	  maritime	  defence	  was	  largely	  shaped	  by	  their	  direct	  contacts	  with	  such	  ships.	  Yet	  it	   seems	   that	   their	  understanding	  of	  Western	  military	   superiority	   focused	  only	  on	   its	   ships	   and	   guns.	  A	   brief	   review	  of	   their	  writings	   on	  naval	  modernisation	  reveals	   that	  words	   like	   ‘heavy	   guns’	   and	   ‘large	  warships’	   appeared	   frequently,	  but	  there	  was	  little	  talk	  about	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  basis	  that	  buttressed	  Western	  naval	  strength.	  It	  would	  seem	  logical	  to	  infer	  from	  this	  that	  they	  had	  overlooked	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  two.	   	  Ding	  Richang	  was	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  advocates	  of	  sea-­‐going	  warships	  with	  experience	   in	   coastal	   provinces	   (not	   to	   be	   confused	   with	   Ding	   Ruchang,	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet).371	   After	   being	   discharged	   from	   the	  position	   of	   county	   magistrate	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Taiping	   War	   in	   1861,	   he	   turned	   his	  focus	   to	   building	  Western-­‐style	  weapons	   (mostly	   field	   guns	   and	   ammunitions)	  and	  became	  one	  of	  the	  most	  outstanding	  makers	  of	  Western-­‐style	  arms	  in	  China	  of	   the	   time.	   In	   1865,	   he	  was	   appointed	   as	   the	   superintendent	   of	   the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal,	   the	   most	   important	   firearm	   industrial	   plant	   and	   the	   second	   largest	  shipbuilding	  centre	  of	  the	  country.	  His	  new	  position	  enabled	  him	  to	  expand	  his	  repertoire	  to	  the	  building	  of	  warships.	  As	  to	  how	  to	  strengthen	  China’s	  maritime	  defence,	   he	   argued	   that	   Western	   military	   superiority	   came	   from	   their	   ‘sturdy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  371	   Edwin	  Pak-­‐wah	  Leung,	  ed.,	  Political	  Leaders	  of	  Modern	  China:	  A	  Biographical	  Dictionary,	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2002),	  pp.	  32-­‐33.	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ships	   and	   sharp	   guns’.372	   He	   claimed	   that	   China	   could	   only	   offset	   Western	  military	  superiority	  if	  it	  was	  equipped	  with	  the	  same	  equipment.	  Champions	   of	   ocean-­‐going	  warships	   like	  Ding	   denounced	   the	   Fuzhou-­‐built	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  as	  militarily	  unworthy.	  He	  criticised	  that	  '[they]	  can	  be	  used	  
for	  transportation,	  but	  are	  not	  suitable	  for	  offensive	  missions.	  [They]	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
suppress	   smugglers	   and	   pirates,	   but	   were	   not	   capable	   for	   repelling	   foreign	  
aggressors.' 373 	   Instead,	   they	   called	   for	   more	   fighting-­‐capable	   ships.	   In	   a	  memorial	   to	   the	   Throne,	   Ding	   suggested	   that	   only	   large	   warships	   could	  safeguard	  China	  against	  foreign	  aggression.	  He	  explained:	   	  	   ‘[a	  sea-­‐going	  navy]	  should	  have	  steam	  vessels	  as	   its	  primary	  weapon,	   in	  
particular	   large,	  military	  ones.	  …	  [if	  we	  have	  such	  ships]	  all	  other	  ships	  
could	  be	   removed	   from	  service.	  …	   [as	   far	  as	  war	  at	   sea	   is	   concerned]	   a	  
hundred	  [small	   junk	  boats]	  are	  no	  equal	  to	  one	  single	   large	  warship.	  …’	  374	   	  
	  Ding’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  large	  warships	  directly	  contributed	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  Hai	  An	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  Yu	  Yuan.	  The	  former	  was	  launched	  in	  May	  1872	  and	  the	  latter	  in	  December	  1873.	  The	  Hai	  An	  class	  was	  76m	  in	  length,	  13.6m	  in	  width,	  and	  had	  a	  draft	  of	  5.9m.	  It	  had	  a	  displacement	  over	  2600-­‐tonnes,	  a	  cruise	  speed	  of	  10.4kts,	  and	  an	  armament	  of	  twenty-­‐four	  guns	  mounted	  broadside	  and	  a	  complement	  of	  three	   hundred	   and	   sixty	  men.375	   It	  was,	   by	   far,	   the	  mightiest	  warship	   Chinese	  navy	  yards	  had	  built.	  To	  navalists	  like	  Ding,	  the	  Hai	  An	  and	  Yu	  Yuan	  were	  a	  great	  achievement.	  Ding’s	  political	  ally	  Li	  Hongzhang,	  who	  later	  became	  patron	  of	  the	  Beiyang	   Fleet,	   extolled	   that	   the	   Hai	   An	   class	  was	   the	   best	   ship	   China	   had	   ever	  built.376	   The	  size	  of	  the	  ship	  remained	  unrivalled	  for	  nearly	  sixty	  years	  until	  the	  cruiser	  Ping	  Hai	  was	  launched	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  in	  the	  Republican	  era.	  However,	   the	  Hai	  An	   class	  was	  extremely	  expensive	   to	  build	  and	  maintain.	  The	  building	  of	  the	  Hai	  An	  cost	  355,189	  taels,	  while	  the	  building	  costs	  of	  Yu	  Yuan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  372‘坚船利炮’	  373	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  393.	  374	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  98,	  p.	  24.	  375	   For	  more	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   Hai	   An	   class	   see	   Chinese	   newspaper	   Shun	   Pao,	   29th,	   the	   5th	  month,	  Tongzhi	  11th	  year;	  and	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  34.	  376	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  4,	  p.	  29.	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were	   slightly	   lower	   at	   318,716	   taels.377	   This	   was	   a	   heavy	   financial	   burden	   to	  bear	  for	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal.	  B.	  Fan’s	  research	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  same	  period	  of	  time,	   the	   average	   amount	   of	   allocation	   that	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   received	   was	  around	  437,000	  taels	  annually.378	   This	  means	  the	  building	  of	  a	  Hai	  An	  class	  ship	  took	   up	   roughly	   seventy	   to	   eighty	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   arsenal’s	   annual	   allocation.	  Moreover,	  the	  three	  hundred	  and	  sixty	  crews	  of	  Hai	  An	  cost	  5,700	  taels	  monthly	  to	  upkeep.379	   This	  was	  an	  amount	  nearly	  three	  times	  higher	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  aforementioned	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’.	   In	  contrast,	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	   required	  only	  2,126	  tales	  monthly	  to	  maintain.380	   Not	  to	  mention	  that	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  like	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	   could	   further	   reduce	   their	  maintenance	   cost	   by	   running	   as	  cargo	   ships.	  The	  Hai	  An	   class,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   could	  not	  navigate	   freely	   in	   the	  littoral	   waters	   and	   in	   the	   Yangtze	   River	   due	   to	   its	   deep	   draft,	   which	   further	  restricted	  its	  use	  in	  peacetime.	   	  The	  accelerated	  development	  of	  naval	   technology	   in	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	  19th	   century	   quickly	   rendered	   many	   warships	   obsolete.381	   This	   meant	   that	   if	  navalist	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   like	   Ding	   wanted	   to	   maintain	   a	   naval	   strength	  comparable	   to	   that	   of	   foreign	  naval	   powers,	   they	  would	   have	   to	   keep	  building	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  ships.	  But	  China’s	  financial	  predicament	  did	  not	  allow	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  Hai	  An	  was	  commissioned	  into	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  the	  Yu	  Yuan,	  launched	  second,	   was	   sealed	   up	   in	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal’s	   dockyard	   due	   primarily	   to	   a	  shortage	  of	  funds.	  Yu	  Yuan	  was	  only	  commissioned	  into	  service	  when	  Hai	  An	  was	  taken	  out	  of	   service	   in	  1878.	  The	  Yu	  Yuan	  participated	   in	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	   was	   sunk	   in	   the	   Battle	   of	   Shipu.	   The	   single-­‐minded	   pursuit	   of	   firepower	  pushed	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  towards	  the	  verge	  of	  bankruptcy.	  The	  shipbuilding	  activities	   in	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  were	  virtually	  stopped	  after	  the	   launch	  of	   the	  
Yu	  Yuan.	  The	  arsenal	  turned	  its	  focus	  to	  manufacturing	  field	  guns,	  naval	  guns	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  4,	  p.	  40.	  378	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1344.	  379	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  4,	  p.	  40.	  380	   HFD,	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.	  423-­‐429.	  381	   It	  is	  highly	  possible	  that	  the	  Hai	  An	  class	  was	  a	  copy	  of	  French	  frigate	  Armorique.	  Yue	  Chen,	  近代国造舰
船志	   Jindai	  Guozao	  Jianchuan	  Zhi	  [A	  History	  of	  the	  Domestically	  Built	  Steam	  Warships	   in	  Late	  Qing],	   (Jinan:	  Shandong	   Huabao	   Press,	   2011),	   p.	   305.	   The	   Armorique	   was	   a	   warship	   built	   in	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century	  transition	   period	   from	   the	   age	   of	   sail	   to	   the	   age	   of	   steam.	   This	  meant	   that	   the	  Hai	   An	   class	   had	   already	  become	   obsolete	  when	   it	  was	   launched	   in	   the	   early	   1870s,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   its	   construction	   had	   almost	  bankrupted	  the	  Arsenal.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  relatively	  higher	  military	  value,	  the	  Hai	  An	  class	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  heavy	  burden	  in	  terms	  of	  finance	  and	  an	  obsolete	  ship	  in	  terms	  of	  performance.	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ammunitions,	   only	   resuming	   shipbuilding	   sporadically	   thereafter	   (200-­‐ton	  gunboat	  Jin	  Ou	  in	  mid-­‐1870s	  and	  1480-­‐ton	  cruiser	  Bao	  Min	  in	  mid-­‐1880s).	   	  	  	  
The	  Littoral/Riverine	  Gunboats	  	  A	   third	   school	   of	   naval	   thinking	   can	   be	   called	   the	   school	   of	   littoral/riverine	  gunboats.	  The	  proposal	  for	  building	  such	  ships	  came	  from	  Peng	  Yulin.	  Peng	  was	  a	  Xiang	  Army	  water	  force	  veteran	  and	  was	  appointed	  as	  commander	  of	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  water	   force	   after	   the	   anti-­‐Taiping	   War.	   His	   proposal	   was	   based	   on	   two	  main	  arguments.	  First,	  comparing	  with	  the	  promoters	  of	  the	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  and	  ocean-­‐going	  warships,	   Peng,	   an	   anti-­‐Taiping	  War	   veteran,	   had	  much	  more	  battlefield	   experience	   (though	   the	   actions	   he	   saw	  were	  mostly	   fights	   between	  war	   junks	   in	   rivers).	   He	   argued	   that	   China	   should	   not	   pursue	   oceangoing	  capabilities	  or	  contest	  for	  naval	  supremacy	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  Instead,	  he	  argued	  that	  China’s	  maritime	  defence	  strategy	   should	   stick	   to	   coastal	  defence.	   Second,	  Peng	  suggested,	  albeit	  implicitly,	  that	  a	  navy	  of	  littoral/riverine	  gunboats	  can	  be	  manned	  by	  sailors	  of	   the	   traditional	  water	   forces.	   In	   this	  way	  men	  of	   the	  water	  
forces	  would	  not	  be	  excluded	  from	  naval	  modernisation.	   	  	   In	   the	   proposal	   of	   littoral/riverine	   gunboats	   that	   Peng	   presented	   to	   the	  Imperial	   Court,	   he	   argued	   that	   a	   flotilla	   of	   small-­‐sized	   shallow	  water	   gunboats	  would	   be	   ideal	   to	   defend	   China’s	   coasts,	   because	   such	   ships	  would	   be	   able	   to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  the	  estuary	  and	  coastal	  terrains	  to	  prevent	  enemy	  advancement.	  His	  proposal	  suggested:	   	  
	  ‘[With	   respected	   to	   the	   suggested	   riverine	  gunboats,]	  at	   least	   ten	   such	  
ships	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  form	  a	  squadron.	  Each	  one	  would	  cost	  seventy	  to	  
eighty	   thousand	   taels	   …	   One	   million	   taels	   would	   therefore	   be	   amply	  
sufficient.	   Such	   ships	   should	   be	   characterised	   by	   two	   [main]	   guns	  
mounted	  on	  the	  bow	  and	  stern,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  auxiliary	  guns	  mounted	  
broadside.	   Such	   ships	   should	   be	   commanded	   by	   experienced	   officers	  
selected	   from	   the	   Yangtze	   water	   force	   and	   these	   officers	   should	   be	  
assisted	  by	  [naval	  college]	  students	  who	  have	  a	  good	  command	  of	  foreign	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languages	   and	   mathematics.	   Fishermen	   from	   coastal	   islands	   could	   be	  
recruited	  as	  pilots,	  [therefore	  we	  could]	  get	  people	  who	  are	  familiar	  with	  
the	  coastal	  waters	  …	  [and]	  could	  prevent	  these	  fishermen	  from	  being	  used	  
by	  our	  enemies	  …	  Such	  ships	  should	  not	  contest	  the	  enemies	  on	  the	  high	  
seas.	  In	  peacetime	  they	  should	  be	  patrolling	  the	  seas	  and	  in	  times	  of	  war	  
they	  should	  be	  used	  to	  defend	  the	  estuary	  areas.	  If	  the	  enemy	  vessels	  dare	  
to	  crash	  through,	  [the	  gunboats]	  should	  surround	  and	  attack	  them	  from	  
the	  four	  directions,	  chasing	  and	  battering	  them,	  or	  lure	  them	  into	  shallow	  
waters	  where	  they	  would	  be	  [as	  cumbersome	  as	  being]	  bogged	  down	  in	  
muddy	  swamps	  whereas	  we	  could	  navigate	  freely.’	   382	  
	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  soon	  authorised	  this	  proposal.	  But	  Peng	  was	  confronted	  with	  a	   major	   challenge:	   unlike	   the	   promoters	   of	   the	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   and	  ocean-­‐going	   warships	   who	   had	   the	   wherewithal	   and	   industrial	   capabilities	   to	  bring	   their	   ideas	   into	   reality,	   Peng,	   a	  military	   commander,	   had	   neither	  money	  nor	  shipyard	  to	  build	  the	  envisioned	  ships.	  He	  had	  to	  seek	  help	  from	  provincial	  authorities.	   	  	   But	  provincialism	  prevented	  Peng	  from	  getting	  the	  funds	  he	  needed	  to	  build	  the	  gunboats,	   as	   there	  was	  a	   lack	  of	   inter-­‐provincial	   coordination	  and	   finances	  were	   organised	   provincially.	   Ten	  months	   after	   the	   first	   proposal,	   the	   Imperial	  Court	  received	  another	  memorial	  from	  Peng,	  in	  which	  he	  petitioned	  the	  emperor	  for	  ordering	  the	  Nanyang	  Superintendent	  to	  raise	  money	  and	  build	  the	  gunboats	  that	  he	  suggested.383	   Feeling	  no	  obligation	  to	  support	  the	  plan,	  the	  then	  Nanyang	  Superintendent	  Liu	  Kunyi	  passed	  the	  buck	  to	  other	  provinces.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  money	  should	  be	  raised	  together	  by	  the	  various	  provinces	  in	  the	  upper	  reaches	  of	   the	  Yangtze	  River,	   namely	  Anhui,	   Jiangxi,	  Hunan	  and	  Hubei.384	   According	   to	  Liu,	  all	   these	  provinces	  would	  benefit	   from	  a	  strengthened	  maritime	  defence	  of	  the	  Yangtze	  estuary.	  Unsurprisingly,	  Liu’s	  appeal	   fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  Peng	  waited	  another	  two	  years	  until	  1882	  when	  his	  old	  comrade-­‐in-­‐arms	  Zuo	  Zongtang	  took	  over	  the	  office	  of	  Nanyang	  Superintendent.	  Zuo	  held	  a	  more	  supportive	  attitude	  towards	  Peng’s	  plan,	  but	  he	  only	  managed	  to	  raise	  funds	  enough	  for	  one	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  382	   PYLJ,	  p.254-­‐255.	  383	   PYLJ,	  p.	  270.	  384	   LZCGYJ,	  p.2383.	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suggested	  ten	  gunboats	  of	  such	  kind.	   	  	   Provincialism,	   again,	   played	   a	   part	   in	   the	   building	   of	   the	   ship.	   Both	   the	  Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   and	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   bid	   for	   the	   contract	   of	   Peng’s	  littoral/riverine	   gunboats,	   and	   both	   came	   up	   with	   their	   own	   designs.	   The	  detailed	  blueprint	  presented	  by	  the	  two	  shipbuilding	  plants	  cannot	  be	  recovered	  today	   as	   they	   went	   missing.	   But	   it	   can	   be	   inferred	   from	   the	   official	  correspondence	   and	   related	   newspaper	   coverage	   at	   the	   time	   that	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard,	   the	  most	   experienced	   Chinese	   shipbuilding	   centre	   came	   up	  with	   a	  design	  that	  featured	  a	  length	  of	  fifteen	  zhang	  (approximately	  fifty	  metres),	  which	  was	  more	  consistent	  with	  Peng’s	  original	  idea.385	   The	  blueprint	  presented	  by	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal,	  according	  to	  R.	  Wright,	  was	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Rendel	  ram	  cruisers	  
Chaoyong	   and	   Yangwei	   that	   China	   had	   bought	   from	   England	   couple	   of	   years	  ago.386	   But	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal’s	   design	   was	   much	   larger	   in	   size	   and	   more	  expensive	   in	   costs	   (a	   hundred	   thousand	   taels	   dearer	   than	   suggested).387	   Also,	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  had	  not	  been	  building	  any	  major	  ships	  after	  the	  Hai	  An	  class	  in	  early	  1870s	  (the	  only	  ship	  built	  in	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  after	  the	  Hai	  An	  class	  was	  the	  200-­‐ton	  gunboat	  Jin	  Ou).	  	   We	  can	  get	  a	  sense	  from	  the	  comparison	  that	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  would	  have	   been	   more	   capable	   of	   building	   Peng’s	   gunboat,	   but	   it	   was	   the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  that	  eventually	  won	  the	  bidding.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  provincialism	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  this	  case.	  Zuo	  Zongtang	  raised	  the	  money	  for	  Peng’s	  littoral/riverine	  gunboat	  project;	  therefore	  he	  had	  the	  final	  word	  on	  who	  was	  to	  win	  the	  bidding.	  Despite	  that	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  was	  founded	  by	  Zuo	  himself	  in	  1866,	  he	  felt	  no	  obligation	  to	  help	  the	  apparently	  more	  capable	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  to	  win	  the	  bidding.	   Because	   at	   that	   time	   (early	   1880s)	   he	   was	   governor-­‐general	   of	  Liangjiang	   and	   Nanyang	   Superintendent,	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   was	   now	   ‘his’	  business,	   and	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   was	   now	   an	   undertaking	   of	   another	  province,	  which	  he	  was	   supposed	   to	   compete	  with.	   Zuo,	   the	   sponsor	   of	   Peng’s	  gunboat	  project,	   favoured	   the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  as	   it	   represented	  his	  provincial	  interests.	  Peng	  had	  little	  say	  in	  this	  matter	  and	  yielded	  to	  Zuo’s	  arrangement.	   	  The	  gunboat	  was	  eventually	  launched	  in	  1885	  and	  was	  named	  Bao	  Min	  (see	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  385	   CZZYHB,	  Vol.	  7,	  p.	  110.	  386	   Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  pp.	  57-­‐58.	  387	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.8,	  pp.	  165-­‐166.	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Photo	  5.4),	  but	  it	  was	  not	  in	  conformity	  with	  Peng’s	  original	  proposal.	  The	  ship	  was	   built	   at	   an	   eventual	   cost	   of	   223,000	   taels,	   three	   times	   higher	   than	   Peng’s	  estimation.	  It	  was	  also	  severely	  over-­‐sized	  with	  a	  displacement	  of	  1,480	  tons	  and	  dimensions	   of	   225ft	   in	   length,	   36ft	   in	   width	   and	   a	   draft	   of	   14ft.	   Its	   main	  armament	  was	   two	   5.9in	   Krupp	   BL	   guns	  mounted	   on	   bow	   and	   stern,	  with	   six	  4.7in	  Krupp	   guns	  mounted	   broadside	   completing	   its	   armament.	   The	   ship	   bore	  many	   features	   of	   a	   cruiser	   rather	   than	   a	   small,	   nimble	   gunboat	   that	   fitted	   the	  requirements	  of	  operating	  around	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  mouth.388	   The	  fact	  that	  the	  
Bao	   Min	   was	   usually	   mentioned	   alongside	   with	   other	   cruisers	   of	   the	   Chinese	  steam	   navy	   suggested	   that	   it	   was	   indeed	   regarded	   as	   a	   cruiser	   rather	   than	   a	  littoral/riverine	  gunboat.	  Being	  unaware	  of	  the	  inside	  story	  of	  Bao	  Min,	  R.	  Wright	  claimed	   that	  Bao	  Min	   was	   an	   unsuccessful	   attempt	   of	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   to	  reproduce	   the	   concept	   of	   Rendel	   ram	   cruisers	   Chao	   Yong	   and	   Yang	   Wei	   (see	  Photo	  5.8).389	   The	  Bao	  Min	  was	  indeed	  a	  failure.	  But	  it	  did	  not	  fail	  as	  a	  cruiser	  as	  R.	  Wright	  claimed.	  Rather,	   it	   failed	  as	  a	  gunboat	  that	   if	  successfully	  built	  would	  enable	  Peng’s	  strategy	  of	  coastal	  defence.	  The	  plan	  of	  building	  more	  of	  such	  ships	  was	  disrupted	  by	  the	  death	  of	  Zuo	  Zongtang	  in	  1885.	  Without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  provincial	  government,	   it	  was	  hard	  to	  continue	  the	  work.	  The	  Bao	  Min	  was	  the	  only	  ship	  built	  of	  its	  class.	   	  Moreover,	   Peng	   Yulin	   did	   not	   receive	   the	   Bao	   Min.	   Instead	   of	   being	  commissioned	  into	  Peng’s	  Yangtze	  River	  water	  force,	  the	  ship	  was	  commissioned	  into	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet	   (both	   the	   Nanyang	   Fleet	   and	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   fell	  within	   Zuo’s	   sphere	   of	   influence).	   Perhaps	   Zuo	   Zongtang	   did	   not	  want	   to	   help	  Peng	  to	  build	  the	  gunboat	  at	  all.	  He	  may	  have	  utilised	  Peng’s	  gunboat	  proposal	  as	  a	  pretext	   to	  build	  a	  new	  cruiser	   for	  his	  Nanyang	  Fleet.	  Whatever	   the	   truth,	   the	  incident	   reveals	   that	   shipbuilding	   was	   a	   local	   enterprise	   in	   the	   Qing	   imperial	  system.	   It	  was	   easier	   to	   get	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   to	   authorise	   proposals	   than	   to	  secure	  funds	  and	  to	  bring	  these	  ideas	  into	  reality.	  The	  money	  and	  the	  industrial	  plants	  were	   in	  the	  hands	  of	   local	  authorities.	   In	  the	  absence	  of	  effective	  central	  coordination,	   it	   was	   very	   hard	   for	   one	   maritime	   defence	   agency	   to	   persuade	  another	  to	  pool	  resources	  and	  make	  joint	  efforts.	  They	  had	  different	  perspectives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  388	   JNZZJJ,	  Vol.	  3,	  p.55.	  See	  also	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  68.	  389	   Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  58.	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towards	  maritime	  defence	  and	  they	  had	  local	  interests	  as	  their	  primary	  concern.	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   divergent	   opinion	   of	   the	   regional	   maritime	   defence	   agencies	  resulted	  in	  a	  severe	  lack	  of	  homogeneity	  among	  the	  home-­‐built	  ships.	   	  	  	  
5.2 	   The	  Decline	  of	  the	  Indigenous	  Shipbuilding	  Capabilities	   	   	  	  The	  Qing	  Empire	  had	  two	  major	  shipbuilding	  facilities:	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  and	  the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard.	   Shipbuilding	   activities	   in	   the	   former	   virtually	   stopped	  after	   the	   launch	  of	   the	  Hai	  An	   class	   in	   the	   early	  1870s.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  remained	  the	  only	  shipbuilding	  centre	  of	  China	  and	  the	  production	  in	  the	  plant	  continued	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  But	  a	  glance	  at	   the	   figure	   5.1	   shows	   that	   the	   production	   in	   Fuzhou	  became	   sluggish	   after	   a	  short	   spurt	  of	   growth	   in	   its	   early	  years.	  A	   total	  number	  of	   around	  16,000	   tons	  were	   built	   in	   the	   period	   from	  1868	   to	   1874,	   averaging	   around	   2,300	   tons	   per	  year.	  While	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1875	  and	  1894,	  only	  a	  total	  number	  of	  23,800	  tons	  were	   built,	   averaging	   as	   low	   as	   around	  1,200	   tons	   yearly	   (see	  Table	   5.1).	  Apart	   from	   low	   productivity,	   the	   ships	   built	   in	   Fuzhou	   also	   had	   a	   problem	   of	  technological	   obsolescence.	  The	   technological	   gap	  between	  Chinese	   indigenous	  shipbuilding	  and	  the	  world’s	  leading	  standard	  became	  increasingly	  widened.	  The	  Chinese	   steam	   navy	   reversed	   its	   course	   from	   primarily	   relying	   on	   indigenous	  shipbuilders	  in	  the	  1870s,	  to	  mostly	  relying	  on	  foreign	  shipbuilders	  in	  the	  1880s.	   	  In	  the	  1894	  Battle	  of	  Yalu,	  only	  three	  of	  the	  twelve	  Chinese	  warships	  presented	  in	  the	  battle	  were	  home-­‐built.	   	  The	   direct	   cause	   of	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Shipyard	   was	   financial	  difficulties.	  Chinese	  shipbuilding	  industries	  and	  that	  of	  the	  West	  were	  supported	  by	  different	  financial	  systems.	  Many	  Western	  navies	  were	  buttressed	  by	  modern	  financial	  infrastructures,	  which	  were	  usually	  composed	  of	  a	  budgetary	  system,	  a	  banking	  system,	  governmental	  bonds,	  etc.	  Such	  financial	  infrastructures	  ensured	  great	  flexibility	  and	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  efficiency	  in	  raising	  funds	  for	  their	  navies.	  The	  Chinese	  system,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  had	  no	  such	  financial	  infrastructure	  and	  its	  capabilities	   in	   funding	   the	  navy	  was	   low.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  operated	  on	  a	  fixed	   amount	   of	   funds	   secured	  mainly	   from	   the	   customs	   revenue.	   This	   income	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was	  hardly	  sufficient	  and	  was	  not	  stable.	  From	  time	  to	  time,	  funds	  earmarked	  for	  shipbuilding	   were	   diverted	   to	   address	   issues	   that	   were	   considered	   more	  important.	   The	   financial	   difficulties	   had	   considerably	   lowered	   the	   Navy	   Yard’s	  capability	  of	  pursuing	  further	  expansion	  and	  technological	  innovations,	  and	  even	  the	  routine	  production	  of	  ships	  was	  often	  adversely	  affected.	   	  	  	  
	  Figure	  5.1	  A	  graph	  showing	  biannual	  shipbuilding	  output	  by	  total	  tonnage	  and	  number	  of	  ships	  launched	  at	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  from	  1868	  to	  1894.390	   We	  can	  see	  that	  there	  was	   spurt	   of	   growth	   in	   the	   period	   between	   1868	   and	   1874,	   and	   that	   the	   production	  remained	  low	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  	  	   The	   financial	   difficulties	   that	   confronted	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   were	   the	  outward	   signs	   of	   internal	   political	   issues,	   as	   financial	   decisions	   were	   in	   fact	  political	  decisions.	  The	  original	  intention	  of	  setting	  up	  the	  navy	  yard	  and	  building	  a	   steam	   navy	   was	   to	   protect	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   order,	   but	   reforming	   the	  financing	   system	   to	   better	   support	   the	   navy	   yard	   necessitated	   institutional	  changes,	  which	  would	   have	   been	   contradictory	   to	   the	   original	   intention	   of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  Without	  modern	  financial	  system,	  the	  financing	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  390	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  1512-­‐1513.	  Lin,	  A	  Draft	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the	  navy	  yard	  remained	  highly	  rigid.	  Technological	  developments	  made	  the	  ships	  increasingly	  expensive	  in	  late	  19th	  century,	  but	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  for	  the	  navy	  yard	  to	  secure	  additional	  source	  of	  funding	  to	  keep	  abreast	  with	  the	  latest	  trends	  in	  naval	  technology.	  Access	  to	  additional	  sources	  of	  revenue	  would	  have	  had	  to	  go	   through	   the	   Imperial	   Court,	   which	   was	   unwilling	   to	   commit	   itself	   to	  supporting	   the	   navy	   yard.	   New	   expenditures	   could	   only	   be	   added	   when	   the	  needs	   had	   become	   pressing	   and	   only	   if	   the	   navy	   yard	   commissioners	   could	  pinpoint	   a	   revenue	   source,	   which	   consumed	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   their	   energy.	  Sources	  of	   revenue	  were	   controlled	  by	  outside	  agencies,	  which	  usually	  did	  not	  feel	   obliged	   to	   support	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard.	   Some	   even	   stood	   in	   direct	  competition	  with	  the	  navy	  yard	  for	  funds	  as	  they	  saw	  buying	  ships	  from	  abroad	  as	  a	  better	  approach	  to	  naval	  modernisation.	  	   ***	  	  The	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   was	   a	   bureaucratic	   institution	   with	   shipbuilding	  functions	  operating	  on	  a	  fixed	  amount	  of	  income.	  Due	  to	  the	  low	  production	  rate	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  in	  the	  navy	  yard,	  the	  Fuzhou-­‐built	  ships	  were	  usually	  much	  more	   expensive	   than	   those	   built	   by	  Western	   private-­‐owned	   companies.	   In	   the	  early	   years	  of	   the	  navy	  yard	   from	  1868	   to	  1874,	   the	  negative	   consequences	  of	  this	  particular	  arrangement	  were	  not	  as	  significant	  as	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  This	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  that	  Zuo	  Zongtang	  (founding	  father	  of	  the	  navy	  yard)	  and	  Shen	  Baozhen’s	  (the	  first	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	  in	  office	  from	  1867	  to	  1875)	  status	  and	  prestige	  ensured	  the	  yard	  ample	  start-­‐up	  funds,	  active	  support	  from	  foreign	   experts	   and	   relatively	   easier	   access	   to	   additional	   funds.	   391	   A	   total	  number	  of	  fifteen	  ships	  were	  built	  in	  this	  period.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  391	   The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  was	  found	  by	  Zuo	  Zongtang,	  former	  leader	  of	  a	  local	  militia	  force	  –	  the	  Chu	  Army,	  with	   the	   assistance	   of	   two	   French	   advisors	   -­‐	   Prosper	   Giquel	   and	   Paul	   d’Aiguebelle.	   The	   contract	   signed	  between	  Zuo	  and	  the	  two	  advisors	  involved	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  a	  Western-­‐style	  naval	  yard,	  constructing	  a	  fleet	  of	  eleven	  150-­‐horse	  power	  gunboats	  and	   five	  80-­‐horse	  power	  gunboats,	  and	  establishing	  schools	   to	   train	  Chinese	  native	  naval	  officers	  and	  naval	  architects.	  The	  contract	  was	  signed	  in	  late	  1866	  and	  was	  completed	  in	   1874.	   For	   a	   review	   of	   the	   Navy	   Yard,	   see	   David	   Pong,	   ‘Keeping	   the	   Foochow	   Navy	   Yard	   Afloat:	  Government	  Finance	  and	  China's	  Early	  Modern	  Defence	  Industry,	  1866-­‐75’,	  Modern	  Asian	  Studies,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	   1.	   (1987),	   pp.	   121-­‐152.	   Steven	   A.	   Leibo,	   Transferring	   Technology	   to	   China:	   Prosper	   Giquel	   and	   the	  
Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  Institute	  of	  East	  Asian	  Studies,	  1985),	  pp.	  76-­‐79.	  
	   160	  
But	  the	  initial	  success	  faded	  away	  quickly	  as	  the	  start-­‐up	  funds	  ran	  dry	  and	  both	  the	  foreign	  advisors	  and	  Shen	  Baozhen	  left	  the	  navy	  yard	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1870s	  (Zuo	  was	   transferred	   to	   the	  office	  of	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Ganshan	   in	   late	  1866	  before	   the	   shipyard	   was	   officially	   opened).	   The	   navy	   yard	   soon	   plunged	   into	  financial	   difficulties.	   Between	   1876	   and	   1886,	   it	   received	   a	   fixed	   allocation	   of	  fifty	   thousand	   taels	   per	  month	   from	   the	   customs	   revenue.392	   This	   amount	  was	  hardly	   enough	   for	   the	   navy	   yard	   to	   maintain	   smooth	   production	   as	   new	  technologies	   made	   ships	   increasingly	   expensive.	   Only	   another	   eighteen	   ships	  were	  built	  until	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  The	  output	  of	   the	  shipyard	  dropped	  to	  as	  low	  as	  around	  1,200	  tons	  yearly	  after	  1874.	   	  	   In	  this	  context,	  the	  navy	  yard	  was	  hardly	  able	  to	  spare	  money	  for	  expanding	  production	   and	   investing	   in	   new	   machines.	   Keeping	   abreast	   with	   the	   latest	  developments	   of	   naval	   technology	  was	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   the	   navy	   yard.	  The	  building	  of	  wooden-­‐hulled	  steamships	  continued	  for	  nearly	  ten	  years	  before	  the	  navy	  yard	  moved	  on	  to	  build	  composite	  ships	  (wooden	  planking	  over	  an	  iron	  frame)	  in	  1877.	  It	  was	  probable	  that	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  price	  of	  compass	  timbers	  (curvy	  wood	  for	  ship	  ribs)	  the	  building	  of	  wooden	  ships	  would	  have	  continued	  for	  many	  more	  years.393	   Q.	  Lin’s	  research	  shows	  that	  in	  the	  first	  decade	   after	   1874	   the	   investment	   in	   new	   shipbuilding	   machinery	   had	   never	  exceeded	  3.8	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  expenditure.	  In	  the	  following	  period	  between	  1886	  and	  1894	  the	  amount	  spent	  on	  upgrading	  machinery	  was	  even	  lower,	  less	  than	   two	  per	   cent	  of	   the	   total	   expenditure	  was	  spent	  on	  buying	  new	  machines	  and	  building	  new	  facilities.394	   In	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  Bian	  Baoquan	   (the	   eleventh	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	   in	   office	   from	  1894	   to	  1896)	  pointed	   out	   to	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   that	   in	   the	   decade	   preceding	   the	   First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  naval	  technology	  improved	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  but	  the	  navy	  yard	  was	  not	  able	   to	   follow	  the	   latest	  developments	  because	   it	   lacked	  the	   ‘machines	  and	  factories’	  that	  would	  enable	  it	  to	  do	  so.395	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  392	   Lin,	  A	  Draft	  History	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  pp.	  258-­‐268.	  393	   Zhang,	  Researches	  on	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard’s	  Achievements,	  p.	  89.	  394	   Lin,	  A	  Draft	  History	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  p.	  267.	  395	   Ibid.,	  266.	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  Figure	   5.2	   The	   balance	   of	   income	   and	   maintenance	   costs	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	  between	  1869	  and	  1874.396	   The	  maintenance	  costs	  rocketed	  as	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  ships	  was	  launched,	  while	  the	  income	  remained	  almost	  unchanged.	   	  	  	   	   	  The	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   was	   not	   a	   commercial	   enterprise	   that	   could	  make	  profits	  from	  the	  ships	  built	  and	  sold;	  lowering	  the	  costs	  by	  increasing	  production	  was	  not	  a	  choice	  open	  to	  it.	   Its	  ships	  were	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  the	  various	  coastal	  provinces	  or	  commissioned	  into	  the	  navy	  yard’s	  fleet.	  Maintaining	  the	  ships	  was	  a	   heavy	   financial	   burden	   that	   consumed	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   the	   already	   tight	  budget.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  5.2	  that	  the	  money	  spent	  on	  maintenance	  was	  actually	   much	   higher	   than	   the	   income	   of	   the	   shipyard	   in	   the	   period	   between	  1871	   and	   1874.	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   policy	   of	   loaning	   out	   the	   ships	   to	   the	  various	  coastal	  provinces	  partly	  relieved	  the	  navy	  yard	  from	  the	  pressure	  of	  ship	  maintenance,	  but	  the	  amount	  of	  budget	  that	  the	  maintenance	  consumed	  was	  still	  very	   burdensome.	   In	   the	   period	   between	   1878	   and	   1880,	   the	   navy	   yard	   spent	  49.4%	  of	  its	  total	  budget	  on	  ship	  maintenance.397	   For	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  the	  more	  ships	  it	  built	  the	  more	  serious	  its	  financial	  difficulties	  became.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396	   Pong,	  ‘Keeping	  the	  Foochow	  Navy	  Yard	  Afloat’,	  p.	  129.	  397	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defense	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  p.	  622.	  
TABLE 
I 
A Comparison between the Income and the Maintenance Costfor Steamships retained by the Foochow Navy Yard, 
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The	  production	  costs	  needed	  to	  be	  controlled.	  But	   instead	  of	  establishing	  a	  modern	  accounting	  system,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  suggested	  the	  Shipyard	  to	  control	  the	  costs	  in	  an	  old-­‐fashioned	  way	  –	  establishing	  a	  set	  of	  detailed	  regulations.398	  Both	   approaches	   could	   achieve	   cost	   control,	   but	   a	   key	   difference	   between	   the	  two	   was	   that	   the	   latter	   approach	   better	   suited	   the	   command	   economy.	   The	  Imperial	  Court	  had	  been	  using	  such	  method	  to	  control	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  building	  and	   maintenance	   of	   traditional	   war	   junks.	   H.	   Wang’s	   study	   shows	   that	   the	  regulations	  of	  war	   junks’	  building	  and	  maintaining	  were	   so	   rigid	   that	   even	   the	  number	  of	  nails	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  paints	  applied	  to	  each	  single	  timber	  plank	  of	  the	   ships	   was	   clearly	   stipulated.399	   But	   there	   was	   a	   serious	   drawback	   in	   this	  method:	   it	   was	   too	   rigid	   to	   allow	   for	   innovations	   and	   technological	  improvements.	   This	   was,	   according	   to	   H.	   Wang,	   a	   key	   reason	   for	   the	   lack	   of	  technological	  improvements	  in	  the	  building	  of	  traditional	  war	  junks.400	   Now	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  intended	  to	  extend	  it	  to	  the	  building	  and	  maintaining	  of	  the	  steam	  navy.	   It	   is	  obvious	  that	  the	  Imperial	  Court	   failed	  to	  realise	  that	  steam	  warships	  were	  too	  technologically	  sophisticated	  and	  fast	  evolving	  for	  such	  rigid	  method	  of	  cost	  control	  to	  be	  applied.	  Wu	  Zancheng	  (the	  third	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	  in	  office	   from	  1876	   to	   1879)	  managed	   to	   decline	   this	   proposal,	  which,	   if	   applied,	  would	  have	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  already	  low	  capabilities	  of	  innovation	  of	  the	  navy	  yard.	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard’s	   nature	   as	   a	   bureaucratic	   body	  meant	  that	  its	  leadership	  tended	  to	  be	  conservative.	  All	  ten	  commissioners	  of	  the	  yard	  assumed	  office	  between	  1867	  and	  1894	  were	  scholarly-­‐officials	  transferred	  from	   the	   mainstream	   officialdom. 401 	   The	   Qing	   Empire’s	   official	   selection	  mechanism	   –	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations	   –	   dictated	   that	   knowledge	   of	   science	  and	   technology	  was	   structurally	   absent	   among	   the	   bureaucrats.	   Some	   officials	  developed	   a	   degree	   of	   interest	   in	   Western	   learning	   and	   tried	   to	   familiarise	  themselves	   with	   modern	   science	   and	   technology.	   For	   example,	   Shen	   Baozhen	  was	  said	  to	  have	  learnt	  about	  mathematics	  and	  physics	  when	  he	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  398	   HFD,	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  p.	  801.	  399	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Early	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  122-­‐123.	  400	   Ibid.,	  134-­‐141.	  401	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  753.	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the	  navy	  yard.402	   But	  officials	   like	  him	  were,	   after	  all,	   rare	  exceptions;	  most	  of	  the	   bureaucrats	   that	   were	   transferred	   to	   the	   positions	   of	   navy	   yard	  commissioner	  knew	  little	  about	  steam	  navy.	  The	   short	   term	   of	   office	   of	   the	   Navy	   Yard	   Commissioners	   further	  exacerbated	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  innovation.	  Most	  of	  the	  ten	  commissioners	  served	  too	  briefly	  to	  be	  able	  to	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  navy	   yard	   and	   to	   carry	   through	   new	   policies.	   During	   the	   nearly	   thirty	   years	  between	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   in	   1867	   and	   the	   First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  in	  1894-­‐95,	  most	  of	  the	  navy	  yard	  commissioners	  had	  a	  short	  tenure	  ranging	  from	  only	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  to	  three	  years	  (there	  were	  only	  two	  exceptions,	   Shen	   Baozhen	   and	   Pei	   Yinsen,	   who	   held	   office	   for	   eight	   years	   and	  seven	   years	   respectively).	   Consequently,	   most	   of	   them	   tended	   to	   adopt	   a	  conservative	  attitude	  towards	  the	  application	  of	  new	  technologies	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  their	   career	   advancement.	   Instead	   of	   building	   sophisticated	   ships	   with	   new	  technologies,	   they	  would	   rather	   use	  mature	   and	  well-­‐tested	   designs	   to	   ensure	  the	   reliability.	   Li	  Zhaotang	   (the	   fourth	  Navy	  Yard	  Commissioner,	   in	  office	   from	  1880	   to	   1883)	   compared	   China’s	   nascent	   shipbuilding	   industry	   to	   the	   initial	  stage	  of	   learning	   to	  compose	  essays.	  He	  said	   that	  one	  should	  not	   ‘try	  advanced	  
techniques	   [before	   he	   fully	   commanded	   all	   the	   basics].’403	   Admittedly,	   he	   was	  right	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  being	  conservative	  could	  lower	  the	  risk	  of	  wasting	  money	  and	  time	  on	  immature	  designs.	  But	  such	  prudence	  was	  overstressed	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  hindered	  technological	  improvements	  in	  the	  navy	  yard.	   	  Due	  to	  the	  abovementioned	  reasons,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  declined.404	   The	  ships	   built	   in	   Fuzhou	   were	   obsolete,	   less	   fighting-­‐capable,	   and	   yet	   more	  expensive	  than	  foreign-­‐built	  ships.	  Since	  early	  1880s,	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  began	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  developed	  a	  strong	  reliance	  on	   British	   and	   German	   shipbuilders	   for	   new	   ships.	   The	   shipyard	   was	   heavily	  criticised	   for	   failing	   to	   produce	   ‘usable’	   ships.	   Even	   the	   Imperial	   Court,	   who	  rarely	  made	  open	  criticisms,	  joined	  in.	  An	  Imperial	  Edict	  put	  it:	  ‘it	  has	  been	  more	  
than	   twenty	   years	   since	   [the	   empire]	   embarked	   on	   the	   preparation	   of	  maritime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  402	   HFD,	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  No.	  151,	  154,	  156.	  403	   HFD,	  II,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  p.	  890.	  404	   The	   decline	   of	   the	   second	   largest	   Chinese	   military	   industrial	   centre	   –	   the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   resulted	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  same	  reason.	  Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  36.	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defence,	  but	  little	  results	  have	  been	  yielded,	  the	  various	  ship	  built	  by	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  
Yard	  are	  not	  useable.’405	   But	  because	  China	  refused	  to	  bring	  about	  political	  and	  economic	   changes	   to	   create	   an	   environment	   that	   could	   nourish	   the	   growth	   of	  modern	  defence	  industry,	  it	  was	  almost	  impossible	  for	  the	  navy	  yard	  to	  attain	  a	  high	   standard.	  A	   contemporary	   official	   observed:	   ‘[the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard]	  was	  
fully	  aware	  of	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  the	  steamships	  in	  foreign	  countries,	  but	  the	  
ships	   built	   there	   remain	   unimproved	   and	   were	   not	   fit	   to	   use	   …	   The	   various	  
provinces	  turned	  to	  foreign	  shipbuilders	  when	  they	  need	  warships.’406	  	   ***	  	  As	   an	   agrarian	   economy,	   China	   did	   not	   have	   sufficient	   financial	   resources	   to	  support	   a	   project	   as	   costly	   as	   naval	   modernisation.	   The	   money	   spent	   on	   the	  steam	  navy	  was	   primarily	   allocated	   from	   the	   customs	   revenue,	  which,	   at	   best,	  was	   growing	   slowly.	   Consequently,	   there	   were	   fierce	   competitions	   for	   funds	  among	   the	   regional	   maritime	   defence	   agencies,	   and	   they	   also	   had	   different	  perspectives	  on	  how	  to	  augment	  China’s	  naval	  power.	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  there	  was	  the	   argument	   that	   naval	   modernisation	   should	   be	   achieved	   by	   taking	   the	  shortcut	   of	   acquisition	   from	   abroad,	   because	   foreign-­‐built	   ships	   were	   more	  economic	   and	   advanced.	  On	   the	   other	   side,	   other	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   suggested	  that	  China	  should	  develop	  its	  own	  shipbuilding	  capabilities.	  Self-­‐dependence,	  as	  they	  saw	  it,	  was	  of	  vital	  importance	  to	  national	  security.	   	  The	   appeal	   for	   buying	   ships	   from	   abroad	   overwhelmed	   that	   of	   domestic	  shipbuilding	  to	  become	  the	  dominant	  voice	  since	  the	  late	  1870s.	  This	  was	  partly	  because	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   the	   most	   powerful	   Self-­‐Strengthener	   supported	   the	  former,	   and	   partly	   because	   the	  main	   shipbuilding	   plant	   in	   China	   –	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  –	  was	  in	  decline	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1870s.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  more	  money	  to	  buy	   ships	   from	   abroad,	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   divert	   the	   funds	   from	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  which	   continued	   to	   receive	   around	   six	   hundred	   thousand	   taels	   per	  year	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1880s.	  The	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  attain	  this	  purpose	  was	   to	   destroy	   the	   reputation	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard.	   To	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  405	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  8,	  p.	  534.	  LZCGYJ,	  p.	  2090.	  406	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  127.	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Self-­‐Strengtheners	  who	  tried	  to	  wrest	  funds	  from	  the	  navy	  yard,	  it	  was	  a	  means	  that	   could	   win	   the	   competition	   once	   and	   for	   all;	   but	   to	   China’s	   indigenous	  shipbuilding	  industry,	  the	  damage	  was	  fatal.	   	   	  The	   core	   of	   the	   Navy	   Yard’s	   shipbuilding	   potential	   –	   the	   Department	   of	  Engineering	  (Gongcheng	  Chu)	  was	  not	  only	  the	  brains	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  but	  also	  the	  cradle	  of	  China’s	  shipbuilding	  talent.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  large	  population,	  China	  was	  not	  a	  country	  rich	   in	  talent	  of	  modern	  maritime	  engineering.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   there	  was	  a	   serious	   lack	  of	  professionals	   capable	  of	   conducting	  naval	  construction.	   China’s	   first	   and	   the	   only	   institution	   that	   provided	   education	   in	  naval	   architecture	   –	   the	   Fuzhou	  Naval	   Academy	   –	  was	   opened	   in	   1867.	   In	   the	  1880s,	   only	   fourteen	   naval	   architects	   had	   completed	   their	   basic	   and	   advanced	  training	  and	  became	  fully	  qualified	  naval	  architects.407	   Records	  show	  that	  most	  of	  these	  native	  Chinese	  naval	  architects	  were	  concentrated	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Engineering	   of	   the	   navy	   yard,	   which	   started	   to	   function	   as	   the	   brains	   of	   the	  institution	   since	   the	   1880s.408	   This	   group	   of	   naval	   architects,	   though	   small	   in	  number	   and	   largely	   inexperienced,	   was	   all	   that	   China	   had	   for	   its	   shipbuilding	  industry	  at	  the	  time	  (see	  Table	  5.2).	  An	  opportunity	   to	  destroy	   the	   reputation	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  presented	  itself	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1880s.	  Forced	  by	  the	  pressure	  to	  build	  more	  advance	  warships,	  the	  navy	  yard	  turned	  away	  from	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  and	  began	  to	  pursue	  more	  sophisticated	   designs.	   In	   the	   last	   few	   decades	   of	   the	   19th	   century,	   warships	  designs	   evolved	   at	   a	   quickened	   pace	   and	   in	   a	   kaleidoscopic	   fashion.	   Even	   the	  world’s	   leading	   naval	   powers	   could	   not	   guarantee	   that	   all	   the	   ships	   that	   they	  built,	  especially	  the	  sophisticated	  ones,	  were	  successful.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  was	   financially	   weak	   and	   its	   naval	   architects	   were	   unfledged.	   Under	   these	  conditions,	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   was	   prone	   to	   make	   mistakes	   in	   building	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  407	   By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period,	   a	   total	  number	  of	  ninety-­‐one	   students	  had	   finished	  basic	  education	   in	   naval	   architecture	   in	   the	   Fuzhou	   Naval	   Academy	   and	   only	   thirty-­‐four	   elite	   students	   among	  them	  were	  sent	  to	  France	  for	  advanced	  education	  in	  naval	  architecture.	  The	  first	  batch	  of	  twelve	  students	  was	  sent	  to	  France	  in	  1877,	  and	  the	  second	  batch	  of	  eight	  students	  was	  sent	  to	  France	  in	  1882,	  and	  the	  third	  batch	  of	   fourteen	  students	  was	  sent	   to	  France	   in	  1886.	  The	  duration	  of	   their	  study	   in	  France	  varied	   from	  three	   to	   six	   years.	   The	   education	   in	   naval	   architecture	   in	   Fuzhou	  was	   only	   of	   basic	   level	   and	   only	   those	  educated	  in	  France	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  professionals	  of	  advanced	  level.	   	  408	   Qingyuan	   Lin,	   ‘论福建船政局管理的先进性	   Lun	   Fujian	   Chuanzhengju	   Guanli	   de	   Xianjinxing	   [On	   the	  Advanced	   Nature	   of	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   Administrations]’	   in	  船政文化研究	   Chuanzheng	   Wenhua	   Yanjiu	  
[Researches	  on	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  Associated	  Cultural	  Achievements],	  Zuoxing	  Zhang	  ed.,	  (Beijing:	  China	  Social	  Press,	  2003).	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advanced	  warships.	   The	  mistakes	   could	  be	  utilised	  by	   other	   regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	   to	  attack	   the	  navy	  yard	  and	   to	   justify	   the	  acquisition	  of	   ships	  from	  abroad.	   	  The	  defects	  of	  the	  Fuzhou-­‐built	  ships	  were	  often	  exploited	  by	  the	  navy	  yard’s	  competitors	   to	   discredit	   the	   naval	   architects’	   reputation	   and	   to	   justify	   their	  projects	  of	  acquisition	  from	  abroad.	  Take	  the	  coastal	  defence	  gunboat	  Ping	  Yuan	  for	  example	  (see	  Figure	  5.7).	  It	  was	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  French	  Acheron	  class	  gunboat.	  Launched	  in	   January	  1888,	   the	  Ping	  Yuan	  was	  arguably	  the	  most	  advanced	  and	  sophisticated	   warship	   that	   China	   built	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	   For	   such	   a	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  piece	  of	  work,	  a	  degree	  of	  imperfection	  was	  almost	  unavoidable.	  But	   the	   defects	   revealed	   in	   Ping	   Yuan’s	   sea	   trial	   were	   pounced	   on	   by	   Li	  Hongzhang,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard’s	  northern	  competitor	  who	  saw	  buying	  ships	  from	  abroad	  as	  a	  better	  approach	  to	  naval	  modernisation.	  Li	  denounced	  the	  then	  Navy	   Yard	   Commissioner	   Pei	   Yinsen	   (the	   eight	   Navy	   Yard	   Commissioner,	   in	  office	  1884	  –1890)	   for	  being	   ‘completely	   ignorant’	   of	   steam	  navy	  and	  criticised	  the	   Ping	   Yuan	   as	   a	   disastrous	   consequence	   of	   Pei	   being	   ‘bewitched’	   by	   the	  architects	   of	   the	   navy	   yard.409	   Three	   naval	   architects	   of	   the	   Department	   of	  Engineering	   Wei	   Han,	   Chen	   Zhao’ao	   and	   Zheng	   Qinglian	   who	   supervised	   the	  building	  Ping	   Yuan	   had	   their	   titles	   suspended	   as	   a	   punishment	   for	   the	   ‘poorly	  built’	  ship.	  In	  reality,	  the	  Ping	  Yuan	  was	  not	  as	  poorly	  built	  as	  claimed	  by	  its	  critics.	  The	  defects	  were	   fixed	  with	  a	  replacement	  of	  a	   faulty	  air	  exhauster	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  other	  minor	  parts.410	   In	  spite	  of	  the	  heavy-­‐handed	  criticism,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  later	  accepted	   the	   ship	   and	   commissioned	   it	   into	   his	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   In	   the	   Battle	   of	  Yalu	   in	   1894,	   the	   Ping	   Yuan	   claimed	   multiple	   hits	   on	   the	   Japanese	   Combined	  Fleet’s	   flagship	   Matsushima	   and	   capital	   ship	   Itsukushima. 411 	   The	   Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	   continued	   to	   use	  Ping	   Yuan	   as	   a	   first-­‐rate	   gunboat	   after	   it	  was	  captured	   in	   the	   Battle	   of	  Weihaiwei	   until	   it	   was	  mined	   and	   sunk	   in	   the	   1904	  Russo-­‐Japanese	   War.412	   Following	   Li’s	   attack	   against	   the	   ship	   when	   it	   was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  409	   LWZGQJ-­‐YSHG,	  Vol.	  17,	  pp.	  40-­‐42.	  410	   CZZYHB,	  Vol.	  16,	  p.	  56.	  411	   Yasuzumi	  Saneyoshi,	  The	  Surgical	  and	  Medical	  History	  of	  the	  Naval	  War	  between	  Japan	  and	  China,	  (Tokyo:	  Tokyo	   Printing	   Company,	   1901),	   p.4-­‐6,	   15-­‐16.	   Ma,	   A	   New	   Examination	   of	   the	   History	   of	   Modern	   Chinese	  
Navies,	  pp.	  159-­‐160.	  412	   The	  Ping	  Yuan	  was	  initially	  called	  Ping	  Yuan	  Go	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy	  and	  was	  renamed	  Heien	  in	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launched,	  there	  was	  no	  other	  record	  of	  complaint	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  Ping	  Yuan.	  Li’s	  attack	  on	  the	  Ping	  Yuan	  was	  largely	  motivated	  by	  inter-­‐regional	  competitions	  for	  funds.	   	  The	  Ping	  Yuan	   incident	  was	  not	  the	  only	  case	  of	   its	  kind.	  A	  similar	   incident	  happened	   five	   years	   earlier	   to	   other	   two	   chief	   architects	   of	   the	  Department	   of	  Engineering,	   Wu	   Dezhang	   and	   Li	   Shoutian.	   In	   1883,	   Zuo	   Zongtang,	   the	   then	  governor-­‐general	   of	   Liangjiang	   petitioned	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   to	   punish	   Navy	  Yard	   Commissioner	   Zhang	   Mengyuan	   (the	   fifth	   Navy	   Yard	   Commissioner,	   in	  office	  1883)	  and	  naval	  architects	  Wu	  Dezhang	  and	  Li	  Shoutian	  for	  malpractice	  in	  the	   building	   of	   cruiser	   Kai	   Ji	   (see	   Photo	   5.6).413	   As	   a	   copy	   of	   French	   cruiser	  
Duguay-­‐Trouin,	   the	  Kai	   Ji,	   too,	  was	  one	  of	   the	  most	  advanced	  warships	  that	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  had	  built	   in	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  Zuo	  criticised	  that	  the	  ship	  was	  different	  from	  the	  original	  design	  in	  its	  draft	  depth	  and	  cruise	  speed.	  Besides,	   there	  was	   a	   cost	   overrun	  and	   the	  delivery	  was	   also	  delayed.414	  Consequent	  to	  Zuo’s	  petition	  the	  architects	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  building	  of	  
Kai	  Ji	  received	  no	  reward,	  which	  was	  rather	  unusual	  for	  major	  works	  like	  this.415	  In	   fact,	   none	   of	   the	   defects	   that	   Zuo	   used	   as	   ammunition	   against	   the	   naval	  architects	  were	  major.	  We	  know	  only	  too	  well	  that	  even	  today	  very	  few	  contracts	  for	   military	   hardware	   can	   be	   carried	   out	   without	   delays	   and	   cost	   inflation.	  Presumably,	   the	  motivation	   for	   Zuo’s	   attack	   against	   Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard	  was	   to	  justify	  the	  purchase	  of	  two	  other	  cruisers	  of	  the	  same	  class	  (Nan	  Chen	  and	  Nan	  
Rui)	  that	  he	  had	  ordered	  from	  Germany.	  The	  competitions	   for	   funds	  between	  the	  various	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  brought	  fatal	  damage	  to	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	  which	  contributed	   to	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   navy	   yard’s	   annual	   allocation	   from	   around	   six	  hundred	   thousand	   taels	   in	   the	   period	   between	   1876	   and	   1886	   to	   around	   2.6	  hundred	  thousand	  taels	  between	  1886	  and	  1894.416	   Between	  1886	  and	  1894	  the	  production	  plummeted	   further	   to	  around	  820	   tons	  per	  year	  and	   the	  navy	  yard	  was	   forced	   by	   financial	   predicaments	   to	   lay	   off	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1900.	   	  413	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  8,	  p.	  368.	   	   	  414	   ZZTQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  8,	  pp.	  366-­‐367.	  415	   Chen,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Domestically	  Built	  Steam	  Warships	  in	  Late	  Qing,	  p.	  194.	  416	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defense	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  p.	  621.	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operatives.	  The	  damage	  that	  the	  job	  cuts	  did	  to	  China’s	  shipbuilding	  capabilities	  was	   incalculable.	  A	   record	   shows	   that	   ‘because	   there	  was	  not	  much	  work,	   some	  [naval	   architecture]	   students	   stood	   idle	   in	   the	   academy	   for	  more	   than	   ten	   years	  
without	  getting	  commissions.’417	   Many	  young	  naval	  architects	  were	  forced	  to	  find	  other	  livelihoods	  and	  a	  considerable	  number	  chose	  to	  leave	  the	  navy	  yard	  and	  to	  return	   to	   their	   hometowns.418	   A	   brain	   drain	   also	   took	   place	   among	   the	   elites	  students	  who	  studied	  abroad.	  A	  Zongli	  Yamen	  report	  pointed	  out	  that:	  ‘when	  the	  
students	  returned	  to	  China,	  many	  stood	  idle.	  Forced	  by	  poverty,	  [they]	  went	  to	  find	  
livelihoods	  elsewhere.	  Good	  ones	  were	  hired	  to	  work	  abroad,	  less	  good	  ones	  worked	  
as	   translators	   in	   foreign	   consulates	   or	   foreign	   firms.	   Our	   talented	   students	  were	  
wasted	  by	  us,	  but	  were	  utilised	  by	   foreign	  countries;	  whereas	  when	  we	  need	  such	  
talent,	   we	   have	   to	   recourse	   to	   foreign	   countries.’419	   The	   brain	   drain	   of	   naval	  architects	  was	  the	  coup	  de	  grâce	   for	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard.	  Chinese	  indigenous	  shipbuilding	  industry	  fell	  into	  irreversible	  stagnation	  in	  the	  late	  1880s.	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   Bao,	   The	   History	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Navy,	   p.	   699.	   Cuilian	   Gao,	   ‘近代中国海军教育与甲午海战	   Jindai	  Zhongguo	  Haijun	   Jiaoyu	   Yu	   Jiawu	  Haizhan	   [Modern	   Chinese	   Navy	   Education	   and	   the	   Jiawu	   Sea	   Battles]’,	  
Military	  Historical	  Research.	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  2.	  (Summer	  1990),	  pp.	  115.	  418	   CZZYHB,	  Vol.	  47,	  p.	  20.	  419	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  129.	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Name in Pinyin Name 
in Chinese 
Expertise Position in the Department 
of Engineering  
Wei Han 魏  瀚 Marine Engineering  
and gunnery (France) 
Chief Architect  
Chen Zhao’ao 陈兆翱 Marine Engineering 
(France) 
Chief Architect 
Zheng Qinglian 郑清濂 Marine Engineering  
and Gunnery (France) 
Chief Architect 
Wu Dezhang  吴德章 Marine Engineering  
and Gunnery (France) 
Chief Architect 
Yang Lianchen 杨廉臣 Marine Engineering  
and Gunnery (France) 
Chief Architect 
Li Shoutian  李寿田 Marine Engineering 
(France) 
Chief Architect 
Lin Qingsheng  林庆昇 Metallurgy (France) Supervisor of the 
Metalworking Factory  
Chi Zhenquan 池贞铨 Metallurgy (France) Supervisor of the 
Metalworking Factory  
Lin Rizhang 林日章 Marine Engineering  
and Metallurgy 
(France) 
Supervisor of the Marine 
Engineering Factory  
Wei Xian 魏  暹 Marine Engineering 
(France) 
Assistant Chief Engineer 
Chen Caizhui 陈才锥 Torpedo (France) Supervisor of the  
Torpedo Factory  
Ren Zhao 任  照 Foundry (France) Supervisor of  
the Hull Factory 
Chen Linzhang 陈林璋 Marine Engineering 
(France) 
Supervisor of  
the Hull Factory 
Wang Guifang 王桂芳 Foundry (France) Supervisor of the 
Metalworking Factory 
Wu Xuejiang 吴学锵 Shipbuilding (France) Supervisor of the  
Iron-Casting Factory  	  Table	  5.2	  A	   list	   of	   the	   senior	  naval	   architects	  of	   the	  Department	  of	  Engineering	   in	   the	  1880s.420	   Most	  of	  these	  naval	  architects	  entered	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy	  in	  the	   late	  1860s	  and	  finished	  their	  advanced	  education	  in	  France	  in	  the	  early	  1880s.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  420	   Lin,	   ‘On	  the	  Advanced	  Nature	  of	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Administrations’.	  Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  
Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  618-­‐619.	   	  
	   170	  
5.3	  Naval	  Acquisitions	  from	  Abroad	  	  A	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   for	   power	   between	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   and	   the	   local	   leaders	  characterised	   the	   political	   landscape	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	   The	  latter	  obtained	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  consequent	  on	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  century,	   which	   they	   continued	   to	   enjoy	   well	   into	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  while	   the	   former	  wanted	   to	   restore	   control.	   To	   the	   Imperial	   Court,	  buying	  ships	  from	  abroad	  was	  the	  only	  viable	  approach	  to	  establish	  an	  imperial	  navy	  because	  the	  military	  industrial	  plants	  were	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  local	  authorities.	  On	   two	   occasions	   during	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	  tried	   to	   buy	   an	   imperial	   navy	   from	   abroad	   via	   the	   Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service.421	   But	  both	  attempts	  were	  thwarted	  by	  local	  leaders.	  In	  the	  first	  attempt	  in	   the	   early	   1860s,	   the	   plan	   was	   aborted	  mainly	   due	   to	   the	   objection	   of	   local	  militia	  force	  leader	  Zeng	  Guofan.	  The	  struggle	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang,	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   and	   Northern	   Superintendent,	   failed	   the	  second	  attempt	  in	  the	  late	  1870s.	   	  	   ***	  	  The	   Lay-­‐Osborn	   Flotilla	  was	   the	   Imperial	   Court’s	   first	   attempt	   to	   buy	   a	   steam	  navy.	  The	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  made	  a	  Western	  style	  navy	  a	  necessity,	  because	  the	  areas	  seized	  by	  the	  rebel	  forces	  were	  mostly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  Lower	  Yangtze	  Plain	   and	   south-­‐eastern	   coasts.	   A	   steam	   navy,	   as	  many	   saw	   it,	   could	   flank	   the	  Taiping	  rebels	  from	  the	  Yangtze	  River	  and	  the	  sea,	  and	  therefore	  would	  facilitate	  putting	  down	  the	  rebellion.422	   In	  early	  1862,	  Prince	  Gong,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Zongli	  
Yamen	   commissioned	   Horatio	   N.	   Lay,	   the	   then	   Inspector-­‐general	   of	   the	   newly	  founded	   Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service	   to	  purchase	  and	  equip	  a	   flotilla	  of	  steam	  warships	  for	  China.	  In	  September	  1863,	  a	  flotilla	  of	  eight	  ships	  and	  around	  six	   hundred	  men	   (mostly	   British)	  was	   acquired	   and	   sailed	   to	   China	   under	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  421	   The	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Costumes	  Services	  was	  established	  in	  the	  aftermath	  the	  Opium	  Wars.	  During	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period,	  it	  was	  an	  office	  attached	  to	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  and	  was	  presided	  over	  in	  succession	  by	  two	  Britons:	  Horatio	  Nelson	  Lay	  from	  1855	  to	  1863,	  and	  Robert	  Hart	  from	  1863	  to	  1911.	   	  422	   CBYWSM-­‐XF,	  Vol.	  79,	  pp.	  16-­‐19.	  Lü	  Shiqiang,	  中国早期轮船经营	   Zhongguo	  Zaoqi	  de	  Lunchuan	  Jingying	  
[Early	   Steamship	   Projects	   in	   China],	   (Taibei:	   Institute	   of	   Modern	   History	   of	   Academia	   Sinica,	   1962),	   pp.	  46-­‐56.	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command	  of	  Captain	  Sherard	  Osborn	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Navy.423	  	   This	   project,	   if	   successfully	   implemented,	   could	   have	   led	   to	   the	   first	  centralised	  Chinese	  steam	  fleet	  before	  the	  local	  authorities	  built	  theirs.	  But	  it	  was	  an	   attempt	   in	   vain.	   On	   the	   surface,	   it	   was	   the	   presumptuousness	   of	   Lay	   that	  rendered	   the	   attempt	   fruitless.	   According	   to	   an	   agreement	   reached	   in	   private	  between	  Lay	  and	  Captain	  Osborn,	  Osborn	  would	  be	  the	  sole	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	   this	  naval	   force.	  He	  was	  to	  take	  orders	  only	   from	  Lay,	  who	   in	  turn	  would	  be	  exclusively	   answerable	   to	   the	   Chinese	   emperor.	  More	  worryingly,	   Lay	  made	   it	  clear	  in	  the	  agreement	  that	  he	  would	  only	  pass	  orders	  on	  to	  Osborn	  if	  he	  agreed	  with	   them.424	   This	   would	   make	   Lay	   the	   de	   facto	   highest	   commander	   of	   the	  Chinese	  naval	  force.	  This	  arrangement	  ignited	  heated	  debates	  between	  Lay	  and	  the	  Chinese	  officials	  over	  the	  control	  of	  the	  fleet.	  The	  whole	  plan	  was	  eventually	  cancelled	   for	   the	   fear	   that	   Lay	   intended	   to	   use	   the	   flotilla	   project	   to	   turn	   over	  China’s	  military	  authority	  into	  his	  own	  hands.	   	  	   However,	   putting	   aside	   Lay’s	   self-­‐aggrandising	   tendency,	   if	   one	   looks	   into	  the	   essence	   of	   what	   became	   known	   as	   the	   Lay-­‐Osborn	   Flotilla	   Incident,	   it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  for	  power	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  local	   leaders	  played	  a	   key	  part	   in	  preventing	   the	  project	   from	  being	   a	   success.	  After	  all,	  Lay	  believed	  that	  the	  flotilla	  should	  be	  an	  imperial	   force	  rather	  than	  a	  regional	  one.	  In	  Lay’s	  opinion:	   	  	  ‘…	   the	   restoration	  and	   the	  preservation	  of	   peace	   in	  China	   called	   for	   the	  
direct	  action	  of	  the	  Central	  Government	  directing	  Imperial,	  not	  Provincial,	  
forces;	   an	   issue	   so	   vital	   as	   national	   peace	   and	   order	   should	   not,	   he	  
maintained,	  be	   left	   to	  provincial	   satraps	  with	  their	  bands	  of	  undesirable	  
foreign	   filibusters	   and	   their	   local	   levies	   of	   ill-­‐trained	   native	   troops.	  
Further,	   if	  China	  was	  ever	   to	  become	  strong	  and	  progressive	   in	  Western	  
sense,	   the	   Central	   Government	   must	   be	   strengthened	   so	   that	   whenever	  
and	  wherever	  necessary	  it	  could	  enforce	  its	  will,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  bring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  423	   The	   eight	   ships	   constituted	   the	   Lay-­‐Osborn	   Flotilla	   were:	   the	   1000-­‐ton	   dispatch	   vessel	   Kiangsu	   as	  flagship;	  the	  670-­‐ton	  wooden	  gunboat	  Peking	  (ex-­‐HMS	  Mohawk);	  670-­‐ton	  wooden	  gunboat	  China	  (ex-­‐HMS	  Africa);	  the	  300-­‐ton	  wooden	  gunboat	  Amoy	  (ex-­‐HMS	  Jasper);	  the	  450-­‐ton	  iron	  dispatch	  vessel	  Tientsin;	  the	  550-­‐ton	  iron	  dispatch	  vessel	  Kwangtung.	   In	  addition,	  there	  were	  the	  steam	  yacht	  Thule	  and	  the	  store-­‐ship	  
Ballarat.	  For	  more	  details	  of	   the	  ships	  of	   the	  Lay-­‐Osborn	  Flotilla,	  see	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  pp.	  16-­‐17.	  424	   Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  17.	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this	   about	  was	  by	   the	  acquisition	  and	   control	   of	   a	   national	   army	  and	  a	  
national	  navy.’	   425	   	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  private	  agreement	  between	  Lay	  and	  Osborn,	  these	  ideas	  would	  have	  led	  to	  a	  navy	  under	  the	  direct	  command	  of	  the	  Chinese	  emperor,	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  Chinese	  ‘royal	  navy’.	   	  Apart	   from	   the	   disagreement	   over	   the	   command	   of	   the	   fleet,	   the	   Imperial	  Court	  welcomed	  the	  idea	  of	  an	   imperial	  navy.	  It	  was	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	   largely	  the	  Zongli	  Yamen	  under	  Prince	  Gong,	  who	  commissioned	  Lay	  to	  buy	  a	  navy	  from	  Britain,	   and	   Lay	   was	   explicit	   about	   the	   point	   that	   he	   was	   only	   to	   serve	   the	  emperor	  rather	  than	  local	  leaders.	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  was	  keen	  to	  have	  a	  navy	  of	  its	  own.	  Otherwise	  it	  would	  remain	  as	  an	  outsider	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Taiping	  War,	  which	  was	   fought	  mostly	   between	   the	   Taiping	   Rebellion	   and	   the	   local	   militia	   forces,	  primarily	   the	  Xiang	  Army,	   the	  Huai	  Army	  and	   the	  Chu	  Army.	   It	  was	  negotiated	  between	  Beijing	   and	  Osborn	   that	   one	   third	   of	   the	   spoils	   of	  war	   that	   the	   latter	  captured	   in	   the	  actions	  against	   the	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  should	  be	  sent	   to	  Beijing,	  while	   the	   rest	  was	   to	   be	   divided	   equally	   between	   the	  Osborn	   and	   the	   Chinese	  local	  militia	   forces	  who	  had	  contributed	   to	   the	  victory.	   In	   the	  case	   that	  Osborn	  won	   a	   campaign	   by	   himself,	   one	   third	   of	   the	   spoils	   of	   war	   should	   go	   to	   the	  Imperial	  Court	  while	  Osborn	  was	  allowed	  to	  take	  all	  the	  rest.426	   The	  local	  militia	  forces	  were	   largely	  excluded	   from	   this	  negotiation	  between	   the	   Imperial	  Court	  and	   Lay.427 	   It	   was	   obvious	   that	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   wanted	   to	   utilise	   the	  Lay-­‐Osborn	  Flotilla	  to	  counterbalance	  the	  local	  militia	  forces.	   	  The	  local	  militia	  leaders,	  Zeng	  Guofan	  in	  particular,	  were	  strongly	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  introducing	  a	  force	  beyond	  their	  control.	  He	  insisted	  that	  the	  ships	  should	  be	  manned	   by	   sailors	   selected	   from	   his	   Xiang	   Army	  water	   force	   and	   that	   only	  three	  to	  four	  British	  sailors	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  remain	  aboard	  as	  instructors.428	  Zeng	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  steamships	  were	  to	  be	  manned	  by	  foreign	  sailors,	  Chinese	  
water	   force	   men	   would	   feel	   frustrated	   because	   the	   giant	   foreign	   steamships	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  425	   Wright,	  Hart	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Customs,	  pp.	  241-­‐242.	  426	   HFD,	  I,	  Acquisition	  of	  Ships	  and	  Guns,	  p.	  174.	  427	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  944.	  428	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  56.	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would	  dwarf	  their	  old-­‐fashioned	  junk	  boats.429	   The	  Imperial	  Court	  agreed	  with	  Zeng	  on	  the	  point	  that	  the	  ships	  should	  be	  manned	  mainly	  by	  Chinese	  sailors,	  but	  instead	  of	  using	  people	   from	   the	  Xiang	  Army,	   it	  was	   suggested	   that	   the	   sailors	  should	  be	  a	  mix	  of	  men	  picked	  from	  Manchus,	  men	  of	  the	  Xiang	  Army	  and	  Han	  Chinese	   from	   a	   variety	   coastal	   provinces.430	   Zeng	   declined	   the	   suggestion	   and	  insisted	   on	   his	   old	   plan.431	   It	   was	   obvious	   that	   he	   wanted	   to	   control	   the	  steamships	  by	  manning	  them	  with	  his	  troops.	  Zeng	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  could	  not	   reach	   an	   agreement	   on	   the	   manning	   of	   that	   naval	   force.	   Eventually,	   the	  Lay-­‐Osborn	  Flotilla	  was	  disbanded	  and	  the	  ships	  were	  resold.	  Hsü	  recorded:	  ‘the	  
Chinese	   government	   had	   spent	   a	   total	   of	   £550,000	   purchasing	   and	   disbanding	   a	  
fleet,	  from	  which	  it	  got	  nothing	  but	  headaches.	  The	  first	  attempt	  at	  a	  modern	  navy	  
was	  a	   complete	   fiasco.’432	   In	   fact,	   it	  was	  not	  only	   the	   first	   attempt	  at	  a	  modern	  navy	  that	  was	  failed,	  but	  more	  importantly	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  it	  was	  the	  first	  effort	  to	  establish	  an	  imperial	  navy	  that	  was	  failed	  by	  the	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  for	  power	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  the	  local	  leaders.	   	  	   ***	  	  The	  struggle	  for	  control	  of	  the	  steam	  navy	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  local	  authorities	   continued	   when	   Robert	   Hart	   replaced	   H.N.	   Lay	   to	   become	   the	  Inspector-­‐general	  of	   the	   Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service,	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang	  replaced	   Zeng	   Guofan,	   who	   died	   in	   1872,	   to	   become	   the	   most	   powerful	   local	  leader.	  This	  time,	  the	  struggles	  between	  the	  two	  revolved	  around	  two	  topics:	  the	  establishment	  of	   a	   centralised	  maritime	  defence	  agency,	   and	  what	   type	  of	   ship	  was	   most	   suitable	   for	   China’s	   of	   maritime	   defence.	   Comparing	   with	   the	   last	  round	   of	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   between	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   and	   local	   leaders	   over	   the	  Lay-­‐Osborn	   Flotilla,	   this	   time	   the	   power	   struggle	   between	   the	   two	   had	   more	  far-­‐reaching	  impacts	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	   	  In	  contrast	  to	  his	  predecessor,	  Hart	  wielded	  much	  stronger	  influence	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  he	  knew	  more	  about	  naval	  matters.	  Lay	  who	  was	  considered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  429	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  21,	  pp.	  16-­‐19.	  430	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  236.	  431	   HFD,	  I,	  Acquisition	  of	  Ships	  and	  Guns,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  73.	  432	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  278.	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self-­‐seeking	  and	  domineering	  by	  officials	   in	   the	  Court,	  whereas	  Hart	  was	  more	  tactful	  and	  patient,	   and	  was	   therefore	  welcomed	  by	  his	  Chinese	  colleges	   in	   the	  
Zongli	   Yamen.	   Prince	   Gong,	  who	   headed	   the	   Zongli	   Yamen	   until	   1884,	  was	   the	  direct	  superior	  of	  Hart	  and	  the	  personal	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  was	  said	  to	  be	  very	  close.433	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  Hart	  had	  better	  knowledge	  of	  steam	  navy	  than	  Lay	  and	  he	  was	  better	  informed	  of	  the	  latest	  developments	  of	  naval	  technology.	  His	  former	  subordinate	  James	  D.	  Campbell	  was	  then	  based	  in	  London	  and	  acted	  as	  his	  representative.434	   The	  two	  kept	  in	  close	  touch	  via	  telegraph,	  so	  that	  Hart	  could	  learn	  the	  then	  latest	  developments	  of	  naval	  technology	  in	  Britain.	   	  Hart	  had	  his	  own	  view	  of	  China’s	  maritime	  defence.	  From	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	   his	   involvement	   in	   Chinese	   naval	   affairs	   he	   strongly	   opposed	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  seagoing	   navy	   and	   ironclad	   battleships.	   He	   believed	   that	   ironclad	   battleships	  were	  not	  the	  best	  option	  for	  China’s	  maritime	  defence	  if	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  navy	  was	   costal	   defence,	   because	   they	  were	   too	   expensive	   and	   their	  deep	  draft	  was	  not	   suitable	   for	   operating	   in	   China’s	   coastal	   waters. 435 	   Instead,	   Hart	  recommended	   a	   type	   of	   ship	   specially	   built	   for	   the	   task	   of	   coastal	   defence,	  namely	   Rendel	   gunboats	   and	   Rendel	   ram	   cruisers.	   Hart’s	   idea	   of	   Rendel	  gunboats	   echoed	   Britain’s	   efforts	   to	   reinforce	   homeland	   coastal	   defence	  consequent	   on	   the	   scare	   of	   ‘steam	   bridge’	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   19th	  century.436	   As	   to	   the	   tactical	   thinking	   behind	   the	   Rendel	   gunboats,	  William	   G.	  Armstrong,	  president	  of	   the	  Armstrong	  Whitworth	  &	  Co	  Ltd.	  where	   the	  Rendel	  gunboats	  were	  built,	  once	  explained:	  	  ‘…	  [the	  gunboats]	  can	  be	  made	  to	  carry	  the	  heaviest	  artillery.	  They	  would	  
present	   very	   a	   small	   target	   to	   the	   enemy’s	   fire,	   and,	   at	   the	   varying	  
distance	  at	  which	  they	  would	  be	  used,	  they	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  
hit.	  They	  would	  be	  spread	  out	  so	  as	  to	  clear	  each	  other’s	  smoke,	  and	  bring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  433	   CBYWSM-­‐XF,	  Vol.	  79,	  p.	  21.	  434	   James	  D.	  Campbell’s	  office	  was	  in	  No.8	  Storey’s	  Gate,	  Westminster,	  London.	   	  435	   Chinese	   records	   of	   Hart’s	   arguments	   against	   ironclad	   battleships:	   LWZGQJ-­‐PLHG,	   Vol.	   18,	   p.	   38.	  LWZGQJ-­‐YSHG,	  Vol.	  3,	  p.	  7.	  YWYD,	  Vol.2,	  pp.	  337-­‐338.	  436	   In	   the	  mid-­‐19th	  century,	   it	  was	   feared	   in	  Britain	   that	   the	   introduction	  of	  steam	  engine	  to	  navy	  would	  wipe	  out	  the	  country’s	  traditional	  naval	  superiority	  over	  France.	  Prime	  Minister	  Palmerston	  declared:	   ‘the	  
Channel	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  barrier.	  Steam	  navigation	  has	  rendered	  that	  which	  was	  before	  impassable	  by	  a	  military	  
force	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  river	  passable	  by	  a	  steam	  bridge’.	  Roger	  Parkinson,	  The	  Late	  Victorian	  Navy:	  The	  
Pre-­‐Dreadnought	  Era	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  (Woodbridge	  and	  Rochester:	  The	  Boydell	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  10.	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a	   converging	   fire	   to	   bear	   upon	   a	   single	   ship.	   They	   could	   retreat,	   when	  
necessary,	   into	   shallow	  water,	   and	   in	   many	   cases,	   maintain	   a	   fire	   over	  
breakwaters	  which	  would	  afford	  them	  protection.	  Instead	  of	  being	  rooted	  
to	  one	  spot	  like	  a	  battery,	  they	  could	  pursue,	  or	  retreat,	  or	  unite	  in	  taking	  
up	   new	  positions	  …	   they	  would	   afford	   a	   flexible	   and	   powerful	  means	   of	  
defence	  …’	   437	  	  As	  to	  the	  ram	  cruisers,	   it	  can	  be	  learnt	  from	  the	  telegraph	  records	  between	  Hart	   and	   his	   London	   representative	   Campbell	   that	   they	   were	   to	   be	   used	   in	  complement	   to	   the	  Rendel	   gunboats.438	   The	   cruisers	  had	  a	  degree	  of	   offensive	  capabilities	   in	   coastal	  waters	   and	  were	   intended	   to	   be	   used	   together	  with	   the	  gunboats,	  which	  were	  mainly	  designed	  for	  defensive	  purposes.	  George	  W.	  Rendel,	  designer	  of	  the	  ram	  cruisers	  explained	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  design:	  	   ‘These	  vessels	  are	  not	  proposed	  as	  improved	  gunboats	  or	  to	  take	  the	  place	  
of	  gunboats	  but	  an	  independent	  part	  of	  a	  naval	  force	  and	  as	  having	  duties	  
quite	  distinct	   from	  those	  of	  the	  gunboats.	  While	  the	  gunboats	  from	  their	  
light	   draught,	   their	   mobility,	   their	   diminutiveness	   and	   their	   number	  
would	   be	   able	   to	  meet	   and	   defeat	   the	   attack	   of	   ironclads.	   These	   larger	  
vessels	   from	   their	   great	   speed	   and	   artillery	   power	   combined	   would	   be	  
able	  to	  follow	  up	  and	  search	  out	  ironclads	  and	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  mode	  
and	  time	  of	  attack	  …	  five	  of	  the	  new	  vessels	  could	  be	  built	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  
one	  …	  ironclad,	  collectively	  they	  would	  be	  at	   far	  greater	  power	  than	  the	  
ironclad	  …	  The	  new	  vessels	  can	  never	  become	  out	  of	  date	  or	  useless	   like	  
the	   ironclad,	   are	   far	   more	   easily	   maintained	   and	   are	   convertible	   to	  
peaceful	  uses.’	   439	  	   The	  above	   two	  statements	  made	  by	  British	  shipbuilders	  proved	   that	  Hart’s	  acquisition	   plan	   was	   logical	   and	   consistent.	   A	   navy	   composed	   of	   these	   ships	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  437	   William	   G.	   Armstrong,	   'Address	   of	   Sir	   W.	   G.	   Armstrong,	   President'	   in	  Minutes	   of	   Proceedings	   of	   the	  
Institute	   of	   Civil	   Engineers;	  with	  Other	   Selected	  and	  Abstracted	  Papers,	   James	  Forrest	   ed.,	  Vol.68,	   (London:	  Institute	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  1882),	  pp.43-­‐44.	  438	   'Campbell	  to	  Hart'	  (June	  20,	  1889),	  Letter	  A-­‐163/593	  in	  Archives	  of	  China's	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs:	  
Confidential	  Correspondence	  between	  Robert	  Hart	  and	  James	  Duncan	  Campbell,	  1874-­‐1907,	  Vol.	  2,	  Xiafei	  Chen	  and	  Rongfang	  Han,	  eds.,	  (Beijing:	  Foreign	  Languages	  Press,	  1990-­‐1993),	  p.	  204.	  439	   Tyne	  and	  Wear	  Archives,	  31-­‐5080	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would	   certainly	   be	   a	   very	   economic	   force,	   yet	   supposedly	   it	   would	   be	   able	   to	  meet	  the	  mission	  requirements	  of	  coastal	  defence	  (the	  scenario	  that	  Armstrong	  and	   Rendel	   envisioned	   had	   never	   take	   place).	   Taking	   advantage	   of	   his	   good	  relations	  with	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  Hart	  lobbied	  for	  the	  two	  types	  of	  Rendel	  ships	  and	  achieved	  remarkable	   successes.	  A	   total	  number	  of	  eleven	  Rendel	  gunboats	  and	  two	  Rendel	  ram	  cruisers	  were	  bought	  under	  the	  recommendation	  of	  Hart	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1870s	  (see	  Table	  5.3).	  	  	  
 Name Date of Commission 
1st batch 
Long Xiang (龙骧) Commissioned into the 
Beiyang Fleet Nov. 1876  
and transferred to the 
Nanyang Fleet Nov.1879 
Hu Wei (虎威) 
Fei Ting (飞霆) 




Zhen Bei (镇北) 
Commissioned into the  
Beiyang Fleet Nov. 1879 
Zhen Nan (镇南) 
Zhen Dong (镇东) 
Zhen Xi (镇西) 
3rd batch 
Zhen Zhong (镇中) Delivered to the Shandong 
provincial government in Aug. 
1881 and were later transferred to 
the Beiyang Fleet  
Zhen Bian (镇边) 
Hai Jing Qing (海镜清) The Guangdong Fleet Aug. 1881 	  Table	  5.3	  A	  list	  of	  the	  Rendel	  Gunboats	  acquired	  via	  Robert	  Hart	  in	  three	  batches.	   440	  	  	   With	  the	  eleven	  gunboats	  and	  two	  ram	  cruisers	  delivered,	  Hart	  proposed	  to	  the	   Imperial	  Court	   in	  1879	   the	  establishment	  of	   a	  national	   agency	  of	  maritime	  defence.	   As	   a	   part	   of	   the	   proposal	   Hart	   himself	   would	   be	   installed	   as	   the	  inspector-­‐general	  of	  the	  agency.	  The	  original	  proposal	  is	  missing	  from	  historical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  440	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  132.	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archives,	  which	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  know	  in	  detail	  about	  Hart’s	  blueprint.	  But	  from	  comments	  made	  by	   some	   contemporary	  Chinese	  officials	   involved	   in	   this	  event	  it	  can	  be	  learnt	  that	  Hart’s	  new	  title	  would	  give	  him	  considerable	  authority	  over	  all	  regional	  fleets.441	   With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  we	  know	  that	  Hart	  was	  not	  as	  ambitious	  as	  his	  predecessor	  Lay,	  whose	  plan	  of	   the	  Lay-­‐Osborn	  Flotilla	  was	  driven	  by	   a	  mixed	  motivation	  of	   reinforcing	   the	   imperial	   government	   and	  aggrandizing	  himself.	  Hart	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  had	  always	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  strengthening	   the	   Chinese	   central	   government.	   This	   proposal	   should	   be	   no	  exception.	  Officials	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   applauded	   the	  proposal,	   they	  made	   a	  few	  amendments	  to	  it	  and	  intended	  to	  authorise	  it.442	  Unsurprisingly,	   local	   leaders	   objected	   Hart’s	   proposal.	   The	   strongest	  objection	   came	   from	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   who	   was	   then	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	  province,	  Beiyang	  Superintendent	  and	  patron	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  Li	  understood	  that	   the	   title	  of	   inspector-­‐general	  of	  a	  national	  maritime	  defence	  agency	  would	  institutionalise	  Hart’s	  influence	  on	  naval	  issues,	  which	  meant	  that	  power	  would	  be	  wrested	   away	   from	   local	   leaders.	   Li	   reminded	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   that	  Hart	  should	  not	  have	  too	  much	  power;	  otherwise	  he	  would	  be	  too	  difficult	  to	  work	  in	  harness	   with.	   Li	   suggested	   that	   Hart	   should	   choose	   one	   from	   the	   two	   titles:	  either	  inspector-­‐general	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Maritime	  Customs	  Service,	  which	  he	  had	  been	  carrying	  since	  1863,	  or	  inspector-­‐general	  of	  the	  national	  maritime	  defence	  agency,	  which	  he	  suggested	  in	  his	  proposal	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court.443	   Hart	  picked	  the	  former	  and	  was	  consequently	  excluded	  from	  naval	  affairs.	  He	  was	  the	  one	  of	  the	   few	   people	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   who	   was	   enthusiastic	   about	   and	   really	  understood	  a	  modern	  steam	  navy.	  Now	  that	  he	  was	  excluded	  from	  naval	  affairs,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  could	  not	  find	  a	  replacement	  for	  him.	  The	  proposed	  national	  maritime	  defence	  agency	  was	  not	  established.	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  lost	  again	  against	  local	   leaders	  in	  the	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  for	  the	  control	  of	  the	  steam	  navy.	  An	  Imperial	  Edict	  in	  late	  1879	  gave	  Li	  Hongzhang	  –	  the	  then	  strongest	   local	   leader	  –	   the	  power	   to	  conduct	  acquisitions	  on	  behalf	  of	  all	  regional	  maritime	  defence	  agencies	  along	  the	  Chinese	  coast.444	   Yet	  Li	  could	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  1000-­‐1002.	  442	   LWZGQJ-­‐YSHG,	  Vol.	  9,	  pp.	  37-­‐38.	  443	   LWZGQJ-­‐YSHG,	  Vol.	  9,	  pp.	  37-­‐39.	  444	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  427.	  DZSL,	  Vol.	  103,	  p.	  11.	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exercise	   little	   influence	   on	   other	   provincial	   leaders,	   because	   after	   all	   he	  was	   a	  local	  leader	  himself.	  He	  was	  given	  the	  title	  of	  vice	  minister	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Board	  of	  Admiralty	  –	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  in	  1885,	  but	  the	  institution	  had	  little	  real	  power	  (see	   section	   6.3).	   The	   authority	   of	   acquisition	   remained	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   local	  leaders.	  The	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  ordered	   two	  cruisers	   from	   the	  German	  shipbuilder	  Howaldt	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1880s,	   the	   Guangdong	   Fleet	   ordered	   two	   Vulcan	   and	   nine	  Schichau	   torpedo	   boats	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   Sino-­‐French	   War.	   The	   lack	   of	  homogeneity	  among	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  was	  not	  improved.	   	  Although	  Li	  Hongzhang	  was	  not	   able	   to	   influence	   the	  naval	   acquisitions	   of	  other	  regional	   fleets,	  at	   least	  he	  was	  now	  empowered	  to	  buy	  ships	   for	  his	  own	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   –	   the	  elite	   fleet	   of	  Chinese	   steam	  navy	  –	   as	  he	  pleased.	  Different	  from	   Hart	   who	   had	   been	   calling	   for	   Rendel	   gunboats,	   Li	   was	   a	   champion	   of	  ironclad	  battleships.	  He	  embarked	  on	  equipping	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  with	  ironclads	  as	  soon	  as	  he	  was	  empowered	  to	  do	  so.	  A	  chronological	  review	  of	  the	  ships	  that	  China	  acquired	  from	  abroad	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1870s	  and	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1880s	  showed	  a	   sudden	  shift	   from	  small-­‐sized	  coastal	  defence	  gunboats	   to	  ironclad	  battleships.	  Before	  Hart	  lost	  influence	  on	  naval	  acquisition,	  the	  Beiyang	  fleet	  was	  evolving	  towards	  a	  costal	  defence	  force	  featuring	  Rendel	  gunboats	  and	  ram	  cruisers.	  After	  Li	  seized	  control	  of	  naval	  acquisition,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  began	  to	  evolve	  towards	  a	  navy	  of	  ironclad	  battleships.	   	  But	   Li’s	   pursuit	   of	   ironclad	   battleships	   was	   not	   motivated	   by	   a	   Mahanian	  intention	   of	   decisive	   battles	   and	   command	   of	   the	   sea.	   Instead,	   he	   was	   largely	  motivated	   by	   a	   worship	   of	   armour	   and	   firepower.	   His	   naval	   thinking	   was	  one-­‐sided	  and	  less	  systematic.	  Moreover,	  unlike	  Hart	  who	  was	  connected	  to	  and	  advised	  by	  the	  best	  naval	  architects	  in	  London	  via	  Campbell,	  Li	  ‘knew	  nothing	  of	  
comparative	  merits	  or	  virtues	  of	  navy	  of	  these	  marvellous	  appliance	  of	  modern	  war’	  and	   was	   surrounded	   by	   weapon	   makers	   and	   arm	   dealers	   from	   all	   over	   the	  Western	  world.445	   All	  tried	  to	  sell	  him	  weapons	  and	  many	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  changes	   to	   the	  original	  design	  the	  way	  Li	  pleased.	  Li	  was	  given	  a	  much	  greater	  variety	  of	  choices	  and	  he	  was,	  to	  an	  extent,	  spoiled	  by	  these	  choices.	  In	  1886,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  445	   Holcombe,	  The	  Real	  Chinese	  Question,	  p.	  134.	  Chester	  Holcombe	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  foreign	  arm	  dealers	  ‘bribed	  [Li	  Hongzhang’s]	  clerks	  and	  doorkeepers.	  They	  interviewed	  his	  cook	  and	  flattered	  his	  barber.	  They	  sought	   consular	   and	   even	   diplomatic	   assistance.	   They	   expended	   money,	   in	   the	   more	   delicate	   way,	   by	  making	  costly	  presents,	  and	  in	  the	  more	  direct	  and	  grosser	  form	  of	  bribery’.	  Ibid.	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coastal	   batteries	   under	   Li’s	   command	   had	   a	   motley	   collection	   of	   guns	   that	  required	   eighty-­‐four	   different	   kinds	   of	   projectiles.446	   The	   ships	   he	   bought	   had	  the	   same	   problem.	   The	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   the	   chief	   fleet	   of	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	  suffered	   from	   a	   considerable	   lack	   of	   homogeneity	   after	   Li	   took	   charge	   of	   the	  acquisitions.	   	  In	   the	  early	  1880s,	  Li	  bought	   two	   ironclad	  battleships	   from	  Germany	  –	   the	  
Ding	  Yuan	  and	  her	  sister	  ships	  Zhen	  Yuan.	  The	  Ding	  Yuan	  class	  was	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  British	  battleship	  HMS	  Inflexible	  and	  cost	  1.63	  million	  taels	  each.447	   Li	  was	  very	  proud	  of	   this	  pair	  of	   ironclads	  and	  wanted	  to	  order	  more,	  but	  he	  soon	  realised	  that	   the	  Qing	  Empire’s	   finance	  was	   too	  weak	   to	   afford	   a	   large	  number	  of	   such	  ships.	   After	   the	   two	   ironclads,	   Li	   turned	   to	   buy	   cruisers	   instead.	   This	   was	  primarily	   because	   cruisers	  were	  much	   cheaper	   than	   ironclads	   and	  had	  no	   less	  impressive	   firepower.	   In	   the	   1880s,	   Li	   bought	   a	   total	   number	   of	   five	   cruisers	  from	  Britain	  and	  Germany.	  These	  included	  the	  German-­‐built	  protected	  cruiser	  Ji	  
Yuan,	   the	  British-­‐built	  protected	  cruiser	  Zhi	  Yuan	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	   Jìng	  Yuan,	  the	  German-­‐built	  armoured	  cruiser	  Jīng	  Yuan	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  protected	  cruiser	  Jìng	  Yuan),	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  Lai	  Yuan.448	   These	  five	  cruisers	  totalled	  a	  displacement	  of	  12,700	  tons.	  Numerically	  speaking,	  these	  ships,	   in	  combination	  with	   the	   two	   7600-­‐ton	   ironclad	   battleships	   made	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   a	   rather	  considerable	  force	  in	  terms	  of	  displacement.	  But	  Li	  was	  blinded	  by	  his	  worship	  of	  armour	  and	  firepower	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	   he	   overlooked	   the	   key	   differences	   between	   ironclads	   battleships	   and	  cruisers.	   The	   two	   types	   of	   ships	   were	   designed	   to	   undertake	   different	   tasks.	  Ironclad	  battleships	  were	  very	  expensive	  ships.	  They	  were	  designed	  for	  decisive	  battles	   to	   secure	   command	   of	   the	   sea.	   For	   this	   reasons	   they	   usually	   featured	  good	   protection	   and	   strong	   firepower.	   Cruisers	   were	   usually	   comparatively	  cheaper	   and	   they	   were	   designed	   to	   protect	   sea-­‐lanes	   of	   communication	   and	  overseas	   interests.	   They	  were	   supposed	   to	   have	   a	   faster	   cruising	   speed	   and	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  57,	  pp.	  11-­‐14.	  447	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	  Vol.	  55,	  pp.	  16-­‐18;	  Vol.	  56,	  p.	  18.	  448	   Protected	   cruiser	   and	   armoured	   cruisers:	   protected	   cruiser	   was	   a	   type	   of	   cruiser	   of	   the	   late	   19th	  century,	   so	   known	   because	   they	   usually	   featured	   an	   armoured	   deck	   that	   offered	   protection	   for	   vital	  machines	  from	  explosive	  and	  armour	  piercing	  rounds.	  Protected	  cruisers	  were	  an	  alternative	  to	  armoured	  cruisers,	  which	   usually	   featured	   armour	   belts	   along	   the	   sides.	   The	   former	  were	   usually	   characterised	   by	  higher	  speed,	  while	  the	  latter	  offered	  better	  protection.	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longer	   operational	   range.	   Both	   types	   of	   ships	   had	   their	   shortcomings:	   the	  ironclad	   battleships’	   protection	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   speed,	   whereas	   the	  manoeuvrability	  of	  cruisers	  usually	  came	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  armour	  protection.	  It	  was	  hard	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  ironclad	  battleships	  and	  cruisers.	   	   	  Failing	   to	   realise	   the	   differences,	   Li	   was	   inclined	   to	   believe	   that	   ironclads	  were	  the	  best	  warships	  and	  that	  cruisers	  were	  only	  second	  rate.449	   Although	  he	  was	  buying	  cruisers,	  he	  wanted	  the	  cruisers	  he	  bought	  to	  be	  cheaper	  substitutes	  for	   ironclads.	   For	   example,	   Li	   asked	   the	   British	   shipbuilder	   Armstrong	  Whitworth	  &	  Co.	  Ltd.,	  who	  was	  building	  protected	  cruisers	  for	  his	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  to	   add	   an	   eight	   to	   ten	   inch	   thick	   water	   belt	   armour	   to	   the	   Zhi	   Yuan	   class	  protected	  cruiser.	  Naval	  architects	  of	   the	  Armstrong	  Company	  refused	   to	  make	  such	  changes	  and	  explained	  via	  the	  Chinese	  minister	  in	  London	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	   between	   armour	   protection	   and	   speed. 450	  Comparing	   with	   the	   British-­‐built	   cruisers,	   Li	   was	   more	   satisfied	   with	   the	  German-­‐built	  armoured	  cruiser	  Jing	  Yuan	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  Lai	  Yuan,	  primarily	  because	   they	   were	   better	   armoured.	   There	   were	   extolled	   as,	   in	   Li’s	   words,	  ‘small-­‐sized	  ironclads’.	  But	  the	  armour	  protection	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  speed.	  The	  two	  German-­‐built	  armoured	  cruiser	  Jing	  Yuan	  and	  Lai	  Yuan	  had	  a	  top	  speed	  of	   15.5kts	   and	   15.75kts	   respectively,	   while	   the	   two	   British-­‐built	   protected	  cruisers	  featured	  a	  top	  speed	  of	  18.5kts.451	   	  The	  British-­‐built	   and	  German-­‐built	   cruisers	  were	   also	   different	   in	   the	  way	  their	  main	  armament	  would	  be	  best	   employed	   in	   combat.	  The	  British-­‐built	  Zhi	  
Yuan	  class	  had	  its	  two	  8.2in	  main	  gun	  mounted	  on	  the	  bow	  and	  stern,	  and	  two	  Armstrong	  6in	  quick-­‐firing	   guns	  mounted	  on	   the	   sponsons	  on	  each	   side	  of	   the	  ship.	  From	  a	  tactical	  perspective,	  this	  configuration	  of	  armament	  favoured	  a	  use	  of	  the	  ship	  in	  a	  line	  ahead	  formation,	  one	  that	  could	  maximise	  the	  ship’s	  strong	  broadside	   fire	   (see	   Photo	   5.10).	   The	   German-­‐built	   Jing	   Yuan	   class,	   in	   contrast,	  had	   its	   two	  8.2in	  main	  guns	  mounted	  on	   the	  bow	  and	   there	  were	  another	   two	  5.9in	  guns	  mounted	  on	  the	  sponsons	  on	  each	  side.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  ship	  could	  concentrate	   all	   its	   firepower	  when	   firing	   end-­‐on	  at	   the	   target,	   therefore	   it	  was	  better	  suited	  for	  a	  line	  abreast	  tactical	  formation	  (see	  Photo	  5.11).	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  449	   GXCZRJSSL,	  Vol.	  14,	  p.	  5.	  450	   LHZQJ-­‐DG,	  Vol.	  1,	  pp.	  563-­‐570.	  YWYD,	  Vol.3,	  pp.371-­‐374	  451	   Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  73.	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Li	   Hongzhang’s	   neglect	   of	   the	   abovementioned	   differences	   and	   his	  single-­‐minded	   pursuit	   of	   armour	   and	   firepower	   had	   led	   to	   a	   fleet	   of	   a	   highly	  heterogeneous	   warships.	   By	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War,	   the	  Beiyang	   fleet	   had	   ten	   capital	   ships	   in	   total.	   Two	  were	   the	   ironclad	   battleships	  
Ding	  Yuan	  and	  Zhen	  Yuan.	  Among	  the	  five	  cruisers	  three	  were	  German-­‐built	  –	  the	  protected	  cruiser	  Ji	  Yuan,	  and	  the	  armoured	  cruisers	  Jīng	  Yuan	  and	  Lai	  Yuan.	  Two	  were	  British-­‐built	  –	  the	  protected	  cruiser	  Zhi	  Yuan	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  Jìng	  Yuan.	  The	  Ji	  Yuan	  was	  one	  of	  Germany’s	  first	  attempts	  at	  a	  protected	  cruiser	  and	  was	  considered	  as	  an	  unsuccessful	  ship.	  The	  two	  German-­‐built	  armoured	  cruiser	  Jing	  
Yuan	   and	   Lai	   Yuan	   featured	   good	   armour	   protection	   but	   their	   speed	   was	  comparatively	  lower	  and	  they	  were	  designed	  for	  line	  abreast	  formation.	  The	  two	  British-­‐built	  protected	  cruisers	  featured	  high	  speed	  but	  low	  protection,	  suitable	  for	   line	   ahead	   tactical	   formation.	   In	   addition,	   there	   were	   the	   two	   Rendel	   ram	  cruisers	   Chao	   Yong	   and	   Yang	   Wei,	   which	   were	   supposed	   to	   be	   used	   in	  complement	   to	   Rendel	   gunboats.	   Lastly,	   there	   was	   the	   Fuzhou	   Built	   coast	  defence	   gunboat	   Ping	   Yuan,	   which	   was	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   French	   coastal	   defence	  gunboat	  Achéron	  (see	  Photo	  5.5).	  The	  lack	  of	  homogeneity	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	   defeat	   in	   the	   Battle	   of	   Yalu.	   R.	   Hill	   observed	   that	   in	   the	   battle	   the	   fleet	  chose	  a	  tactical	  formation	  that	  was	  reminiscent	  of	  Adm.	  Tegetthoff’s	  at	  the	  1866	  Battle	  of	  Lissa	  and	  what	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  same	  tactics	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  ram.452	   However,	   due	   to	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	   ships,	   the	   fleet	   moved	   very	  slowly	  when	   it	   steamed	   towards	   the	   Japanese	   Combined	   fleet	   (the	   speed	   of	   a	  fleet	  is	  that	  of	  the	  slowest	  ship).453	   By	  the	  time	  it	  reached	  close	  range,	  many	  of	  the	   ships	  had	  already	  been	  heavily	  damaged,	   especially	   the	  unarmoured	   ships,	  which	  were	   supposed	   to	  offset	   their	   inferior	   armour	  protection	  by	  high	   speed.	  Four	  out	  of	  the	  five	  Chinese	  ships	  that	  sunk	  in	  the	  battle	  were	  unarmoured	  ships.	  A	   statistical	   analysis	   after	   the	   battle	   showed	   that	   the	   ships	   that	   survived	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  452	   Hill,	  War	  At	  Sea	  In	  The	  Ironclad	  Age,	  p.	  199.	  453	   Some	  account	  said	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  moved	  at	  a	  speed	  as	  low	  as	  7kts.	  Yue	  Chen,	  '甲午黄海大东沟海战北
洋海军阵型考	   Jiawu	  Huanghai	  Dadonggou	  Haizhan	  Beiyang	  Haijun	  Zhenxing	  Kao	  [An	  Examination	  on	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet's	  Battle	  Formation	  during	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu]'	  in	  北洋海军新探：北洋海军成军 120周年国际
学术研讨会论文集	   Beiyang	  Haijun	  Xintan:	  Beiyang	  Haijun	  Chengjun	  120	  Zhounian	  Guoji	  Xueshu	  Yantaohui	  
Lunwenji	   [Beiyang	   Navy	   Revisited:	   A	   Collection	   of	   Theses	   Presented	   at	   the	   International	   Symposium	  
Commemorating	   the	   120th	  Anniversary	   of	   the	  Beiyang	  Navy's	   Establishment],	   Junjie	  Qi	   and	  Yang	  Guo	   eds.,	  (Beijing:	  Zhonghua	  Shuju,	  2012),	  p.	  706.	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taken	  a	  staggering	  number	  of	  direct	  hits:	  the	  ironclad	  battleship	  Ding	  Yuan	  159,	  her	   sister	   ship	   Zhen	   Yuan	   200,	   the	   armoured	   cruiser	   Lai	   Yuan	   225,	   and	   the	  protected	   cruiser	   Jing	   Yuan	   110.454 	   The	   low	   speed	   of	   the	   fleet	   caused	   by	  heterogeneity	   of	   the	   ships	   was	   considered	   as	   the	  main	   reason	   of	   the	   Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  failure	  to	  apply	  ramming	  tactics.	  	  	  
5.4	  Conclusion	   	  	  As	  to	  the	  home-­‐built	  ships,	   the	  opinion	  on	  what	  type	  of	  ship	  most	  suited	  China	  diverged.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Yard	  had	  financial	  survival	  as	  its	  paramount	  concern;	  it	   built	   the	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	   ships’	   in	   the	  hope	   that	   the	  warships	   could	  earn	   their	  keep	  by	  serving	  as	  cargo	  ships	  in	  peacetime.	  However,	  these	  ships	  proved	  to	  be	  militarily	  inadequate	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War,	  as	  the	  cargo	  capabilities	  of	  these	  ships	  severely	  compromised	  their	  military	  values.	  Admirers	  of	   Western	   naval	   power	   like	   Ding	   Richang	   argued	   from	   a	   purely	   military	  viewpoint	   that	   China	   should	   build	   larger	   and	  mightier	  warships.	   They	   claimed	  that	  only	  warships	  as	  powerful	  as	  those	  of	  the	  West	  could	  safeguard	  China.	  But	  they	   neglected	   that	   Western	   naval	   power	   was	   backed	   by	   a	   type	   of	   economy	  different	  from	  that	  of	  China,	  and	  China	  lacked	  the	  same	  level	  of	  financial	  strength	  to	   uphold	   expensive	   Western-­‐style	   warships.	   Those	   who	   called	   for	  littoral/riverine	   gunboats	   suggested	   a	   type	   of	   ship	   that	   conformed	   with	   the	  traditional	  Chinese	  military	  modus	  operandi	  of	  coastal	  and	  riverine	  warfare.	  But	  the	  realisation	  of	  their	  ideas	  was	  rendered	  impossible	  by	  provincial	  leaders	  who	  pursued	  local	   interests	  as	  top	  priority.	  The	  underlying	  problem	  that	  caused	  the	  failure	  of	  home-­‐built	  ships	  was	  the	  political	  structure	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  Under	  its	  premise,	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  naval	  modernisers	  to	  take	  the	  overall	  situation	  into	   consideration.	   Notwithstanding	   that	   each	   school	   of	   thinking	   had	   its	   own	  sound	  reasons,	  none	  could	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  the	  mission	  of	  the	  navy	  and	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  realities	  of	  China.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  454	   Ma,	  A	  New	  Examination	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navies,	  p.	  80.	  Apart	  from	  the	  Chinese	  fleet’s	  low	  speed,	   another	   key	   reason	   that	   thwarted	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet’s	   application	   of	   ramming	   tactics	  was	   that	   the	  Japanese	  ships	  were	  equipped	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  quick	  firing	  guns.	  A	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  Japanese	  Fleet	  was	  equipped	  with	  sixty-­‐six	  quick	  firing	  guns,	  while	  the	  Chinese	  had	  only	  two.	  Hill,	  War	  At	  Sea	  In	  The	  
Ironclad	  Age,	  p.	  199.	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Financial	   difficulties	   impeded	   the	   development	   of	   Chinese	   indigenous	  shipbuilding	   capabilities.	   First,	   China	   lacked	   and	   refused	   to	   establish	   a	  Western-­‐style	   financial	   infrastructure	   to	   raise	   funds	   for	   the	   cause	   of	   naval	  modernisation.	  The	  shipbuilding	  centres	  operated	  on	  fixed	  amount	  of	  allocations.	  The	   funds	   were	   not	   enough	   for	   the	   shipbuilding	   plants	   to	   reinvest	   in	   new	  machineries,	   which	   made	   it	   difficult	   for	   them	   to	   keep	   abreast	   with	   the	   latest	  developments	  of	  naval	  technology.	  Second,	  the	  strong	  government	  control	  of	  the	  shipbuilding	   centres	   meant	   that	   they	   operated	   in	   the	   fashion	   of	   bureaucratic	  bodies	   rather	   than	   commercial	   enterprises.	  The	   conservative	   inclination	  of	   the	  bureaucrats	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  command	  economy	  that	  they	  observed	  further	  lowered	   the	   innovative	   capabilities	   of	   the	   Chinese	   indigenous	   shipbuilding	  industries.	  Third,	  the	  provincialism	  that	  characterised	  the	  political	   landscape	  of	  the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   resulted	   in	   cutthroat	   competitions	   between	   the	   various	  regional	   maritime	   defence	   agencies.	   They	   severely	   damaged	   the	   reputation	   of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  –	  the	  main	  Chinese	  shipbuilding	  centre	  –	  and	  that	  of	  the	  native	   naval	   architects.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   decline	   of	   Chinese	   shipbuilding	  industries,	   acquisition	   from	  abroad	   replaced	  building	  at	  home	   in	  becoming	   the	  main	  source	  of	  ships	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	   	  A	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  between	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  affected	  the	  projects	  of	  overseas	  naval	  acquisition.	  The	   former	  wanted	  to	  buy	  a	  centralised	  naval	   force	  from	   abroad,	   as	  most	   of	   the	  military	   industries	  were	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   local	  authorities.	  The	  latter,	  however,	  strived	  to	  retain	  control	  of	  naval	  modernisation	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  local	  interests.	  In	  late	  19th	  century	  when	  the	  local	  authorities	  had	  an	  upper	  hand	  in	  the	  power	  struggle	  against	  the	  Imperial	  Court,	  achieving	  naval	  centralisation	  was	  difficult.	   In	  the	  early	  1860s,	   the	  Imperial	  Court	  attempted	  to	  establish	   a	   central	   navy	   through	   buying	   a	   flotilla	   via	   the	   Imperial	   Maritime	  Customs	  Services,	  but	  the	  project	  was	  thwarted	  due	  to	  the	  objection	  of	  the	  then	  most	  powerful	  local	  leader	  Zeng	  Guofan,	  who	  wanted	  to	  bring	  the	  flotilla	  under	  his	   control.	   In	   the	   late	   1870s,	   the	   Imperial	   Court’s	   planned	   the	   building	   of	   a	  centralised	   coastal	   defence	   navy	   via	   Robert	   Hart	   but	   the	   then	   most	   powerful	  local	  leader	  Li	  Hongzhang	  disagreed.	  Naval	  acquisition	  remained	  a	  local	  business.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  strategy	  of	  naval	  acquisition,	  Li’s	  acquisition	  policy	  for	  his	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  –	  the	  elite	  unit	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  –	  lacked	  consistency,	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the	  resulting	  heterogeneity	  of	  ships	  contributed	  to	  the	  fleet’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	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  Photo	  5.1	  The	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	  was	  the	  first	  ship	  built	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  in	  the	  late	  1860s	  that	  embodied	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’.	  Twelve	  ships	  of	  this	  class	  were	  built	  from	  1868	  to	  1876.	  To	  a	  great	  extent	  also	  the	  Wei	  Yuan	  class	  composite	  ships	  (wooden-­‐hulled	  with	  iron	  ribs)	  built	  after	  1876	  embodied	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’.	   	  	  
	  Photo	  5.2	  Cruiser	  Yang	  Wu,	   the	  only	   real	  military	   vessel	   built	   by	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	   in	   the	  1870s.	  It	  was	  equipped	  with	  twenty-­‐three	  naval	  guns	  but	  it	  had	  a	  very	  low	  cargo	  potential.	  None	  of	  the	  coastal	  provinces	  adopted	  the	  Yang	  Wu.	  It	  remained	  in	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  was	  later	  used	  a	  training	  vessel.	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  Photo	  5.3	  The	  Hai	  An	  (or	  Yu	  Yuan).455	   It	  was	  built	  by	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  in	  the	  early	  1870s.	  In	  spite	  of	   its	   relatively	  high	  military	  value,	   this	  ship	  was	   too	  expensive	   to	  build	  and	  maintain	   for	  China.	  (source:	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  37)	  	  
	  Photo	  5.4	  The	  cruiser	  Bao	  Min.	  Launched	  in	  1885,	  the	  cruiser	  Bao	  Min	  was	  the	  last	  ship	  built	  in	  the	   Jiangnan	   Arsenal	   in	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   period.	   It	   was	   originally	   intended	   as	   a	  littoral/riverine	   gunboat,	   but	   the	   ship	   failed	   to	   embody	   this	   idea.	   (source:	   The	   Chinese	   Steam	  Navy,	  p.67)	  














远”则因缺乏运行经费而一度封存在江南制造局内。1878 年 8、9 月间，使用多年的“海安”进
入江南制造局维护，后从档案中除名，推测因为舰况较差而废除。“驭远”因此得以启封，顶替“海
安”的位置，中法战争中“驭远”被编入南洋水师支援台湾防务的舰队南下，遭遇法国舰队军舰




图源：Japan － China War ：The Naval Battle of Haiyang
 “海安”（“镇安”）、“驭远”
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  Photo	   5.5	   The	   coastal	   defence	   gunboat	   Ping	   Yuan	   was	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   French	   coastal	   defence	  gunboat	  Acheron.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  advanced	  ships	  built	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  before	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  	  	  
	  Photo	   5.6	   The	   cruiser	   Kai	   Ji.	   It	   was	   a	   copy	   of	   French	   cruiser	  Duguay-­‐Trouin,	   one	   of	   the	   most	  sophisticated	  ships	  built	  by	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  during	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period.	  (source:	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  56.)	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  Photo	  5.7	  Rendel	  gunboat	  Delta	  (later	  renamed	  Che	  Dian)	  upon	  completion,	  the	  other	  ten	  Rendel	  gunboats	   that	  Hart	  bought	   in	   the	   late	  1870s	  were	  virtually	  of	   the	  same	  design	  (source:	  Wright,	  
The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  45.).	  	  	  
	  Photo	  5.8	  Rendel	  ram	  cruiser	  Yang	  Wei	  upon	  completion.	  Both	  the	  Chao	  Yong	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  
Yang	  Wei	  were	  sunk	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  (source:	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  47.).	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Displacement 7144 tons designed, 7670 tons full load 
Dimensions (ft) 308 oa, 298.5 pp × 60 × 20 
Machinery 
Reciprocating 8-cyl. boilers, 2-shaft, 3-cyl. 
Horizontal trunk engines. Trials. Ding Yuan 6200 IHP = 14.5 
knots (Ding Yuan); 7200 IHP = 15.4 knots (Zhen Yuan) 
Coal & Radius 700 tons normal, 1000 tons max. 4500 nm at 10 knots 




Ding Yuan: laid down 31 Mar 1881, launched 28 Dec 1881, 
trials 2 May 1883 
Zhen Yuan: laid down Mar 1882, launched 28 Nov 1882, trials 
Mar 1884 	  Photo	  5.9	  Ironclad	  Battleship	  Ding	  Yuan	  and	  its	  technical	  details.	  Ding	  Yuan	  –	  the	  flagship	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  –	  and	  her	  sister	  ship	  Zhen	  Yuan	  were	  the	  largest	  ships	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  period.	  (source:	  Wright,	  The	  Chinese	  Steam	  Navy,	  p.	  65.)	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  Photo	  5.10	  The	  Zhi	  Yuan	   class	  protected	  cruiser.	   Its	   configuration	  of	  armament	   favoured	  a	   line	  ahead	  tactical	  formation.	   	  	  
	  	  Photo	  5.11	  The	  Jing	  Yuan	  class	  armoured	  cruiser.	  Its	  configuration	  of	  armament	  favoured	  a	  line	  abreast	  tactical	  formation.	   	  	  
	   191	  
	  Photo	  5.12	  Some	  capital	  ships	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  that	  took	  part	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu.	  It	  can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   pictures	   that	   the	   ships	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   were	   highly	  heterogeneous	  in	  their	  features.	  (Source:	  The	  Graphic,	  1st	  Dec.	  1894)	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  Chapter	  Six	  
	  






	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  three	  aspects:	  (1)	  Chinese	  military	  traditions	  and	  their	  influences	  on	  the	  use	  of	  naval	  power;	  (2)	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  four	  regional	  fleets	  and	   the	   subsequent	   defeat	   of	   the	   fleet	   of	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   during	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War;	  and	  (3)	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Board	  of	  Admiralty	  –	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  –	  and	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	   It	   will	   try	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	  informed	   China’s	   use	   of	   naval	   power,	   and	   how	   it	   affected	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	  coordination	  between	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets.	  A	  navy	  is	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  state;	   its	  mission	  and	  the	  way	   in	  which	   it	   is	  used	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  nation’s	  goals,	  perceived	  threats	  and	  practical	  experiences.	  Yet	  as	  a	  state	  institution,	  the	  navy’s	   organisational	   structure	   and	   command	   system	   has	   to	   be	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	   political	   framework	   of	   the	   state,	   which	   is	   in	   turn	   determined	   by	   the	  dynamics	  between	  various	  power	  centres.	   	  	  
	  
6.1	   The	   Chinese	   Military	   Traditions	   and	   Their	   Influences	   on	   the	   Use	   of	  
Naval	  Power	  	  During	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   period,	   the	   steam	   navy	   was	   brought	   under	   the	  overarching	  term	  of	  maritime	  defence.	  This	  implied	  that	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	   regarded	   as	   a	   means	   to	   the	   end	   of	   maritime	   defence.	   However,	   the	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Self-­‐Strengtheners	  who	  built	  the	  steam	  navy	  did	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  explanation	  of	  how	  they	  intended	  to	  use	  the	  navy	  for	  that	  purpose	  and	  there	  was	  no	  clearly	  formulated	  maritime	  strategy.	  Therefore	  the	  navy	  was	  used	  largely	  in	  conformity	  with	  traditional	  Chinese	  military	  modus	  operandi,	  which	  was	  largely	  based	  on	  a	  concept	   of	   defence	   through	   fixed	   fortifications.	   This	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  throughout	   Chinese	   history	   the	   most	   menacing	   external	   threat	   had	   been	   the	  incursions	   of	   nomadic	   peoples	   from	   the	   northern	   (including	   the	   Manchus	  themselves).	  Although	  usually	  not	  large	  in	  number,	  the	  tactics	  of	  these	  mounted	  raiders	  featured	  high	  mobility	  and	  concentration	  of	  force.	  These	  the	  often	  more	  numerous	  Chinese	  infantry	  found	  difficult	  to	  defend	  against,	  especially	  in	  terrain	  lacking	  in	  defensive	  features.	  To	  tackle	  such	  threats,	  fortresses	  were	  usually	  built	  along	  the	  borders	  of	  agrarian	  areas	  to	  ward	  off	   the	  aggressors.	  The	  Great	  Wall,	  which	   was	   built	   and	   improved	   continuously	   throughout	   Chinese	   history	   since	  the	  Qin	  Dynasty	  (221-­‐206	  BC),	  was	  the	  concept	  of	  such	  fortresses	  writ	  large.456	   	  Fortress	   warfare	   was	   also	   commonly	   seen	   in	   Chinese	   domestic	   wars.	   A	  majority	   of	   the	   domestic	  wars	   in	   Chinese	   history	   revolved	   around	   the	   capture	  and	  defence	  of	  agricultural	  resources.	   In	  this	  context,	   ‘strengthen	  the	  walls	  and	  clear	   the	   fields’	   –	   consolidating	   one’s	   defences	   while	   applying	   scorched	   earth	  tactics	  was	  a	  frequently	  applied	  strategy.457	   Thick	  walls	  were	  built	  around	  cities	  and	  towns	  so	  that	  when	  attackers	  came,	  the	  defending	  side	  could	  concentrate	  the	  most	  valuable	  strategic	  resources	  of	  an	  agrarian	  economy	  –	  manpower	  and	  food	  –	  inside	  the	  walls.	  Attacking	  walled	  cities	  by	  direct	  assault	  was	  considered	  a	  risky	  and	  potentially	  costly	  action	  for	  the	  attacking	  side.	  The	  most	  renowned	  Chinese	  military	  classic	  –	  The	  Art	  of	  War	  –	  said:	  ‘when	  troops	  attack	  cities,	  their	  strength	  
will	  be	  exhausted’	  and	  ‘the	  worst	  policy	  is	  to	  attack	  [walled]	  cities.	  Attack	  [walled]	  
cities	   only	  when	   there	   is	   no	   alternative.’458	   In	   short,	   fortress	  warfare	   and	   static	  defence	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  feudal-­‐agrarian	  economy	  and	  was	  commonly	  practiced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  456	   As	   to	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   Great	   Wall	   and	   the	   agrarian	   economy,	   Ray	   Huang	   observed:	   ‘the	  
traditional	  line	  of	  defence	  that	  China	  erected	  along	  the	  steppe	  land,	  customarily	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Great	  Wall”,	  
was	  by	  no	  means	  fixed,	  It	  moved	  back	  and	  forth,	  yet	  never	  too	  far	  away	  from	  the	  “15-­‐inch	  isohyet	  line”.	  That	  is	  
to	  say,	  the	  territories	  north	  and	  west	  of	  the	  Great	  Wall,	  having	  an	  annual	  rainfall	  of	  less	  than	  fifteen	  inches	  and	  
therefore	  inadequate	  for	  cultivation,	  remained	  a	  grazing	  ground	  for	  the	  nomads.	  ’	  Ray	  Huang,	  Broadening	  the	  
Horizons	  of	  Chinese	  History:	  Discourses,	  Syntheses,	  and	  Comparisons,	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.	  E.	  Sharpe,	  Inc.,	  1999),	  p.	  29.	  457	   ‘坚壁清野’	  458	   Tzu	  Sun,	  The	  Art	  of	  War,	  Samuel	  B.	  Griffith	  tran.,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1971),	  p.	  73,	  78.	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in	  Chinese	  warfare.	  Such	   military	   thinking	   did	   not	   fade	   away	   during	   subsequent	   Chinese	  dynasties.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   it	  was	  developed	  further	  and	  became	  a	  key	  military	  doctrine	   of	   the	  Qing	   armed	   forces	   in	   the	   domestic	  wars	   of	   the	   19th	   century.	   E.	  Wang	   observed	   that	   mid-­‐19th	   century	   Chinese	   warfare	   was	   characterised	   by	  stationary	  rather	  than	  mobile	  warfare.	  Zeng	  Guofan,	  the	  most	  prominent	  military	  commander	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  summarised	  his	  operational	  doctrine	   as	   ‘building	   hardened	   fortifications	   to	   fight	   static	   war.’459	   Augustus	   F.	  Lindley,	  an	  ex-­‐British	  Royal	  Navy	  officer	  who	   joined	   the	  Taiping	  Rebellion	  as	  a	  military	   advisor,	   provided	   a	   vivid	   depiction	   of	   Zeng’s	   application	   of	   fortress	  warfare:	   	  	   ‘[Zeng’s	  army	  built]	  themselves	  in	  with	  a	  formidable	  series	  of	  earth-­‐works	  
and	  stockades,	  from	  which	  they	  could	  neither	  climb	  out	  nor	  enemies	  climb	  
in.	  As	  a	  rule,	   the	  Chinese	  never	   fight	  unless	  they	  are	  obliged	  to.	  Not	  that	  
they	  are	  so	  cowardly	  as	  some	  Europeans	  have	  mistakenly	  seemed	  to	  have	  
believe,	  but	  rather	  from	  those	  singularly	  refined	  traits	  of	  reasoning	  which,	  
with	  these	  peculiar	  people,	  border	  closely	  upon	  the	  absurd.’460	  	   As	   this	   extract	   implied,	   such	  military	   practice	   had	   its	   accompanying	   logic,	  which	  Zeng	  summarised	  as	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  ‘master-­‐guest’:	  with	  the	  master	  in	  a	  military	  campaign	  being	  the	  side	  that	  held	  stationary	  defence,	  whereas	  the	  guest	  was	   the	   one	   that	   relied	   on	   attacks	   through	  movement.	   Zeng	   believed	   that	   the	  
master	  always	  had	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  winning	  than	  the	  guest.	  Such	  a	  theory	  had	  its	  origins	  in	  Chinese	  military	  traditions.	  With	  respect	  to	  offense	  and	  defence,	  The	  
Art	  of	  War	  states	  that	  ‘invincibility	  lies	  in	  the	  defence.’461	   The	  doctrine	  of	  passive	  defence	   was	   deeply	   rooted	   in	   Chinese	   economic	   realities	   and	   was	   commonly	  practiced	  by	  Chinese	  military	  commanders	  as	  a	  result.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  military	  thinking	  had	  influenced	  China’s	  use	  of	  naval	  power	  was	   reflected	  by	   the	  popularity	  of	   the	  book	  A	  Treatise	   on	  Coast-­‐Defence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  459	   Luo,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Hunan	  Army,	  pp.	  167-­‐169.	   	  460	   Augustus	  F.	  Lindley,	  Ti-­‐ping	  Tien-­‐kwoh:	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Ti-­‐ping	  Revolution.	   (London:	  Day	  &	  Son	  Ltd.,	  1866),	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  346.	  461	   Sun,	  The	  Art	  of	  War,	  p.	  85.	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among	   the	   officials	   involved	   in	   China’s	   maritime	   defence.	   The	   book	   was	   first	  published	  in	  London	  in	  1868	  and	  was	  translated	  by	  the	  translation	  bureau	  of	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal	   in	   the	   early	   1870s.	   The	   author	   of	   the	  book,	  Viktor	  E.K.R.	   von	  Scheliha	   was	   a	   Prussian	   subject	   who	   served	   as	   an	   army	   –	   rather	   than	   navy	   –	  officer	   and	   engineer	   in	   the	   Department	   of	   the	   Gulf	   of	   Mexico	   of	   the	   late	  Confederate	  States	  of	  America.	  The	  preface	  of	  the	  book	  reads:	   	  	  ‘The	   following	   treatise	   presents	   chiefly	   the	   results	   of	   the	   Author’s	  
experience	  and	  observation	  in	  Coast-­‐defence	  during	  the	  four	  years	  of	  the	  
late	  war	   in	  North	  America.	  …	  The	  work	   is	  mainly	   intended	  to	  set	   forth	  
the	  principles	  of	  Coast-­‐defence	  as	  they	  had	  developed	  themselves	  at	  the	  
close	  of	  the	  American	  war’.462	  	  The	   book	   had	   two	   parts.	   The	   first	   part	   was	   titled	   ‘the	   progress	   made	   in	   naval	  
architecture	  and	  in	  artillery	  necessitates	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  principles	  heretofore	  
observed	  in	  coast-­‐defence’.	  In	  this	  part,	  the	  author	  covered	  in	  detail	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   technical	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	   construction	   and	   wartime	   use	   of	   coastal	  fortifications.	   The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   book	   focused	   on	   three	   topics,	   namely,	  ‘obstruction’,	   ‘torpedoes’	   (naval	   mines),	   and	   ‘methods	   for	   lighting-­‐up	  channels’.463	  A	  key	  reason	  behind	  the	  popularity	  of	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Coast-­‐Defence	   in	  China	  was	  that	  it	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  conformed	  to	  existing	  Chinese	  military	  practice.	  As	  an	   army	   officer	   in	   charge	   of	   coastal	   defence,	   von	   Scheliha	   studied	   maritime	  warfare	  from	  the	  same	  perspective	  as	  the	  Chinese	  officials	  in	  charge	  of	  maritime	  defence.	  Both	  were	  defending	  an	  agrarian	  economy,	  and	  both	  viewed	  preventing	  enemy	  ships	   from	  breaking	  through	  coastal	  defences	  as	   their	  primary	  aim.	  The	  book	  was	  widely	  read	  and	  cited	  by	  Chinese	  officials	  involved	  in	  maritime	  defence.	  In	   contrast,	   other	   books	   that	   focused	   on	   naval	  warfare	   introduced	   to	   China	   at	  roughly	  the	  same	  time	  did	  not	  draw	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  attention.	  In	  particular,	  an	   Austrian	   book	   named	   Haizhan	   Xinyi	   (the	   origins	   of	   the	   original	   book	   are	  unclear,	   the	  Chinese	  name	   can	  be	   translated	   literally	   as	  A	  New	  Treatise	   on	   Sea	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  462	   Von	  Scheliha,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Coast-­‐Defence,	  (London:	  E	  &	  F.	  N.	  Spon,	  1868),	  p.	  vi.	  463	   See	  the	  table	  of	  contents	  of	  Von	  Scheliha’s	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Coast-­‐Defence.	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Battles)	   that	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   command	   of	   the	   sea	   and	   sea-­‐lanes	   of	  communication	  in	  maritime	  warfare,	  was	  largely	  ignored.464	   	  What	   the	   Chinese	   readers	   took	   away	   from	   their	   reading	   of	   A	   Treatise	   on	  
Coast-­‐Defence	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   frequency	   the	   book	   was	   cited	   by	   officials	  responsible	  for	  maritime	  defence	  in	  their	  memorials	  to	  the	  Throne.	  Among	  them	  were	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   then	   governor	   of	   Zhili	   province;	   Li	   Zongxi,	   then	  governor-­‐general	   of	   Liangjiang;	   Liu	   Kunyi,	   then	   governor	   of	   Jiangxi	   province;	  Ding	   Baozhen,	   then	   governor	   of	   Shandong	   province.465	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   who	  wielded	   the	  strong	   influence	  on	  China’s	  maritime	  defence	  policies,	   reflected	  on	  his	  learning	  from	  the	  book	  in	  an	  1874	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne:	   	  	  ‘according	   to	   von	   Scheliha	   ...	   [the	  most	   practical	   stratagem	   for	   China’s	  coast	  defence]	   is	   twofold.	  The	   first	   is	   stationary	  defence,	  which	  requires	  
extraordinarily	   sturdy	   coastal	   fortifications	   and	   batteries	   that	   can	  
withstand	   the	   shelling	   of	   enemy	   ships	   …	   along	   with	   ironclads	  mounted	  
with	  large	  guns,	  which	  are	  required	  to	  defend	  the	  waterways	  [to	  prevent	  the	   enemy	   from	   breaking	   through].	   …	   The	   second	   is	   mobile	   warfare,	  
which	  requires	  a	   large	  number	  of	  well-­‐trained	  troops	  and	   large	  military	  
vessels	  …	  to	  prevent	  the	  enemy	  from	  landing	  [on	  our	  coasts].’466	  	   Two	   points	   can	   be	   distilled	   from	   how	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners’	   reading	   of	  A	  
Treatise	  on	  Coast-­‐Defence	   influenced	  how	  they	  used	  the	  navy.	  First,	   the	  Chinese	  maritime	  defenders	  saw	  passive	  defence	  rather	   than	  offence	  as	  a	  means	   to	   the	  end	  of	  maritime	  security.	  The	  aim	  of	  maritime	  defence	  was	  to	  prevent	  the	  enemy	  from	   penetrating	   the	   line	   of	   defence	   and	   landing	   troops	   on	   the	   Chinese	   coast.	  Second,	   defensive	   capabilities,	   which	   comprised	   of	   coastal	   fortifications	   and	  ironclads,	  were	  regarded	  as	   the	  key	   to	  successful	  maritime	  defence.	  These	   two	  key	   points,	   broadly	   conformed	   to	   the	   traditional	   Chinese	   military	   modus	  
operandi.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  464	   Mingyong	  Pi,	   '洋务运动时期引进西方海战理论情况述论	   Yangwu	  Yundong	  Shiqi	  Yinjin	  Xifang	  Haizhan	  Lilun	   Qingkuang	   Shulun	   [The	   Introduction	   of	   Western	   Naval	   Warfare	   Doctrines	   during	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	   Period]',	   Military	   Historical	   Research,	   Vol.	   30,	   No.	   1	   (Spring	   1994),	   pp.	   89-­‐97.	   Jiang,	  
Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  364.	  465	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defense	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  p.	  113.	  466	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  99,	  pp.	  20-­‐21.	  
	   197	  
Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   perspectives	   of	   the	   Chinese	   maritime	   defenders	  towards	  maritime	  strategy	  was	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  landlocked	  Chinese	  military	  
modus	   operandi,	   maritime	   warfare	   was	   very	   much	   different.	   As	   virtually	   all	  contemporary	   naval	   strategists	   agreed,	   contesting	   command	   of	   the	   sea	   –	   or	   at	  least	  preventing	  the	  enemy	  from	  using	  it,	  i.e.	  sea	  denial	  –	  is	  the	  central	  element	  of	  war	   at	   sea,	   even	   though	   the	   strategic	   aim	  was	  merely	  defensive.	  Adm.	  Cyprian	  Bridge	  explains	  that:	  ‘[the	  command	  of	  the	  sea]	  enables	  the	  nation	  which	  possess	  
it	  to	  attack	  its	   foes	  where	  it	  pleases	  and	  where	  they	  seem	  most	  vulnerable.	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  it	  gives	  its	  possessor	  security	  against	  serious	  counter-­‐attacks’.467	   Many	  other	  naval	  strategists	  echoed	  this	  view,	  with	  Julian	  Corbett	  pointing	  out	  that	  in	  any	   circumstances	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   establish	   defence	   without	   securing	   a	  working	   control	   of	   the	   sea	   by	   aggressive	   action	   against	   the	   enemy’s	   fleet;	   and	  however	   strictly	   one’s	   aim	   may	   be	   defensive,	   the	   most	   effective	   means	   of	  securing	  it	  would	  be	  by	  counter-­‐attack.468	   Mahan	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  idea	  of	   defence	   involves	   two	   means:	   passive	   defence,	   and	   taking	   proactive	   action	  against	  the	  enemy.	  The	  former	  is	  meant	  to	  strengthen	  oneself	  and	  await	  attack,	  but	  the	  real	  object	  of	  defensive	  preparation	  should	  be	  best	  secured	  by	  the	  latter,	  which	  is	  attacking	  the	  enemy.469	   However,	  the	  idea	  of	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  and	  preventing	  the	  enemy	  from	  securing	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  was	  overshadowed	  by	  traditional	  Chinese	  military	  thinking.	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   enshrining	   of	   passive	   defence	   in	   Chinese	  military	   doctrine	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  had	  serious	  consequences	  on	  China’s	  use	  of	  naval	  power.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	   the	  two	  maritime	  wars	   that	  took	   place	   during	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   the	   Sino-­‐French	   War	  (1884-­‐1885)	  and	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  (1894-­‐1895),	  illustrates	  this	  point.	   	  In	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy’s	  strategic	  aim	  was	  to	  ward	  off	  French	  aggressors	  and	  prevent	  them	  from	  landing	  on	  the	  mainland	  coast	  and	  Taiwan	   Island.	   A	   comparison	   of	   the	   two	   belligerent	   navies	   shows	   that	   the	  mid-­‐1880s	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  inferior	  to	  the	  French	  Far	  East	  Squadron	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  quality	  of	   the	   ships.470	   Under	   these	  circumstances,	   the	   role	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  467	   Cyprian	  Bridge,	  Sea-­‐power,	  and	  Other	  Studies,	  (London:	  Smith,	  Elder	  &	  Co.,	  1910),	  p.	  84.	  468	   Julian	  S.	  Corbett,	  Some	  Principles	  of	  Maritime	  Strategy,	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  and	  Co.,	  1911),	  p.	  29.	  469	   Mahan,	  The	  Influence	  of	  Sea	  Power	  Upon	  History,	  p.87.	  470	   Piotr	  Olender,	  Sino-­‐French	  Naval	  War:	  1884-­‐1885,	  (Petersfield:	  Mushroom	  Model	  Publications,	  2012),	  p.	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Chinese	  navy	  should	  have	  been,	  according	  to	  the	  commonly-­‐accepted	  principles	  of	   naval	  warfare,	   to	   prevent	   the	   French	   Far	   East	   Squadron	   from	  using	   the	   sea	  freely	   as	   a	   platform	   for	   power	   projection.	   However,	   a	   study	   of	   China’s	   use	   of	  naval	   forces	   in	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  shows	   that	   the	  ships	  were	  used	   to	  build	  a	  ‘fortress’	  between	  the	  French	  ships	  and	  the	  Chinese	  coast.	  The	  most	  illustrating	  case	  occurred	  when	  Chinese	  frontline	  commanders	  believed	  that	  the	  French	  was	  attempting	  to	  capture	  the	  city	  of	  Fuzhou,	  which	  was	  located	  to	  the	  northwest	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  (the	  area	  indicated	  as	  ‘Arsenal’	  in	  Map	  6.1).471	   During	  the	  subsequent	   Battle	   of	   Fuzhou,	   the	   Chinese	   side	   deployed	   eleven	   ships	   in	   total,	  with	   the	   1,560-­‐ton	   wooden	   cruiser	   Yang	   Wu,	   and	   five	   1,260-­‐ton	   wooden	  gunboats	  constituting	  the	  main	  force.472	   Most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  capital	  ships	  were	  moored	  close	  to	  the	  south	  of	  the	  navy	  yard	  to	  act	  as	  stationary	  defence	  against	  landing	  French	  troops	  (see	  Map	  6.1).	   	  The	  consequences	  were	  predictably	  disastrous.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  was	   virtually	   annihilated	   within	   one	   hour	   following	   the	   first	   exchange	   of	   fire.	  After	   the	   battle,	   China	   lost	   command	   of	   the	   sea	   that	   flanked	   its	   southern	   and	  south-­‐eastern	  coasts	  which	  became	  completely	  open	  to	  French	  actions	  (see	  Map	  6.2).	   In	   October	   1884,	   the	   French	   fleet	   threw	   a	   blockade	   around	   the	   western	  coast	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  tried	  to	  cut	  it	  off	  from	  reinforcements	  and	  supplies	  from	  the	  mainland.	  The	  blockade	  produced	  considerable	  adverse	  impacts	  on	  the	  Chinese	  troops	   defending	   the	   island,	   though	   the	   French	   were	   not	   able	   to	   exploit	   the	  situation	   further	  due	   to	  an	   insufficient	  number	  of	   ships.473	   In	  March	  1885,	   the	  French	   fleet	   initiated	   the	   Rice	   Blockade,	   which	   severely	   disrupted	   the	  transportation	  of	  rice	  by	  sea	  from	  the	  Yangtze	  Plain	  to	  northern	  China	  and	  forced	  the	   Chinese	   to	   carry	   it	   overland	   (the	  Grand	   Canal	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century	  was	  rarely	  in	  use	  because	  many	  parts	  of	  it	  was	  choked	  with	  silt).474	   With	  inevitable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45.	  471	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  177.	  472	   The	  Yang	  Wu	  was	  the	  training	  ship	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Academy,	  and	  the	  five	  ‘dual-­‐purpose’	  ships	  took	  part	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou	  were	  all	  of	  the	  Wan	  Nian	  Qing	  class.	  They	  had	  a	  displacement	  of	  1,260	  tons	  and	  were	  usually	  armed	  with	  around	  six	  guns.	  They	  were:	  Yong	  Bao,	  Chen	  Hang,	  Fu	  Bo,	  Ji	  An	  and	  Fei	  Yun.	  On	  the	  French	   side,	   there	   were:	   two	   4,600-­‐ton	   ironclads,	   Triomphante	   and	   La	   Galissonnière;	   one	   3,500-­‐ton	  armoured	   cruiser,	   Duguay-­‐Trouin;	   two	   2,400-­‐ton	   cruisers,	   Villars	   and	   d’Estaing;	   one	   1,800-­‐ton	   cruiser,	  
Châteaurenault;	  and	  one	  1,300-­‐ton	  cruiser,	  Volta.	  These	  ships	  were	  complemented	  by	  a	  number	  of	  gunboats,	  torpedo	  boats	  and	  transports.	   	  473	   Piotr	  Olender,	  Sino-­‐French	  Naval	  War,	  pp.	  72-­‐76.	   	  474	   The	  other	  two	  naval	  battles	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  war	  were	  the	  Battle	  of	  Shipu	  (February	  1885)	  and	  the	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defeat	  in	  sight,	  the	  Qing	  government	  ended	  the	  war	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
of	  Tianjin	  in	  June	  1885.475	   The	  war	  crippled	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet,	  which	  never	  regained	  its	  former	  strength.	  	  
	  Map	  6.1:	  The	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou,	  23rd	  August	  1884.	  The	  Chinese	  highest	  frontline	  command,	  Zhang	  Peilun,	  lined	  up	  the	  ships	  between	  the	  French	  fleet	  and	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  (i.e.	  the	  Arsenal	  on	  the	  map)	  to	  prevent	  the	  French	  troops	  from	  landing.	  Most	  of	  the	  Chinese	  ships	  were	  sunk	  within	  one	  hour	  of	  the	  first	  exchange	  of	  fire.	   	  	   In	  an	  Imperial	  Edict	  promulgated	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  attributed	  the	   defeat	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   powerful	   warships,	   a	   shortage	   of	   competent	  military	  commanders	  and	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  financial	  resources.476	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  number	   of	   senior	   officials	   also	   presented	   their	   reflections	   on	   the	   cause	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Battle	  of	  Zhenhai	  (March	  1885).	  After	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou,	  the	  French	  Far	  East	  Fleet	  turned	  to	  Taiwan	  as	   its	  next	   target.	  The	  two	  battles	   took	  place	  when	  a	  detachment	  of	   five	  gunboats	  of	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  was	  intercepted	  by	  the	  French	  on	  their	  way	  to	  reinforce	  Taiwan.	  As	  soon	  as	  the	  French	  were	  in	  sight,	  the	  detachment	  squadron	  of	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  split	   into	   two	  groups.	  Two	  slow	  ships,	  Cheng	  Qing	   and	  Yu	  
Yuan,	   retreated	   into	   the	  Shipu	  Bay,	   and	  were	   later	   sunk	  by	   the	  French	   (some	  historians	   claimed	   that	   the	  ships	  were	  scuttled	  by	  the	  Chinese	  crew	  themselves),	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  196.	  The	  other	  three	  faster	  ships	  sought	  shelter	  in	  Zhenhai	  Bay	  and	  eventually	  survived	  because	  the	  bay	  had	  better	  coastal	  batteries.	  The	  detached	  squadron	  of	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  did	  not	  reach	  Taiwan.	  475	   Also	  known	  as	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Tientsin	  in	  English.	   	  476	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  50.	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defeat	   to	   the	   throne. 477 	   A	   number	   of	   them	   highlighted	   that	   the	   lack	   of	  coordination	  between	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  had	  rendered	  concentration	  of	  forces	  difficult.	  This	  realisation,	   in	  turn,	  contributed	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Chinese	   Board	   of	   Admiralty	   –	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   (the	   lack	   of	   coordination	  between	   regional	   fleets	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   will	   be	  elaborated	  on	  later	  in	  this	  chapter).	  However,	  none	  of	  them	  questioned	  the	  way	  that	  China’s	  naval	  power	  was	  used.	  The	  basic	  principles	  of	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  continued	  to	  be	  overlooked.	  The	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  continued	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  ‘fortress’	   that	   stood	  between	   the	  enemy	  ships	  and	   the	  objectives	   that	   the	  navy	  was	   tasked	  to	  safeguard.	  This	  way	  of	  using	  naval	  power	  embodied	  the	  military	  thinking	   crystallised	   from	   feudal-­‐agrarian	   politico-­‐economic	   realities	   and	   19th	  century	   China’s	   practice	   of	   fortress	   warfare,	   both	   of	   which	   was	   deeply	  entrenched	  and	  was	  difficult	  to	  change.	   	  A	  review	  of	  the	  instructions	  that	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  and	  Li	  Hongzhang	  gave	  to	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   during	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   shows	   that	   securing	  command	  of	   the	  sea	  or	  preventing	   the	   Japanese	   from	  doing	  so	  was	  never	  been	  given	  enough	  attention.	  There	  were	  three	  fleet	  engagements	  during	  the	  conflict:	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fengdao	  (25th	  July	  1894),	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  (17th	  September	  1894),	  and	  the	  Battle	  of	  Weihaiwei	  (20th	  January	  to	  12th	  February	  1895).478	   In	  none	  of	  these	  three	  battles	  were	  the	  Chinese	  fleet	  given	  orders	  to	  dispute	  the	  command	  of	   the	   sea	  with	   the	   Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet.479	   The	   first	   Chinese	  naval	   action	  took	   place	   on	   the	   22nd	   July	   1894	   –	   three	   days	   before	   the	   Battle	   of	   Fengdao	   –	  when	   Li	   Hongzhang	   received	   an	   intelligence	   report	  warning	   that	   the	   Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet	   had	   sailed	   out	   from	  Sasebo.	   Li’s	   reaction	  was	   to	   send	   ships	   to	  patrol	   Asan	   Bay,	   off	   the	   Korean	   Peninsula,	   to	   protect	   the	   transport	   ships	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  477	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  207-­‐209.	  478	   The	  Battle	  of	  Fengdao	  was	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Battle	  of	  Pungdo	   	  479	   The	   Imperial	   Japanese	   Navy	   Combined	   Fleet	   consisted	   of	   twelve	   ships.	   They	   were:	   the	   4,150-­‐ton	  protected	  cruiser	  Yoshino;	  the	  3,650-­‐ton	  protected	  cruisers	  Naniwa	  and	  Takachiho;	  the	  3,150-­‐ton	  protected	  cruiser	  Akitsushima;	  the	  4,300-­‐ton	  protected	  cruisers	  Matsushima,	  Itsukushima	  and	  Hashidate;	  the	  3,700-­‐ton	  ironclad	  Fusō;	   the	  2400-­‐ton	   cruiser	  Chiyoda;	   the	  2,200-­‐ton	   ironclad	  Hiei;	   the	  600-­‐ton	  gunboat	  Akagi;	   and	  armed	  merchantman	   Saikyo	   Maru.	   On	   the	   Chinese	   side,	   there	   were	   ten	   ships.	   They	   were:	   the	   7,300-­‐ton	  ironclads	   Ding	   Yuan	   and	   Zhen	   Yuan;	   the	   2,300-­‐ton	   protected	   cruiser	   Ji	   Yuan;	   the	   2,300-­‐ton	   protected	  cruisers	  Zhi	  Yuan	  and	  Jing	  Yuan;	  the	  2,900-­‐ton	  armoured	  cruisers	  Jing	  Yuan	  and	  Lai	  Yuan;	  the	  1,400-­‐ton	  ram	  cruisers	  Chao	  Yong	  and	  Yang	  Wei;	  and	  the	  2,200-­‐ton	  gunboat	  Ping	  Yuan.	  These	  ten	  ships	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  were	  reinforced	  by	  a	  1,300-­‐ton	  gunboat	  Guang	  Jia	  and	  two	  1,000-­‐ton	  gunboats	  Guang	  Yi	  and	  Guang	  Bing.	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delivering	   Chinese	   troops	   to	   the	   peninsula.480	   On	   25th	   July,	   a	   Chinese	   escort	  squadron	  encountered	  a	  Japanese	  intercepting	  squadron	  in	  waters	  around	  Asan	  and	  exchanged	  fire	  with	  it.	  This	  battle,	  known	  as	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fengdao,	  preluded	  the	   Battle	   of	   Yalu,	   a	  major	   naval	   engagement	   that	   decided	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	  war.481	  	  
	  Map	  6.2:	  After	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Yard	  Fleet,	  the	  French	  secured	  command	  of	  the	   sea	   in	   southern	   and	   south-­‐eastern	   China,	   and	   initiated	   the	   Blockade	   of	   Taiwan	   in	   October	  1884	  and	  the	  Rice	  Blockade	  in	  March	  1885.	  A	  five-­‐ship	  detachment	  of	  the	  Nanyang	  Squadron	  was	  sent	  to	  reinforce	  the	  defence	  of	  Taiwan,	  but	  was	  separated	  on	  their	  way	  south.	  Two	  ships	  –	  the	  
Cheng	  Qing	  and	  Yu	  Yuan	  –	  were	  sunk	  in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Shipu,	  and	  the	  other	  three	  ships	  –	  the	  Kai	  Ji,	  
Nan	  Rui	  and	  Nan	  Chen	  –	  found	  shelter	  in	  Zhenhai	  and	  survived	  the	  Battle	  of	  Zhenhai.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  480	   LHZQJ,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  800.	   	  481	   The	   Battle	   of	   Fengdao	   (also	   known	   as	   the	   Battle	   of	   Pungdo)	   took	   place	   on	   25th	   July	   1894,	  when	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet’s	   German-­‐built	   protected	   cruiser	   Ji	   Yuan	   and	   Fuzhou-­‐built	   torpedo	   cruiser	  Guang	   Yi,	   in	   an	  escort	  mission,	  encountered	  the	  Flying	  Squadron	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet.	  The	  Chinese	  ships	  were	  outnumbered.	  The	  Ji	  Yuan	  fled	  and	  the	  Guang	  Yi	  was	  beached	  and	  burned.	  Gao	  Sheng,	  a	  British	  ship	  carrying	  Chinese	   troops	  passed	  by	   the	  battlefield	  was	   sunk	  by	   the	   Japanese,	   and	  Gao	  Sheng’s	   escort	   Jiangnan-­‐built	  gunboat	  Cao	  Jiang	  was	  captured.	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During	  the	  fifty-­‐three	  days	  between	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fengdao	  and	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  went	  on	  four	  sea	  patrols.	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Chinese	  fleet’s	  movement	  shows	  that	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  contest	  command	  of	  the	  sea	   or	   prevent	   the	   Japanese	   fleet	   from	   using	   the	   sea	   freely,	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	  spent	  most	   of	   its	   time	   patrolling	   at	   three	   locations	   –	   the	  Weihaiwei	   Base,	   the	  Lüshun	  Base	  (Port	  Arthur)	  and	  the	  Taedong	  River	  mouth.482	   The	  first	  two	  were	  the	   bases	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   and	   the	   latter	   was	   the	   landing	   area	   of	   Chinese	  army	  units	  being	  transported	  to	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  The	  Imperial	  Court,	  whist	  wanting	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  to	  increase	  the	  frequency	  of	  combat	  patrols,	  wanted	  it	  to	   defend	   the	   Chinese	   coast	   rather	   than	   forcing	   a	   battle	   with	   the	   Imperial	  Japanese	  Navy.	   An	   order	   that	  was	   issued	   from	  Beijing	   on	   23rd	   August	   pressed	  Admiral	  Ding	  Ruchang,	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  to	  patrol	  more	  actively	   between	   the	   Liaodong	   Peninsula	   and	   the	   Shandong	   Peninsula	   to	  safeguard	   Bohai	   Bay,	   which	   was	   the	   gateway	   to	   Beijing.	   The	   order	   explicitly	  forbade	  the	  fleet	  from	  sailing	  out	  of	  this	  area	  (see	  Map	  6.3).483	   	  On	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   was	   used,	   Evans	   and	   Peattie	  commented:	   	  	  
‘Although	   China	   possessed	   bases	   near	   the	   likely	   theatre	   of	   war,	   the	  
generally	  passive	  strategy	  that	  it	  adopted	  shortly	  after	  the	  war	  broke	  out	  
largely	  offset	  any	  advantages	  these	  bases	  might	  have	  provided.	  Instead	  of	  
taking	   the	   war	   to	   Japan,	   the	   Peiyang	   Fleet	   [the	   Beiyang	   Fleet]	   at	   the	  
instructions	  of	   the	   Imperial	  Court,	  was	   confined	   to	   the	  north	  half	   of	   the	  
Yellow	   Sea	   and	   the	   Gulf	   of	   Chihli	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   the	   Chinese	   coast	  
between	   the	   Weihaiwei	   and	   the	   Yalu	   River.	   In	   addition	   to	   abandoning	  
Korea	   to	   Japanese	   landings,	   this	   strategy	   foolishly	   relinquished	   at	   the	  
outset	  any	  attempt	  to	  gain	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  and	  thus	  wasted	  China’s	  
most	   powerful	   naval	   asset,	   the	   Peiyang	   Fleet,	   by	   reducing	   it	   to	   convoy	  
duties.’484	   	  	  China’s	   use	   of	   naval	   power	   was,	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent,	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  482	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  361.	  483	   GXCZRJSSL,	  Vol.	  16,	  p.	  27.	  484	   Evans	  and	  Peattie,	  Kaigun,	  p.	  40.	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commonly	  recognised	  principles	  of	  maritime	  strategy.	  The	  steam	  navy	  was	  used	  as	   a	   ‘Great	  Wall’	   at	   sea	   to:	   (a)	   prevent	   the	   enemy	   from	   landing	   troops	   on	   the	  Chinese	  coast	  rather	   than	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula;	   (b)	  protect	  strategic	   locations,	  such	   as	   naval	   bases	   and	   landing	   areas	   of	   Chinese	   army	   units	   projected	   to	   the	  battlefield;	  and	  (c)	  escort	  the	  convoy	  of	  troops	  and	  goods	  between	  the	  homeland	  and	  forward	  bases.	  Thus	  the	  navy	  played	  an	  auxiliary	  role	  in	  the	  war,	  with	  little	  attempt	  made	   to	   contest	   the	   command	  of	   the	   sea	  with	   the	   Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet.	  	  
	  Map	  6.3:	  A	  map	  of	  Northeast	  Asia.	  The	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  was	  a	  maritime	  war	  in	  which	  the	  main	   battlefield	   –	   the	   Korean	   Peninsula	   –	   was	   flanked	   on	   both	   its	   sides	   by	   bodies	   of	   water.	  Obtaining	   command	   of	   the	   sea	  was	   therefore	   of	   crucial	   importance	   during	   the	  war.	   However,	  Chinese	   commanders	   failed	   to	   realise	   this	   point	   and	   most	   of	   their	   naval	   operations	   were	  concentrated	   in	   the	   area	   between	   the	   Liaodong	   Peninsula,	   the	   Shandong	   Peninsula	   and	   the	  north-­‐western	  coast	  of	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  (the	  rectangular	  area	  highlighted	  in	  grey).	  	   However,	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  was	   a	  maritime	  war.	   The	  battlefield	  was	  located	  in	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  which	  is	  flanked	  by	  the	  sea	  on	  its	  both	  sides.	  This	  meant	   that	   the	   belligerent	   that	   possessed	   the	   command	   of	   the	   sea	  would	  enjoy	  great	  strategic	  initiative.	  As	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  securing	  the	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  in	  maritime	  warfare,	  Corbett	  pointed	  out:	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‘[In	   a	  maritime	  war,]	   he	   that	   commands	   the	   sea	   is	   at	   great	   liberty	   and	  
may	  take	  as	  much	  or	  as	  little	  of	  the	  war	  as	  he	  will,	  whereas	  those	  that	  be	  
strongest	  by	  land	  are	  many	  times	  nevertheless	  in	  great	  straits.’485	   	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   China,	   Japan	   had	   a	   war	   plan	   that	   revolved	   around	   the	  command	  of	  the	  sea.	  The	  Imperial	  General	  Headquarters	  of	  Japan	  had	  based	  the	  whole	  plan	  of	  the	  war	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  war	  at	  sea.	  It	  was	  planned	  that	  if	  the	  Combined	  Fleet	  were	  to	  win	  decisively,	  the	  larger	  portion	  of	  the	  Japanese	  army	  would	  undertake	  immediate	  landings	  on	  the	  Chinese	  coast	  and	  bring	  the	  war	  to	  a	  swift	  conclusion.	   If	   the	  naval	  engagement	  were	  a	  draw	  and	  neither	  side	  gained	  control	  of	  the	  sea,	  the	  army	  would	  concentrate	  on	  the	  occupation	  of	  Korea.	  Lastly,	  if	  the	  Combined	  Fleet	  were	  defeated	  and	  consequently	  lost	  command	  of	  the	  sea,	  the	   bulk	   of	   the	   army	   would	   remain	   in	   Japan	   and	   prepare	   to	   repel	   a	   Chinese	  invasion.	   In	   case	   of	   this,	   the	   Japanese	   army	   units	   already	   positioned	   on	   the	  Korean	   Peninsula	   would	   be	   ordered	   to	   remain	   there	   and	   fight	   a	   rear-­‐guard	  action.486	  It	  was	  within	   this	   context	   that	   on	   17th	   September	   1894,	   the	   Battle	   of	   Yalu	  took	   place.	   To	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   that	   had	   been	   busy	   escorting	   convoys	   to	   the	  west	   coast	  of	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	   this	  was	  a	  battle	  of	   encounter,	  whereas	   to	  the	   Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet,	   this	  was	  an	  opportunity	   for	  a	  decisive	  battle	   that	  had	   been	   sought	   for	   weeks.	   In	   this	   battle,	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   though	   not	  completely	  wiped	  out,	  was	  severely	  crippled.	  Of	  the	  twelve	  ships	  that	  took	  part	  in	   the	   battle,	   five	   were	   sunk,	   including	   one	   armoured	   cruiser,	   one	   protected	  cruiser,	  one	  gunboat	  and	  two	  ram	  cruisers.	  A	  couple	  of	  others	  were	  also	  severely	  damaged.	  After	  the	  battle,	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  retreated	  into	  the	  Lüshun	  Base	  (Port	  Arthur)	  for	  repairs	  and	  were	  later	  withdrawn	  to	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base,	  because	   the	   Japanese	   started	   to	   land	   troops	   on	   the	   east	   side	   of	   the	   Liaodong	  Peninsula,	  posing	  an	  imminent	  threat	  to	  the	  base.487	   In	  late	  November	  1894,	  the	  Lüshun	   Base	   fell	   into	   Japanese	   hands,	   and	   the	   Japanese	   troops	   turned	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  485	   Corbett,	  Some	  Principles	  of	  Maritime	  Strategy,	  p.	  55.	  486	   Evans	  and	  Peattie,	  Kaigun,	  pp.	  40-­‐41.	  487	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	  388.	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Shandong	  Peninsula	  as	   its	  next	  target.488	   Confronted	  with	  no	  challenges	  at	  sea,	  the	  Japanese	  soon	  managed	  to	  land	  around	  two	  divisions	  of	  ground	  forces	  on	  the	  Shandong	  Peninsula	   in	  mid-­‐January	  1895.	  The	  Battle	  of	  Weihaiwei,	  which	   took	  place	  between	  20th	  January	  and	  12th	  February	  1895,	  saw	  an	  amphibious	  assault	  by	  the	  Japanese	  army	  and	  navy	  against	  the	  remnant	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  that	  had	  been	  encircled	  in	  the	  defended	  Weihaiwei	  Base.	  This	  battle	  was	  again	  a	  Japanese	  victory,	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  was	  completely	  wiped	  out.	  This	  was	  the	  last	  major	  battle	   of	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War.	   The	   Japanese	   capture	   of	   the	   Liaodong	  Peninsula	   and	   the	   Shandong	   Peninsula	   forced	   China	   to	   sign	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Shimonoseki,	   which	   formally	   ended	   the	   war	   to	   the	   great	   detriment	   of	   China’s	  national	  interests.	   	  It	   can	   be	   distilled	   from	   this	   review	   that	   the	   strategic	   reason	   for	   China’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  war	  was	  the	  same	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  nation’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  war	  with	  France	   a	   decade	   before:	   the	   lack	   of	   interest	   in,	   or	   understanding	   of,	   the	  significance	  of	   command	  of	   the	  sea.	   It	  had	  been	   Japan’s	  victory	   in	   the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	   and	   concomitant	   success	   in	   securing	   command	   of	   the	   sea	   that	   had	  permitted	   the	   Japanese	  army	   to	  mount	  an	  effective	   landing	  on	   the	   coast	  of	   the	  Liaodong	   Peninsula	   and	   the	   Shandong	   Peninsula,	   which	   forced	   China	   into	   a	  peace	  treaty	  with	  Japan.	  Had	  the	  Chinese	  navy	  managed	  to	  disrupt	  Japan’s	  power	  projection	   to	   the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  or	  denied	   Japan’s	   command	  of	   the	   sea,	   the	  result	  of	  the	  war	  could	  have	  been	  different.	  However,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  telegraphs	  between	   the	   de	   facto	   commander	   of	   the	   Chinese	   forces	   during	   the	   war,	   Li	  Hongzhang,	   and	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet’s	   commander-­‐in-­‐chief,	   Adm.	   Ding	   Ruchang,	  shows	  that	  such	  a	  strategy	  never	  occurred	  to	  them.	  Command	  of	  the	  sea,	  the	  key	  to	  victory	  in	  maritime	  warfare,	  continued	  to	  be	  ignored.	   	  It	  was	  not	  that	  the	  Chinese	  military	  commanders	  had	  never	  been	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  theories	  of	  command	  of	  the	  sea.	  Western	  treatises	  on	  naval	  warfare,	  which	  contended	  the	  theory	  of	  command	  of	  the	  sea,	  had	  been	  introduced	   and	   translated	   into	   Chinese	   as	   early	   as	   in	   the	   1870s	   and	   1880s.	  However,	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners’	   reading	   of	   Western	   treatises	   on	   maritime	  warfare	   had	   been	   selective.	   They	   emphasised	   the	   books	   that	   conformed	   to	  Chinese	  military	  traditions	  and	  disregarded	  those	  at	  odds	  with	  those	  traditions.	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   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  p.	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For	   this	   reason,	   they	  read	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Coastal-­‐Defence	   and	  overlooked	  others	  that	   promoted	   the	   theory	   of	   command	   of	   the	   sea.	   This	   ignorance	   of	   the	  importance	  of	  command	  of	  the	  sea	  precipitated	  China’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.489	  
	  
	  
6.2	  The	  Formation	  of	   the	  Four	  Regional	  Fleets	  and	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  
Fleet’s	  Defeat	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  	  Nearly	  fifteen	  years	  after	  the	  Second	  Opium	  War,	  China’s	  maritime	  defence	  was	  still	  provincially	  structured.	  The	  various	  coastal	  provinces	  were	  responsible	  for	  maritime	  defence	  of	  their	  own	  coasts,	  and	  each	  province	  had	  its	  own	  water	  force	  for	   this	   mission.490	   This	   structure	   of	   maritime	   defence	   was	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  principle	   of	   concentration	   of	   force:	   the	   side	   that	   takes	   offence	   could	   bring	   an	  overwhelmingly	  superior	  force	  to	  bear	  on	  China,	  whose	  water	  forces	  were	  thinly	  dispersed	   along	   the	   18,000km	   long	   coastline.	   This	   structure	   of	   the	   empire’s	  maritime	   defence	   remained	   unchanged	   after	   the	   Second	  Opium	  War.	   This	  was	  partly	  because	  the	  water	  forces	  were	  defeated	  too	  quickly	  by	  Western	  navies	  in	  the	  Opium	  Wars	  to	  make	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elites	  realise	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  a	  provincially-­‐organised	   maritime	   defence	   (the	   reflections	   after	   the	   war	   had	  mainly	   focused	  on	  equipment	   inferiority).	   In	  addition,	   there	  was	  no	  centralised	  authority	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  that	  had	  the	  responsibility	  to	  bring	  the	  problem	  under	  consideration.	   	  In	  its	  early	  years,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  complied	  with	  this	  organisational	  framework.	   From	   the	   1850s	   to	   the	   early	   1860s,	   various	   coastal	   provinces	  conducted	  naval	  modernisation	  themselves.	  Some	  of	   them	  sought	  a	  solution	  by	  purchasing	  second-­‐hand	  steam	  vessels	   from	  abroad,	  whilst	  others	  made	  efforts	  to	  build	  steamships	  of	  their	  own.	  No	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  integrate	  the	  steamships	  into	  a	  centralised	  force	  and	  command	  structure.	  Moreover,	  as	  provincial	  finances	  were	   too	   scarce	   to	   support	   naval	   modernisation,	   such	   ships	   were	   mostly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  489	   There	  were	  two	  other	  issues	  that	  impeded	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  effective	  use	  of	  naval	  power:	  the	  hardware	  weakness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  regional	  fleets.	  The	  former	  was	  addressed	  in	  Chapter	  three,	  and	  the	  latter	  will	  be	  elaborated	  on	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	   	  490	   The	  water	  forces	  were	  not	  navies	  in	  the	  Western	  sense,	  see	  Section	  2.2.	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obsolete	  and	  many	  were	  not	  designed	  to	  be	  military	  vessels.	  Fundamentally,	  the	  ships	  that	  the	  various	  coastal	  provinces	  bought	  or	  built	  were	   little	  more	  than	  a	  ragtag	   collection	   of	   vessels	   of	   limited	   military	   value.	   These	   two	   factors	   –	   the	  unchanged	   organisational	   structure	   and	   the	   limited	   improvement	   in	   vessel	  performance	   –	   resulted	   little	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   net	   increase	   in	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  Chinese	  maritime	  defence.	   	  The	   1874	   Japan	   invasion	   of	   Taiwan	   was	   a	   monumental	   event	   in	   Chinese	  naval	   history. 491 	   The	   modestly	   modernised	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   –	   in	   fact	  provincial	  navies	  –	  was	  not	  able	  to	  counter	  the	  maritime	  invasion	  by	  what	  some	  surprised	  Chinese	  officials	  called	  the	  ‘tiny	  and	  insignificant	  state’	  of	  Japan.492	   The	  empire	  was	   shocked	   by	   its	   insufficient	   capability	   in	   tackling	  maritime	   threats.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  subsequent	  groundswell	  of	  appeal	  for	  reforming	  the	  organisational	  structure	  of	  maritime	  defence.	  Prince	  Gong,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  people	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  concerned	  with	  naval	  modernisation	  initiated	  a	  nationwide	  discussion	  on	  how	  to	   improve	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  maritime	  defence.493	   Those	  who	  took	  part	  included	   a	   dozen	   senior	   officials	   from	   both	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   and	   coastal	  provinces.	   	  A	   key	   outcome	   of	   the	   1874	   maritime	   defence	   discussion	   was	   that	   the	  weakness	   of	   provincially-­‐organised	   maritime	   defence	   was	   brought	   to	   the	  forefront,	  and	  there	  was	  an	   increasing	  consensus	  that	  maritime	  defence	  should	  be	   restructured	   to	   enable	   a	   degree	   of	   concentration	   of	   force.	  Ding	  Richang,	   an	  enthusiastic	   navalist	   Self-­‐Strengthener	   put	   forward	   a	   new	   organisational	  framework.	  In	  his	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne	  he	  argued:	   	  	   ‘[Instead	  of	  structuring	  maritime	  defence	  provincially,	  we]	  should	  install	  
three	   admirals.	   From	   Shandong	   province	   to	   Zhili	   province,	   a	   Northern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  491	   The	   trouble	   began	   in	   1871	   when	   the	   ‘subjected’	   aboriginals	   of	   Taiwan	   killed	   fifty-­‐four	   shipwrecked	  sailors	   of	   the	   Ryukyu	  Kingdom.	   Japan	   organised	   a	   punitive	  maritime	   expedition	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	  Ryukyu	  Kingdom	  acknowledged	  Japanese	  suzerainty	  (in	  fact	  the	  Ryukyu	  Kingdom	  acknowledged	  suzerainty	  of	  both	  China	  and	  Japan),	  and	  that	  the	  murdered	  sailors	  were	  Japanese	  subjects.	  The	  Japanese	  expeditionary	  force	  consisted	  of	  only	  three	  ships	  and	  about	  3,600	  men,	  but	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  had	  no	  navy	  strong	  enough	  to	  tackle	   it.	   The	   event	  disclosed	  China’s	   insufficient	   naval	   power,	   a	   number	  of	   vigilant	   officials	   appealed	   for	  further	   improvement	   to	  China’s	  maritime	  defence,	  which	   led	   to	   the	  1874	  discussion	  of	  maritime	  defence.	  see	  Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  pp.	  60-­‐61.	  492	   ‘蕞尔小邦’	  493	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  5-­‐7.	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Ocean	   Admiral	   headquartered	   in	   Tianjin;	   from	   Zhejiang	   province	   to	  
Jiangsu	   province,	   an	   Eastern	   Ocean	   Admiral	   headquartered	   in	  Wusong;	  
and	   from	   Guangdong	   province	   to	   Fujian	   province,	   a	   Southern	   Ocean	  
Admiral	   headquartered	   in	   Nan’ao.	   The	   admirals	   shall	   be	  well	   versed	   in	  
both	  polite	   letters	   and	   the	  martial	   arts	   [here	  Ding	  probably	  meant	   the	  admirals	  should	  have	  administrative	  as	  well	  as	  a	  commanding	  power],	  
and	   should	   be	   empowered	   to	  memorialise	   the	   throne	   directly.	   Each	   sea	  
should	  be	  garrisoned	  by	  six	  large	  steamships	  warships	  and	  ten	  gunboats.	  
The	   three	   admirals	   shall	   hold	   joint-­‐fleet	   exercises	   on	   a	   half-­‐yearly	  
basis.’494	  	   Li	  Hongzhang,	  Ding’s	  political	  ally,	  elaborated	  on	  Ding’s	  idea.	  Li’s	  exposition	  disclosed	  the	  rationale	  behind	  Ding’s	  plan.	  Li	  pointed	  out	   to	   the	  Imperial	  Court	  that	  an	  overstretched	  line	  of	  maritime	  defence	  would	  be	  financially	  burdensome,	  yet	  the	  dispersed	  ships	  would	  not	  make	  an	  effective	  force.	  He	  argued	  that	  since	  Bohai	  Bay	   (see	  Map	  6.4)	  was	   the	  gateway	   to	   the	  capital,	   it	   should	   therefore	  be	  treated	  as	  the	  top	  priority.	   Jiangsu	  province	  and	  its	  vicinity	  was	  the	  gateway	  to	  the	  Yangtze	  River,	  and	   the	  Yangtze	  drainage	  basin	  was	   the	  main	  agrarian	  area,	  therefore	   it	   should	  be	   treated	  as	   the	   second	  priority.	  The	  defence	  of	   these	   two	  areas	   should	   be	   emphasised,	   whereas	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   coast	   deserved	   only	  marginal	  attention	  because,	   in	  Li’s	  view,	  no	  lethal	  damage	  could	  be	  done	  to	  the	  empire	  if	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  centre	  was	  well	  protected.495	  Ding	   and	   Li’s	   proposal	   gained	   a	   larger-­‐than-­‐usual	   support	   from	   officials	  involved	   in	   the	  discussion.	  Among	   them	  were:	   Shen	  Baozhen,	   the	   then	  Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard	   Commissioner;	  Wang	  Kaitai,	   governor	   of	   Fujian	   province;	  Wen	  Bin,	  governor-­‐general	   of	   the	   Grand	   Canal;	   Yang	   Changjun,	   governor	   of	   Zhejiang	  province;	   and	   Liu	   Kunyi,	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Liangjiang. 496 	   Many	   others,	  although	   disagreed	   with	   Ding	   and	   Li	   in	   some	   details,	   generally	   supported	   the	  proposal.	  Such	  broad	  consensus	  was	  rarely	  seen	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire,	   as	   political	   elites	  were	   usually	   inclined	   to	   take	   local	   interests	   as	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  494	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  9.	  Ding	  Richang	  put	   forwarded	  a	  highly	   similar	  proposal	   seven	  years	  ago	   in	  1867,	  but	   the	  suggestion	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	   	  495	   CBYWSM-­‐TZ,	  Vol.	  99,	  pp.	  20-­‐22.	  496	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  89-­‐90,	  94-­‐95.	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primary	  consideration.	  One	  key	  point	  can	  be	  distilled	  from	  this	  episode:	  virtually	  all	   Chinese	   elites,	   the	   keenest	   navalist	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   included,	   shared	   the	  view	  that	  safeguarding	  the	  Chinese	  feudal-­‐agrarian	  order	  should	  be	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  This	   common	   perspective	   on	   security	   priorities	   made	   re-­‐structuring	  maritime	   defence	   possible.	   In	   1875,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   promulgated	   an	   Edict	  appointing	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   then	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   Province	   and	  Superintendent	   of	   Trade	   for	   the	   Three	   Northern	   Ports	   (the	   Northern	  Superintendent	  hereafter),	  as,	  concurrently,	  Commissioner	  of	  Maritime	  Defence	  of	   the	  Northern	  Ocean;	  and	  Shen	  Baozhen,	   then	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangjiang	  and	   Superintendent	   of	   Trade	   for	   the	   Five	   Southern	   Ports	   (the	   Southern	  Superintendent	  hereafter)	   as	   concurrent	  Commissioner	  of	  Maritime	  Defence	  of	  the	   Southern	  Ocean	   (note	   that	   the	   Southern	  Ocean	   in	   the	   1875	   Imperial	   Edict	  included	  the	  Eastern	  Ocean	  and	  Southern	  Ocean	  in	  Ding’s	  original	  proposal).497	  The	   rationale	   of	   such	   division	   was	   largely	   in	   conformity	   with	   Ding	   and	   Li’s	  proposal.	  The	  Imperial	  Edict	  stated	  that	  the	  seas	  flanking	  China	  to	  the	  east	  and	  southeast	  shared	  borders	  with	  numerous	  provinces,	  and	  demarcations	  must	  be	  made	  to	  specify	  responsibilities.498	   	  Ostensibly,	   the	   1875	   Imperial	   Edict	   transferred	   the	   authority	   of	   maritime	  defence	  from	  provincial	  leaders	  to	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  Shen	  Baozhen.	  However,	  a	  closer	   look	  at	   the	   Imperial	  Edict	   shows	   that	  Li	   and	  Shen	  did	  not	  hold	  absolute	  authority.	   The	   Edict	   only	   conferred	   on	   them	   the	   power	   to	  oversee	   rather	   than	  
command	   the	  maritime	   defence	   of	   the	   various	   coastal	   provinces,	  which	  meant	  that	   they	  were	   little	  more	   than	   coordinators.	   This	  was	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	  military	   practice	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire:	   nobody	   other	   than	   the	   emperor	   himself	  should	   have	   real	   control	   over	   the	   armed	   forces.	   Taking	   the	   Opium	   Wars	   for	  example,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   sent	   commissioners	   to	   the	   frontline,	   but	   the	  commissioners	   themselves	   had	   no	   troops	   under	   their	   direct	   command.	   Their	  power	  was	  limited	  to	  coordinating	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  the	  various	  provinces	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  the	  battlefield.	  A	  great	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  energy	  was	  wasted	  on	  negotiating	  with	  local	  leaders	  who	  too	  had	  only	  limited	  contingents	  of	  troops	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  497	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  12-­‐13.	  498	   Ibid.	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their	  disposal.499	   In	  fact,	  Zuo	  Zongtang,	  the	  founding	  father	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard,	   reminded	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   as	   early	   as	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	   of	   the	   1874	  maritime	   defence	   discussion	   that	   such	   division	   of	   responsibilities	   would	   offer	  little	   help	   to	   solve	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	   between	   the	   ‘three	   admirals’	  themselves,	  and	  between	  the	  admirals	  and	  the	  provincial	  leaders.500	   	  Zuo’s	   foresight	   was	   correct.	   Ostensibly,	   the	   commandership	   of	   maritime	  defence	  was	  now	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Shen	  and	  Li;	  in	  fact,	  authority	  still	  remained	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  provincial	  leaders.	  An	  immediate	  consequence	  was	  that	   inter-­‐regional	   joint	   fleet	   exercises	   could	   not	   be	   effectively	   organised.	   In	  1879,	  Shen	  drafted	  a	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne	  suggesting	  the	  very	  first	  joint	  fleet	  exercise	  in	  Chinese	  naval	  history.	  He	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  that	  the	  steamships	  of	   the	  seven	  coastal	  provinces	   lacked	  standardisation	  and	  were	  not	  familiar	  with	  the	  sea	  beyond	  their	  respective	  defence	  parameters,	  and	  therefore	  joint	   fleet	   exercises	  were	   needed	   to	   solve	   these	   problems.	   In	   carefully	   chosen	  language,	   Shen	   suggested	   that	   such	  exercises	  be	  held	  under	   the	   command	  of	   a	  ‘prestigious	   senior	   commander’	   appointed	  by	   the	   Imperial	  Court	   and	  be	   carried	  out	   in	   a	   ‘suitable	   and	   central	   location’	   to	   all	   regional	   fleets.501	   This	   approach	  indicates	  Shen	  attempted	  to	  please	  all	  regional	  fleets,	  aware	  of	  his	  lack	  of	  direct	  authority.	   	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   exercise	   was	   not	   a	   success.	   It	   was	   thwarted	   by	   a	  reluctance	   of	   coordination	   between	   the	   various	   provincial	   maritime	   defence	  authorities,	  who	  were	   primarily	   concerned	   about	   losing	   hold	   of	   the	   ships	   that	  they	  ‘owned’.	  The	  ‘prestigious	  senior	  commander’,	  Shen	  nominated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  memorial	  was	  Li	  Chaobin,	  a	  water	  force	  commander	  subordinate	  to	  Shen,	  and	  the	   ‘suitable	   and	   central	   location’	   was	   Wusong,	   which	   also	   fell	   within	   Shen’s	  jurisdiction.	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	  know	  whether	  Shen	  was	   trying	   to	  wrest	  control	  of	  the	  ships	  away	  from	  the	  various	  provincial	  maritime	  defence	  authorities,	  but	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   the	   various	   provincial	  maritime	   defence	   authorities	   feared	   that	  they	   would	   lose	   control	   of	   their	   ships	   to	   Shen.	   The	   then	   governor-­‐general	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  499	   Haijian	   Mao,	  近代的尺度：鸦片战争军事与外交	   Jindai	   de	   Chidu:	   Liangci	   Yapian	   Zhanzheng	   Junshi	   yu	  
Waijiao	  [A	  Modern	  Assessment:	  the	  Military	  and	  Diplomatic	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Two	  Opium	  Wars],	  Updated	  Edition,	  (Beijing:	  SDX	   Joint	  Publishing	  Company,	  2011),	  pp.	  62-­‐66.	  Mao,	  The	  Collapse	  of	   the	  Heavenly	  Kingdom,	  pp.	  48-­‐58.	  500	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  114.	  501	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  386-­‐387.	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Liangguang	  refused	  to	  send	  ships	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  joint	  fleet	  exercise,	  insisting	  his	  ships	  were	  designed	  for	  coastal	  waters	  and	  inland	  rivers,	  and	  not	  sufficiently	  seaworthy	   to	   sail	   a	   long	  distance.502	   The	   governor-­‐general	   of	  Minzhe	  was	   also	  reluctant	   to	   send	   ships	   to	   join	   the	   training	   project.	   His	   pretext	   was	   that	   he	  needed	   the	   ships	   to	   strengthen	   provincial	   defence	   and	   could	   spare	   no	   ship	   to	  attend	  exercises	  held	  elsewhere.	  Reluctantly,	  he	  sent	  only	   two	  gunboats	   to	   join	  the	  exercise	  and	  no	  ships	  were	  sent	  for	  joint	  fleet	  exercises	  thereafter.503	   Even	  Li,	  who	  endorsed	  Shen’s	  joint	  fleet	  training	  proposal,	  became	  reluctant	  to	  take	  part	  in	  such	  exercises	  in	  the	  early	  1880s	  after	  acquiring	  a	  few	  cutting-­‐edge	  ships	  from	  England.504	   The	  ships	  that	  eventually	  showed	  up	  in	  the	  joint	  fleet	  exercises	  were	  mostly	   those	   of	   Shen’s	   own	   fleet.505	   The	   plan	   of	   joint	   fleet	   training	   proved	  fruitless.	  In	   the	   following	   years,	   the	   various	   provincial	   maritime	   defence	   forces	  evolved	   into	   four	   mutually-­‐independent	   fleets.	   From	   south	   to	   north,	   they	  comprised	  the	  Guangdong	  Fleet,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  and	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	   The	   Guangdong	   Fleet	   was	   subject	   to	   the	   authority	   of	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangguang,	  and	  consisted	  mainly	  of	  coastal	  defence	  ships,	  none	  of	  which	  were	  larger	  than	  a	  thousand	  tons	  until	  the	  late	  1880s.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard	   had	   its	   own	   fleet,	   mainly	   composed	   of	   a	   number	   of	   ‘dual-­‐purpose	  ships’	  built	  by	  the	  yard	  in	  the	  1870s.	  The	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  was	  crippled	  during	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	  did	  not	   fully	   recover	   for	   the	   remainder	  of	   the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement.	  The	  third	  fleet	  was	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  sponsored	  by	  the	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangjiang.	  According	  to	  the	  1875	  Imperial	  Edict,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  should	  have	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  a	  vast	  body	  of	  water	  ranging	  from	  Jiangsu	   province	   to	   Guangxi	   province,	   but	   this	   was	   now	   divided	   among	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Guangdong	  Fleet.	  Since	  Shen	  failed	  to	  bring	  the	  latter	  two	  fleets	  under	  his	  control,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  remained	  a	  provincial	  force.	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   SWSGZS,	  vol.7,	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  Map	   6.4:	   A	   map	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   four	   regional	   fleets,	   namely:	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Guangdong	  Fleet.	  Also	  shown	  on	  the	  map	  are	  the	  two	  main	  bases	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet:	  the	  Lüshun	  Base	  and	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base,	  and	  the	  two	  main	  shipbuilding	  centres:	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  the	  Jiangnan	  Arsenal.	   	  	  	  The	  fourth	  regional	  fleet	  was	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  the	  strongest	  among	  the	  four.	  This	   is	   partly	   because	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	  was	   considered	  more	   important	   as	   it	  was	  guarding	  the	  waterways	  to	  the	  capital	  city,	  and	  partly	  because	  Li	  Hongzhang,	  the	  patron	  of	  the	  fleet,	  wielded	  more	  influence	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  Unlike	  Shen	  Baozhen,	   who	   died	   prematurely	   in	   1879,	   Li	   kept	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   under	   his	  charge	  from	  1875	  until	  the	  fleet’s	  defeat	  in	  1895.	  During	  those	  two	  decades,	  Li’s	  prestige	  increased	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  he	  was	  considered	  the	  most	  powerful	  man	  in	  late	  19th	  century	  China.	  His	  stature	  ensured	  that	  he	  could	  exert	  strong	  influence	  over	  the	  two	  coastal	  provinces	  of	  Shengjing	  and	  Shandong,	  both	  of	  which	  yielded	  
	   213	  
to	  his	  authority	  thanks	  to	  his	  political	  leverage.	  In	   the	   early	   1880s,	   Shandong	   province	   bought	   two	   Rendel	   gunboats	   from	  England,	  but	  no	  sooner	  had	  the	  ships	  arrived	  they	  were	  commissioned	  into	  Li’s	  Beiyang	   Fleet.506	   The	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   became	   the	   sole	   steam	   fleet	   of	   the	   three	  northern	   coastal	   provinces.	   There	   is,	   however,	   an	   element	   of	   luck	   in	   Li’s	  successful	  monopolisation	  of	  maritime	  defence	  of	  the	  northern	  coastal	  provinces.	  The	  Tianjin	  Arsenal	  under	  his	  control	  was	  the	  only	  modern	  naval	  industrial	  plant	  in	  the	  area,	  whereas	  in	  the	  south	  the	  Guangdong	  Fleet,	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  and	   Nanyang	   fleet	   were	   all	   backed	   by	   their	   own	   shipbuilding	   industries.	   This	  self-­‐sufficiency	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  three	  fleets	  to	  maintain	  independence	  from	  each	  other.	  The	   four	   regional	   fleets	   were	   largely	   isolated	   from	   each	   other,	   and	   the	  isolation	  resulted	  in	  a	  severe	  lack	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  equipment	  and	  operational	  doctrine.	  One	  of	   Li’s	   staff	   officer	   observed	   that	   the	   southern	   fleets’	   equipment,	  semaphore	   and	   even	   uniform	   differed	   from	   those	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.507	  Another	  mid-­‐1880s	  observation	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  were	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  seas	  beyond	  their	  respective	  defence	  parameters.508	   In	  1879,	  joint	   fleet	   exercises	   were	   impeded	   mainly	   through	   reluctance,	   but	   by	   the	  mid-­‐1880s,	  such	  reluctance	  had	  evolved	  into	  institutional	  heterogeneity	  between	  the	   four	   regional	   fleets.	   They	  were	   so	   different	   from	   and	   independent	   to	   each	  other	   that	   some	   historians	   claimed	   that	   they	  were	   in	   fact	   four	   navies.509	   As	   a	  result,	  coordination	  between	  them	  became	  even	  harder.	  Provincialism	   not	   only	   had	   an	   adverse	   impact	   on	   training,	   but	   it	   also	  impacted	  on	  coordination	  during	  wartime.	  At	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou,	  a	  major	  naval	  engagement	  of	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War,	  a	   lack	  of	   coordination	   led	   to	   the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet.	  More	  than	  a	  month	  passed	  between	  the	  first	  French	  warship	  intruding	  into	  the	  River	  Min	  on	  14th	  July	  1884	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  fire	  that	   started	   on	   23rd	   August	   1884.510	   During	   this	   period	   of	   time,	   the	   Chinese	  frontline	   commanders	   in	   Fuzhou	   desperately	   requested	   reinforcements	   from	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  Vol.	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  p.	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  p.	  291.	  509	   FO	  17/782,	  pp.	  172-­‐173,	  No.	  152	  Thomas	  Wade	  to	  Salisbury,	  Peking,	  Aug.	  27,	  1878.	  510	   Piotr	  Olender,	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  Naval	  War:	  1894-­‐1895,	  (Petersfield:	  Mushroom	  Model	  Publications,	  2014),	  pp.	  41-­‐47.	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other	   regional	   fleets.	   A	   review	   of	   telegraph	   communication	   between	   Chinese	  frontline	  commanders	  and	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  shows	  that	  the	  former	  sent	  at	  least	  thirty	   telegraphs	  petitioning	   for	   reinforcements	  or	   a	   coordinated	  movement	  of	  other	  regional	  fleets.511	   	  Despite	   the	   Imperial	   Court	   ultimately	   approving	   reinforcements,	   both	   the	  Beiyang	  and	  Nanyang	  fleets	  who	  were	  forwarded	  the	  petition	  declined	  Fuzhou’s	  appeal.512	   The	  Nanyang	  fleet	  claimed	  that	  ‘large	  [seaworthy]	  warships	  we	  do	  not	  
have	  many,	  and	  small	  ones	  we	  have	  but	  a	  few	  …	  [we	  are]	  in	  a	  genuine	  difficulty	  to	  
send	  any	   ship	   to	   [reinforce]	   Fuzhou.’513	   The	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   also	   refused	   to	   send	  reinforcements	  with	  Li	  saying	  in	  his	  reply:	   	  	   ‘the	   ships	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   are	   all	   small,	   they	   are	   not	   suitable	   to	  
confront	  French	  ironclads.	  Also,	  there	  were	  three	  French	  vessels	  anchored	  
outside	   the	   port	   of	   Yantai	   [the	   Weihaiwei	   Base]	   …	   and	   Lüshun	   [Port	  Arthur],	  away	  from	  the	  coast,	  also	  need	  to	  be	  safeguarded.	  If	  [the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s]	   ships	   were	   sent	   away,	   who	   should	   be	   responsible	   if	   something	  
unexpected	   happens?	   The	   six	   [Rendel]	   gunboats	   [of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet]	  
were	  only	  suitable	  for	  coastal	  defence	  and	  not	  for	  a	  sea	  battle.’514	  	  The	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   fleet	   received	   only	   two	  Wan	   Nian	   Qing	   class	   wooden	  gunboats	   as	   reinforcements.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Chinese	   side	   was	   outmoded	   and	  outgunned.	  This	  was	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  fleet	  was	  virtually	  annihilated	  within	  an	  hour	  during	  the	  Battle	  of	  Fuzhou.	   	  With	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	  crippled,	  the	  French	  naval	  action	  continued.	  The	   French	   Far	   East	   Squadron	   turned	   to	   Taiwan	   (at	   the	   time	   under	   the	  jurisdiction	   of	   Fujian	   province)	   as	   its	   next	   target,	   in	   the	   hope	   that	   its	   capture	  could	  force	  China	  into	  a	  peace	  treaty.	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  asked	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  to	  reinforce	  the	  defence	  of	  Taiwan.	  This	  time,	  the	  pressure	  of	  public	  opinion	  was	  much	  greater	  and	  they	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  refuse	  to	  send	  ships	  as	  before,	  which	  both	  dually	  did.	  However	  both	  also	  attempted	  to	  play	  for	  time	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  511	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1052.	  512	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  113.	  513	   GXCZFJSSL,	  Vol.	  19,	  p.	  18.	  514	   LHZQJ,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  172.	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and	   strived	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   ships	   dispatched.	   The	   French	   Far	   East	  Squadron	   initiated	   the	  Taiwan	  Campaign	   in	   late	  October	  1884	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   received	   orders	   to	   send	   reinforcements	   in	   early	   November.	   Despite	   this,	  the	  detachment	  only	  arrived	  at	  Shanghai	  on	  20th	  December.	  Moreover,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  ships	  arrived,	  they	  entered	  a	  local	  shipyard	  for	  repairs	  and	  weapon	  upgrades,	  which	   took	   another	   twenty	   days.515	   The	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   received	   the	   orders	   to	  send	  a	  detachment	  at	  almost	  the	  same	  time,	  but	  no	  sooner	  did	  they	  receive	  the	  order,	  than	  the	  ships	  were	  sent	  into	  shipyards	  for	  upgrading.516	   The	  detachment	  of	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  set	  sail	  as	  late	  as	  mid-­‐January	  1885,	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  months	  after	  the	  French	  action	  started.517	   	  As	   for	   the	   number	   of	   ships	   sent	   to	   reinforce	   Taiwan,	   the	   Imperial	   Court	  expected	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  to	  send	  a	  detachment	  of	  five	  ships,	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   to	   send	   four	   to	   five	   ships.518	   Expectations	   both	   fleets	   were	   reluctant	   to	  meet.	  The	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  attempted	  to	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  detachment	  to	  three	  ships,	   and	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   to	   two.519	   The	   Imperial	   Court	   compelled	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   to	   send	   five	   ships	   by	   threatening	   to	   discharge	   its	   patron	   Zeng	  Guoquan	  (the	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangjiang	  and	  the	  Southern	  Superintendent,	  in	   office	   from	   1884	   to	   1887)	   from	   his	   position	   and	   put	   him	   on	   trial.520	   Li	  Hongzhang	  successfully	  managed	  to	  cut	  down	  the	  number	  of	  his	  reinforcement	  squadron	  to	  two	  ships	  by	  convincing	  the	  court	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  ships	  were	  not	  seaworthy.	  Moreover,	  Li	  withdrawal	  his	  ships	  before	  they	  arrived	  at	  Taiwan	  on	  the	   grounds	   that	   the	   Japanese	   threats	   revealed	   in	   the	   Gapsin	   Coup	   in	   Korea	  mandated	  their	  return	  north.521	  China	   lost	   the	   Sino-­‐French	   War,	   but	   a	   closer	   examination	   of	   the	   material	  strength	  of	   the	  belligerents	   shows	   that	  although	   the	  French	  Far	  East	  Squadron	  had	   a	   margin	   of	   supremacy	   over	   China,	   it	   was	   nothing	   like	   the	   superiority	  enjoyed	   by	   the	   British	   two	   and	   a	   half	   decades	   previously	   during	   the	   Second	  Opium	  War.	  By	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  had	  a	  total	  number	  of	  over	  fifty	  modern	  warships,	   with	  more	   than	   half	   being	   locally	   built.	   Among	   others,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515	   LWZGQJ-­‐DG,	  Vol.	  4,	  p.	  23.	  ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  p.	  94.	   	  516	   ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  pp.	  202-­‐203,	  231-­‐233.	  517	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1074.	  518	   ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  p.	  79.	  519	   ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  p.	  94.	  Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1071.	  520	   ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  p.	  94-­‐95.	  521	   ZFZZ,	  Vol.	  6,	  p.	  94.	  Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1072.	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thirteen	  were	   Armstrong	   gunboats,	   and	   two	  were	   German	   ships	  with	   two	   8in	  guns	  each.	  Unfortunately	   these	  were	  not	  brought	   to	  bear	  and	   the	  war	  with	   the	  French	   was	   fought	   by	   the	   Fuzhou	   Navy	   Yard	   fleet	   alone	   at	   its	   homeport.522	  Rawlinson	  commented	   that	  China’s	  problems	   in	   the	  war	  with	  France	  were	   ‘not	  
based	  on	  the	  material	  aspects	  of	  her	  navy	  as	  much	  as	  they	  were	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  
leadership	  and	  the	  political	  organization	  of	  the	  empire.’523	  Many	   people	   who	   have	   commented	   on	   the	   Sino-­‐French	   War	   argue	   that	  defeat	   could	   have	   been	   avoided	   had	   the	   regional	   fleets	   cooperated	   with	   each	  other	  more	  efficiently.	  However,	  the	  regional	  fleet	  commanders	  felt	  no	  obligation	  to	   help	   each	   other.	   Both	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   patron	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   and	   Zeng	  Guoquan,	  patron	  of	   the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  were	  reproached	   for	   their	  reluctance	   to	  help	  when	   the	   Fuzhou	  Navy	   Yard	   Fleet	   and	   Taiwan	   Island	  were	   facing	   defeat.	  This	   should	   not	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   personalities	   of	   Li	   Hongzhang	   and	   Zeng	  Guoquan	  but	   rather	   it	  was	   the	   institutional	  matrix,	   i.e.	   the	  provincialism	  of	   the	  Qing	  Empire	  that	  is	  to	  blame	  as	  no	  matter	  who	  became	  the	  patron	  of	  the	  regional	  fleets,	  they	  displayed	  the	  same	  inclination	  to	  take	  regional	  interests	  as	  their	  main	  concern.	   	  	  	  
6.3	   The	   Establishment	   of	   the	   Chinese	   Board	   of	   Admiralty	   –	   the	   Haijun	  
Yamen	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  Defeat	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  	  China’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  1884-­‐1885	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  convinced	  Chinese	  elites	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  naval	  centralisation	  was	  needed.	  Despite	  some	  victories	  on	  land,	  China	  ultimately	  lost	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  at	  sea.	  The	  defeat	  ignited	  a	  heated	  discussion	  amongst	   Chinese	   political	   elites,	   during	   which	   many	   came	   to	   realise	   that	   a	  deficiency	   of	   naval	   power	   resulting	   from	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	   between	   the	  various	  regional	   fleets	  was	  the	  main	  reason	  for	   the	  defeat.524	   A	  groundswell	  of	  appeals	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  central	  naval	  administrative	  and	  commanding	  authority	  emerged,	  with	  advocates	  arguing	  it	  would	  structurally	  augment	  China’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  522	   Elman,	   ‘Naval	   Warfare	   and	   the	   Refraction	   of	   China’s	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Reforms	   into	   Scientific	   and	  Technological	  Failure,	  1865-­‐1895’,	  p.	  316.	  523	   Rawlinson,	  China's	  Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development,	  p.	  127.	   	  524	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  p.	  206.	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naval	   power	   by	   breaking	   up	   the	   compartmentalisation	   of	   the	   various	   regional	  fleets.525 	   Li	   Hongzhang	   was	   one	   of	   such	   champion	   of	   a	   centralised	   naval	  authority.	   In	  an	  exceptionally	   lengthy	  memorial,	  he	  pointed	  out	   to	   the	   Imperial	  Court	   that	   all	   Western	   powers	   had	   admiralties	   and	   that	   even	   Japan,	   China’s	  potential	  naval	  adversary,	  established	  one	  in	  1872.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Chinese	  navy,	  he	   argued,	   was	   divided	   and	   commanded	   by	   various	   mutually-­‐independent	  provincial	   authorities.	   The	   various	   regional	   fleets	   lacked	   standardisation	   and	  centralised	  command.526	  Li	  suggested	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Haijun	  Yamen	  (Board	  of	  Admiralty)	  should	  be	  modelled	   after	   Western	   admiralties,	   which	   were	   usually	   presided	   over	   by	  specifically-­‐assigned	  officials	   and	  had	  authoritative	  power	  over	   administration,	  command	   and	   finance. 527 	   Another	   proposal	   put	   forward	   by	   a	   different	  Self-­‐Strengthener	  suggested	  that	  a	  Haijun	  Yamen	  should	  be	  headed	  by	  a	   ‘senior	  military	   professional’,	   and	   be	   assisted	   by	   a	   group	   of	   officials	   specialised	   in	  administration,	  personnel,	  contract	  and	  purchase,	  supplies	  and	  accountancy.	  The	  proposal	  even	  envisioned	  a	  naval	  general	  staff	  and	  a	  supervision	  department.528	  The	   consensus	   on	   the	   need	   of	   a	   central	   naval	   authority	   was	   broad.	   Even	   Li’s	  political	  enemy,	  Zuo	  Zongtang,	  then	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangjiang,	  agreed	  with	  him	   on	   the	   necessity	   of	   such	   institution	   to	   a	   degree.529	   In	   short,	   many	   such	  proposals	   pointed	   in	   the	   same	   direction:	   in	   order	   to	   better	   coordinate	   the	  regional	  fleets,	  China	  needed	  a	  central	  naval	  authority	  that	  was	  professional	  and	  authoritative	   enough	   to	   bring	   the	   regional	   fleets	   under	   centralised	  administration	  and	  command.	   	  In	  October	  1885,	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  sanctioned	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Haijun	  
Yamen.	   However,	   this	   institution	   did	   not	   meet	   the	   expectation	   of	   those	   who	  appealed	   for	   its	   establishment.	   To	   begin	   with,	   the	   institution	   lacked	  professionalism.	   A	   key	   reason	   for	   this	   was	   that	   the	   Manchu	   rulers’	   desire	   to	  maintain	   control	   overrode	   the	   demand	   for	   professionalism.	   J.	  Wang’s	   research	  shows	   that	   during	   the	   ten	   years	   between	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen’s	  establishment	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  525	   Ibid.,	  207-­‐208.	  526	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  570-­‐571.	  527	   Ibid.	  528	   Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	   the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.206-­‐207.	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	   the	  
Navy,	  p.	  215.	  529	   Wang,	  Coastal	  Defence	  in	  the	  Late	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  pp.	  207-­‐208.	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1885	   and	   its	   abolition	   in	   1895,	   an	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   officials	   that	  constituted	   the	   leadership	   and	   staff	   body	   of	   that	   institution	   were	  Manchus.530	  Many	  of	   them	  originated	   from	  the	  Beijing	  Field	  Force	  (Shenji	  Ying)	  –	  a	  Manchu	  imperial	   guard	   unit	   garrisoning	   the	   vicinity	   of	   the	   Forbidden	   City.	   Even	   the	  official	   seal	   of	   the	   Beijing	   Field	   Force	  was	   borrowed	   as	   the	   seal	   of	   the	  Haijun	  
Yamen	  in	  its	  early	  days.531	   It	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  most	  of	  them	  had	  very	  limited	  knowledge	  about	  modern	  navy,	  because	  the	  Kunminghu	  Naval	  Academy,	  which	  was	   specifically	   dedicated	   to	   naval	   education	   of	   the	  Manchus,	   opened	   in	   1887	  with	   the	   first	   batch	  of	   students	   finishing	   their	   study	  no	   earlier	   than	  1893,	   one	  year	  before	   the	  First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  broke	  out.532	   This	  meant	   that	  none	  of	  the	  Manchus	   that	   staffed	   the	  Haijun	  Yamen	   had	   a	  working	   knowledge	  of	   naval	  affairs.	   Many	   contemporary	   observations	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   group	   not	   only	  lacked	  professionalism,	  but	  was	  also	  lax	  and	  corrupt.533	   	  A	   second	   factor	   hindering	   the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   as	   a	  professional	  body	  was	  that	  the	  autocratic	  emperors	  did	  not	  want	  their	  power	  to	  be	  challenged	  by	  another	  authority.	  The	  organisation	  of	  this	  ‘Chinese	  Admiralty’	  was	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Grand	  Council,	   in	  that	  all	   its	  personnel	  held	  only	  concurrent	   appointments.534	   This	  meant	   that	   they	   all	   worked	   on	   a	   temporary	  basis	  for	  the	  institution,	  so	  that	  emperor	  could	  remove	  them	  from	  the	  institution	  at	   will.	   The	   Haijun	   Yamen’s	   nature	   as	   a	   temporary	   office	   undermined	   its	  efficiency.	  For	  example,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  vice	  minister	  of	  the	  institution.	  He	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  familiar	  with	  the	  steam	  navy	  (although	  it	  was	  arguable	  that	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  steam	  navy	  was	  also	  limited),	  yet	  he	  was	  simultaneously	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   province	   and	   the	   Northern	  Superintendent	  of	  Trade.	  The	  Haijun	  Yamen	  was	  in	  Beijing,	  the	  official	  residence	  of	   the	   governor-­‐general	   of	   Zhili	   province	  was	   in	  Baoding,	   and	   the	   office	   of	   the	  Beiyang	   Superintendent	  was	   located	   in	   Tianjin;	   the	   three	   cities	   are	  more	   than	  one	   hundred	   kilometres	   apart.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   modern	   means	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  530	   Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  pp.	  217-­‐220.	  531	   Jiang,	  Dragon	  Flags	  over	  the	  Navy,	  pp.	  217-­‐218.	  Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  
Navy,	  pp.	  216-­‐211.	  532	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.1,	  p.612.	  Bao,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  
Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  796.	   	  533	   Fan,	   The	   New	   Policy	   toward	   Foreign	   Affairs	   during	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   Vol.	   2,	   p.	   1085.	   Li,	   The	   Political	  
History	  of	  China,	  1840-­‐1928,	  pp.	  123-­‐126.	  534	   Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  pp.	  216-­‐211.	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communication,	  the	  efficiency	  of	  decision-­‐making	  of	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  was	  low.	  Furthermore,	   in	   order	   to	   minimise	   personal	   authority,	   there	   was	   no	   specific	  division	  of	  duty	  in	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen;	  officials	  in	  the	  institution	  had	  to	  sign	  official	  documents	  collectively.535	   Undoubtedly	  this	  was	  done	  to	  prevent	  ministers	  from	  monopolising	  power	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  throne,	  but	  it	  would	  certainly	  increase	  the	  possibility	   for	   non-­‐professional	   officials	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   a	   confused	  situation.	  Moreover,	   the	  Haijun	  Yamen	   lacked	  authority.	  Different	   from	  admiralties	   in	  the	  West,	  which	  had	  real	  power,	   the	  Haijun	  Yamen’s	  power	  was	   largely	   titular.	  The	  autocratic	  polity	  of	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty	  tolerated	  no	  authoritative	  institutions,	  especially	   military	   ones.	   For	   example,	   the	   Board	   of	   War	   was	   merely	   an	  administrative	  rather	  than	  a	  commanding	  body,	  and	  only	  exercised	   jurisdiction	  over	  the	  Green	  Standard	  Army	  –	  one	  of	  the	  many	  branches	  of	  armed	  forces	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  The	  emperor	   retained	  command	  of	   all	  military	   forces;	   the	  Haijun	  
Yamen	   conformed	   to	   this	   rule	   and	   the	   proposed	   naval	   general	   staff	   and	  department	  of	   supervision	  were	  not	  established.	   Indeed,	   the	  notional	  power	  of	  ‘commanding	   all	   regional	   fleets’,	   as	   stipulated	   in	   the	   Imperial	   Edict	   that	  pronounced	   the	   establishment	  of	   the	  Haijun	  Yamen,	   remained	  nominal.	  During	  its	   ten	   years	   of	   existence	   between	   1885	   and	   1895,	   aside	   from	   three	   major	  inspections	   and	   the	   promulgation	   of	   the	   1888	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   Regulation,	   the	  institution	  had	  few	  accomplishments.536	  The	   Haijun	   Yamen’s	   lack	   of	   real	   power	   can	   be	   reflected	   in	   a	   memorial	  presented	   to	   the	   Throne	   by	   the	   institution	   itself	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	   During	   the	  war,	   the	   elite	   of	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   –	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   –	   was	   virtually	   annihilated.	   Other	   regional	   fleets	   were	   far	  more	  inferior	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  equipment	  and	  training.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  revitalise	  the	   navy,	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen	   petitioned	   the	   Throne	   for	   its	   own	   dissolution,	   as	  there	  were	  no	  more	  ships	  over	  on	  which	  the	  institution	  could	  exercise	  its	  power:	   	  	  
‘without	   large-­‐scale	   procurement	   of	   large	   ships	   and	   big	   guns,	   it	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  535	   Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  220.	  536	   For	  the	  first	  major	  inspection	  see	  QMHJSL,	  pp.	  251-­‐254.	  For	  the	  second	  and	  the	  third	  major	  inspection	  see	   LWZGQJ-­‐ZG,	   Vol.	   72,	   pp.	   3-­‐4.	   Only	   the	   first	  was	   attended	   by	   the	   head	   of	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen.	  Wang,	  Li	  
Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  pp.	  390-­‐395.	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impossible	   to	   prepare	   for	   offence	   and	   defence.	   Without	   effective	  
coordination	   between	   the	   [fleets	   of]	   the	   Northern	   Ocean	   and	   the	  
Southern	  Ocean,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   exercise	   [centralised]	   command	  and	  
control.	  …	  Since	  all	  these	  [prerequisites]	  are	  lacking,	  there	  is	  little	  for	  the	  [Haijun]	  Yamen	   to	   do.	   Staff	   should	   be	   dissolved	   and	   budgets	   should	   be	  
suspended	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  expenses.’537	   	  	  This	   extract	   indicates	   that	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   did	   not	   concern	   itself	   with	   the	  re-­‐building	   of	   the	   steam	   navy.	   Key	   functions	   that	   characterised	   Western	  admiralties,	  such	  as	  acquisition	  of	  equipment	  and	  coordination	  of	  fleets,	  did	  not	  fall	   within	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen.	   The	   Haijun	   Yamen	   failed	   to	  replace	  the	  old	  decentralised	  system.	  The	   Haijun	   Yamen	   also	   did	   not	   possess	   sufficient	   financial	   strength	   to	  exercise	   its	   authority.	   This	  was	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   rigid	   economic	   policy	   of	   the	  Qing	   Empire	   that	   refused	   to	   establish	   a	   Western-­‐style	   financial	   infrastructure	  with	  which	  to	  raise	   funds,	  and	  partly	  due	  to	  strained	  relations	  between	  central	  and	  provincial	  governments	  that	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  former	  to	  wrest	  funds	  from	   the	   latter.	   When	   it	   was	   newly	   established,	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   secured	  around	   six	  million	   taels	   indirectly	   from	   foreign	   banks	   and	   raised	   another	   one	  million	   taels	   from	   ‘maritime	  defence	   donations’.538	   It	  was	   expected	   that	   in	   the	  following	   years,	   a	   steady	   flow	  of	   four	  millions	   taels	   could	   be	  pressed	   from	   the	  various	  provinces.539	   However,	   the	   steam	  navy	  was	  more	  costly	   than	  expected	  and	  pressing	  funds	  from	  the	  provinces	  proved	  difficult.	  Provincial	  governments	  were	   requested	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   local	   Green	   Standard	   Army	   and	  old-­‐fashioned	  war	  junks	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  naval	  funds,	  but	  such	  requests	  often	  fell	  on	   deaf	   ears.	   A	   report	   that	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen	   presented	   to	   the	   Throne	   in	   late	  1886	  complained	  that	   the	  seven	  million	  taels	   secured	  when	  the	   institution	  was	  established	   was	   quickly	   running	   out,	   and	   it	   was	   difficult	   to	   collect	   the	   four	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  537	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  85.	   	  538	   The	  Maritime	  Donation	  (海防捐)	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  Qing	  government	  to	  solve	  the	  shortage	  of	  naval	  funds.	   It	   clearly	   showed	   the	   incompetency	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   economy	   to	   upkeep	   a	   navy.	   Ranks	   and	  offices	  were	  openly	  sold	  for	  this	  purpose,	  and	  officials	  were	  encouraged	  to	  'repay	  imperial	  kindness'	  (报效)	  with	   funds	  which	  could	  bring	   them	  promotion	  or	  even	   forgiveness	   for	  past	  delinquencies.	  Liu	  and	  Smith,	  ‘The	  Military	  Challenge’,	  p.	  254.	  539	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  626-­‐627.	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million	   taels	   of	   annual	   funding	   anticipated	   from	   the	   various	   provinces.	   The	  report	  indicates	  only	  one	  fourth	  of	  the	  funds	  were	  secured.540	   	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   did	   not	   have	   enough	   financial	   strength	   to	  maintain	   its	   authority.	   A	   statistic	   shows	   that	   during	   the	   period	   from	   1885	   to	  1894,	  even	  the	  elite	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  only	  received	  an	  average	  of	  sixty-­‐two	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  funds	  expected	  from	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen.541	   To	  the	  other	  regional	  fleets,	  the	  
Haijun	  Yamen	  was	  even	  less	  reliable	  as	  a	  source	  of	  funds,	  as	  priorities	  were	  given	  to	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  Consequently,	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  were	  forced	  to	  rely	  on	  local	  authorities	  for	  funding,	  who	  were	  therefore	  able	  to	  retain	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   influence	  over	  their	   ‘own’	   fleets,	   including	  a	  say	   in	  a	  range	  of	   issues,	  such	  as	  the	   education	   and	   appointment	   of	   officers,	   the	   acquisition	   of	   ships,	   and	   the	  construction	  of	  related	  naval	  infrastructures.542	   Fundamentally,	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  over	  regional	  fleets	  was	  weak.	   	  The	   original	   intention	   of	   establishing	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   was	   to	   unify	   the	  regionalised	   fleets	   and	   to	   bring	   them	   under	   a	   centralised	   administration	   and	  command.	  Ostensibly,	   this	  goal	  was	  achieved.	  During	   the	   ten	  years	  between	   its	  establishment	  in	  1885	  and	  its	  abolition	  in	  1895,	  three	  fleet	  reviews	  were	  held	  in	  1886,	  1891	  and	  1894,	  to	  which	  all	  the	  four	  regional	  fleets	  sent	  their	  ships.	  Efforts	  were	   also	   made	   to	   achieve	   standardisation	   between	   the	   various	   fleets	   by	  joint-­‐fleet	  exercises.543	   However,	  a	  closer	  examination	  shows	  that	   the	  so-­‐called	  centralised	  coordination	  of	  the	  various	  regional	  fleets	  was	  not	  achieved	  upon	  the	  platform	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen;	   instead,	   it	   was	   achieved	   largely	   because	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   outgrew	   the	   other	   regional	   fleets	   to	   become	   the	   dominant	   one	  among	  the	  four.	   	  In	  1888,	  three	  years	  after	  its	  establishment,	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  authorised	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  Regulation,	  which	  established	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  as	  the	  pillar	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.544	   This	  was	  due	  to	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  was	  considered	  more	   important	   strategically.	   As	   has	   been	   indicated	   earlier	   in	   this	  chapter,	   the	   logic	  behind	  the	  demarcation	  of	  maritime	  defence	  parameters	  was	  continentally	   minded.	   The	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   was	   assigned	   with	   the	   task	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  540	   QMHJSL,	  pp.	  626-­‐627.	  541	   Wang,	  Li	  Hongzhang	  and	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  p.	  383.	  542	   Wang,	  Collected	  Essays	  on	  the	  History	  of	  Modern	  Chinese	  Navy,	  p.	  223.	  543	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  501-­‐503.	  544	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  1083-­‐1084.	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safeguarding	   the	  sea	   flanking	   the	  gateway	   to	   the	  political	  centre	  of	   the	  empire,	  whilst	  other	   fleets	   in	   the	  south	  were	  given	  only	  secondary	   importance,	  as	   they	  garrisoned	  the	  agrarian	  areas.	  Second,	  Li	  Hongzhang,	  the	  patron	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet,	  was	  more	  powerful	  than	  other	  regional	  fleet	  heads,	  wielding	  considerable	  influence	  in	  the	  Imperial	  Court.	  Upon	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen,	  Li	  was	   appointed	   vice	   minister	   of	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen.	   For	   these	   two	   reasons,	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   received	   more	   attention	   than	   other	   regional	   fleets	   and	   the	  resulting	  skewed	  distribution	  of	  resources	  enabled	  it	  to	  become	  the	  single	  most	  power	  fleet	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	   	  As	  such,	  the	  so-­‐called	  inter-­‐fleet	  coordination	  was	  in	  fact	  not	  carried	  out	  on	  the	   platform	   of	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen;	   rather,	   it	   was	   enabled	   by	   the	   other	   fleets’	  subservience	   to	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	   and	   the	  prestige	  of	   its	  patron	  Li	  Hongzhang.	  The	  1888	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  Regulation	  provided	  that	  all	  other	  regional	  fleets	  should	  sail	   their	   seaworthy	   ships	   north,	   and	   subject	   them	   to	   the	   administration	   and	  command	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   annually	   from	   late	  March	   to	   late	   September.545	  Naturally,	  many	  were	  unhappy	  with	  this	  arrangement.	  A	  memorial	  to	  the	  Throne	  presented	   by	   a	   concerned	   official	   soon	   after	   the	   promulgation	   of	   the	   1888	  Beiyang	   Fleet	   Regulation	   illustrates	   such	   discontent.	   The	   memorial	   bluntly	  warned	   that	   such	  a	   regime	  would	  make	  China’s	   steam	  navy	  Li’s	   ‘private’	   navy,	  and	   if	  Li’s	  power	  was	  unchecked,	   it	   could	  pose	  a	  serious	   threat	   to	   the	   Imperial	  Court’s	   authority	   in	   the	   long	   run.546	   In	   short,	   provincialism,	   the	   fundamental	  cause	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	   had	   not	   been	   eliminated;	   rather,	   it	   was	   only	  papered	  over.	  In	  summary,	  the	  Haijun	  Yamen	  made	  little	  substantial	  contribution	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy.	  There	  were	  still	  four	  fleets,	  with	  Li’s	  the	  largest,	  yet	  they	  still	  lacked	  coordination.	  When	   the	   First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	   War	   broke	   out,	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	  between	  regional	   fleets	  re-­‐emerged.	  The	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  suffered	  heavy	   losses	   in	  the	  Battle	  of	  Yalu	  and	  retreated	  into	  the	  Lüshun	  Base	  (Port	  Arthur),	  and	  shortly	  thereafter,	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base.	  It	  was	  concerned	  that	  if	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base	  were	  attacked,	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  would	  be	  completely	  annihilated	  (with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	   we	   know	   that	   such	   worries	   made	   sense).	   Li	   Hongzhang,	   then	   vice	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  545	   QMHJSL,	  p.	  501-­‐503.	  546	   YWYD,	  Vol.	  3,	  pp.	  17-­‐18.	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minister	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   and	   patron	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   fleet,	   petitioned	   for	  reinforcements	  from	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet,	  the	  second	  largest	  fleet	  by	  then.	  In	  1894,	  the	   Nanyang	   Fleet	   had	   a	   considerable	   force;	   most	   noticeable	   among	   its	   ships	  were	  the	  four	  2,200-­‐ton	  cruisers	  acquired	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1880s.	  Li	  expected	  that	  the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   could	   send	   the	   four	   cruisers	   north	   and	   place	   them	   under	   the	  command	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   to	   strengthen	   their	   defence.547	   The	   Imperial	  Court	  responded	  to	  Li’s	  petition	  actively	  and	  ordered	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  to	  send	  three	  of	  the	  four	  cruisers	  north	  to	  help	  to	  defend	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base.	  However,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  was	  reluctant	  to	  send	  any	  ships	  north,	  with	  its	  leaders	  arguing	  that	  the	  fleet	  was	  safeguarding	  the	  economically	  important	  Lower	  Yangtze	  Plain,	  which	   the	   Japanese	   were	   keen	   to	   control,	   and	   surprise	   attacks	   there	   were	  considered	   a	   real	   possibility.	   ‘Both	   the	   frontline	   [the	  Weihaiwei	   Base]	   and	   the	  
economic	  centre’,	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  replied,	  ‘are	  of	  vital	  importance’.548	   No	  ships	  were	  sent	  north	  to	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet’s	  rescue.	  In	  January	  1895,	  Japan	  began	  to	  assemble	  ships	  outside	  the	  Weihaiwei	  Base,	  which	   put	   tremendous	   pressure	   on	   the	   remaining	   forces	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.	  The	  Imperial	  Court	  sent	  another	  order	  to	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  asking	  it	  to	  dispatch	  its	  cruisers	  to	  harass	  the	  Japanese	  archipelagos.	  It	  was	  expected	  this	  would	  force	  the	  Japanese	  Combined	  Fleet	  to	  divert	  some	  of	  its	  ships	  to	  defend	  its	  coast,	  thus	  relieving	   pressure	   on	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet.549	   This	   proposal	   was	   declined	   by	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   with	   the	   excuses	   that	   its	   ships	   were	   slow	   and	   insufficiently	  armoured,	   that	   its	   armaments	  were	   inadequate,	   and	   its	   officers	   not	   capable	   of	  such	  a	  mission.550	   These	  were	  almost	  exactly	  the	  same	  excuses	  employed	  by	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  and	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  in	  their	  refusal	  to	  send	  ships	  to	  the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet’s	  rescue	  in	  the	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  ten	  years	  previously.	   	  In	  early-­‐February	  1895,	  Japan	  initiated	  an	  all-­‐out	  offensive	  on	  the	  remaining	  ships	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet	   in	   the	   Weihaiwei	   Base.	   A	   total	   destruction	   of	   the	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  p.	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   ZRZZ,	  Vol.	  3,	  p.	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  549	   It	  was	  highly	  possible	  that	  this	  idea	  came	  from	  William	  F.	  Tyler,	  a	  Briton	  serving	  in	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  In	  his	  memoir	  he	  mentioned:	   ‘my	  contribution	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	   the	  war	  …	  was	  this:	   -­‐	  Buy	  telegraphically	  that	  new	  Chillan	  cruiser	  for	  delivery	  in	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  waters	  –	  I	  think	  she	  was	  the	  Fifteenth	  of	  May	  –	  the	  fastest	  cruiser	  in	  the	  world.	  …	  Give	  me	  command	  of	  her.	  …	  I	  will	  harry	  the	  enemy	  coast	  and	  shipping	  …	  [the	  Japanese]	  will	  detail	  the	  Yoshino	  and	  other	  fast	  cruisers	  to	  watch	  the	  coaling	  ports;	  and	  thus	  so	  much	  better	  for	  our	  fleet.’	  Tyler,	  Pulling	  Strings	  in	  China,	  pp.	  38-­‐39.	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Beiyang	  Fleet	  seemed	  unavoidable,	  but	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet	  suddenly	  changed	  its	  attitude	  towards	  the	  plan	  of	  harassing	  the	  Japanese	  homeland.	  Memorials	  were	  sent	  to	  Beijing	  calling	  for	  the	  acquisition	  of	  four	  to	  five	  protected	  cruisers	  and	  a	  dozen	   sea-­‐going	   torpedo	   gunboats	   for	   the	   purpose	   (the	   Nanyang	   fleet	   still	  refused	  to	  send	  the	  ships	  that	  they	  already	  had).	   It	  was	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  undelivered	  ships	  ordered	  by	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  before	  the	  war	  now	  be	  delivered	  to	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	   instead.551	   It	   is	   highly	   probable	   that	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet’s	  sudden	   change	   of	   mind	   was	   due	   to	   its	   desire	   to	   seize	   the	   opportunity	   of	   the	  Beiyang	   Fleet’s	   precarious	   position	   to	   strengthen	   itself.	   The	   plan	   was	   not	  implemented.	  The	  naval	  battles	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  were	  not	  ‘fair’	  battles	  in	  that	  the	   Japanese	   Combined	   Fleet	   contained	   around	   twenty-­‐two	   of	   Japan’s	   most	  modern	  and	  combat-­‐capable	  ships,	  whereas	  China,	   in	  spite	  of	  a	  total	  number	  of	  some	  sixty-­‐five	  ships,	  was	   in	  a	   fourfold	  division.552	   Similar	   to	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  Fleet	   situation	   a	  decade	   ago,	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  managed	   to	   secure	  only	   a	  few	   reinforcements	   from	  other	   regional	   fleets	   in	   the	  war	  with	   Japan.	   All	   came	  from	  the	  Guangdong	  Fleet,	  which	  sent	   three	  of	   its	  most	  seaworthy	  ships	   to	   the	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	  However,	  even	  this	  was	  largely	  because	  the	  Guangdong	   Fleet	   was	   patronised	   by	   Li	   Hangzhang,	   the	   older	   brother	   of	   Li	  Hongzhang.	  Li	  complained	  that	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  was	  a	  war	  in	  which	  ‘a	   corner	   of	   China	   [the	   Beiyang	   Fleet]	   fought	   against	   the	   whole	   Japanese	  
Empire’.553	   However,	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   Haijun	   Yamen	   and	   the	   entrenched	  provincialism	   between	   the	   various	   regional	   fleets	   rendered	   it	   impossible	   for	  China	  to	  form	  its	  own	  combined	  fleet.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  551	   Wemyu	  Zhu	  and	  Dun	  Liu,	   ‘张之洞与南洋海军	   Zhang	  Zhidong	  Yu	  Nanyang	  Haijun	   [Zhang	  Zhidong	  and	  the	  Nanyang	  Fleet]’,	  Tsing	  Hua	  Journal	  of	  Chinese	  Studies,	  Vol.	  43	  (New),	  No.	  2.	  (Jun.	  2013),	  pp.	  283-­‐310.	  552	   The	  fourfold	  division	  of	  Chinese	  navy	  remained	  throughout	  the	  Sino-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  and	  even	  for	  some	  years	  after	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  a	  British	  military	  diplomatic	  observed	  in	  1898	  that	  ‘there	  are	  still	  four	  navies	  or	  squadrons’.	  A.	  E.	  J.	  Cavendish,	  ‘The	  Armed	  Strength	  (?)	  of	  China’,	  Royal	  United	  Services	  
Institution	  Journal,	  Vol.	  42,	  No.	  244.	  (Jun.	  1898),	  p.	  718.	  553	   GXCZRJSSL,	  Vol.20,	  pp.	  25-­‐28.	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6.4	  Conclusion	  
	  Qing	   China’s	   use	   of	   naval	   power	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   the	   nation’s	  traditional	   military	   practice,	   and	   overlooked	   the	   importance	   of	   securing	   or	  preventing	   the	  enemy	   from	  securing	  command	  of	   the	   sea	   in	  maritime	  warfare.	  The	   Chinese	   military	   modus	   operandi,	   which	   stressed	   passive	   defence	   and	  fortress	  warfare,	  stemmed	  from	  its	   feudal-­‐agrarian	  economic	  roots,	  but	  did	  not	  suit	  war	  at	   sea.	  The	  Chinese	   top	  echelon	  did	  have	  opportunities	   to	   learn	  about	  principles	  of	  modern	  maritime	  warfare	   from	  translated	  foreign	  books,	  but	   they	  only	   focused	   on	   A	   Treatise	   on	   Coast-­‐Defence,	   which	   further	   reinforced	   their	  neglect	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   command	   of	   the	   sea.	   In	   the	   Sino-­‐French	  War,	   the	  ships	  of	  the	  Fuzhou	  Naval	  Yard	  Fleet	  were	  used	  as	  a	   ‘fortress’	  that	   lay	  between	  the	  enemy	  and	  their	  objective.	  The	  French	  Far	  East	  Squadron	  obtained	  command	  of	   the	   sea	   and	   China	   lost	   the	   war.	   The	   principles	   of	   command	   of	   the	   sea	  continued	  to	  be	  ignored	  in	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War;	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  did	  not	  try	   to	   dispute	   command	   of	   the	   sea	  with	   the	   Japanese	   Combined	   Fleet.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   the	   Japanese	   secured	   command	   of	   the	   sea	   in	   the	   battle	   of	   Yalu,	  expanded	  the	  war	  to	  the	  Chinese	  homeland	  and	  won	  the	  war.	   	  Chinese	  maritime	  defence	  was	  organised	  provincially	  in	  its	  early	  years.	  After	  the	  1874	   Japanese	   invasion	  of	  Taiwan	  a	  group	  of	  Chinese	  elites	   realised	   that	  a	  degree	  of	  integration	  of	  the	  provincial	  navies	  was	  a	  necessity.	  An	  1875	  Imperial	  Edict	  instructed	  the	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Zhili	  and	  governor-­‐general	  of	  Liangjiang	  to	  be	   in	  charge	  of	  maritime	  defence.	  However,	   the	  Edict	  did	  not	  give	   them	  real	  power	  and,	  apart	  from	  the	  northern	  coastal	  provinces,	  Chinese	  maritime	  defence	  remained	   localised.	   The	   provincialism	   impeded	   standardisation	   among	   the	  regional	   fleets,	   which	   eventually	   evolved	   into	   four	   heterogeneous	   fleets	   that	  were	  difficult	   to	   coordinate.	   In	   the	  Sino-­‐French	  War,	   the	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  and	   the	  Nanyang	   Fleet	  were	   reluctant	   to	   reinforce	   the	   Fuzhou	  Naval	   Yard	   Fleet,	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  latter’s	  defeat.	  Consequent	  on	  the	  disaster	  of	  the	  war,	  a	  central	  naval	   institution	   –	   the	  Haijun	   Yamen	   –	   was	   created.	   However,	   because	   of	   the	  political	  dynamics	  –	  i.e.	  the	  autocratic	  Manchu	  rule,	  the	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  between	  the	  central	   and	   local	   government	   and	   the	   conservatism	   in	   financial	   policies	   –	   the	  
Haijun	  Yamen	  had	  no	  real	  power.	  The	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  showed	  that	  the	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lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  the	  regional	  fleets	  was	  not	  solved,	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Beiyang	  Fleet.	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  Chapter	  Seven	  	  	  Conclusions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement	  made	   extraordinary	   efforts	   and	   appeared	   to	  have	  achieved	  remarkable	  results	  in	  building	  a	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy.	  When	  they	  opened	   in	  the	   late	  1860s,	   the	  Fuzhou	  Navy	  Yard	  and	  the	   Jiangnan	  Arsenal	  were	  among	  the	  then	  largest	  shipbuilding	  centres	  in	  East	  Asia,	  with	  a	  staggering	  amount	   of	   nearly	   thirty	   million	   teals	   spent	   on	   the	   building	   and	   upgrading	   of	  these	   facilities. 554 	   The	   two	   main	   bases	   of	   the	   Beiyang	   Fleet,	   Lüshun	   and	  Weihaiwei,	   were	   also	   world-­‐class	   naval	   ports.	   A	   considerable	   number	   of	  professional	   commanding	   officers,	   engine-­‐room	   officers	   and	   naval	   architects	  were	   trained	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	   and	  many	  of	   them	  were	  highly	   regarded	  by	  their	   Western	   counterparts.	   A	   total	   number	   of	   twenty-­‐two	   million	   taels	   were	  spent	   on	   building	   ships	   at	   home	   and	   buying	   ships	   from	   abroad.555	   The	   two	  7,300-­‐ton	   ironclad	  battleships	  Ding	  Yuan	  and	  Zhen	  Yuan	  were	  the	   largest	  ships	  operating	  in	  East	  Asia	  at	  the	  time.	  By	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   boasted	   sixty-­‐five	   large	   warships	   and	   forty-­‐three	  torpedo	   boats,	   and	   ranked	   eighth	   in	   the	  world	   in	   terms	   of	   displacement.556	   In	  many	   ways,	   the	   accomplishments	   of	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthen	   Movement	   in	   naval	  modernisation	  were	  impressive.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  554	   Fan,	   The	   New	   Policy	   toward	   Foreign	   Affairs	   during	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty,	   Vol.	   2,	   pp.	   1502-­‐1503.	   The	  expenditure	   included	   that	   of	   other	   minor	   shipbuilding	   facilities	   such	   as	   the	   Tianjin	   Arsenal	   and	   the	  Guangdong	  Dockyard.	  555	   Fan,	  The	  New	  Policy	  toward	  Foreign	  Affairs	  during	  the	  Qing	  Dynasty,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  1505.	  556 	   Hsü,	   The	   Rise	   of	   Modern	   China,	   p.	   340.	   Elman,	   ‘Naval	   Warfare	   and	   the	   Refraction	   of	   China’s	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Reforms	  into	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Failure,	  1865-­‐1895’,	  p.	  316.	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However,	  if	  we	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  navy	  against	  its	  goal	  –	  ‘learn	  
barbarians’	   superior	   techniques	   with	   which	   to	   repel	   the	   barbarians’	   –	   the	   navy	  could	  hardly	  be	  called	  a	  success.	  In	  1874,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  failed	  to	  defend	  Taiwan	   against	   the	   Japanese	   invasion.	   The	   incident	   was	   finally	   settled	   when	  China	  agreed	  to	  pay	  reparations	  of	  half	  a	  million	  taels.	  In	  addition,	  China	  agreed	  not	   to	   condemn	   Japan’s	   action.	   This	   concession	   implied	   recognition	   of	   Japan’s	  claim	   to	   sovereignty	   over	   the	   Ryūkyū	   Kingdom	   –	   a	   Chinese	   vassal	   state	   since	  1372,	  which	  Japan	  annexed	  in	  1879	  and	  renamed	  it	  Okinawa	  prefecture.	   In	  the	  words	  of	  British	  minister	  to	  Japan	  Harry	  Parkes,	  this	  was	  a	  blatant	  revelation	  of	  China’s	   weakness	   and	   an	   invitation	   to	   further	   foreign	   encroachment.557 	   In	  1884-­‐1885,	   the	   Chinese	   steam	   navy	   lost	   the	   war	   against	   the	   French	   over	   the	  suzerainty	  of	  Annam	  (northern	  Vietnam).	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  defeat,	  China	  was	  forced	  to	  recognise	  all	  French	  treaties	  with	  Annam,	  which	  had	  been	  within	  China’s	   sphere	   of	   influence	   since	   the	   Han	   Dynasty	   (140-­‐87	   BC).	   Although	   no	  indemnity	  was	  paid,	  Chinese	  expenditure	  during	  the	  conflict	  was	  in	  excess	  of	  one	  hundred	  million	  taels,	  with	  another	  twenty	  million	  taels	  incurred	  as	  debts.558	   In	  1894-­‐1895,	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  again	  defeated	  in	  the	  war	  with	  Japan	  for	  influence	  over	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula.	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Shimonoseki	  signed	  between	  China	  and	   Japan	   in	  1895	  provided	   for	   (1)	   recognition	  of	  Korean	   independence	  and	  termination	  of	  all	  tribute	  to	  China;	  (2)	  an	  indemnity	  of	  two	  hundred	  million	  
taels	  to	  Japan;	  (3)	  cession	  of	  Taiwan,	  the	  Pescadores,	  and	  the	  Liaodong	  Peninsula	  to	   Japan;	   (4)	   the	   opening	   of	   four	   cities	   –	   Chongqing,	   Suzhou,	   Hangzhou	   and	  Shashi	  –	  as	  ports	  for	  Japanese	  trade;	  (5)	  the	  right	  of	  Japanese	  nationals	  to	  open	  factories	  and	  engage	   in	   industry	  manufacturing	   in	  China.559	   The	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	   failed	  spectacularly	   in	  all	   the	  wars	   it	   fought	  during	  the	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  and	  did	  not	  fulfil	  its	  duty	  to	  defend	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  against	  seaborne	  foreign	  aggressions.	   	  These	   naval	   conflicts	   with	   the	   French	   and	   Japanese,	   as	   Bernard	   D.	   Cole	  observed,	   demonstrated	   that	   while	   China	   had	   successfully	   acquired	   the	   ships	  and	   guns	   of	   a	   Western-­‐style	   modern	   navy,	   it	   had	   failed	   to	   institutionalise	  effective	  central	  administration,	  training,	  logistical	  and	  maintenance	  support,	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  557	   Hsü,	  ‘Late	  Ch'ing	  Foreign	  Relations,	  1866-­‐1905’,	  p.	  88.	  558	   Ibid.,	  100-­‐101.	  559	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  342.	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well	  as	  command	  and	  control.560	   Moreover,	  there	  lacked	  an	  operational	  doctrine	  that	   suited	   modern	   naval	   warfare	   as	   well	   as	   effective	   inter-­‐fleet	   exercise	   and	  coordination.	  Finally,	  China	  failed	  to	  fit	  the	  steam	  navy	  into	  the	  grand	  picture	  of	  a	  national	   strategy,	  which	  was	   in	   turn	   shaped	   by	   its	   politics,	   economy,	   ideology,	  etc.	   	  However,	   it	   seems	   that	   these	   problems	   could	   not	   be	   fixed	   as	   long	   as	   the	  mind-­‐set	   of	   ‘Chinese	   learning	   for	   fundamental	   structure,	   Western	   learning	   for	  
practical	   use’	   dominated.	   William	   M.	   Lang,	   former	   chief-­‐inspector	   of	   the	   elite	  Beiyang	  Fleet	  commented	  on	  China’s	  efforts	  to	  re-­‐build	  the	  steam	  navy	  following	  the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War:	   	  	   ‘It's	  a	  sad	  pity	  to	  see	  China	  ordering	  ships	  at	  random	  without	  any	  thought	  
of	  homogeneity.	   I	  spoke	  to	  Li	  Hung-­‐chang	   [Li	  Hongzhang]	  on	  this	  subject,	  
and	  he	  perceived	  the	  mistake	  they	  are	  making	  at	  Peking.	  Li	  begged	  me	  to	  
draw	   up	   a	   scheme	   for	   the	   reorganisation	   of	   the	   navy,	   which	   I	   am	   now	  
engaged	  upon	  in	  my	  spare	  time.	  I	  am	  very	  afraid	  of	  the	  Chinese	  are	  drifting	  
into	  making	  the	  same	  blunder	  over	  again.’561	  	  The	   weakness	   of	   Chinese	   naval	   power	   was	   determined	   by	   the	   deep	  incompatibility	   between	   the	   Qing’s	   empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   and	   the	  requirements	  of	  a	  modern	  steam	  navy.	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  repeated	  failures	  of	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  in	  achieving	  its	  national	  objectives.	  	  	  
7.1	  A	  Review	  of	  the	  Relations	  between	   ‘Fundamental	  Structure’	  and	  Naval	  
Power	   	  	  A	   country’s	   political	   system	   works	   to	   determine	   a	   navy’s	   administrative	  efficiency	  in	  times	  of	  peace	  and	  command	  efficiency	  in	  times	  of	  war.	  The	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  560	   Bernard	  D.	   Cole,	  The	  Great	  Wall	   at	   Sea:	   China's	  Navy	  Enters	   the	  Twenty	   First	   Century,	   Second	  Edition,	  (Annapolis:	  Naval	  Institute	  Press,	  2010),	  p.	  5.	  561	   Demetrius	  C.	  Boulger,	  The	  Life	  of	  Sir	  Halliday	  Macartney,	  (London:	  John	  Lane	  Company,	  1908),	  p.	  452.	  In	  another	  occasion	   in	  1898,	  William	  M.	  Lang	   told	   the	  British	  Admiralty	   that	   ‘the	   lesson	  of	   the	   late	  war	  with	  
Japan	  has	  been	  lost	  upon	  China	  [the	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War].	  She	  will	  not	  change	  her	  mode	  of	  governing	  the	  
Provinces,	  but	  will	  leave	  as	  of	  old	  the	  organisation	  of	  provincial	  squadrons	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  several	  Viceroys	  [governor-­‐generals],	  and	  so	  will	  never	  have	  a	  National	  Fleet.’	  Wright,	  Hart	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Customs,	  p.	  481.	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systems	  that	   favoured	  the	  growth	  of	  naval	  power	  were	  usually	  associated	  with	  the	   principles	   of	   democracy.	   This	  was	  mainly	   because	   of	   two	   reasons:	   first,	   in	  representative	   governments,	   the	   social	   groups	   that	   benefited	   from	   a	   powerful	  navy	   could	   be	   better	   heard	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   and	   these	   social	  groups	   provided	   consistent	   support	   for	   the	   navy.	   Conversely,	   absolutist	  monarchies	  usually	   reflected	   the	   ruler’s	  personal	   interests,	  which	  were	  usually	  less	   persistent.	   Second,	   unlike	   autocracies,	   which	   tended	   not	   to	   tolerate	   any	  authority	   other	   than	   the	   ruler	   himself,	   representative	   governments	   allowed	   a	  degree	   of	   delegation	   of	   power	   to	   professional	   bodies,	   so	   that	   naval	  administration	   and	   command	   could	   become	   more	   efficient,	   whereas	   under	  autocratic	  rule	  it	  usually	  became	  less	  so.	   	  The	   Qing	   Empire	   was	   undoubtedly	   an	   autocracy,	   and	   it	   was	   arguably	   the	  most	  autocratic	  episode	  in	  Chinese	  history.	  The	  emperor	  only	  attached	  marginal	  importance	   to	   the	   navy,	   fundamentally	   because	   the	   rise	   and	   fall	   of	   the	   empire	  was	  not	  dependent	  upon	  naval	  power.	  The	  navy	  only	  drew	  the	  attention	  of	   the	  emperors	  when	  the	  security	  of	   the	  continent	  was	  threatened	   from	  the	  sea,	  and	  their	  attention	  drew	  away	  once	  these	  seaborne	  threats	  were	  gone.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   in	  order	   to	  protect	   their	   absolute	  power	   from	  being	   challenged,	   the	  Qing	  rulers	  tended	  to	  keep	  a	  check	  on	  any	  individual	  officials	  or	  bureaucratic	  bodies	  from	   becoming	   too	   powerful.	   This	   rendered	   a	   Chinese	   version	   of	   Alfred	   von	  Tirpitz	   or	   a	   powerful	   Admiralty	   largely	   impossible.	   Consequently,	   the	  development	  of	  naval	  power	  in	  China	  received	  no	  strong	  and	  sustained	  support	  from	  its	  top	  echelon.	  While	  a	  unified	  country	  was	  a	  condition	  usually	  taken	  for	  granted	  by	  many	  historians	  looking	  at	  modern	  seapowers,	  a	  truth	  that	  cannot	  be	  overlooked	  when	  studying	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  that	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  in	   reality	   highly	   decentralised,	   with	   the	   steam	   navy	   being	   built	   by	   provincial	  leaders	  who	  gained	  a	  great	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  turmoil	  during	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   century.	   But	   the	   political	   landscape	   of	   that	   time	   was	  characterised	   by	   an	   on-­‐going	   tug-­‐of-­‐war	   for	   power	   between	   the	   central	   and	  provincial	  authorities,	  with	  intense	  competitions	  amongst	  provincial	  authorities	  themselves.	  The	  navy	  often	  found	  itself	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  these	  power	  struggles.	  Also,	  the	  steam	  navy	  never	  managed	  to	  supplant	  the	  traditional	  navy	  –	  
	   231	  
the	  water	  forces	  of	  the	  provinces,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  was	  always	  a	  mere	  modernised	  offshoot	  of	   an	  otherwise	  obsolete	   and	   incompetent	  military	   system.	  Lastly,	   the	  Chinese	   elites	   reached	  no	   agreement	   on	   the	   strategic	   status	   of	   the	   steam	  navy	  with	  multi-­‐angled	   opposition	   arising	   towards	   the	   naval	  modernisation	   project.	  Under	   such	   circumstances,	   the	   administrative	   and	   command	   efficiency	   of	   the	  steam	  navy	  was	  invariably	  low.	   	  	   ***	  	  The	   economy	   model	   and	   the	   economic	   strength	   of	   a	   nation	   determine	   the	  amount	   of	   resources	   it	   can	   offer	   in	   support	   of	   the	   development	   of	   its	   navy.	  Different	   from	   manpower-­‐intensive	   armies,	   navies	   rather	   are	   typically	   capital	  and	   technology-­‐intensive.	   Strong	   navies	   tended	   to	   be	   associated	  with	   societies	  characterised	   by	   capitalist	   economy,	   prosperous	   seaborne	   trade	   and	   a	   high	  degree	   of	   industrialisation.	   In	   societies	   where	   wealth	   was	   created	   mainly	   by	  seaborne	   trade,	  navies	  usually	  played	  a	  central	   role	   in	   the	  equation	  of	  national	  greatness,	  and	   therefore	  received	  strong	  and	  continuous	  attention.	   In	  capitalist	  economy	   it	   is	   usually	   easier	   to	   raise	   funds	   and	   to	   attain	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	  industrialisation,	  thus	  the	  development	  of	  the	  navies	  could	  be	  better	  supported.	  Financial	   and	   industrial	   capabilities	   are	   of	   critical	   importance	   to	   steam	   navies	  because	  they	  are	  much	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  expensive	  to	  build	  and	  maintain.	  Yet	  the	  attainment	  of	  higher	  financial	  and	  industrial	  capabilities	  usually	  requires	  a	   freer	  market	  and	  more	  flexible	  economic	  policies,	  which	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  command	  economy	  that	  agrarian	  nations	  tend	  to	  associate	  with.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  economic	  model	  was	  less	  capable	  of	  upholding	  a	  steam	  navy.	  It	  had	  a	  self-­‐sufficient	  agrarian	  economy	  and	  a	  ‘exalting	  agriculture	  and	   disparaging	   commerce’	   tradition	   with	   which	   to	   reinforce	   it,	   resulting	   in	  manufacturing	  and	  commerce	  being	  marginalised	  within	   the	  nation’s	  economy.	  In	  this	  context,	   the	  role	  of	  the	  navy	  was	  reduced	  to	  merely	  a	  movable	   ‘fortress’	  offering	   protection	   to	   agricultural	   lands	   and	   safeguarding	   the	   feudal-­‐agrarian	  social	  order.	  It	  was	  therefore	  less	  significant	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  Chinese	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  considered	  insignificant	  by	  the	  society.	  Qing	  Dynasty	  China’s	  weaknesses	  in	  commerce	   and	   manufacturing	   ensured	   that	   its	   society	   was	   less	   competent	   in	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providing	   the	   steam	   navy	   with	   the	   financial	   and	   industrial	   resources	   that	   it	  required.	   In	   essence,	   China	   simply	  did	  not	  have	   the	  money	   to	   finance	   all	   of	   its	  established	   as	   well	   as	   new	   undertakings.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   Manchu	  government	   was	   determined	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   Confucian	   orthodoxy	   to	   justify	  their	   legitimacy	   to	   rule,	   and	   its	   economic	   and	   financial	   policies	  were	   therefore	  particularly	  rigid.	  It	  was	  unsurprising	  therefore	  that	  a	  Western-­‐style	  steam	  navy	  enjoyed	  little	  support	  within	  the	  economic	  context	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	   	  	   ***	  	  Social	  ethos	  played	  a	  key	  role	   in	  determining	  a	  society’s	  willingness	  to	  support	  the	   development	   of	   its	   navy.	   Favourable	   social	   ethos	   served	   as	   a	   powerful	  catalyst	   in	   facilitating	   the	  growth	  of	  naval	  power.	  As	  a	   rule,	   societies	  with	  high	  regards	   towards	   their	   navies	   usually	   had	   prosperous	   maritime	   communities,	  which	  held	  a	  positive	  perspective	  towards	  seaborne	  trade,	  because	  navies	  played	  a	  key	  role	   in	  protecting	  and	  expanding	  the	  seaborne	  trade.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  a	  pro-­‐navy	  social	  ethos	  was	  usually	  a	  result	  of	  nurture	  as	  much	  as	  nature,	  which	  required	  continuous	  governmental	  effort	  to	  cultivate.	  Once	  such	  a	  social	  ethos	  is	  established,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  navy	  would	  be	  elevated	  from	  simply	  a	  necessity	  to	  a	  social	  ideal	  highly	  regarded	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  society.	  This	  in	  turn	  allowed	  the	  navy	  to	  easily	  secure	  the	  human,	  material	  and	  financial	  resources	  it	  needed	  to	  flourish.	  In	   contrast,	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	  Qing	   Empire	   had	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	  development	  of	  its	  steam	  navy	  by	  disparaging	  wealth	  creation	  through	  trade	  and	  disregarding	  science	  and	  technology	  due	  to	  their	  perceived	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  the	   Chinese	   feudal-­‐agrarian	   social	   order.	   Instead	   of	   extolling	   the	   merchant	  classes,	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   installed	   Confucian	   scholars	   as	   the	   role	   models	   of	  society.	  Artisans	  and	  the	  merchants	  were	  marginalised,	  with	  even	  military	  men	  being	   placed	   categorically	   lower	   than	   Confucian	   scholars	   in	   the	   Chinese	   social	  stratification.	  A	  twofold	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  ideological	  realm	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  critical.	  Firstly,	  the	  Imperial	  Examinations	  were	  the	  tool	  by	  which	  the	  Qing	  Empire	   ensured	   that	   its	   elite	   classes,	   i.e.	   intellectuals,	   gentry	   and	   officials	  adhered	   to	   the	   Confucian	   ideology.	   By	   stressing	   Confucian	   values	   only	   the	  examinations	   rewarded	   literary	   and	   humanistic	   accomplishments	   at	   the	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expenses	  of	  science,	  technology,	  commerce	  and	  industry,	  which	  were	  vital	  for	  the	  creation	   of	   a	   sea-­‐loving	   social	   ethos.	   Secondly,	   the	   Confucian	   ideology	   and	   its	  symbiotic	   worldview	   resulted	   in	   a	   strong	   belief	   in	   the	   dynastic	   cycle	   and	  promoted	   the	  Sino-­‐centric	  model	   among	   the	  Chinese	  elites,	   thus	   inhibiting	  any	  desire	  to	  learn	  from	  the	  West.	  	   ***	  	  This	   dissertation	   addressed	   a	   point	   that	   Rawlinson	   failed	   to	   clarify	   in	   China’s	  
Struggle	  for	  Naval	  Development:	  1839-­‐1895,	  namely	  what	  the	  key	  challenge	  that	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy	  was	  struggling	  with	  during	  its	  development?	  The	  answer	  that	   this	   research	  offers	   is	   that	   the	  navy	  was	   struggling	  with	   the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire.	  Chapters	  Three	  to	  Six	  demonstrated	  in	  detail	  how	  the	  empire’s	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  was	  incompatible	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  modern	  steam	  navy.	  These	  determined	  the	  Chinese	  steam	  navy’s	  fate	  as	  a	  force	  that	  was	   insufficiently	  powerful	   and	   ineffective	   in	   safeguarding	   the	   country.	   In	  war	   there	   is	  no	  prize	   for	   runner-­‐ups,	   and	   to	  be	  deficient	  meant	  defeat,	   a	  point	  clearly	  proved	  by	  the	  catastrophic	  Sino-­‐French	  War	  and	  First	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	  steam	  navy	  were	  destined	  for	  defeat	  long	  before	  the	  battles	  began.	  The	  Self-­‐Strengthening	  Movement,	  which	  lasted	  from	  1861	  to	  1895,	  did	  not	  try	  to	  alter	  the	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  ultimate	   aim	   of	   the	  movement	  was	   to	   safeguard	   and	   consolidate	   it.	   Under	   the	  slogan	   of	   ‘learn	   barbarians’	   advanced	   techniques	   with	   which	   to	   repel	   the	  
barbarians’	  and	  ‘Chinese	  learning	  for	  fundamental	  structure,	  Western	  learning	  for	  
practical	   use’	   the	   Self-­‐Strengtheners	   attempted	   to	   utilise	   advanced	   Western	  military	  technology,	  that	  of	  a	  steam	  navy,	  with	  which	  to	  defend	  the	  old	  Chinese	  order.	  What	  they	  neglected	  was	  that	  Chinese	  learning	  and	  Western	  learning	  each	  had	   its	   own	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   and	   ‘practical	   use’,	   meaning	   a	   hybrid	  mixture	  was	  not	  sustainable	  because	  the	  former	  was	  bound	  to	  affect	  the	  latter.	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7.2	  Some	  Thoughts	  	  A	  question	  emerged	  from	  the	  above	  discussion:	  would	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  be	  able	  to	   solve	   the	   institutional	   problems	   that	   impeded	   the	  development	   of	   its	   steam	  navy	  by	  reforming	  its	  ‘fundamental	  structure’?	  And	  if	  not,	  why?	   	  In	   the	  period	  between	   the	  end	  of	   the	  First	   Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	   in	  1895	  and	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  in	  1911,	  a	  flurry	  of	  reforms	  aimed	  at	  altering	  the	  Qing	  Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   were	   carried	   out	   (‘the	   Post-­‐1895	   Reforms’	  hereafter).562	   Different	   from	   the	   Self-­‐Strengthening	   Movement,	   which	   mostly	  focused	   on	   the	   acquisition	   of	   Western	   military	   equipment,	   the	   Post-­‐1895	  Reforms	   pursued	   a	   transformation	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire	   into	   a	   Western-­‐style	  modern	  power,	  with	  changes	  in	  various	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  Chinese	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  being	  suggested.	  These	  reforms	  attempted	  to	  address	   the	  underlying	  political,	   economic	   and	   ideological	   issues	   that	   were	   at	   the	   root	   of	   China’s	  weaknesses.	  In	  its	  political	  dimension,	  the	  reform	  agenda	  included	  establishing	  a	  constitutional	  monarchy	   and	   rebalancing	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   central	  and	   local	   government.	   In	   its	   economic	   dimension,	   the	   goal	   of	   reforms	   was	   to	  enrich	   the	   country	   by	   promoting	   capitalism	   and	   industrialisation.	   In	   its	  ideological	  dimension,	   the	   reforms	  were	  aimed	  at	   changing	   the	   social	   ethos	  by	  establishing	   a	   new	   education	   system	   and	   official	   selection	  mechanism,	   so	   that	  the	  empire	  would	  have	  more	  talent	  to	  support	  the	  modernisation	  projects.	  	   Had	  they	  been	  successfully	  implemented,	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  would	  have	  had	  institutionally	  evolved	  towards	  a	   form	  of	  Western-­‐style	  capitalist	  power,	  which	  would	  have	  also	  shifted	  its	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  a	  seapower	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  led	  the	  way	  towards	  a	  stronger	  navy.	  This	  logic	  was	  understood	  by	  the	  post-­‐1895	  reformers	  as	  the	  leading	  reformist	  Kang	  Youwei	  had	  presented	  the	   Guangxu	   Emperor	   with	   a	   number	   of	   books	   compiled	   by	   himself	   on	   the	  political	   histories	   of	   modernised	   countries.	   Notably	   among	   the	   books	   were	   A	  
Study	   of	   the	   Political	   reforms	   in	   Meiji	   Japan,	   and	  An	   Account	   of	   the	   Reforms	   of	  
Peter	   the	  Great	  of	  Russia	  –	  countries	   that	  achieved	  exponential	  growth	   in	  naval	  power	  following	  periods	  of	  great	  institutional	  reform.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  562	   In	  practical	  terms,	  they	  included	  the	  1898	  Hundred	  Days'	  Reform,	  the	  1901-­‐1905	  New	  Policies	  and	  the	  1905-­‐1911	  Constitutional	  Movement.	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The	  post-­‐1895	   reformers	  were	   generally	   optimistic	   towards	   the	   successful	  implementation	   of	   the	   reforms.	   Kang	   once	   confidently	   pointed	   out	   to	   the	  emperor	  during	  a	  personal	  audience	  that	  ‘after	  three	  years	  of	  reform	  China	  could	  
stand	  on	  her	  own.	  From	  then	  on	  China	  would	  daily	  make	  progress	  and	  outstrip	  all	  
the	   other	   countries	   in	   terms	   of	   wealth	   and	   power’.563	   However,	   such	   optimism	  later	  proved	  unjustified.	  The	  Qing	  Empire	  did	  not	  become	  a	  Western-­‐style	  power	  as	  expected;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  it	  declined	  even	  further	  and	  was	  overthrown	  by	  an	  internal	   uprising	   –	   the	   Revolution	   of	   1911.	   Many	   historians	   argue	   that	   the	  Post-­‐1895	  Reforms,	  rather	  than	  consolidating	  the	  empire,	  had	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent	   precipitated	   its	   downfall.564	   Why,	   then,	   was	   Qing	   China’s	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  so	  difficult	  to	  change?	   	  The	  key	  to	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  was	  a	  redistribution	  of	  power	  between	  the	  emperor	  and	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Imperial	  Court.	   Autocratic	   rulers’	   reluctance	   to	   relinquish	   power	   was	   not	   unusual,	   but	  what	  made	  constitutional	  reforms	  exceptionally	  difficult	  for	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  was	  that	   the	   rulers	   were	   Manchus.	   Prior	   to	   the	   constitutional	   reform,	   consecutive	  Qing	  emperors	  had	  been	  the	  sole	  rulers	  of	  China.	  This	  monopolisation	  of	  power	  papered	   over	   the	   Manchu-­‐Han	   schism.565 	   Constitutionalism	   meant	   that	   the	  emperor	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   the	  monopoliser	   of	   power.	   To	   the	   emperor,	   if	   he	  had	  to	  share	  power	  with	  others,	  it	  would	  be	  with	  the	  Manchus	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  Han	  Chinese.	   Therefore,	   the	   institutional	   reshuffle	   became	   retrogressive	   in	  that	   it	   increased	  the	  power	  of	   the	  Manchu	  bureaucrats	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   that	  of	   the	  Han	  Chinese.566	   The	   constitutional	   reform	   revealed	   the	   Manchus’	   discrimination	  against	  the	  Han	  Chinese,	  which	  stirred	  up	  anti-­‐Manchu	  sentiment	  among	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  elites.	  As	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen,	  the	  leading	  spirit	  of	  the	  Revolution	  of	  1911	  noted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  563	   Chang,	  ‘Intellectual	  Change	  and	  the	  Reform	  Movement,	  1890-­‐98’,	  p.	  325.	  564	   Chuzo	   Ichiko,	   ‘Political	   and	   Institutional	  Reform,	   1901-­‐11’	   in	  The	  Cambridge	  History	   of	   China,	   Vol.	   11:	  
Late	   Ch'ing,	   1800-­‐1911,	   Part	   2,	   Kwang-­‐Ching	   Liu	   and	   John	   K.	   Fairbank	   eds.,	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  p.	  415.	  565	   Prior	   to	   the	   20th	   century,	   nationalism	  was	   very	  weak	   in	   China.	  Whether	   or	   not	   one	  was	   Chinese	  was	  judged	  by	  whether	  or	  not	  one	   followed	   the	  Chinese	  way	  of	   life.	  The	  Manchus	  successfully	  disguised	   their	  ethnic	   ‘alienness’	   by	   observing	   the	   Confucian	   traditions,	   and	   therefore	   gained	   the	   cooperation	   of	   Han	  Chinese	  elites.	  566	   After	  the	  reform,	  the	  number	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  officials	  in	  Qing	  bureaucracy	  declined	  from	  roughly	  half	  to	  less	  than	  one-­‐third	   in	  the	  top	  echelon	  of	  the	  government,	  see	  Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  pp.	  390-­‐391,	  414.	  Among	  the	  thirteen	  new	  Cabinet	  ministers,	  eight	  were	  Manchus	  (five	  among	  the	  eight	  were	   imperial	  relatives),	  whereas	   only	   four	  were	  Han	  Chinese.	   Chien-­‐nung	   Li,	  The	  Political	  History	   of	   China,	   1840-­‐1928,	  Ssu-­‐yü	  Teng	  and	  Jeremy	  Ingalls	  trans.	  and	  eds.,	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1967),	  pp.	  234-­‐235.	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in	  one	  of	  his	  revolutionary	  slogans	  ‘expel	  the	  Manchus,	  restore	  the	  [Han]	  Chinese	  
rule,	  and	  establish	  a	  federal	  republic.’567	   	  Another	   aim	   of	   the	   Post-­‐1895	   Reforms	   in	   the	   political	   realm	   was	   to	  rebalance	   the	   power	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	   governments.	   This	   would	  create	   a	   unitary	   regime	   in	   which	   the	   central	   government	   would	   have	   much	  greater	   authority,	   and	   the	   de	   facto	   separate	   status	   of	   the	   provinces	   would	   be	  ended.	   The	   key	   to	   successful	   implementation	   of	   the	   reform	   was	   therefore	   to	  wrestle	  power	  away	  from	  the	  local	  authorities	  and	  transfer	   it	   into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	   Imperial	   Court.	   The	   high	   provincial	   officials	   opposed	   such	  moves,	   and	   the	  reform	   was	   fruitless.568	   The	   fundamental	   reason	   of	   the	   miscarriage	   of	   the	  reform	  was	  the	  self-­‐serving	  objectives	  of	  the	  provincial	  leaders,	  whose	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Imperial	  Court	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	  patriotism,	  but	  rather	  out	  of	  a	  fear	  that	  their	   personal	   power	  would	   vanish	   should	   it	   fall.	   The	   efforts	   to	   rebalance	   the	  power	  between	   central	   and	   local	   government	   therefore	  eroded	   their	   loyalty	   to	  the	  central	  government	  even	  further.	  As	  a	  result,	   in	   less	   than	  two	  months	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  Revolution	  of	  1911,	   fourteen	  out	  of	   the	  eighteen	  provinces	  that	  constituted	  China	  proper	  declared	  independence.569	   	  A	  primary	  economic	  objective	  of	   the	  Post-­‐1895	  Reforms	  was	   to	  establish	  a	  degree	   of	   capitalist	   economy	   and	   industrialisation	   to	   enrich	   the	   country.	   The	  self-­‐sufficient	   agrarian	   economy	   was	   the	   main	   roadblock	   to	   success.	  Feuerwerker	  commented:	   	  	   ‘The	  equilibrium	  of	  traditional	  agriculture	  had	  been	  reached	  at	  a	  very	  low	  
level	  of	  per	  capita	  output	  of	  which	  a	  very	  high	  proportion	  was	  consumed	  by	  
the	   agricultural	   producers.	   Only	   a	   small	   quantity	   of	   marketable	   surplus	  
was	   available	   either	   as	   industrial	   raw	   material	   or	   to	   feed	   the	   non-­‐farm	  
sector.	  Conversely,	  the	  effective	  demand	  for	  urban	  manufactured	  products	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  567	   ‘Expel	  the	  Manchus,	  restore	  the	  [Han]	  Chinese	  rule,	  and	  establish	  a	  federal	  republic’	  (驱除鞑虏，恢复中华，
创立民国)	   was	   the	   oath	   taken	   by	   members	   of	   the	   Revive	   China	   Society	   (兴中会).	   This	   was	   the	   first	  revolutionary	  body	  of	  the	  late	  Qing	  Dynasty.	  It	  was	  founded	  by	  Sun	  Yat-­‐sen	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  1895.	   	   	  568	   Li,	  The	  Political	  History	  of	  China,	  1840-­‐1928,	  p.	  211-­‐212;	  and	  Ichiko,	   ‘Political	  and	  Institutional	  Reform,	  1901-­‐11’,	  p.	  395.	  569	   Chunhui	  Hu,	   ‘再论地方主义与辛亥革命	   [Regionalism	  and	  Xinhai	  Revolution	  Revisited]’	  in	  纪念辛亥革
命九十周年国际学术讨论会论文集	   Jinian	  xinhai	  geming	  jiushi	  zhounian	  guoji	  xueshu	  taolunhui	   lunwenji	  [A	  
Collection	   of	   Theses	   Presented	   at	   the	   International	   Symposium	  Commemorating	   90th	   Anniversary	   of	   Xinhai	  
Revolution],	  Vol.	  1.	  Association	  of	  Chinese	  Historians	  ed.,	  (Beijing:	  Central	  Party	  Literature	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  412.	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was	   limited.	   Thus	   the	   immediate	   possibilities	   either	   of	   extensive	  
industrialization	   or	   of	   agricultural	   development	   were	   narrowly	  
constrained	  by	  the	  disabilities	  of	  the	  agricultural	  sector.’570	  	  However,	   the	   self-­‐sufficient	   agrarian	   economy	   was	   so	   entrenched	   that	   it	   was	  almost	   impossible	   to	   change	   it	   in	  any	  meaningful	  way.	  The	  massive	   size	  of	   the	  Chinese	   self-­‐sufficient	   economy	   had	   created	   considerable	   redundancy	   that	  ensured	   its	   stability.	   Crises	   such	   as	   natural	   disasters	   and	   social	   turmoil,	  while	  endemic,	   did	   not	   threaten	   the	   overall	   structure.	   By	   the	   downfall	   of	   the	   Qing	  Dynasty,	   there	  was	   little	   sign	   suggesting	   that	   the	   traditional	   form	  of	   economy,	  which	  had	  lasted	  for	  thousands	  of	  years,	  was	  in	  such	  a	  poor	  state	  as	  to	  be	  readily	  replaced	  by	  other	  forms	  of	  economy.571	   	  The	   reforms	   also	   tried	   to	   boost	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   economy	   by	   issuing	  national	  debt,	  which	  the	  imperial	  government	  first	  issued	  in	  1898.	  Contrary	  to	  its	  name,	   which	   can	   be	   literally	   translated	   as	   ‘manifest	   credibility	   bonds’,	   this	  episode	   ended	   disastrously,	   further	   lowering	   people’s	   confidence	   in	   the	  government.572	   Many	   local	   officials	   compulsorily	   apportioned	   the	   bonds	   to	  native	   Chinese	   capitalists,	   and	   many	   debt	   holders	   were	   later	   ‘encouraged’	   to	  relinquish	   the	   debts	   and	   make	   it	   a	   donation	   to	   the	   government.573	   When	   the	  government	   tried	   to	   issue	   another	   national	   debt	   in	   the	   late	   1910s,	   society	  responded	  coldly.574	   Before	  a	  degree	  of	  democratisation	  was	  attainted	  in	  China,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  establish	  capitalistic	  confidence	  in	  the	  government;	  but	  as	  long	  as	  the	  absolutism	  remained,	  this	  remained	  very	  hard.	  Establishing	   a	  new	  education	   system	  and	  official	   selection	  mechanism	  was	  also	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  Post-­‐1895	  Reform	  agenda.	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  the	  traditional	   academies	   and	   Imperial	   Examinations	   should	   be	   replaced	   by	  Western-­‐style	   schools	   to	   nurture	   and	   select	   the	   best	   talent	   for	   China’s	  modernisation	   projects,	   allowing	   sustainable	   progress	   to	   stem	   from	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  570	   Feuerwerker,	  ‘Economic	  Trends	  in	  the	  Late	  Ch'ing	  Empire’,	  p.	  15.	  571	   Ibid.,	  69.	  572	   ‘昭信股票’,	  This	  was	  a	  twenty-­‐year	  long-­‐term	  bond	  aimed	  at	  raising	  100	  million	  taels	  at	  an	  interest	  rate	  of	  five	  per	  cent.	  See	  Yu	  Li,	  ‘晚清昭信股票发行过程论略	   [A	  Review	  of	  the	  Zhao	  Xin	  Bond	  Issuance	  Process	  in	  Late	  Qing]’,	  Modern	  Chinese	  History	  Studies,	  No.	  4.	  (Jul-­‐Aug.,	  2006),	  pp.	  111-­‐127.	   	  573	   Ibid.,	  126.	  574	   Ibid.	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fundamental	   change.	   To	   the	   disappointment	   of	   the	   advocates	   of	   educational	  reform,	   they	  not	  only	   failed	   to	   increase	   the	  amount	  of	   talent	   for	  aiding	  China’s	  modernisation	  attempts,	  but	  also	  generated	  a	  series	  of	  destabilizing	  side	  effects	  that	   contributed	   to	   the	   eventual	   downfall	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire.575	   Before	   the	  educational	   reforms	   were	   introduced,	   the	   Chinese	   social	   elite	   was	   mainly	  comprised	  of	  Confucian	  scholars	  with	  examination	  degrees	  who	  enjoyed	  special	  privileges;	   these	   disappeared	   with	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations	  system.	   For	   candidates	   who	   had	   spent	   many	   years	   preparing	   for	   the	  examinations,	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  system	  meant	  that	  their	  only	  pathway	  to	  social	  mobility	  and	  success	  had	  been	  closed	  off.	  Discontentment	   towards	   the	  reforms	  stemmed	   from	   these	   social	   groups	   whose	   vested	   interests	   depended	   on	   the	  Imperial	  Examinations.	  Even	   the	   reformers	  who	  advocated	   the	  abolition	  of	   the	  examinations	  became	  concerned	  about	  its	  destabilizing	  side	  effects.	  Liang	  Qichao,	  a	   leading	   figure	   of	   the	   Post-­‐1895	   Reforms	   suggested	   restoring	   the	   Imperial	  Examinations,	   as	   ‘millions	   of	   old-­‐style	   Confucian	   scholars	   and	   students	   lost	   their	  
hopes	  overnight.’576	  The	   old	   education	   and	   official	   selection	   system,	   though	   ineffective	   in	  nurturing	   talent	   for	   modernisation,	   had	   been	   successful	   in	   keeping	   the	   elites	  loyal	   to	   the	   Qing	   Empire.	   However,	   following	   the	   introduction	   of	   Western	  ideologies,	  especially	  modern	  nationalism,	  the	  ethnic	  ‘alienness’	  of	  the	  Manchus	  was	   brought	   to	   the	   fore,	   and	   a	   consequent	   anti-­‐Manchu	   sentiment	   began	   to	  spread	  firstly	  amongst	  the	  students	  in	  the	  new	  schools,	  and	  later	  to	  the	  literati.577	  While	   the	   government	   tried	   to	   suppress	   anti-­‐Manchu	  movements	   amongst	   the	  students,	  anti-­‐Manchu	  sentiment	  exhibited	  by	  the	  students	  only	  became	  stronger	  the	   tighter	   the	   control	   became,	   with	   students	   of	   the	   new	   schools	   increasingly	  rallying	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  nationalism.	  Many	  of	  them	  went	  on	  to	  become	  key	  promoters	  of	   the	  early	  20th	  century	  anti-­‐Manchu	  movement,	  and	  played	  crucial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  575 	   The	   main	   reason	   for	   the	   failure	   of	   promoting	   modern	   education	   was	   mainly	   because	   of	   the	  entrenchment	   of	   the	   traditional	   education	   and	   the	   conservatism	   of	   the	   authorities.	   See	   Chuzo	   Ichiko,	  ‘Political	  and	  Institutional	  Reform,	  1901-­‐11’,	  pp.379-­‐380	  576	   Shiming	  Li,	  大变局下的晚清政治	   Dabianju	  xia	  de	  Wanqing	  Zhengzhi	  [Late-­‐Qing	  Politics	  during	  Times	  of	  
Great	  Changes],	  (Shanghai:	  Shanghai	  Classics	  Publishing	  House,	  2009),	  p.	  109;	  Dezhao	  Wang,	  清代科举制度
研究	   Qingdai	   keju	   zhidu	   yanjiu	   [Research	   on	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   Examination	   System],	   (Beijing:	   Zhonghua	  Shuju,	  1984),	  p.	  246.	  577	   The	  introduction	  of	  Western-­‐style	  education	  further	  fueled	  the	  anti-­‐Manchu	  sentiment.	  See	  Chuzo	  Ichiko,	  ‘Political	  and	  Institutional	  Reform,	  1901-­‐11’,	  pp.382-­‐383.	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roles	  in	  the	  1911	  Revolution,	  which	  eventually	  overthrew	  the	  Manchu	  Dynasty.	   	  The	   efforts	   to	   reform	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	   structure’,	   i.e.	   the	  Post-­‐1895	   Reforms,	   constituted	   a	   war	   against	   the	   whole	   package	   of	   Chinese	  traditions	   and	   the	   people	   whose	   interests	   were	   dependent	   on	   them.	   Hsü	  observed:	  	  
‘the	   [post-­‐1895]	   radical	   reform	   was	   in	   effect	   a	   war	   on	   the	   whole	  
Confucian	   state	   and	   society,	   one	   which	   could	   not	   but	   arouse	   strong	  
opposition	   from	  many	   quarters.	   The	   abolition	   of	   the	   eight-­‐legged	   essay	  [i.e.	   the	   Imperial	   Examinations]	   hurt	   the	   future	   of	   all	   students	   who,	  
having	   spent	   their	   lives	   preparing	   for	   the	   …	   examinations,	   suddenly	  
discovered	  what	  they	  learnt	  was	  not	  what	  the	  government	  wanted.	  …	  The	  
elimination	   of	   sinecure	   offices	   and	   the	   three	   governorships	   and	   the	  
suggestion	   that	   twelve	  new	  bureaus	  be	   created	   caused	   fear	   of	   dismissal	  
among	  all	  office	  holders.	  The	  decree	  which	  called	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  
men	   of	   practical	   knowledge	   instead	   of	   promotion	   of	   incumbents	   on	   a	  
seniority	   basis	   created	   insecurity	   in	   officialdom.	   The	   military	   reform	  
jeopardised	   the	   privileges	   of	   the	   Manchus	   bannermen	   and	   the	   Chinese	  
Green	   Standard	   Army.	   …	   The	   order	   to	   turn	   temples	   and	   shrines	   into	  
schools	   irritated	   the	  monks	   and	   priests.	   The	   fact	   that	   all	   the	   reformers	  
except	  the	  emperor	  were	  Chinese	  aroused	  fear	  among	  Manchus.	  All	  these	  
elements	   –	   scholars,	   officials,	   army	   officers,	   eunuchs,	   monks,	   and	   the	  
Manchus	  in	  general	  –	  sought	  to	  undo	  the	  reform.’578	  	  In	  retrospect,	  the	  Post-­‐1895	  Reforms	  did	  take	  China	  into	  a	  new	  era,	  and	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  country	  of	  today.	  However,	  as	  far	  as	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  is	  concerned,	  the	  Post-­‐1895	  Reforms	  were	  a	  disastrous	  failure,	  which	  helped	  to	  bring	  around	  its	  downfall	  rather	  than	  strengthening	  it.	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	   and	   its	   naval	   power,	   the	   old	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   of	   the	   Qing	  Empire,	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  Chapters	  Three	  to	  Six,	  was	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  steam	  navy;	  and,	  as	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  the	  passages	  above,	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  578	   Hsü,	  The	  Rise	  of	  Modern	  China,	  p.	  381.	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was	  impossible	  to	  adapt	  the	  ‘fundamental	  structure’	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	   steam	   navy	   in	   a	   short	   time.	   In	   short,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Qing	   Empire’s	  naval	  power	  was	  caught	   in	  a	  dilemma:	   the	  old	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  was	  not	  suitable	   for	   a	   steam	   navy,	   yet	   establishing	   a	   new	   ‘fundamental	   structure’	   that	  better	  suited	  the	  navy	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  overnight.	  	   ***	  	  The	   practical	   significance	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   that	   it	   has	   put	   forward	   a	   key	  point	  that	  has	  often	  been	  overlooked	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	   late	  19th	  century	  Chinese	  steam	  navy:	  the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	  of	  a	  nation	  played	  an	  essential	  role	   in	  determining	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	   its	  navy.	  In	  present	  day	  China,	  this	  point	   is	   still	   largely	   neglected.	   As	   was	   shown	   in	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   this	  dissertation,	   the	   English	  word	   ‘seapower’	  was	   interpreted	   in	   Chinese	   in	   a	  way	  that	   one-­‐sidedly	   stressed	   its	   outward	   sign	   –	   naval	   power	   –	  whilst	   overlooking	  the	   fact	   that	   different	   nations	   had	   different	   types	   of	   ‘fundamental	   structures’,	  which	  did	  not	  always	  favour	  the	  growth	  of	  naval	  power.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  term	  that	   underscores	   the	   relationship	   between	   naval	   power	   and	   the	   ‘fundamental	  structure’	   of	   a	   nation	   should	   be	   seriously	   addressed,	   because	   language	   is	   the	  vehicle	  of	  thought,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  a	  term	  in	  the	  Chinese	  language	  suggests	  that	  the	  Chinese	  academics	  have	  not	  paid	  enough	  attention	  to	  it.	  As	   to	   which	   word	   could	   serve	   this	   purpose,	   the	   answer	   was	   already	  suggested	  one	  and	  a	  half	  centuries	  ago.	  The	  First	  Opium	  War,	  which	  took	  place	  between	  1840	  and	  1842,	  saw	  the	  first	  clash	  between	  China	  and	  a	  real	  seapower	  –	  Britain.	  Lin	  Zexu,	  a	  key	  commander	  on	  the	  Chinese	  side,	  had	  a	  close	  friend	  named	  Wei	   Yuan.	   A	   progressive	   scholar,	   Wei	   was	   subsequently	   known	   by	   later	  generations	  of	  Chinese	  as	  ‘the	  first	  Chinese	  to	  open	  his	  eyes	  to	  the	  world’.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war,	  Wei	  presented	  Lin	  with	  a	  book	  on	  some	  European	  nations	  edited	  by	  himself,	  with	  these	  countries’	  characteristics	  arranged	  by	  trade,	  navies	  and	   fortified	   ports,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   impacts	   that	   they	   would	   have	   on	  Chinese-­‐dominated	   East	   Asia.	   The	   book	   was	   titled	   Illustrated	   Treatise	   on	  
	   241	  
Maritime	   Nations	   (haiguo	   tuzhi).579	   As	   the	   name	   of	   the	   book	   suggests,	   Wei	  vaguely	  realised	  that	  those	  nations	  were	  different	   from	  the	  Qing	  Empire	  –	  they	  were	   haiguo	   (maritime	   nations).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   answer	   to	   why	   the	   Qing	  Empire’s	  steam	  navy	  failed	  is	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  haiguo.	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